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CURRENT HISTORY

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF The New York Times

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NO. 3

JUNE—1916

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RETURNING FROM A DIFFICULT MISSION

(From a Painting by Lady Butler)



BELGIAN ROYAL FAMILY

King Albert, Queen Elizabeth, Prince Leopold, Prince Charles, and
Princess Marie-José at Their Villa in Flanders

CURRENT HISTORY

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF THE NEW YORK TIMES

JUNE, 1916

WORLD EVENTS OF THE MONTH

NOTEWORTHY FEATURES

CURRENT HISTORY presents in this number several features which will prove of especial value. "The Defense of the British Blockade," Sir Edward Grey's official reply to the representations of the United States regarding interference with neutral trade, has not heretofore been printed in this country, except in very abbreviated form. It is a document of profound interest to all the neutral nations. The detailed account of what occurred in the Belgian Foreign Office on the fateful night of the German ultimatum, as related by the Belgian Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, is a moving drama of thrilling interest, and a human document that will always rivet attention. The complete correspondence leading up to the final triumph of President Wilson's diplomacy in relation to submarine warfare is given in chronological order; nowhere else has it appeared in this permanent form, with all the documents collated into one consecutive serial. It is a completed chapter of American diplomacy which will rank with the most momentous in our nation's annals. The dramatic chapter of Ireland's ill-starred adventure in independence is also given in completed form, with the official copy of the declaration of independence and a careful and correct narrative of what actually occurred. It is an ideal form in which to preserve the story of one of the most memorable episodes growing out of the war. These are only four features of the June number, but they serve to emphasize the purpose of CURRENT HISTORY, namely, to

bring to its readers authentic and complete narrations of the chief events of the world's history each month, its scope being confined at present to such episodes as bear directly or indirectly upon the European war.

* * *

ACTUALLY A "WORLD WAR"

THE extent to which the entire world is concerned in the war was shown at the recent conference of the Allies at Paris. The following countries were officially represented, and acted in concert:

	Sq. Kilom.	Population.
Belgium and Congo...	2,394,451	22,424,000
France and colonies...	12,927,364	86,361,000
Italy and colonies.....	1,920,260	37,338,000
Japan and colonies....	673,681	73,385,000
British Empire.....	29,819,400	424,089,000
Russian Empire.....	22,556,520	176,400,000
Serbia	87,300	4,633,000
Portugal and colonies..	2,185,000	15,170,000
Total.....	72,563,976	839,800,000

Estimating the total population of the earth at 1,600,000,000, and the superficial area of the world at 135,420,000 square kilometers, it will be observed that the Allies alone represent over one-half the total. The Teutonic and Turkish Empires and Bulgaria, including the German colonies, represent a population of about 150,000,000 and an area of 6,150,000 square kilometers. Hence the total number of people actually involved in the war is approximately 1,000,000,000 and the area of "hostile territory" is nearly 80,000,000 square kilometers, or about 32,000,000 square miles. The area of the United States is 3,200,000 square miles, hence the warring nations repre-

sent ten times the population and ten times the area of our nation.

* * *

TALK OF PEACE

THE indirect references to peace in Germany's submarine note to the United States, with the Pope's letter to President Wilson and a cloud of less definite peace rumors, have caused much talk, but have no solid significance as yet, beyond emphasizing the self-evident fact that Germany is weary of the war. The failure at Verdun, the pressure of the blockade, the tightening food crisis in Germany, the resignation of Dr. Delbrück, Minister of the Interior, and the proposed appointment of a "food dictator"—these are straws that seem to show an adverse wind of destiny for the Central Powers and an increasing desire for the end of the war. For the real situation regarding peace, however, one must question not Germany, but the Entente Allies, who now have the stronger battalions. The answer is found in the words of President Poincaré, spoken at Nancy on May 14:

France will not expose her sons to the dangers of new aggressions. The Central Empires, haunted by remorse for having brought on the war, and terrified by the indignation and hatred they have stirred up in mankind, are trying to make the world believe that the Allies alone are responsible for the prolongation of hostilities—a dull irony which will deceive no one.

Neither directly nor indirectly have our enemies offered us peace. But we do not want them to offer it to us. We do not want to submit to their conditions; we want to impose ours on them. We do not want a peace which would leave Imperial Germany with the power to recommence the war and keep Europe eternally menaced. We want peace which receives from restored rights serious guarantees of equilibrium and stability. So long as that peace is not assured us, so long as our enemies will not recognize themselves as vanquished, we will not cease to fight.

Sir Edward Grey has said the same thing in his own way. Peace is a year nearer than it was a year ago, but the evidence of it is not yet in sight. As Secretary Lansing pointed out a few days ago, the time has not yet come for any neutral to take the initiative in that direction.

ENLARGING OUR ARMY

THE Conference Committees of House and Senate, to which their differences on the new Army bill were referred, reached a compromise which Congress doubtless will promptly ratify; hence, by the end of May, our first measure of preparedness will become law. The compromise provides as follows: The maximum strength of the regular army in time of peace will be 11,000 officers, 175,000 men, in addition to the enlisted men of the Signal, Medical, and Quartermasters' Corps and Philippine Scouts, bringing the total to 11,000 officers and 200,000 men; this can be increased by Executive order, when war threatens, to 11,500 officers and 225,000 combatant troops, plus the necessary Staff Troops, Philippine Scouts, &c.

The increase will consist of thirty-four regiments of infantry, ten regiments of cavalry, fifteen regiments of field artillery, five regiments of engineers, two battalions of mounted engineers, ninety-three companies of coast artillery, and eight aero squadrons. The company units, instead of skeletons as heretofore, will consist of two-thirds of the war strength, as follows: Infantry company, in peace, 100; in war, 150; cavalry troop, in peace, 70; in war, 105; battery, in peace, 126; in war, 190 men.

The measure provides a minimum strength in time of peace of 160,000 men; there was no minimum provision before. The maximum force of National Guard under the new bill is 17,000 officers and 440,000 enlisted men—800 for each Senator and Congressman. National Guardsmen are required to take the Federal as well as the State oath of allegiance, and will be given stronger inducements to improve; provision is made for compensating the officers and enlisted men of the Guard. A provision for Federal Volunteers was stricken out, but all necessary expenses of men at the National Training Camps are to be paid by the Federal Government. An important provision makes the enlistment term seven years, three to be served with the colors and four in the reserves. Provision is also made for the

erection of nitrate plants for the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen by the development of water power. It is estimated that this will require an outlay of approximately \$20,000,000. Such a plant can be utilized in the manufacture of fertilizers in time of peace.

* * *

BLOCKADE PROBLEMS

THE British blockade is now receiving renewed attention at the hands of the United States Government. The latest British note appears elsewhere in this issue. Our Government declined to consider the question in connection with the German submarine issue, but now that the latter appears to have been adjusted, the interference with our trade and mails is to be made the subject of a serious protest.

The British contend that the blockade is impartial: that since it is impossible to put a stop to importation of goods across the inland sea from Scandinavia, or across a land frontier, as from Holland, a blockade that fails to inclose such inaccessible parts of an enemy's territory is nevertheless binding and to be respected. This is a moot question which some future international conference must settle. Our greatly increased exports to neutral countries give color to the charge that Americans thus seek to evade the blockade, and the British authorities give assurance that every effort will be made to minimize delays and make the restraints of trade as little burdensome as possible. The news from Germany indicates that food shortage there is becoming an acute question, and this apparently confirms the English contention that the blockade is effective, and hence binding upon neutrals. Our Government, however, is restive under the British seizure of mails. We are assured that the British Government is striving to eliminate these delays and interferences, but that it cannot relinquish its right to prevent the use of the mails for the transmission of goods or information by her enemies.

A strong point is made by Great Britain that the Orders in Council do not control her prize courts, the intima-

tion being strong that if our rights are in any way infringed we shall be sure of redress and justice in the courts. Certain phases of the question, however, are due to receive more serious attention, now that the acute stage of the submarine controversy has passed, and it is not unlikely that the whole issue may be submitted to international arbitration. The question will then arise, Shall the orders be suspended during the pendency of the arbitration? However settled, there is no fear that the issue will not be amicably arranged by diplomacy.

* * *

AN EPOCH-MAKING BUDGET

THE British budget for 1916-17 is epoch-making, the greatest by all odds in the history of the empire, exceeding by millions the sum raised through taxation by any other Government. The total budget is \$2,045,000,000. The national revenue of Great Britain was \$1,335,000 in 1914-15, \$1,683,835,000 in 1915-16, with an increase of over \$350,000,000 for the current year. The interest debt charge is over \$700,000,000 for 1916-17. The new budget, on the basis of peace expenditure, notwithstanding the colossal interest charge, would yield a surplus of \$425,000,000.

The new taxation for 1916-17 will amount to about \$380,000,000, and is derived from the following new assessments: Increased income taxes, \$200,000,000, beginning at 56 cents in \$5 on incomes not exceeding \$2,500, and reaching \$1.25 in \$5, or 25 per cent., on incomes over \$12,500; on unearned incomes, where total earned and unearned income does not exceed \$1,500, 75 cents in \$5 up to \$1.25 in \$5, or 25 per cent., on incomes exceeding \$10,000. Taxes on railway tickets range from 2 cents for a fare of 25 cents to 2 cents in the shilling with a tax of \$1 on Continental journeys; 1 cent on tickets to entertainments where the admission does not exceed 4 cents, to 25 cents on tickets costing \$3.12, and 25 cents for every \$2.50; 87½ cents on every 10,000 friction matches; 8 cents a gallon for table waters, fermented, and 16 cents a gallon on other table

waters; 8 cents a gallon on cider; an extra 1 cent a pound on sugar; on cocoa 12 cents a pound; on coffee 12 cents a pound; on motor cars \$21 for 6½ horse power to \$315 for 40 to 60 horse power and over; \$10.50 on motor cycles. On excess profits the tax and super-tax reach 77 per cent. on the biggest firms, it is estimated that this source of revenue alone will be worth \$430,000,000 to the Treasury in 1916-17.

* * *

MERCHANT MARINE LOSSES

IT is estimated that the loss in ships and cargoes inflicted on the British marine since the beginning of the war exceeds in value \$150,000,000. In one week in April, 1916, when the warfare was at its height, the British merchant marine lost eighteen ships, with a gross tonnage of 64,000. During the twenty months of the war, about 2,000,000 tons of British merchant shipping have been sunk. On March 31, 1916, there were 424 ships building, with a gross tonnage of 1,423,435. It is claimed by the British Admiralty that the present total tonnage is greater than at the beginning of the war, but this claim is disputed. The records show that from March 1, when the new German submarine warfare was begun, to March 18, nineteen ships, with a gross tonnage of 40,000, were sunk. From March 15 to March 28 the total tonnage lost was 70,000. From March 28 to April 12 the total losses to the Allies and all neutrals aggregated 81,000 tons. Unofficial reports show that between March 1 and May 15, 1916, ninety-eight ships were sunk by Teutonic submarine and mines, with a total tonnage of 225,000.

* * *

GERMANY YIELDS

THE firm attitude of President Wilson in his note to Germany following the sinking of the *Sussex*, threatening an immediate rupture in diplomatic relations unless the German submarine warfare was conducted in accordance with international law, evidently accomplished its purpose, and Germany has now determined definitely to yield. The correspondence in full appears else-

where. It was supplemented on May 12 by a note verbale delivered by Count von Bernstoff to Secretary Lansing, which evidently confirms the purpose of the German Government to adhere rigidly to its agreement.

In this note the German Government suggests that the masters of merchant vessels be given to understand that in the event of their being stopped by "German public (sic) vessels the provisions of international law must be observed to the letter, [as to compliance with the order,] and that their special attention be called to the danger incurred by turning their ships on a submarine." This note was occasioned by the confusion which arose when a Dutch merchantman, upon being signaled to stop, turned and approached the submarine in order to facilitate examination and search, and thereby narrowly escaped being torpedoed. It is evident from this note that Germany wishes to take all precautions to avoid a repetition of mistakes such as she says occurred in the cases of the *Sussex*, the *Tubantia*, and other passenger ships recently sunk.

* * *

FULL COMPULSION IN ENGLAND

THE British Prime Minister introduced in the House of Commons on May 3 a bill for applying general compulsion to men of military age in England, Wales, and Scotland. It requires enlistment to be imposed on every male, whether married or single, between the ages of 18 and 41. Every young man as he reaches the age of 18 is to be brought in after a month's grace; time-expired men are to be recalled if under 41 years of age. The bill passed its third reading in the House May 16, and is expected to become a law before June 1, 1916.

Premier Asquith announced when he presented the bill that, aside from Indian troops, Great Britain and her colonies had enlisted since the war began 5,000,000 men in the army and navy. It is estimated that there are 4,560,000 men of military age in Great Britain, of whom fully 4,000,000 have already enlisted; hence there remain available under the

Compulsory bill about 500,000 men, from which must be deducted the physically unfit.

For the first time in history Great Britain is engaged in military operations on land upon an extensive scale. Marlborough never had more than 12,000 British troops in his army at one time. England's largest contribution to the allied cause in the Napoleonic wars was 30,000 men with Wellington. There were but 300,000 British men under arms in the Boer war. There are now, according to Premier Asquith, 1,500,000 British troops at the various fronts, and 2,500,000 are being prepared for the front, with at least 400,000 more in sight as the result of compulsory enlistment.

* * *

MEXICAN BORDER TROUBLES

PATIENCE, firmness, and good diplomacy seem to have turned up the silver edge of the war cloud in Mexico. At the present writing the situation is reported by General Funston to be more hopeful than at any time since the American troops crossed the border in pursuit of Villa's bandits.

After the attack by Carranza troops upon American soldiers at Parral on April 12 General Funston sent reinforcements to Pershing, and at the same time the latter's forces were recalled as far as Namiquipa to avoid a clash. On April 13 General Carranza sent a long official note to Washington asking for the complete withdrawal of American troops from Mexico. The demand was refused, but arrangements were made for a frank discussion of the whole subject at a conference in El Paso between General Alvaro Obregon, representing the Carranza Government, and Major Gen. Hugh L. Scott, representing the American Government.

This conference lasted through the first ten days of May, and, though no signed protocol was obtained, it is believed to have solved the hardest part of the problem. It was almost frustrated by two new bandit raids on the Texas border—in the Big Bend country—which occurred while it was in session, and which caused the militia of Texas,

Arizona, and New Mexico to be called out. But General Scott succeeded in convincing General Obregon of the absolute good faith of the United States, a better triumph than a battle; apparently this, together with the firm determination to keep our troops in Mexico, has worked a complete change in the attitude of the Mexican *de facto* Government.

The net result of the El Paso conference is a verbal agreement by which the two Governments divide the patrol of the lawless area, the Americans continuing to cover the region between the New Mexican border and Namiquipa, while the Carranzistas undertake to police the Big Bend hinterland and the whole region south of Parral. Ten thousand Mexican troops have already been assigned to this work. General Funston now has nearly 50,000 militia and regulars to guard the border and do our part of the task. The ultimate withdrawal of our forces from Mexican soil now depends upon the promptness with which General Carranza's army is able to demonstrate its ability to restore law and order.

* * *

BUILDING A GREAT NATION

DR. NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, President of Columbia University, delivered a memorable address before The Associated Press in New York on April 25, in which he described the present war as "the Nemesis of nation-building conceived as an end in itself." Unless a nation have some purpose above and beyond self-interest, he said, war must continue to devastate the earth until "the last and strongest man, superb in his mighty loneliness, shall look out from a rock in the Caribbean upon a world that has been depopulated in its pursuit of a false ideal." Urging upon Americans the higher ideal of service to mankind, Dr. Butler continued:

We are the inheritors of a great tradition. What poets and philosophers have dreamed, that we are trying day by day to do, our stumblings, our blunders, our shortcomings are many; but if we keep our hearts clean and our heads clear he who a thousand years from now writes the history of liberty and justice and happiness among men will be able to tell to those far-off generations the story of the rise and influence of the American Nation.

Interpretations of World Events

After Verdun—What?

THE tentative German "explanation" of the Crown Prince's armies to take Verdun—that the Germans were greatly outnumbered by the French—is as curious as it is unconvincing. Imagine, only two years ago, the Teuton war lords confessing that the military force of France at any point hopelessly outnumbered and overmatched the military force of Germany. The thing would then have been inconceivable. But its significance goes deeper, and sheds much light on the probable next moves of the mighty game. Now that Verdun seems to be impregnable, or, to speak more truly, now that the armies of France must appear to their opponents to be invincible, shall we see that great "forward drive" of the Allies which has been promised and expected ever since the Marne? And shall we see, on the Russian front, a converging drive, carrying the Czar's forces back across Poland and Galicia, and, perhaps, much further? Possible, yet not very probable. First, because defensive war is now so exceedingly strong, offensive war so exceedingly costly. Next, because all indications show that the Allies can get the prize without paying the price.

General Shuvayeff, Russia's New War Minister

GENERAL SHUVAYEFF, who recently succeeded General Polivanoff at the War Ministry at Petrograd, is a big, deliberate man with a cool head and enormous energy. An infantry General, he was appointed about a year ago Chief of Commissariat to Grand Duke Nicholas. Before that he had been for six years head of the Commissariat Department at the Ministry of War. He put through a drastic series of reforms in his department, beginning with 1911, and taking as his watchword the rather caustic epigram, "The Commissariat Department exists for the army and not the army for the Commissariat Department," a sufficiently vivid commentary on the work of some of his predecessors. In

taking over the War Ministry, General Shuvayeff announced that he would be ruled by conscience, not by fear; and that he confidently expects Russia and her allies to gain a decisive victory.

Dmitri Savelevitch Shuvayeff was born in 1854. As a junior officer, Dmitri Shuvayeff took part in the Turkestan campaigns of 1873-75. There is a certain tragedy in the fact that the soldier who presided at the Petrograd Ministry when the war broke out, and under whom General Shuvayeff had served as a departmental head, is at present a prisoner in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul in that city, on charges growing out of the ammunition famine, which compelled the disastrous retreat from Poland and the loss of Warsaw, Vilna, and other important cities. General Sukhomlinoff professes his innocence of any willful fault, but, unhappily, both the shortage of shells and the dire retreat remain unforgettable facts.

English and Russians in Mesopotamia

THE surrender of General Townshend's force at Kut-el-Amara is likely to have less effect on the actual fighting on the eastern verge of the Sultan's empire than on the future relative standing of Russia and England there and in neighboring Persia. For, while the English have met with reverse after reverse, from Ctesiphon to Kut-el-Amara, Russia has, during the same period, won a series of victories, from Erzerum to Sultana-bad, from Hamadan to Trebizond. In mid-May the Czar's forces were announced to be within 100 miles of Bagdad, on the east, among the Persian foothills; they were pressing south from Bitlis and west, toward Constantinople, from Trebizond.

The failure of the English Government to send an adequate relief force up the Tigris to Kut-el-Amara is the more extraordinary in view of the fact that before the war the English "Residency" at Bagdad, as the Consulate General there was called, maintained a private line of shallow-draft steamships on the

Tigris, which plied up and down between Bagdad and the head of the Persian Gulf. As the gulf is only five days from Bombay, it would seem exceedingly easy to ship any amount of men right up the Tigris, all the lower waters of which had been fought for and won, step by step, and were in English hands for months before the battle of Ctesiphon. But the loss to England is less of military strength than of political prestige in the eyes of Turkey, of Persia, and of the Mohammedans of India. Yet even here it may be said that English expeditions have time and again met with equal misfortune, as, for example, the Afghan expeditions, and that English prestige and credit have very solidly weathered the storm. But Russia's stock has gone up.

The "Irish Republic" of 1916

A VERY curious, very strange, and very pathetic episode of the world war was the "Irish rebellion," which flared up in Dublin, and as suddenly burned out, having cost, it is said, a loss of 521 soldiers and supporters of the British crown, and about four times as many "Irish Republicans." Curious, yet neither strange nor unprecedented, having in view the facts of Irish history.

The gravamen of the charge against the present "rebels" is, of course, that they struck at England at a moment of national peril, associating themselves for that purpose with England's most dangerous enemies. But this has happened many times before. When England was threatened by the invincible armada of Philip II. of Spain, in 1588, the Irish rebels of that day were intriguing with the Spaniards against England. A century later, their successors in Ireland, who had espoused the cause of the banished Stuarts, received aid and comfort from Louis XIV. of France, then the most determined opponent of England. The Irish rebellion of the Spring of 1798, and other movements of the same period, sought help and received encouragement from England's arch-enemy, Napoleon. And without doubt it was this readiness to rush into the arms of England's enemies, far more than her nationalism,

that earned for Ireland the suspicion and distrust of England, the cause of so much suffering and discord.

By their appeal to Germany at this juncture the Irish aspirants for "liberty" and "nationalism" have done much to forfeit any sympathy that might have been extended to them; by their deliberate and calculated opposition to the expressed will of the vast majority of their fellow-countrymen they have forfeited all claim to the title of nationalists. It is noteworthy that, on this occasion, as so many times before, from the days of John Mitchel to the days of Parnell, many of the leaders of the "Irish rebellion" have been either of English birth or of English descent—"more Irish than the Irish themselves."

Cutting the Bagdad Railroad

IN order finally to secure domination in the Mesopotamian area it will be necessary for the Allies—and this means chiefly the rapidly advancing Russian forces of the Grand Duke Nicholas—to cut the Bagdad Railroad, and thus make it impossible for the Teuton-Turkish powers to send further reinforcements, and, in particular, guns and munitions to the Tigris-Euphrates valley. The suggestion has been made, and it is distinctly among the possibilities of the immediate future, that the effective way to do this would be for a Russian force to cut its way through from the Euphrates, in the region of Urfa, the ancient Edessa, to Aleppo, the junction, from which the Pilgrims' Railroad runs south toward Medina and Mecca; and, from Aleppo to Alexandretta, near St. Paul's birthplace, Tarsus; a force of French and English meanwhile operating against Alexandretta from the Mediterranean, and, if successful there, cutting inland toward Aleppo, which is only some seventy miles from the coast. Admiral Degouy, who advocates this plan, makes an interesting comparison with Sherman's march through Georgia, and his junction, at Savannah, with the Federal fleet in 1865, thus cutting the armies of the South in two. Sherman, with 60,000 troops, not abundantly supplied with guns or ammu-

dition, relied upon the Federal fleet to make good what he lacked; and in the same way a Russian army might make forced marches, in light order, across the open country between Urfa and Aleppo, there meeting an allied force, with a strong naval base at Alexandretta, secured by the Allies' enormous preponderance of sea power in the Mediterranean Sea. This plan has two manifest advantages—it would effectually prevent the Turks from sending any of their now slender forces to Mesopotamia, and it would render wholly impossible any further attacks, or even threats, against Egypt by way of the Suez Canal.

The Iron Bones of War

IF gold be the sinews of war, then we may say that the bones of war are iron, especially in these days when huge steel guns, in enormous numbers, and therefore consuming enormous masses of steel shells, play the predominant part in every battle. It is a curious thought that the shells made with heavy steel casings, especially when carrying a charge of high explosive, practically go out of existence and are lost as completely as if, as in Jules Verne's story, they were shot to the moon; this meaning an enormous and unceasing destruction of the very substance of iron.

A French Senator, M. Berenger, has been quoted as saying that without the additional sources given to Germany by her possession of the iron mines of Northeastern France, and especially those of the Briey Valley, north of Metz, Germany would, before this, have been compelled to seek peace, from sheer inability to provide the raw material of her heavy shells. It is even suggested that the need to preserve her hold on the Briey Valley accounts for Germany's obstinate attacks on Verdun—to anticipate and check a French offensive toward Metz and the iron mines of Briey; a suggestion of very great interest in itself.

Along the same lines of thought an American economist has suggested that the Allies, if they are victorious and if they wish finally to draw the teeth of Prussian militarism, should confiscate

Germany's coal fields, thus cutting at her manufacturing power and her munition plants at one blow, and forcibly turning her back into an agricultural nation. That Germany is enormously productive, agriculturally, is, of course, evident from the fact that she has been able to feed her population of nearly seventy millions, during the greater part of two years, without any imports of foreign food; a task that England would at present be quite incapable of. The Allies, according to this proposal, should divide Germany's western coal fields between France and Belgium, and give her eastern coal fields, in Silesia, to Russia, or, perhaps, to a reconstituted Poland.

Perhaps the realization of some such possibilities as these is the motive which is at present urging Germany, while making claims of victory, at the same time to put out feelers in the direction of peace; indicating terms which, at each repetition, are less stiff, less favorable for Germany, more favorable for the Allies. The latest terms seem to be something like these: Northern France and Belgium to be evacuated, an indemnity being paid to Belgium; Poland to be erected into an autonomous kingdom, (presumably with a pro-German ruler, after the models of Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria,) and Germany to get back her colonies in Africa and the Pacific.

What England Is Doing for France

THERE is a recurring disposition to suggest that, on the side of the Entente, England is not fighting her weight. A statement of the French Committee on War Publications—which contains men like General Malletierre, Joseph Bédier, Ernest Lavisse, and Emile Boutroux, the two last being members of the French Academy, and Henri Bergson, who to that honor adds a repute which is world wide—makes it quite clear that, in France, the part being played by England is more truly estimated. At the beginning of the war the expeditionary force which England was able to send to France numbered, says this statement, only four divisions, or 80,000 men. In August, 1915, England had under arms 3,000,000 men, and this number, through

the supreme sacrifice of the traditional principle of voluntary service, has now been increased to 4,000,000 men, of whom 1,000,000 are already on the soil of France. England, at the beginning of 1916, counted 550,000 men among her losses, yet this left her with practically untouched reserves of force.

"When Germany has no more men," says the statement, "England will draw on her inexhaustible wealth of warriors. And her 'new armies,' supple, gay, already inured to toils and perils, the living image of a nation of athletes," will be ready to speak their word. The French recorders include, with lively recognition, "the Canadians of Ypres, the Australians of the Dardanelles"; Canada alone has already given 250,000 soldiers; she promises 500,000. But men alone are not enough. Early in the war, says the committee, the Allies, each in turn, came to realize that Germany must be beaten by artillery blows. And England set herself to do her part. At the outset almost everything was lacking. In a few months thirty-three huge munition factories rose out of the earth. This was the beginning; by Feb. 1, 1916, 2,720 factories were organized, all over England, and in this number vast enterprises, analogous to the famous Creusot gun factories, count as units. In England there are nearly 2,000,000 munition makers. In Canada 320 factories are making munitions, employing 100,000 skilled workmen.

An item of another sort: since the war began, England has made for the Allies a strip of cloth for military uniforms 15,000 miles long; three-fifths of the world's girth at the equator. And, side by side with this enormous host, the field army of 4,000,000, the army of 2,000,000 engaged in munition making, England maintains, at the highest point of efficiency, the greatest and strongest fleet the world has ever seen. "The English blockade, slowly, perhaps, but inflexibly," says the committee, "is making victory certain. Let us not, then, be chary of our admiration, our faith! she has given us so abundantly of both; for she has praised, with an ardent heart, the heroism and the resolution of

France! We are witnesses of a 'moral mobilization' which exalts and unites all the energies of England into an irresistible 'will to conquer.' The power of England is an ancient, potent spring. Slow to extend itself, it is now extended; with continuous weight it will press upon the enemy. Other peoples are more subtle, more swift; none is more vigorous. The grain of this metal has no flaws; it is impossible to break it."

The Teuton reader of these generous words will see, with a peculiar twinge of pain, the application to England of the famous Nietzschean phrase "the will to conquer," which Germans have in times past so habitually applied to themselves. But the deeper import of these words is the indication which they furnish, that the present Entente powers will, after the war, be held together by bonds stronger than triple steel; they will form the great nucleus of world power.

Russia and the Golden Horn

IN the Autumn of 1877, when the armies of Alexander II. were swinging forward toward the Sultan's capital, an English music hall song brought into being a new word which has since enjoyed a measure of fame. The word is *Jingo*, and, roughly, it is the reverse of pacifist. The song ran thus:

We don't want to fight, but, by *Jingo*, if we do,
We've got the ships, we've got the men,
we've got the money too;
We've fought the Czar before, and we'll fight him yet again,
And the Russians shall not have Constantinople!

This is what the late Lord Salisbury called "putting England's money on the wrong horse"; and it would seem that, still to adhere to racetrack metaphors, there has been a complete reversal of form, coupled with the determination that "the Russians shall have Constantinople"—if they can take that fair city, with or without the help of England and France. That a clear-cut agreement to divide the sick man's heritage exists is implied by the recent statement, in the Imperial Duma, of Professor Milyukoff, who weighs his words, and does not go off at half-cock. Milyukoff said: The ques-

tion is no longer whether the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles should become Russian or remain Turkish. The question is, whether they are to become Russian or remain German. Let us not be deceived. The question now pending may be decided once for all. But the conditions may never again be so favorable for us. The chief element in our favor is the attitude of our allies toward our national problem. Berlin-Bagdad is too great a menace for England, because of India and Egypt, and for France, because of her plans in Syria. Because of this real danger, therefore, these two powers cannot fail to come to an agreement with us, after centuries of suspicion. March, 1915, should be a memorable epoch for us, for then our agreement with our allies was reached.

The Modern Use of Monitors

A GAIN and again it has been noted that the history of war has been moved backward through the centuries. Steel helmets, long discarded, are once more in universal use. Hand grenades, which, generations ago, gave a name to a famous British corps, the Grenadiers, are rife along the whole line. Sapping and mining are about what they were in Hamlet's day, or, at least, in Shakespeare's—who made the Danish Prince speak of countermining a yard below his antagonist, the manoeuvre so constantly used today. One more weapon of war esteemed outworn is once more in fashion, the low-lying monitor, which is about half way between a surface battleship and a submarine. Of these monitors there are a number now in the British Navy, each with two big guns in a turret in the bow, able to slip in close to the shore of Belgium, and to rain big-calibre shells on the west end of the long German line. Each of these craft carries an odd-looking mast, only less unsightly than the lattice masts of our American battleships; they resemble the three legs on which gypsies support their kettles, and, presumably, form the support of a battery of machine guns. Since these monitors do their work not far from Zeebrugge, the German submarine base, they are specially protected, by auxiliary

craft continually on the lookout, against submarine attack. The complete success of these monitors in breaking into the sea end of the German line would mean the establishment of a British base near Ostend, with the possibility of outflanking the Teutons there, and so compelling a withdrawal in the direction of Bruges and Brussels.

General Yudenitch, the Hero of Erzerum

NICHOLAS YUDENITCH, who commanded the field forces of Russia at Erzerum, is one of the youngest army commanders in the present war, being only 53. When the Turks first entered the war, at the close of 1914, their plan of campaign included a swift invasion of the Russian Caucasus, a drive toward Tiflis, its capital. The battles of Sarikamysh and Ardahan, where Yudenitch led the troops of the Czar, smashed this movement of invasion and put the Turks on the defensive. The hero of these victories, after a course at the Alexandrovski Military School at Moscow, got his commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Guards, being then 18 years old. Three years later he entered the Military Academy at Petrograd. Thereafter he had practical experience on the staff of an army corps and as Chief of Staff of a brigade of Turkestan Rifles; was gazetted Colonel at the age of 33, and was put in command of the Eighteenth Regiment of Rifles. At the head of this regiment Colonel Yudenitch fought through the Russo-Japanese war, being seriously wounded on a Manchurian battlefield. In recognition of his war services he was promoted to the rank of Major General. Shortly after this he was stationed in the Caucasus, with a staff appointment; five years later he received the epaulets of a Lieutenant General, and the appointment of Chief of Staff of the military district of the Caucasus, in which position he rapidly acquired the deep-seated local knowledge which enabled him to carry out one of the most brilliant campaigns of the world war, the campaign which is likely to cause larger territorial changes than in any other area save, perhaps, Africa; for, after the war, the Black Sea will be practically a Russian lake.

THE REVOLT IN IRELAND

THE sudden attempt of a group of idealists to secede from the British Empire and set up an Irish republic has furnished one of the most dramatic surprises of the war. A direct connection between the plotters and Germany, through the person of Sir Roger Casement, both magnifies the significance of the revolt and helps to account for the swift and savage punishment administered to its captured leaders.

In its hidden causes the outbreak harks back to the crisis over home rule two years ago, when the two sections of Ireland armed against each other; its supporters were drawn partly from the Irish Volunteers, who organized and armed themselves in behalf of home rule at that time, but the movement also received financial aid from Irish sympathizers in America, while practical aid from Germany was expected. The conspiracy centred in Dublin, and its leaders for the most part belonged to the Sinn Fein, a secret society of extremists for whom home rule was not enough. The project which has cost them their lives is revealed in the following document, issued on April 24, the first day of the revolt:

PROCLAMATION

The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic to the people of Ireland:

Irishmen and Irishwomen, in the name of God and of the dead generations from which you received the old traditions of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom, having organized and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organization, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organization, the Irish Volunteers, and the Irish citizen army.

Having patiently perfected their discipline and resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and, supported by her exiled children in America, and by her gallant allies in Europe, by relying on her own strength, she strikes, in full confidence of victory.

We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies to be sovereign and indefeasible. Long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and Govern-

ment has not extinguished that right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people.

In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty. Six times during the past 300 years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right, and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a sovereign, independent State, and we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades in arms to the cause of its freedom, its welfare, and its exaltation among nations.

The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman. The republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation, and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences, carefully fostered by an alien Government, which have divided the minority from the majority in the past.

Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment of a permanent National Government, representative of the whole people of Ireland and elected by the suffrage of all her men and women, the Provisional Government hereby constituted will administer the civil and military affairs of the republic, in trust for the people.

We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God, whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause will dishonor it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish Nation must, by its valor and discipline and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.

Signed, in behalf of the Provisional Government:

THOMAS J. CLARKE,
S. MacDIARMAD,
THOMAS MacDONAGH,
P. H. PEARSE,
E. CEANNT,
JAMES CONNOLLY,
JOSEPH PLUNKETT.

The first inkling of the revolt reached the outside world when the British authorities announced on April 24 that Sir Roger Casement, a former Consul General, had been captured in the act of trying to land German arms on the west coast of Ireland; that he had been conveyed thither in a German submarine,

with two Irish soldiers from German prisons, and that a German auxiliary cruiser loaded with 20,000 rifles and ammunition had been taken and sunk at the same time. The vessel had been sunk by its own men, and the twenty-two German bluejackets on board had been made prisoners.

Casement had last been heard of in Germany, where he had attempted to induce Irish prisoners of war to join an anti-British expedition to Ireland. Testimony at his preliminary trial in London subsequently showed that on Good Friday he had landed near Tralee from the German submarine U-19 with a soldier named Bailey and another named Monteith. In "McKinna's Fort" he was seen to drop a paper containing a code and the words: "Await further instructions. Have decided to stay. Further ammunition and rifles are needed. Send another ship." The small collapsible boat in which he and his companions had landed also helped to betray them, and Casement and Bailey were arrested before they could get away in the automobile which was waiting for them.

At the same time a German auxiliary cruiser from Kiel, disguised as a Norwegian merchantman, was caught in an even more dramatic way. The signalman of the British patrol boat which made the capture afterward told the facts thus briefly in court:

Early Good Friday morning the Bluebell was on patrol duty off the southwest coast of Ireland, when we sighted a ship flying the Norwegian colors. We signaled her and asked who she was and where she was bound. She replied that she was the Aud, bound from Bergen for Genoa. At that time we were about 130 miles west of Queenstown.

We ordered the Aud to follow us, but she did not do so until we fired a shell. Then she proceeded with us.

When we got near Daunts Rock the Aud stopped her engines. The Bluebell was then a cable's length away from her, and we saw white smoke coming from her after hold. Two German ensigns were run up on her masthead. The Aud lowered two boats, which were rowed toward the Bluebell. We fired around these boats. They flew flags of truce, and the occupants put up their hands. They were made prisoners. They proved to be nineteen or twenty German bluejackets, with three officers. Ten minutes later the Aud sank, about a mile and a quarter from the lightship.

Sir Roger Casement had been in the United States at the beginning of the war, but had made his way to Berlin to offer his services in some capacity to the German Government. At the present writing he is a prisoner in the Tower of London awaiting trial for high treason.

OUTBREAK IN DUBLIN


Announcement of Sir Roger's capture was made public by the British Government on Easter Monday, April 24, and on the same day the insurrection broke forth in Dublin. The first move was a dash by members of the Sinn Fein Society into the General Post Office, where they drove all officials from their posts, and cut the telephone and telegraph lines, with the intention of severing communication with England and the rest of Ireland. Many of these men were in the uniform of the Irish Volunteers. They posted armed sentinels at the doors and windows. On the streets other rebel bands began shooting all persons in khaki. Several unarmed British officers thus fell victims in the first moments of the uprising.

The authorities, taken unawares, ordered the police and soldiers to retire to their headquarters, as they were without arms. Meanwhile the rebels established themselves in the City Hall, Liberty Hall, and Stephen's Green, and also occupied many houses in Sackville Street and the side streets leading into it. Sharpshooters took up positions on the roofs and at the windows of houses. An attempt was made to seize Dublin Castle, but the little guard of Royal Irish Constabulary and soldiers prevented the rebels from getting beyond the gate at which they killed the policeman on duty.

A REBEL NEWSPAPER

On the 25th they continued to hold the places they had taken, as the military force at hand was still insufficient to attack them. Sniping continued, and Dublinites who tried to go about their regular business were the chief sufferers. In the midst of this confusion the Sinn Feiners published a newspaper called *The Irish War News*. The following extract from it reveals the atmosphere of self-delusion in which they lived:

At the moment of writing this report, 9:30



SCENE OF THE FIGHTING IN DUBLIN

A. M. Tuesday, the Republican forces hold their position and the British forces have nowhere broken through. There has been heavy and continuous fighting for nearly twenty-four hours; the casualties of the enemy have been much more numerous than those on the republican side. The republican forces everywhere are fighting with splendid gallantry.

The population of Dublin is plainly in support of the republic, and the officers and men are everywhere cheered as they march through the streets. The flag of the republic flies from the General Post Office. Commander General Pearse is Commander in Chief of the Army of the Republic and is President of the Provisional Government. Commander General James Connolly is commanding in the Dublin district.

Communication with the county is largely cut, but reports to hand show that the county is largely rising. Bodies of men from Kildare and Fingall have already reported in Dublin.

ARRIVAL OF TROOPS

A large body of troops under General

Sir John Maxwell was already on its way from England, and on the morning of the 26th a cordon of fighters had been drawn around the rebel strongholds. Then bloodshed began in earnest. The insurgents had abundant ammunition and used it so freely that it was dangerous even for peaceful citizens to sit at a window or walk across a street.

Martial law was proclaimed in the City and County of Dublin. A gunboat came up the River Liffey and fired several shells into Liberty Hall, demolishing it and driving out the rebel officers who had their headquarters there. The cordon of troops was tightened, and the fighting became fast and furious.

By Thursday, the 27th, Dublin was a roaring battleground, with the streets full of barricades. The rebels in some force had taken a position in a flour mill on the south side of the Custom House

quay, from which they harried the troops on the north side until the authorities decided to use artillery to dislodge them. A dozen shells did deadly work, and the rebels retired to a disused distillery further south; there a naval gun and field artillery opened fire upon them. The bombardment was spectacular. From the top of the distillery floated the green rebel flag. Forty-eight shells hit the building, wrecking it, but the flag continued to wave, and it still hung there after the rebels had evacuated the structure.

IN SACKVILLE STREET

In the Sackville Street region the fighting also had grown hotter, and by the 28th sniping by rebel sharpshooters had become so troublesome that the artillery officer in charge ordered the shelling of the Post Office and adjoining houses. Eight shells were fired into the Young Men's Christian Association Building, two into the Catholic Club, and two into the Post Office. A cessation of the cannonade was then ordered, as some houses had caught fire and it was feared the entire city might be placed in peril. Additional fresh troops had arrived, and the cordons were further tightened.

The rebels started fires in several places in the hope that the flames would reach the Castle. On Friday night the sky for miles around was illuminated and flames shot up from many points. The green rebel flag that flew over the Post Office was sharply outlined by the glow. Rebels were seen walking on the roof. It was afterward discovered that they had sprinkled petroleum over the building and set fire to it before retiring to the Coliseum, where they again put up a stout fight.

A SUDDEN COLLAPSE

Early on Saturday morning the rebel leaders realized the folly of their undertaking and asked to be allowed to surrender, as their commander, James Connolly, had been severely wounded. Padraic H. Pearse, the "Provisional President," issued a proclamation to his followers: "In order to prevent the further slaughter of unarmed people, and in the hope of saving the lives of our followers, who are surrounded and hope-

lessly outnumbered, the members of the Provisional Government at headquarters have agreed to unconditional surrender, and the commanders of all the units of the republican forces will order their followers to lay down their arms." This order failed to reach some of the isolated bands for many hours, and sniping continued throughout the day.

The final collapse came on Sunday, when the main body of the rebels in Dublin surrendered, beginning with those in the College of Surgeons. The prisoners here included the Countess Georgina Markiewicz, the Irish wife of a Polish nobleman, with 120 youths who had taken part in the fighting under her leadership. At the hour agreed upon for her surrender she marched out of the College of Surgeons with her followers arranged in ranks by twos. She was dressed entirely in green, and dramatically kissed her revolver before handing it to a British officer with the words, "I am ready." Her followers were then disarmed and marched away to Dublin Castle.

COUNTING THE COST

By Sunday evening more than 1,000 rebels had surrendered, and the military authorities, under General Sir John French, at once began transferring the rank and file of them to England. The leaders, however, were retained at Dublin Castle, where they were speedily put on trial by court-martial under General Maxwell. The other rebel bodies outside the city, notably those at Enniscorthy, surrendered the next day. Except in Dublin the uprising had met with little support. And in Dublin itself it was all over. It had left new bitterness, and the centre of Ireland's capital was a heap of smoking ruins.

On May 12 Mr. Asquith announced that the civilian dead, including rebels, numbered 180, the wounded, 614. The military losses were 124 killed and 388 wounded, making a total of 304 killed and 1,002 wounded. More than 1,800 prisoners were taken. At that date fourteen men had been executed, seventy-three condemned to various periods of penal servitude, and 1,706 deported.

The total damage by fire in Dublin was estimated at \$15,000,000. The buildings

destroyed numbered 179. An eyewitness says:

When I stood on O'Connell Bridge and saw the gaunt walls of what had been hotels and shops and the tottering masonry of the great Post Office Building it was with feelings of profound sorrow for the country and its capital. Sackville Street was full of women who had come from the slums at the back of Marlborough Street and Tyrone Street. Their object was to get news of the misguided men who had worked this ruin. As we came up the street ambulance men were bringing bodies of rebels out of the ruins of the fallen buildings. Now and again a heart-rending scream of grief would tell the despair of some distracted creature whose husband or son had been lured to his death by the emissaries of the Kaiser. Round the Doris Gresham Hotel another crowd was clamoring for any broken meats available.

Round the corner in Chancery Lane evidences of the struggle were more apparent. There were great shot holes in the corner of the Four Courts.

Crossing the Liffey over Wine Tavern Bridge, we walked down King Edward Street to Dublin Castle. Here we met a detachment bringing in about 200 rebel prisoners of all ages, all sizes, and all conditions of life. Some wore the green uniform of the Sinn Fein, some the uniform of the Irish National Volunteers, but most were in civilian dress. There were three or four boys of 13 or 14, and old men of 60 on.

Down Nassau Street and Grafton Street again we crossed to College Green and went down Westmoreland Street to O'Connell Bridge. From this point a scene of horror disclosed itself. Lower Sackville Street from the Nelson Pillar to the bridge was destroyed. The Metropole Hotel and office of *The Freeman's Journal* had disappeared and were now heaps of smoking ruins. The Post Office had been burned clean out, nothing being left standing save the bare walls and the front portico. The street in front was littered with telegraph forms, account books, ledgers, dockets, and piles of paper. Right in front of the Post Office lay the body of a horse, evidently dead for some days. Dead bodies were being brought out of the building.

The same destruction extends down Henry Street. In the middle of Abbey Street and round Byeden Quay to Beresford Place firemen were busy among the ruins and the last embers of the great conflagrations we had been watching for three consecutive nights.

IRISH PUBLIC OPINION

The Irish Nationalist Party denounced the revolt as "an attempt to torpedo home rule," and its foremost Parliamentary leader, John E. Redmond, cabled to the editor of an Irish-American newspaper:

The whole thing has been organized by

those in Ireland and in America who have always been the open and irreconcilable enemies of home rule and of the Irish Party. Though the hand of Germany was in the whole thing, it was not so much sympathy for Germany as hatred of home rule and of us which was at the bottom of the movement. It was even more an attempt to hit us than to hit England. The whole disgraceful plot is viewed with execration by the Irish people. It was almost entirely a Dublin movement; partly the creation of the Sinn Fein cranks and German agents there, partly of the remnants of that mass of discontent and anarchy which was left by the disastrous Larkinite strike.

In New York City there were enough Irish and German sympathizers with the Dublin outbreak to fill a theatre to overflowing and to pass resolutions in the tenor of the following:

We affirm Ireland's right to a separate and distinct national existence, and we remind the American people that the freedom of the seas, which is necessary to the world's peaceful commerce, and to no nation more than to the United States, which is now controlled and restricted by England for her own selfish interests alone, can only be permanently secured by the independence of Ireland. We affirm that, freed from the blight of English rule, and the deliberate crippling of her industrial and economic life, which has prevailed for many centuries, and the continuance of which is provided for by express provision in the so-called "Home Rule bill," Ireland could support a population of 25,000,000 and become a thriving hive of industry, capable of maintaining her independence and defending her rights.

We thank the Government of Germany for extending to Ireland as far as the present military situation will permit the same kind of aid as was rendered to the infant American Republic by France. We hope that aid will be enlarged so far as circumstances will permit, but Ireland will be recognized as a belligerent and an ally of the Central Powers, her civil and military rights asserted, and a place secured for her in the congress of the nations which will settle the terms of peace.

On the other hand, the United Irish League of America, representing "the solid belief of the vast majority of the Irish people in Ireland," passed resolutions in support of Mr. Redmond and voiced the prevailing sentiment by deploping the misguided efforts of the rebels, which, though sincere, "could only bring anguish to the Irish heart and greatly prejudice the cause for which a forty-five-year peaceable contest has been waged and which was on the threshold of actual fruition." The same

resolutions denounced those leaders who had acted "either from blind hatred of the English people, or, worse, with German gold in their pockets."

FATE OF THE REBELS

The military court at Dublin has meted out punishment to the rebel leaders with a swift severity that has aroused alarm even in England. At the present writing (May 18) fourteen of them have been shot after a summary trial. Every man whose name was attached to the proclamation of the "Irish Republic"—or any other official document of the revolt—has suffered the extreme penalty for high treason. The trial of Casement and Bailey in the civil courts upon the same capital charge promises to be one of the sensational events of British history.

The executions began on May 3 with that of Padraic H. Pearse, the "Provisional President," Thomas J. Clarke, and Thomas MacDonagh. The next day Joseph Plunkett was shot at dawn, after having been married in prison at midnight. Edward Daly, Michael O'Hanrahan, and William Pearse, also were executed on that day. A day or two later Major John McBride was added to the death roll, and on the 7th Eamonn Ceannt, (Edmund Kent,) Cornelius Culbert, Michael Mallon, and J. J. Heuston, followed. On the 9th Thomas Kent of Coole was put to death, and on May 12 James Connolly, "Commander General of the Irish Republican Army," suffered the same fate, along with S. MacDiarmid, the last of the signers of the fatal proclamation. The sentence of Countess Markiewicz was commuted to penal servitude for life. Upward of a hundred others have thus far been tried and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.

HIGH OFFICIALS RESIGN

The Irish revolt has caused the resignation of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Baron Wimborne, and of his chief secretary, Augustine Birrell, who has held

that responsible post since 1907. The Under Secretary, Sir Matthew Nathan, also is out. A commission headed by Lord Hardinge, former Viceroy of India, has been appointed to investigate the causes of the Irish outbreak. The admission by the Government that F. Sheehy Skeffington, editor of *The Irish Citizen*, and two other journalists were executed in the Portobello barracks at Dublin without the knowledge of the military authorities has helped to raise a demand for less drastic methods in dealing with the situation. Mr. Asquith, the Premier, has himself gone to Ireland to quiet the excitement and diffuse a spirit of calmer justice.

At the same time John E. Redmond, the Nationalist leader, and Sir Edward Carson, the Ulster leader, with other members of the Irish Parliamentary Party, have issued a manifesto to the people of Ireland pleading for their allegiance to the constitutional movement. The manifesto says in part:

It is true that Ireland has been shocked and horrified by a series of military executions by the military tribunals in Dublin. These things have been done in the face of incessant and vehement protests of the Irish leaders, and these protests will be pressed continually and strongly until the unchecked control of the military authorities in Ireland is abolished. But it is also true that, in spite of bitter provocations, the people of Ireland have had no hesitation in condemning the rising in Dublin as a dangerous blow at the heart and hopes of Ireland.

On the morrow of this tragedy we feel called upon to make a solemn appeal to the people of Ireland to draw the conclusions which these events force upon them. We must leave no misunderstanding in their minds as to our convictions and our resolves. Either Ireland is to be given over to unsuccessful revolution and anarchy, or the constitutional movement is to have the full support of the Irish people and go on until it has completed its work.

The coming together of the Ulster and Nationalist leaders on this unfortunate episode is regarded by some observers as a hopeful augury for a settlement of the difficult home rule problem.



THE REBELLION IN IRELAND

PADRAIC H. PEARSE
"Provisional President"
Executed



COUNTESS MARKIEWICZ
Penal Servitude



SIR ROGER CASEMENT
On Trial for High
Treason
(© Brown & Dawson)




AUGUSTINE BIRRELL
Chief Secretary. Resigned



BARON WIMBORNE
Lord Lieutenant. Resigned

DUBLIN AFTER THE REVOLT



Sackville Street Looking Toward the O'Connell Bridge



The Post Office, of Which the Outer Shell Remains

Origins of the Irish Revolt

WRITTEN FOR CURRENT HISTORY

By Padraic Colum

Irish Author, Playwright, and Journalist

THE revolutionary movement in Ireland began in the year 1912. In September of that year thousands of men in Northeast Ireland, directed by Sir Edward Carson, entered into a covenant to resist the administration of a Government which the King, Lords, and Commons of the United Kingdoms purposed to set up in Ireland. At the time the covenanters had already a military discipline and a military manner. Rumors came that they were actually acquiring arms. A small shipment of rifles was seized at Belfast, and from that time on much space was given in the newspapers to the formation, the movements, and the declarations of the Ulster Volunteers.

The editorial writers on the Conservative papers in England and Ireland rather missed the significance of happenings in Northeast Ulster. They thought that the arming of men there would kill Home Rule and the Liberal Government and safeguard the veto of the House of Lords. But the significant thing was that a section of the people of Ireland were handling guns. The British Government had always been jealous of Irishmen arming themselves. In the sixties and seventies men had been given long terms of penal servitude in horrible prisons for smuggling arms into Ireland. Of course Nationalist Ireland knew that Northeast Ulster was privileged. Still it was brought to the notice of Nationalists that the Arms Embargo act had been repealed.

Nationalist Ireland made no effort to obtain arms. Why should she? A Home Rule bill that satisfied the Nationalist leaders was being passed. Northeast Ulster was said to be preparing to make it inoperative, but then, as the Nationalists thought, the Government was not so impotent as it seemed. Besides, Northeast Ulster had bluffed through all history, and there was no reason to believe it was

doing anything else now. Nationalist Ireland regarded the Ulster Volunteers and the Ulster Provisional Government as theatrical.

Coincidentally with the arming of the Ulster Volunteers came labor troubles in Dublin, Wexford, and Cork. The Dublin troubles amounted to civic disturbances in the Fall of 1913. Dublin has practically the same population now as it had in the eighteenth century—about 360,000 people. But in the eighteenth century Dublin was an industrial centre and had a spending population. Her industries decayed, her gentry vanished with her Parliament, but her population remained the same. Dublin can give adequate employment for only about 200,000 people. The city has a great brewery and great distilleries, but it is now mainly a centre for distribution and transportation.

The Dublin Transport Workers had been organized by Mr. James Larkin. They had headquarters in a former hotel near the quays—Liberty Hall, and they had a base in Croydon Park, a piece of ground they owned. In the lockout of 1913 the employers had been able to bring the authorities against the workers. The labor revolt was crushed, and baton charges by the police had broken up meetings in the streets. The intellectuals who had allied themselves with Liberty Hall and the two labor leaders saw that the workers would have to have some means of defense against police attacks.

Talk of arming men was in the air. One of the intellectuals who had allied themselves with the workers, a gentleman who had been an officer in the British Army, offered to organize a defense force from among the workers themselves. Most of the Transport Workers had been in the militia. They were easily drilled and easily led. In a few weeks the first organized force outside Ulster was drilling in Croydon Park. This was the Citizen Army.

Meanwhile Nationalists in Northeast Ulster were becoming alarmed. Men who regarded Home Rulers as enemies were in possession of arms, and at any time a storm of hatred might break out. Appeals for assistance began to come from the Home Rulers of the Northeast. In response to these appeals a distinguished Ulster Nationalist living in Dublin, Professor MacNeill, published in the Gaelic League journal "*An Cleadhreamh Soluis*" a project for the creation of a body of volunteers for Nationalist Ireland.

In November, 1913, the enrollment of the Nationalist Volunteers began. The response was eager. The Irish are a soldierly people, and this was the first time in 200 years that they had had the chance to organize along military lines in defense of a national principle. In March, 1914, came the Curragh Camp mutiny. Eminent officers in the army declared they would not obey orders if they were sent to put down any revolt in Northeast Ulster. "The army has killed Home Rule," vaunted the Conservative press. There was a crisis in Parliament, and the incident helped enormously the recruitment of the Irish Volunteers.

The Ulster and the Irish Volunteers had now to arm themselves surreptitiously. In November, immediately on the formation of the latter body, an embargo on arms going into Ireland had been declared. In May, 1914, the Ulster Volunteers ran a big cargo of arms into Larne. The authorities made no move to stop the shipment. At the end of July the Irish Volunteers ran a cargo of arms into Howth, just outside of Dublin. The authorities moved to intercept the volunteers on their return to the city. The military was called out, and the regular and irregular forces met half way between Howth and Dublin. The volunteers dispersed and got away with their arms. As the military went back through the streets they were hooted by a Dublin crowd. Stones were thrown at them. The commanding officer, Major Haig, gave his men an order to fire on the populace. They fired, and afterward charged with the bayonet, killing and wounding men and women.

A week later the European war broke

out. Ireland was swept into it with a fresh memory of citizens killed by British soldiers and with a sense of unfair discrimination as between the Nationalist and the Ulster Volunteers.

The historian of the Irish insurrection has now to account for certain happenings in Irish public life during the eighteen months of war—first, the loss of accord between the Irish people and their Parliamentary representatives; secondly, the determination of the Irish Volunteers to hold their arms at all costs; thirdly, the growing ascendancy of a secret society that in 1912 was regarded as moribund, and, fourthly, the exasperation that made Irish men and women long for the day of combat—these happenings made the insurrection of Easter, 1916.

A big minority of the Irish people supported the Allies in the war. But among the bulk of the people the belief persisted that any war in which England engaged was a war for conquest and spoliation. The Parliamentary party helped to recruit for the army in Ireland. Still, as Mr. Redmond and his followers spoke at recruiting meetings, many Nationalists were noting that while their men were being sent to the front, pains were being taken to keep the Ulster Volunteer organization intact. No accord was established between the Irish people and the men who, to the Irish mind, stood for the English ascendancy. In the first month of the war Mr. Balfour made a demand that the Home Rule bill be withdrawn. Finally the Home Rule bill was put upon the statute book. No date was given for its being made operative, and the measure was tied up with an amending bill that would reduce powers and perhaps curtail Irish territory.

Three threats kept the Irish nationalist public in a state of alarm. The first was that of conscription. Ireland's effective male population had been terribly reduced by emigration and people felt instinctively that the loss of many more young men would have a grave effect on the Irish stock. The second threat was that of a taxation that would leave the people hardly any margin for life. The third was that of actual famine. The Irish people have ghastly recollections of the

famine of 1846-7. Then, as they believe, the food they produced was swept into England to pay landlords' rents. If there was a scarcity of food in England, their stock and crop, they thought, would be swept out of the country to supply the English industrial centres. In order to safeguard the food supply, to guard against conscription, and to put up a threat against increased taxation, the Irish Volunteer command issued instructions that the rank and file of the volunteers were to resist disarmament.

A split had occurred in the volunteer ranks. Those who favored Mr. Redmond's policy separated themselves as the National Volunteers, and those who remained with Professor MacNeill kept the title of Irish Volunteers. The Irish Volunteers became more and more uncompromising in their attitude to the administration in Ireland. Meantime the Liberal Government that had put the Home Rule bill on the statute book had gone out of existence, and the new Coalition Cabinet included such opponents of home rule as Sir Edward Carson, Mr. Bonar Law, and Mr. Arthur Balfour.

It was the apparent inability of the Irish Parliamentary Party to save the country from a devastating taxation that broke the accord between the people and Mr. Redmond and Mr. Dillon. Before the war Ireland, it was calculated, was overtaxed to the amount of \$15,000,000. Then she had to raise a revenue of \$45,000,000. She had now to raise a revenue of \$85,000,000—that is to say, the revenue she had to raise was greater by \$10,000,000 than the revenue of Bulgaria, greater by \$10,000,000 than the revenue of Norway, greater by \$25,000,000 than the revenue of Denmark. In England and Scotland there were compensations for the increased taxation. Workmen were earning high salaries in the military and naval arsenals. But in Ireland, outside of Belfast, there were no such compensations.

More and more the Irish public turned

toward Professor MacNeill and the Irish Volunteers. And now, for some reasons not yet apparent, many of the volunteer higher command—Professor MacNeill was not among them—went over to a secret revolutionary organization—the Irish Republican Brotherhood. Using secret and open means, and supported more or less by an alarmed and exasperated public, the seven men whose names appeared on the republican proclamation prepared for revolt. An understanding now existed between members of the Irish Volunteer command, representing the Nationalist professional, business, and farming classes, and the command of the citizen army, representing the Dublin workers.

About last March the heads of the revolutionary organization were made to feel that a crisis had come. Several journals were suppressed, and men important in the volunteer organization had been arrested. Threats of conscription and disarmament had come up again. Public meetings were being held in Dublin to protest against overtaxation and deportation of prisoners—a private letter written at the time said, "Things have reached the breaking point here."

On April 19 a document was read to the Dublin Corporation which had an effect on the revolutionary preparations. It purported to be a secret order issued to the military; it was in cipher, and had been stolen off the files in Dublin Castle. According to this document all the heads of the Irish Volunteers, the National Volunteers, the Citizen Army, the Sinn Féin Council, and the Gaelic League were to be put under arrest on an order from the military commander. With this document made public the revolutionary group felt that they would have to move at once or their preparations would end in a fiasco like that of 1867. So on Easter Monday the Irish Volunteers and the Citizen Army paraded, and the revolutionists struck their resounding blows in Dublin and the country districts.



The Battle of Verdun

An Authoritative French Account Based on Official Records

By M. Ardouin-Dumazet

Military Editor of Temps and Figaro

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY]

BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE

THE City of Verdun itself, in spite of its high, encircling walls and citadel covering an immense subterranean town, has no longer any military significance; it owes its importance to the belt of detached forts which, spreading over a circuit of forty-eight kilometers, (thirty miles,) was intended to render stationary an entire army, to insure the investment of the city in view of a regular siege. General Séré de Rivières, the creator of the intrenched camp, estimated that it would take four army corps (160,000 men) to besiege it. But the present attack had forces of a very different character and means of action which Séré de Rivières could not have guessed at, and was made at first on a sector of about seven kilometers, (four and a half miles,) that is to say, on one-seventh of the line of forts.

Séré de Rivières held that an offensive against Verdun must of necessity be directed against the works on the left (west) bank of the Meuse, which make a curve from Dugny, down stream, to Charny, up stream; he thought that the line of the ridges of the Meuse was too strong to be the object of an attack, and considered hazardous any operations on the central sector. Yet this sector was the one attacked.

The enormous human flood, rushing upon a narrow stream, is without example in history, even in this war. It explains the successive withdrawals of our troops up to the limits fixed by Séré de Rivières for the advanced defenses toward Douaumont, limits which the enemy did not quite reach, since Pepper Ridge (Côte du Poivre) is still two miles from the Terre-Froide works, and these are in front of the line of forts which

immediately cover Verdun — Belleville, Saint-Michel, Souville—and protect the road and railway to Metz.

For several days the French commanders knew that the attack was near; our intelligence department had noted the preparations of the enemy; beginning with Feb. 15, we looked for the first storm of cannon shots. These were fired on Sunday, Feb. 20. An enormous quantity of artillery of all calibres, of all ranges, disposed on a front of thirty miles, from Montfaucon in Eastern Argonne, to Etain in the heart of Woevre, opened fire on our trenches, on the forts on the northern sector, and on the City of Verdun itself, which was soon subjected to a systematic destructive fire. The Governor of the town was forced to order the departure of the last inhabitants who lingered in the unhappy city.

Monday, Feb. 21.—In the evening, after a lively cannonade, the Germans made a first infantry attack with very considerable forces; capturing certain of our first line trenches, they reached our second line, from which counterattacks drove them back.

Tuesday, Feb. 22.—The enemy bombardment stretched across both banks of the Meuse, covered the ridges and was prolonged in Woevre to the neighborhood of Etain, near the village of Fromezey. The conflict was intense.

To the north of Verdun the Meuse descends by wide and harmonious curves as far as the village of Brabant; its course, skirted by the railroad to Sedan, exceeds twelve and a half miles, but the road which cuts across its curves is only nine miles. Opposite Brabant the Forges brook enters the Meuse; its valley up to its source almost exactly marks the line between the French and German trenches. On the right (east) bank of the Meuse

[illegible]

SHOWING ALL GERMAN ADVANCES DURING THREE MONTHS' TERRIFIC FIGHTING

the hills merge with a gentle slope into the Meuse ridges. Their tops are wooded—Haumont Wood, Caures Wood, Herbébois. From the Meuse to Herbébois is six miles. In this space there are only two villages—Haumont-les-Samogeux and Beaumont, the latter on a hillside at the foot of which passes the road from Montmédy to Verdun, which, with the Sedan road, formed principal approaches for the Germans.

On Feb. 22 the enemy bombarded this whole front, and then began a series of very violent infantry attacks. These were almost everywhere repulsed, but at the Haumont Wood, and in the salient to the north of Beaumont, toward the Joli-Coeur house and the Caures Wood, the Germans were able to secure a footing. Their losses were considerable, but this did not stop the movement.

While this was going on in the north another attack was being prepared in the east, in Woevre, to the northwest of Fromezey, in the space between Fromezey and Mogneville, occupied in part by the Haute-Charrière Wood. As soon as the enemy appeared here he was subjected to a barring fire so heavy that he was unable to complete the proposed movement. On this side the fighting was confined to the artillery—a slow and continuous duel.

Wednesday, Feb. 23.—Between the Meuse and the Herbébois Wood the bombardment was continued throughout the night. We replied with vigor, and at dawn on Wednesday infantry fighting was resumed on a front of nine and a half miles. The village of Haumont was the scene of especially furious fighting in which the enemy suffered severe losses, but gained possession of the ground. To counterbalance this a part of the salient occupied the evening before by the Germans, in the Caures Wood, was retaken by us and a strong attack to the north of Ornes, against our Herbébois line, was stopped short by our fire. The Germans squandered men belonging to seven different army corps; the prisoners we took said that certain enemy units had been completely destroyed. The enemy came forward, wave after wave, only to crumble under our

fire, sowing the slopes and the hollows with thousands and thousands of corpses.

EVACUATION OF BRABANT

Thursday, Feb. 24.—All night long the bombardment continued, from the right bank of the Meuse near Brabant as far as Ornes; the violence of the cannonade was such that it was necessary to order the evacuation of Brabant. It was made without difficulty, thanks to the darkness, while our batteries on the left bank, above Regnéville and Forges, answered the German cannon. This retirement brought us to Samogneux, 1,600 meters to the south, (one mile,) where, at dawn, the enemy launched a strong attack, which was repulsed. But the enemy was more fortunate on the northeast; they took back from us a part of the Caures Wood, employing a brigade for this assault. We only retained an angle of the wood. Our troops fell back before Beaumont and held their position there for part of the day, in spite of vigorous offensives. The village was then abandoned and we organized a line of resistance behind it.

In the same way we had had to give up Herbébois to take up a position in the open passage at the source of the Ornes, between this position and the Chaume Wood, near the village of Ornes. These movements, the tactical reasons for which, as well as the perfect order with which they were executed, were recognized later, brought us to the line of the heights extending from the hamlet of Neuville, in the Commune of Champneuville, to the south of Ornes, where are the Caurières and Vauche Woods.

PEPPER RIDGE

Friday, Feb. 25.—The night of Feb. 24-25 was broken only by artillery fire; no infantry attack was developed. Snow began to fall abundantly; it did not stop the German offensive, which on Feb. 25 began again with unheard-of violence along the whole line, and brought the battle line further to the south, to the edge of the village and fort of Douaumont.

The struggle once more took on the character of the most sanguinary fighting, on the Pepper Ridge, a long back-

bone whose culminating point, near Louvemont, reaches 347 meters (1,138 feet) in height, and which comes to an end above the Meuse at Vacherauville, where the Meuse flows past at a distance of 200 meters, (220 yards.) This position commands the roads from Longuyon and Sedan, by which arrived enemy masses that multiplied their assaults without succeeding in breaking in our front.

On this side the battle was terrible; the stories of the wounded give tragic details of the heaping up of German dead; our report said, "The enemy no longer count their sacrifices."

Even more violent was the struggle around Douaumont; there it took on a character of sanguinary slaughter. Innumerable enemy corpses covered the slopes, and new masses ceaselessly presented themselves, having for objective the village, the fort, and the row of redoubts which border the strategic road leading to the Terre-Froide position.

Douaumont, the culminating point of the intrenched camp of Verdun, had been the object of a terrible bombardment; the fort, at the end of the day, was nothing but a ruin. The defense of the positions near it, notably of the Vauche Wood between Douaumont and Bezonvaux, caused fierce combats; more than once the German assaults were broken before the resistance had fixed itself on the culminating point of the plateau.

DEFENSE OF HAUDROMONT

Saturday, Feb. 26.—The fighting throughout the day of Feb. 26 seems to have been the fiercest, the enemy then making his greatest efforts; our command, on its part, marked a halt in the movement of retreat, or, if the word be preferred, withdrawal. The German batteries redoubled the violence of their bombardment along the whole front, on both sides of the Meuse, to assure the success of this effort which might prove decisive, for, if the lines of Douaumont were forced, the assailants would be able to reach the row of forts which border the passage through which runs the railroad to Metz. Attacks launched with the help of large forces toward Neuville

(Champneuville) and on Pepper Ridge were repulsed. Bloody contests were renewed, without reaching such a paroxysm as marked the struggle about Douaumont. The fort, shaken by the firing of enormous guns, was the object of repeated assaults which cost the enemy enormous losses.

Finally, his success seemed decisive; the defenders having had to abandon the ruins, a Brandenburg regiment, the Twenty-fourth Infantry, effected an entry. This advantage was immediately announced to the whole world by a dispatch from German General Headquarters, proclaiming the capture of the fort of Douaumont, "the northeastern cornerstone of the principal line of permanent fortifications of the fortress of Verdun." The Imperial General Staff was in too great haste to record a great victory. Hardly had the fort been taken from us when a strong counterattack was launched; all the lines were retaken and even passed, the fort was half surrounded without the Brandenburgers having evacuated it.

At the close of the day the enemy outlined two attacks on the flanks of the position; one, to the east, attempted to drive us from the Haudromont farm, situated on a wooded slope between Louvemont and Douaumont, between two folds along which passed roads leading to Bras; our artillery and machine guns broke it; a counterattack pushed back our assailants on the heights of Louvemont.

With equal violence other large enemy contingents made a drive against our Hardaumont positions, between Rezonvaux and Vaux; there also the enemy was repulsed.

The entire effort of the day had, therefore, been concentrated between the road from Louvemont to Bras and the edge of the ridges at Hardaumont. The enemy had failed wherever he attacked, except in the centre, where the fate of Douaumont, reached by the Brandenburgers, and then repassed by us, remained uncertain.

During these three last days events were being prepared in Woevre; we shall later devote a special paragraph to them.

DOUAUMONT AND VAUX

Sunday, Feb. 27.—On the plateau, between the Meuse and Woevre, the enemy's effort was aimed against our right wing; except for artillery action, the region of Champneuville and the Pepper Ridge were not the theatre of any fighting; but, between these two points, the Talou Ridge, (288 meters, 945 feet,) on which we had for a short time made a stand, had to be evacuated, without the enemy being able to gain a footing there, however, as the position, under artillery fire from both sides, had become untenable.

While the bombardment continued along the whole front, the Germans were directing furious efforts against the village and fort of Douaumont, to try to disengage the Brandenburgers, who seem to have remained in the ruins as in a trap. But we held on; repeated furious assaults did not overcome the tenacity of our soldiers. A movement on the east, to the north of the village of Vaux, that is, near the Hardaumont Wood, was not more fortunate. In spite of the unheard-of losses to which they consented, the Germans remained unable to retake the ground from which we had pushed them back.

Monday, Feb. 28.—On Monday also the enemy multiplied attacks around Douaumont, but without giving them the character of massed rushes such as marked the preceding days. These partial attempts at one time resulted in the occupation of one of the redoubts attached to the fort, but a hand-to-hand fight drove the enemy out again. These attacks continued at night, sometimes with great violence; they involved bayonet fighting, in which our men got the better of it.

Tuesday, Feb. 29.—The attacks slackened greatly; all were not noted in the dispatches, for the one of that night announced that the enemy was intrenching on the north slope of Pepper Ridge. But we had been told that our men held that long crest since they had given up the Talou Ridge, on which neither French nor Germans could stand the artillery fire. The Talou Ridge had, therefore, been passed. If the north flank of the Pepper Ridge was now furrowed by the

trenches of our adversaries, the crest remained in our possession. Further, the enemy had still only small numbers on the ground won, since we had shelled a single battalion collected at Samogneux, three miles to the north, on the Meuse.

Except for this incident, the day was only marked by intermittent bombardments.

ATTACKS IN WOEVRE

In the above description of the phases of the great battle, day by day, we have passed over the symptoms which manifested themselves in Woevre of an attack against the eastern front of the intrenched camp, that is, the barrier of the ridges of the Meuse. At the outset we explained the value of these escarpments, and detailed the fortified works which were established there at a time when it could not be supposed that artillery would one day have a power superior to all armor. This line of positions, so long considered impregnable, was threatened in its turn; attacks were produced in three directions, including that of the heights of Vaux-before-Damloup, which we connected with the Douaumont fight.

When the great battle began our lines extended a considerable distance in Woevre, to the outskirts of Etain on the north, and around Fresnes-in-Woevre on the south. Enemy movements against these positions took place to the west of Etain, near Fromezey, as noted under Feb. 22. During the days of Feb. 23 and 24 the bombardment continued on this side with such intensity that a serious attack could be foreseen. Before this threat our command had the posts of the first line withdrawn; this operation was carried out rapidly, with a skill and success so complete that the enemy became aware of it only several hours later. None the less it was announced as a German victory. But we had not fired a shot.

On Feb. 27 the enemy, recovering from his surprise, advanced along the Etain road toward the Eix defile, through which both the road and the railroad from Verdun to Conflans and Metz enter the Woevre district. Our troops occupied the railroad station 2,000 meters (1¼ miles) from Eix and 1,500 meters from

Abaucourt, and bearing the name of these two villages. This station is important because the narrow-gauge railroad from Commercy to Verdun and Montmédy cross the railroad to Metz. Violently attacked, it was taken from us; it was retaken, then taken from us again, and finally remained in our hands.

To the south of the station, at a distance of a little more than 2 kilometers, (1½ miles,) a hillock which dominates by some 30 meters (100 feet) the lower parts of the plain is traversed by a road coming from Etain and going to the entrance of the ridges at Moulainville. This position, strongly occupied by us, had already been bombarded; it was attacked at the same time as the Eix station, but all assaults were repulsed. The front of Moulainville and its attached batteries dominate by 200 feet this crest, which is bordered by two streams.

About six miles to the south the enemy attacked the village of Manheulles, on the direct road from Verdun to Metz, at the point of junction of a road coming from Pont-à-Mousson, with the road which skirts the base of the ridges of the Meuse. The point is thus important; it was energetically defended; the Germans were repulsed. On Monday two attacks directed against Fresnes-in-Woevre failed. But the enemy returned to the charge. He succeeded in seizing Manheulles; but, if he held the village, we retook the approaches to it. The objective of this operation of the Germans was the high promontory of Haudromont, (363 meters, 1,190 feet,) which dominates the plain by more than 100 meters (328 feet) and beneath which the road from Verdun climbs the pedestal of the plateau which holds the fort of Rozellier. Manheulles is 3 kilometers (3,280 yards) away.

ATTACKING DOUAUMONT

As might have been foreseen by noting the constant intense bombardment of our positions on the left (west) bank of the Meuse, an attack, not less serious than that on the front between the Meuse and Woevre, was being prepared on that side; it developed on Monday, Feb. 28, and on Tuesday, Feb. 29, had assumed very large proportions. It was, then, in Eastern Argonne, and perhaps also in Woevre,

that the Germans were preparing to direct their effort, while they confined themselves to demonstrations along the lines of Douaumont. We shall follow the incidents of each of these sectors separately.

The last events which we noted between the Meuse and Woevre were the hand-to-hand combats during the night of Feb. 28-29 around Douaumont, and the lodging of the enemy on the northern slope of Pepper Ridge, the crest of which we continued to hold.

Wednesday, March 1.—The only event was a fairly brisk bombardment; the Germans were preparing infantry attacks which took place on the following day with extreme violence.

Thursday, March 2.—We have not been told the exact points against which these successive assaults were directed; "the region of Douaumont" only was indicated. The fire of our troops pushed back the waves of the enemy while our cannon replied to our adversary and covered with shells the paths by which their columns were advancing to the assault. Our adversaries then resumed the bombardment of the village and made new attacks with redoubled violence. Several times the assailants, cruelly tried, had to retire; a last effort finally allowed them to get a lodging among the ruins.

Another action was going on meanwhile to the east of the village of Vaux, hidden in a hollow dug out in the breast of the ridges of the Meuse, at the outlet of a pond from which flows an affluent of the Ornes. Vaux spreads along this hollow; at the foot of a hill 349 meters (1,144 feet) high, 100 meters (328 feet) above the plain, and crowned by a fort bearing its name, facing the Hardaumont works. The struggle was bloody; the enemy, descending by a kind of defile between the Douaumont fort and the Hardaumont works, rushed against Vaux, without these repeated assaults enabling him to force our wire entanglements. Our machine guns and cannon inflicted enormous losses on him. Finally he withdrew, leaving numerous corpses on the wires.

Friday, March 3.—The struggle was

resumed with great heat around the village of Douaumont. If the enemy was in the ruins, we held the top of the slope under which these lay. A counterattack brought us to the immediate approaches to the hamlet, and, in the evening, we retook them. The affair might have been extended, for troops were seen descending from Beaumont, moving against Pepper Ridge, bombarded since the day before—but our batteries dispersed them.

The enemy did not give up the game. The bombardment was continued.

Saturday, March 4.—Douaumont was once more attacked; the Germans regained a footing there; we drove them out again; they returned; the whole day passed in alternations of successes and withdrawals from this lamentable heap of crumbling dwellings. In the evening the fight took on a larger development; the enemy bombarded the whole sector, more than 3 kilometers, (3,280 yards,) included between the woods which surround the Haudromont farm, near Pepper Ridge, and the fort of Douaumont. A very lively attack followed the cannonade; our barring fire sufficed to stop it. We still held the approaches of Douaumont.

Sunday, March 5.—The bombardment, resumed, was not able to drive us from Douaumont. On the same day an attempt to take from us the little wood covering the extremity of Pepper Ridge, toward Vacherauville, was repulsed.

The Germans had shown a great deal of activity in these regions; troops on the march appeared toward the Fosses Wood near Beaumont, and at the approaches of the village of Louvemont, offering a target to our batteries, which directed their fire upon them.

Monday, March 6.—On the following night no infantry action was attempted; in compensation, the artillery was active, especially between Douaumont and the Meuse. Perhaps the cannonade on this side should be considered a participation in the events which were being prepared on the left (west) bank of the river.

Tuesday, March 7.—The enemy attempted a new attack to the east of Douaumont, against our Hardaumont Wood positions. After a bombardment

which drew a reply from our batteries, troops were launched in an assault; the enemy got a footing in a redoubt; a counterattack drove him out of it.

Wednesday, March 8.—He reoccupied it.

IN WOEVRE

Before following the contests which suddenly carried the interest to the west, we must record what took place in Woevre, or rather in a small corner of that region, around Fresnes-in-Woevre.

We have seen that the enemy had succeeded in seizing Manheulles, a village situated on the road from Metz to Verdun, 2,500 meters (2,733 yards) from the promontory of Haudiomont, which sticks out, high and abrupt, before the mass of the ridges. But an attack against the neighboring town, Fresnes-in-Woevre, failed. Renewed on March 1, after an intense bombardment, it had a brief success; certain elements of our trenches were entered. A counterattack restored them to us. During March 2 a bombardment of like force took place; it was continued through the night; however, when the Germans attempted to advance our barring fire sufficed to push them back. Thereafter the cannonade continued, becoming constantly more intense. On March 7 it covered not only Fresnes but the villages which fringe the base of the ridges of the Meuse, and was followed by a very powerful infantry attack; our troops resisted valiantly, causing the adversary heavy losses, but had finally to abandon the town, without doubt withdrawing through Bonzée-in-Woevre on the ridges of the Meuse, to the north of Les Eparges, where mine contests took place. Les Eparges is at least five kilometers (three miles) to the southwest of Fresnes. The artillery struggle was continued with vigor. The fire of our batteries on Blanzée and Grimaucourt makes it probable that the enemy was active near the Conflans railroad.

In this region the enemy gets supplies by the railroad from Commercy to Montmédy, which receives, at Vigneulles-les-Hattonchâtel, the munitions and food supplies sent from Metz by the strategic railroad from Thiaucourt to St. Mihiel.

On different occasions the Vigneulles junction was bombarded by our airmen and long-range guns; this firing was renewed, for Vigneulles has an important part to play in events; several trains were hit, a locomotive blew up, fires were observed. These results bring credit to our fire, which was directed from a long distance.

WEST OF THE MEUSE.

General Séré de Rivières, creator of the intrenched camp of Verdun, held that the most threatened point of the great fortress would be the western sector, that is, the left bank of the Meuse. He feared that an enemy coming from Champagne and Argonne might get very close to the town, on the high hills which form the watershed between the Meuse and the Aire. He had proposed to cover the place along the line of the summit, by establishing a fort ten kilometers (6 miles) from the town on the plateau of Sivry-la-Perche. By expressing the fear that the enemy might get a footing on the northeast—toward Mort Homme Hill—he indicated that these heights should have been occupied.

It was the organization of this position that had to be considered in 1914, when the French and Germans had fixed their defense between Verdun and Montfaucon. Violent battles extending from Montfaucon to the Meuse ended by giving us as our barrier, after many fluctuations, the valley of the Forges stream, a rivulet born near the twin villages of Malancourt and Haucourt, and passing through Béthincourt on its way to join the Meuse opposite Brabant-on-the-Meuse, from which the battle of 1916 developed. The stream separated the two sides; from Malancourt the lines of the trenches descended toward Avocourt, left to the enemy the woods of Cheppy, to the French the forest of Hesse, then, by a sinuous line, crossed and divided the peak of Vauquois, passing the Aire at Boureuilles, which remained in our hands, and finally climbing up into the Argonne forest toward the Fille-Morte and the Haute-Chevau-chée.

The enemy made Montfaucon, a feudal stronghold perched on the top of a con-

ical hill, the centre of his position. Thence he threatened the whole region between the Aire and the Meuse—the eastern Argonne. The movement which took place in March had been foreseen for a long time.

Malancourt, in our hands, is only 4 kilometers (2½ miles) from Montfaucon. The watershed is a range of ridges reaching 304 meters (1,000 feet) between the villages of Malancourt and Esnes, which is dominated by a hill 310 meters (1,017 feet) high. There is here a series of very strong positions; a valley coming down from Béthincourt separates them from a system of hills which slope down to the Meuse at Regnéville, opposite Samogneux. On these hills there are some well-marked crests—two at the Mort Homme are, the one 265 meters, the other 295 meters, (870 and 968 feet;) a long ridge which separates the Forges brook from the broad valley of the Meuse toward Cumières reaches 265 meters (870 feet) between this village and Regnéville. It is called the height of Goose Ridge at the place where the Forges road crosses it.

This whole system of heights which descends in a gentle slope, like a glacis, toward the Forges Valley, had been submitted to bombardment from the beginning of the battle of Verdun. This artillery action was even more accentuated beginning with March 1, being particularly directed against the Mort Homme, Goose Ridge, and the passages of the Meuse, and then extending toward Malancourt. The cannonade was continued during the night of March 4-5, through the whole of Sunday, (March 5,) and the forenoon of March 6, from Béthincourt to the Meuse.

Then the infantry came on the stage. The village of Forges, where we had a post, was vigorously attacked—a fierce struggle which compelled us to evacuate Forges to transfer the defense to Goose Ridge. The enemy launched several successive attacks against these slopes without succeeding in reaching the summit. Our counterattacks drove him back into the village.

This was only the beginning. On March 6, after an intense bombardment, a new and more violent attack was made.

Troops which came from Forges followed the railroad track, on which a marked curve follows more regularly the curve of the Meuse at Regnéville, and, coming in small groups, concentrated to climb up the slopes, while an entire division, coming up from Forges, under our fire, reached the summit, 265-Meter Hill, a kilometer (1,093 yards) to the east of Goose Ridge. In spite of heavy losses they were able to gain a foothold. But the height of Goose Ridge remained in our hands; we remained masters of Béthincourt, of the woods of Corbeaux and Cumières and, consequently, of the Mort Homme hillocks. This line of defense, violently bombarded by large-calibre guns during March 7, was the object of multiplied attacks; all were repulsed, but the enemy was able to gain a footing at the centre of our lines in the Corbeaux Wood sector; thus at two points he held the crest between the Forges Valley and the meander formed by the Meuse around the territory of Champneuville. These two points, between which is the height of Goose Ridge, are the approaches of the Corbeaux Wood, if not the wood itself, and 265-Meter Hill.

On March 8 we counterattacked in the Corbeaux Wood and drove out the enemy, who held on only in the extreme east. A German attack with large forces against Béthincourt was repulsed at the same time. Violent fighting continued for two days, at the end of which the Germans had succeeded in regaining the position from which we had driven them.

Thursday, March 9.—We pushed our assailants back from the Corbeaux Wood, and carried on an artillery duel while our long-range guns shelled convoys signaled on our extreme left wing in the wooded region comprised between Avocourt and Montfaucon. On the next day, also, our batteries took as a target an enemy column in the same direction. It must be noted that, each day since the battle began, there had been similar firing on this side. But, in spite of the activity shown by the movements of the enemy in this forest formed of communal woods, there was, up to this, no infantry action.

Friday, March 10.—Was marked by repeated assaults against our Corbeaux Wood position. In vain did our shells, the fire of our machine guns and the rifle fire from our trenches break up their ranks; new waves swept forward. Finally, to break our resistance, the enemy launched against us forces estimated at not less than a division, (20,000 men.) At a cost of enormous losses he succeeded in dislodging us from the part of the wood which we had retaken. In the night the effort was directed against Béthincourt, along the road which connects this village with Chattancourt, by the Mort Homme positions. The enemy penetrated a connecting trench, from which a counterattack drove him immediately.

Saturday, March 11; Sunday, March 12.—There was a continuous bombardment, to which we replied with success.

Monday, March 13.—The fire of our adversaries redoubled, directed against the Mort Homme and, more to the south, the undulating region whose highest points are occupied by the Bois-Bourrus Woods, 400 hectares (1,000 acres) in extent. These woods give their name to one of the forts which cover a long crest that comes out over the Meuse above Charny, a series of works separated by 6 kilometers ($3\frac{3}{4}$ miles) from the citadel and circuit wall of Verdun. On this day our long-range guns reached the enemy organizations, the shelters and field railroads in the region of Montfaucon, where were organized the forces destined to operate against Béthincourt and the movement of which was carried out on the following day.

Tuesday, March 14.—After several hours' bombardment the enemy directed a strong attack against the three-mile front between the Béthincourt road and Cumières. The enemy was repulsed, but gained a footing in certain elements of the trenches between Béthincourt and the Mort Homme.

Wednesday, March 15.—He lost a part of this by a counterattack, after which our front was marked out by Béthincourt, the Mort Homme, the edge of Cumières Wood, and Cumières village.

THE FIGHT FOR VAUX

Events between the Meuse and the plain of Woivre had been more important. It will be remembered that, on March 7, the Germans essayed against the Hardaumont Wood an attack which allowed them to keep a redoubt that was long contested. On March 8 the struggle began once more, very fiercely, between Douaumont and the village of Vaux. Several times running, large forces, the whole of the Third Corps, it was said, sustained by violent artillery fire, drove against our lines without bending them. The enemy was continually repulsed; at one time the village of Vaux was entered; our men freed it by a counterattack with the bayonet.

The fight was continued all night and the following day with growing violence. The Germans directed furious assaults against Vaux, covering the ground with their dead. Other troops were launched against the steep slopes which led to the fort; in massed formations, the enemy tried to climb the cliff-like ascent, but crumbled under our fire; their losses were enormous. The enemy believed themselves certain to succeed; the German General Staff telegraphed to Berlin to announce the taking of Vaux and the armored fort; the name of the victorious General was given, and the numbers of the regiments that had gained the victory. The large cities were illuminated. Our command was compelled to issue a contradiction; the Germans, caught in the act, extricated themselves by announcing that we had "retaken" the fort, which we had never lost. Our enemy's sacrifices in men had been terrible; yet they prepared to renew them on the same day, when our artillery, reaching their organizations, forced them to disperse.

On March 10 they returned to the charge, after having once more directed an intense bombardment against the ravine-like hollow with precipitous sides. Assault after assault was directed against the heaps of ruins that had been Vaux. All these efforts only enabled the enemy to occupy a few houses around the church, built at the spot where the ravine opens out into the plain, the open-

ing of which the enemy had been able to reach, thanks to the fog.

At the same time the steep hill on which is the fort and its batteries had been approached by the Germans; in spite of terrible losses, our enemy reached the slope of the plateau; but there they found themselves against our barbed wire entanglements; they could not even reach them, as our fire drove them back in masses over the edge of the hill.

On the same day (March 10) our trenches to the west of Douaumont, that is, toward the wood which covers the ravine-cleft curve that opens beneath the Haudromont farm, were attacked with unprecedented violence. Three times successively, in columns of four, the enemy surged against our lines. Each time our cannon and machine guns broke up these masses, which, decimated and exhausted, were forced to retreat to the shelter of the trenches. But the German artillery continued firing with great intensity against Douaumont and Vaux. After this, the infantry did not attack this region again except on March 13, toward Haudromont; a strong reconnoissance was stopped as soon as it appeared.

An advance was made close to the Meuse. On March 11 a grenade attack took place in a thicket called the Bois-Carré, at the end of Pepper Ridge, next the river. On March 12 the gathering of troops was signaled by our observers in the ravine hollowed out on the north of that ridge, whose sides, carpeted with short grass, remained in our hands. Our shells rained on these groups, and reached the German batteries installed between Louvemont and the Longuyon road.

On Monday, March 13, the enemy's activity was concentrated in a violent bombardment against Vaux and Dam-loup.

In Woivre, except for an unimportant infantry attack, which, on the evening of March 11, took from us one element of our trenches on the road from Verdun to Conflans, to the north of Eix, there was only an artillery duel, but this was continuous. It was especially violent, beginning with March 10, along the whole line of the ridges, from Eix to the

height of Fresnes-in-Woevre. Eix, Moullainville, and its steep slopes, then, beyond Haudromont, Villers-under-Bonchamps, and Bonzée, and, later, Ronvaux on the north slope of the Haudiomont promontory, were cannonaded; our artillery replied to the enemy, whose infantry did not intervene.

The Germans tried to interfere with our communications between the two banks of the Meuse by launching floating mines at St. Mihiel on March 10; they hoped to blow up the bridges which we had thrown across the river and the permanent bridges of Verdun. But the river is well guarded; the terrible engines were discovered and fished out.

Thursday, March 16.—As on the preceding day, gun fire was particularly violent. Our batteries had to hammer the works which the enemy constructed between Douaumont and Haudromont. Movements of troops were signaled near Vaux, and caught under the fire of our guns. It was the prelude of an attack which developed toward 8 in the evening, and which the usual bombardment enabled us to foresee. It consisted of a whole series of furious actions, directed against the village of Vaux and the slopes crowned by the fort. Twice the village was assailed; the enemy, subjected to our fire, was compelled to retreat, leaving numerous dead in the ruins. The heights were twice subjected to equally furious attacks; there also the troops that attempted to scale the cliff were broken up. The enemy did not admit that they were defeated; taking advantage of the night, they entered, to the southeast of the village, a sunken road by which they hoped to get behind the fort; but our men were vigilant; cannon and machine guns dispersed the attacking column. It would seem that in these attacks our infantry played a subordinate part; the artillery and machine guns overcame the attack.

Friday, March 17; Saturday, March 18.—On Saturday the Germans returned to the charge, attempting, in the forenoon, along the whole front from Haudromont to Vaux, a series of partial attacks, which did not succeed in reaching our trenches. In the afternoon, after vig-

orously bombarding Vaux, the slopes of the fort, and the ridges, toward Damloup, they launched a new assault, but our barring fire pushed them back again, and they were compelled to retire. After this Vaux was left in peace. On Wednesday, March 22, the bombardment was still going on.

THE MORT HOMME REGION

Events on the left (west) bank of the Meuse were more important. On March 15, after having retaken a part of the trenches on 265-Meter Hill, to the north of the principal height of the Mort Homme, we held a line going from Béthincourt to Cumières, by the Mort Homme and the fringe of the wood of Cumières, which joins the Corbeaux Wood. The enemy seemed to be keeping quiet, but, on March 16, he resumed the bombardment of this front and, in the afternoon, made a strong attack in waves of assault which were broken forthwith by our fire. It appears that six divisions (120,000 men) were engaged.

They did not attack again on this side, but our guns continued to shell the connecting roads behind their front, anticipating a movement from the southwest. March 18 was marked only by the fire of our guns against the positions near the Mort Homme and the Corbeaux Wood.

Sunday, March 19.—Quiet reigned all along the front.

Monday, March 20.—An intense bombardment with shells of the largest calibre suddenly broke out to the west and southwest of Béthincourt, on the sector extending from the village of Malancourt to Avocourt, the two villages being separated by a wooded hill which forms a part of the sylvan zone called the Forest of Montfaucon. After this preparation an entire division was launched in an attack. It had not up to this time taken part in the operations before Verdun, and arrived intact from a distant front. Preceded by men who projected flaming liquids, it rushed against our lines; in spite of the violence of the assault, our fire held the enemy; cannon, machine guns, infantry fire caused such losses that the assailant was forced to

retire, holding only the east end of the woods.

The bombardment began again, and lasted throughout the night.

Tuesday, March 21.—Repeated infantry attacks were preceded by the projectors of flaming liquids. Our fire inflicted enormous losses on the enemy, but was not able to prevent his getting a footing in the southeast end of the forest, called the Avocourt Wood.

While this fighting was going on the enemy's long-range fire continued to sweep the ground between Malancourt and the approaches of the Bois-Bourrus. The 304-Meter Hill, between Malancourt and Esnes, was a special target. Its occupation would have made it possible to attack the Mort Homme from the rear. On March 21 the artillery struggle was intense, but the Germans made no new infantry attacks.

Wednesday, March 22.—Several attacks were directed against our fronts comprised between Malancourt and the angle of the Avocourt Wood. All the attempts of the enemy to advance from the wood were checked, and he only gained a foothold on a hillock to the southwest of Haucourt.

During the next week no infantry fighting took place around Verdun. It might have been thought that the battle was ended.

Tuesday, March 28.—The struggle began again in the Malancourt-Avocourt region, without advantage to the enemy.

Wednesday, March 29.—We made appreciable gains. We had foreseen a renewal of infantry fighting which had been announced by the almost continuous bombardment of our lines, and the fire which we directed on the woods constituting the forest of Apremont and, beyond, on the region where the departments of the Meuse and of the Ardennes march together, from the defile of Grandpré, in the Argonne Forest, to the approaches of Montfaucon. On Wednesday morning our artillery opened fire on the Avocourt Wood, which we had had to abandon during the preceding week, and prepared an attack on the southeast corner. Our infantry, sent forward to the assault, seized trenches on a depth of

more than 300 meters, (330 yards,) reached a work called the Avocourt redoubt, powerfully held by the enemy, and seized it. The Germans tried to regain this ground; they threw against our positions a brigade which had recently arrived and had not yet been engaged. It suffered the fate of other assaulting troops; its effort was broken; after great losses, it was thrown back to the west.

The enemy at the same time resumed his attack, with considerable forces, against the village of Malancourt; he seized an advance work, to the north, and two houses, but could not press home this slight success.

DOUAUMONT-VAUX LINE

Between the Meuse and the plain of Woevre also there were only intermittent bombardments, more sustained on the sector Douaumont-Vaux-Damloup. On this side also the enemy's fire was extended to reach our second lines, the row of forts to the north of the Metz railroad. The German dispatches boasted of the destruction of the City of Verdun by incendiary bombs, a procedure to which Rheims, Soissons, and Arras have accustomed us.

Our cannon replied vigorously to the enemy from Pepper Ridge and Douaumont and Vaux.

In Woevre there was a renewed artillery attack on the ridges of the Meuse, from Moulainville to Eparges; Châtillon, between Moulainville and Haudiomont was also bombarded. Noting troop movements, our airmen bombarded the enemy's railroad communications, setting fire to a train of cars on March 27. Three days earlier a train of munitions had been destroyed at Vigneulles.

Thursday, March 30.—The Germans approached our trenches, which they had bombarded on the previous day. Preceded by projectors of flaming liquids, they threw themselves on us. In spite of their barbarous methods of surprise, they were pushed back, but soon returned to the charge, to be thrown back again after suffering heavy losses.

But they did not give up the game. In the afternoon they resumed the bombardment with extreme violence, keeping

it up all night on a front of 5 kilometers (3 miles) from the woods of Haudromont, near Pepper Ridge, to Vaux.

Friday, March 31.—During Friday night they launched two attacks in great force against Vaux. The first was not even able to approach our lines, as our gun and rifle fire broke it up. The second, directed especially against the village, was very lively; the Germans succeeded in occupying the western part of Vaux.

Saturday, April 1.—The enemy, wishing to extend his success, tried to dislodge us from the ravine which comes down from the fort of Douaumont to Vaux, but our barring fire stopped him.

Sunday, April 2.—The fight became more violent. A bombardment with large calibre shells was prolonged for a considerable time. When the enemy thought the desired effect had been produced he sent forward four columns at once, more than a division, (20,000 men,) on the whole front from Douaumont to Vaux. To the south of the road which joins these two villages there is a wood of some size, which is called La Caillette. The Germans succeeded in penetrating it, but counterattacks took most of it away from them again; they were pushed back on the north of the wood, near Douaumont fort. At Vaux they failed to drive us from the approaches of the village.

Monday, April 3.—Our troops vigorously counterattacked, and succeeded in retaking most of the Caillette Wood, and, throwing themselves on Vaux, retook the part of the village which had been taken from us. This last action was carried out with exceptional energy.

Tuesday, April 4.—After a bombardment lasting till 3 P. M., compact masses of the enemy appeared coming out of the little Chaufour Wood, 500 meters (547 yards) to the northwest of the village of Douaumont, followed at a distance by columns ready to profit by a breach in our lines, situated between Douaumont and the row of redoubts joining the fort to the Terre-Froide Ridge. Our batteries and machine guns immediately opened fire on these masses, which were estimated to contain more than a division, (20,000 men.) Whole ranks were mowed

down; twice the wave broke against our trenches, small isolated columns coming up to sustain the assault, while the reaping continued. At last the enemy troops flowed back in disorder, seeking cover in the Chaufour Wood, from which they had come. Our batteries, concentrating their fire, dug new hollows in the masses taking refuge in the bushes. No help could come from the German detachments occupying the north corner of the Caillette Wood; these also were pushed back by our troops, who pressed them vigorously against the Douaumont fort.

Wednesday, April 5.—The slopes on which is the fort of Moulainville, on the ridges of the Meuse, were very heavily bombarded, as far as Châtillon. Floating mines, sent down from St. Mihiel, as before, to destroy the Verdun bridges, were stopped.


IN AVOCOURT WOOD

In the night of March 28-29, the Germans several times threw themselves on that part of the Avocourt Wood from which we had driven them; each time, our barring fire drove them back, inflicting terrible losses. The principal attack was against the redoubt, where their dead bodies were piled up in heaps.

On the following day the Avocourt zone was quiet except for two grenade contests, but at Malancourt, after a night bombardment, the enemy launched a series of massed attacks, approaching the village from three sides. We had only a battalion (1,000 men) there, while the forces launched against them were estimated at five brigades, (50,000 men.) Our little troop resisted valiantly, inflicting enormous losses, and then withdrew without losing one unwounded prisoner. The Germans then occupied the ruins of Malancourt, but were able to go no further; we held all the approaches.

Until April 2 there was only intermittent bombardment. On April 2 repeated assaults failed to capture the Avocourt redoubt. Our trenches on the left bank of the Forges rivulet, rendered untenable by the taking of Malancourt, had been evacuated on the night of March 31, without the enemy discovering it; throughout the whole of April 1 he bombarded these empty galleries unceas-

A HISTORIC MOMENT IN THE SUBMARINE CRISIS



President Woodrow Wilson Delivering His Address to Congress on the Ultimatum to Germany, April 19, 1916

CONFERENCE OF THE ALLIES IN PARIS, MARCH 27-28



Presided over by President Briand of France, who is No. 25 in the photograph. The others are (1) Premier Asquith of England; (2) Lord Bertie, (3) Lloyd George, Minister of Munitions, both of England; (4) M. Thomas of France; (5) Lord Kitchener and (6) General Sir William Robertson of England; (7) an English military aid; (8) Ambassador Tittoni, (9) Premier Salandra, (10) Baron Sonnino, (11) General Cadorna, and (12) General Dall' Olio, all of Italy; (13) Mr. Matsi, Japan; (14) Senhor Chagas of Portugal; (15) General Gilinski, (16) M. Isvolsky, of Russia; (17) Premier Pashitch, (18) General Vesnitch, and (19) Yovan Yovanovitch, of Serbia; (20) General Rochitch; (21) General Castelneau, (22) General Joffre, (23) Admiral Lacaze, (26) General Roques, (27) General Bourgeois, all of France; and (28) Sir Edward Grey of England.

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ingly and on April 2 launched a strong attack against them. We had transferred our defense to the right bank of the Forges rivulet, where bare slopes, forming a glacis, gave us a superb shooting range. From these slopes our guns, aided by the guns of Béthincourt, which took the assailants obliquely, mowed the enemy down without their finding a man in front of them.

The bombardment from Avocourt to Béthincourt was resumed, but the expected infantry attacks did not develop, with the exception of an assault against Haucourt on the afternoon of April 4. It was repulsed.

SUMMARY OF LATER EVENTS

[By the Translator]

To bring the account of this terrible and unprecedented battle up to date, it is necessary only to enumerate the oft-repeated and as often-repelled attacks at three points: First, in the Woevre region, the plain which lies to the east of the ridges of the Meuse on the east of Verdun, between the great intrenched camp and Metz; secondly, on the right (east) bank of the Meuse, in the region between Douaumont and Vaux, and, third, on the left (west) bank of the Meuse, against the Mort Homme Hill, 304-Meter Hill, and 287-Meter Hill, all of which have been described again and again in the foregoing narrative. The attacks, beginning with April 5, are as follows:

1. In the Woevre, April and May, almost incessant bombardment; few infantry attacks.
2. East of the Meuse, April 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 17, and 27, and May 8.
3. West of the Meuse, April 5, 7, 9, 10, and 22, and May 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

In each of the three battle sectors practically the same ground was fought over, week after week; where the Ger-

mans made small gains French counter-attacks invariably drove them out.

From a consideration of these facts two conclusions follow: First, that during the last week of February the French were not retreating from a strong position, but were retreating to a strong position; and, having reached their definitive line of defense, they have been able to hold it against the greatest and most furious assaults ever made in the history of war, prepared by the most tremendous artillery forces that have ever been brought together. This successful defense forms one of the finest military achievements ever recorded, and brings higher glory to the soldiers of France, from General Joffre, General Castelnau, and General Petain to the privates in the trenches, than did even the great and decisive victory of the Marne. Secondly, it is quite evident that, after the first two weeks of the battle—when the original plan miscarried—the German Great General Staff has had no plan at all, no strategic, no tactical, conception; it has simply been a case of blindly, obstinately hammering away; and the rotation of the attacks, against the three sectors we have indicated, might just as well have been settled by the rattling of the dice-box. On this point a military writer recently said:

In short, with ever-ebbing vigor, the German Army is smashing its head against the walls of Verdun. The weight and vigor of the blows decrease, but the suicidal mania continues. Two months have passed since the early success of the German attack ended with the capture of Vaux village. Each resumption of the attempt to take Verdun since that time has been a cause for increasing wonder. What is there about this enterprise that has turned it into a fatal obsession, from which the German high command cannot escape, however great the cost of continuance?





A BERLIN ARTIST'S VIEW OF GERMAN WAR TRIUMPHS

[A GERMAN INTERPRETATION]

Verdun: The Epic of the War

WRITTEN FOR CURRENT HISTORY

By H. H. von Mellenthin

Foreign Editor New Yorker Staats-Zeitung

VERDUN has brought war back into honor, the sort of war in which the individual man and personal courage are given their full chances and values. At Verdun the bearing-down strategy, the open battle, comes back into honor. Trench warfare is that form of wearing-down strategy which plays the bloody game with the least possible risk, and which has no great fondness for battle.

This war, like all others, will be won not in the trenches, but on the battlefield. The wearing-down strategy, which aims at tiring the opponent to the point of utter exhaustion, at winning the war by a gradual wearing-out, is false. The view that trench warfare means the last word of strategy has long since been disproved. The last word is still the same today that it was in the days of the great bearing-down strategists, Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Napoleon, Gneisenau, Sheridan, Moltke.

The strategy which aims at defeating the enemy in open battle becomes folly only when it becomes recklessness—the kind of recklessness which “puts all on one throw.” But Verdun is not a “throw.” The results that can be expected from the wearing-out strategy are definitely limited; the effects of the bearing-down strategy, however, are decisive. That is the lesson of the history of world wars, the great teacher and admonisher. The decisive effects whereof we speak embody victory.

Verdun will bring the decision. And the victory will be fought for with legitimate weapons and with open visor. At

Verdun bombardments are carried on neither with “silver bullets” nor with “paper notes.” The battle is fought neither with the intrigues of back-stairways nor from ambush. At Verdun there are no “hymns of hate,” no “boches,” and no “degenerates.” The sole commander upon that battlefield is military genius. The fight is fought, breast to breast, by man’s courage, the sort of courage that does not deny even to the enemy the recognition that is due him.

In the midst of the tragedy, after the various satires and farces of this war of nations, Verdun is an epic, a song of heroism. Let Thersites return! Patroclus lies in his grave of honor before Verdun, too; Verdun is the Epopeus, the Iliad of this war.

Priam’s fortress fell. Verdun, too, will fall.

* * *

The German General Staff figured the duration of the Verdun campaign at five months. The Imperial German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, declared in the Reichstag that the operations against the fortress of Verdun were developing in accordance with an accurately pre-determined plan which provided for all possibilities.

The Prussian War Minister, General Wild von Hohenborn, made the following statement in the Reichstag session of April 11, last:

“These are not, as our enemies are pretending to believe, the last exertions of an exhausted nation, but the hammer blows of a strong, invincible people which commands sufficient reserves in

men and all other means for the continuation of the hammer blows."

With the accuracy of clock-work and with the force of hammer blows the German campaign against Verdun takes its course. Like a giant glacier, slowly but irresistibly, the solid mass of German warriors sweeps down upon Verdun.

That is the German view of the events which have taken place since February 21 on the fronts of Verdun, and of the military situation as it has developed.

The French view is reflected in the announcement that the Verdun campaign as such is already a closed incident, and in the decree which bestowed upon General Petain, the defender of Verdun—who, in the meantime, has been hurled upon the Tarpeian rock—the highest dignity of the Honor Legion: "It is due to his calm firmness and to the wisdom and foresight of his orders that he succeeded in improving a precarious situation and in inspiring all with confidence."

The ultimate goal of every war consists in beating the enemy army, in putting it out of action. As against this ultimate aim, which means victory, fortresses are, in themselves, without significance. Their military importance for the development and often for the decision, is based solely upon the question as to whether and in what respect they are suitable to the army as bases in an offensive and as points of refuge in a defensive, and whether and how they are suitable as the "starting points" for a great drive.

Antwerp, which was regarded as the strongest and most modern fortress, had lost its military importance from the moment it was divested, by the rapid and victorious march of the German troops through Belgium, of its suitability as a base for an allied march into Germany. The fortress could not even serve as a refuge point.

The whole powerful fortress chain on the eastern frontier of Russia was important for the development of the war only by virtue of the fact that it covered the retreat of the Russian armies and created for them the possibility to escape the threatened envelopment.

Verdun, however, is not at all a fortress in the accepted sense of the term. Verdun represents an entirely novel and modern strategic factor. As a link of the French chain of fortresses which extends down to Belfort, Verdun had been constructed and built out first, as a point of concentration of the military forces for an offensive; second, as the gate from which these forces were to be put into motion against the enemy; third, as a point of refuge for the event of the failure of an offensive, and fourth, as a battlefield upon which a possible invasion was to be resisted.

A starting point for an offensive against the enemy is at the same time a point of incidence for the enemy. Verdun represents the "Anti-Metz." But the German frontier stronghold also represents the "Anti-Verdun." With Metz as their base, the Germans are driving against Verdun, which blocks the advance into the interior of France. To open the door for this advance—that is the task the German General Staff has set itself in the campaign against Verdun.

The fall of Verdun would bring the purpose and aim of every war, the disabling of the hostile army, very considerably nearer its realization.

The events up to date before the fortress have given the military situation the following aspect:

Verdun, intended as a starting point, has completely lost its value as such and as a base for an offensive. It no longer forms a refuge point for the army, but must be defended by the army in open battle. The defense already has devoured such huge masses of troops that in these circumstances there can scarcely be any question of an offensive at any other point of the front.

What do these things mean? They mean that the German General Staff is aiming, with the campaign against Verdun, at an advance into the interior of France. Such an advance would bring into motion all other fronts as well.

The achievements up to date of the German operations against Verdun may be comprised thus:

1. Verdun is no longer a starting point for an offensive, but has become the point of incidence for the enemy.

2. A large part of the French army has been completely withdrawn from active part in the war and is partly "tied up" on a very small part of the front.

3. The successes of German arms won thus far create all the pre-conditions for the systematic extension of that which has already been achieved. This means that they are driving further and further toward the ultimate goal of all wars: the disabling of the enemy's army.

As for the discussions in the allied countries, the Verdun campaign, as a military undertaking with a definite aim in view, has already been relegated to the "closed incidents" and is merely considered an offensive operation on a larger scale, comparable to the French drive in Artois and Champagne last September. Again, on the German side, the wishes were so "well winged," and the marching gait of expectations was so rapid, that the German troops and the successes have not always been able to keep an even pace. A closer understanding of the tactics employed in the fighting against Verdun teaches one to realize the reasons for this slow and systematic pushing forward. The rate of the forward movement is determined, first, by the strength of the resistance it meets, and, second, by the careful sparing of human material.

The operations at Verdun since Feb. 21 can be divided into three sections. Each new phase forms the continuation of that which preceded it on the militarily logical line of development. The first phase, the shortest, consisted of the advance against the northern outer fortifications in the terrain lying in front of the fortress, and in the capture of the area necessary for a concentrated attack and for the bringing up of the heavy guns. It culminated in the storming of Fort Douaumont, Feb. 25.)

The second phase was initiated by the extension of the attacking front to the east, from the Woevre plain against the Côte Lorraine. This advance brought the attackers as far as the foot of the

Meuse Heights. The northernmost point of this line south of the railway leading from Verdun to Metz is the village and railway station of Eix; to the north of the railway this line stretches as far as Dieppe. From Eix two roads lead in a westerly direction against Verdun, through the two valleys of the Meuse Heights; the old army road and the railway. North of the railway the advance started out from the line Damloup-Dieppe. In that area the contact was established between the German northern army and the Woevre army. Both armies were participating in the fighting against Vaux, which aims at the possession of the whole plateau between Douaumont, Harcourt, and Vaux—fighting which is still in progress.

The third stage of the Verdun battle carried the extension of the German front of attack to the west, to the left bank of the Meuse, from the line Forges-Malancourt to within the firing range against Le Mort Homme and the Côte de L'Oie. This new offensive is directed against the northwestern outer fortifications of Verdun, as well as against the railway which leads from Verdun to Paris and which is today the only great line of supply—and the logical line of escape.

The first move in this offensive was the advance (March 14) against Le Mort Homme (Dead Man Hill) on the sector Béthincourt-Cumières and then (March 20 to 22) through the large wooded area between Malancourt and Avocourt. As a consequence, the French front had assumed the form of a salient whose head, extending beyond Haucourt to Malancourt, reached far into the German positions. This head was crushed in by the Germans through the capture of Malancourt. The loss of the northern slopes of Termiten Hill (Hill 287) on April 7 forced the French to evacuate their positions south of the Forges Brook between Haucourt and Béthincourt, as well as to abandon the latter village itself, all these positions being exposed to the German flanking fire. The new French line now ran from the southern slopes of Bois d'Avocourt over Hill 304 to the southern slopes of Le

Mort Homme and the Bois des Corbeaux. The taking up of this new front marked the conclusion of the third stage of the campaign, a stage which, with artillery duels and occasional infantry attacks, lasted into the middle of April.

The fourth phase of the campaign of Verdun will one day be the object of deep and extensive study for the history of wars. This phase is taken up by a great military surprise: a French counteroffensive. The French had, by means of occasional counterattacks, made repeated attempts to escape encirclement by the Germans at Verdun. The surprise, however, consisted of the fact that the French General Staff had actually weighed the possibility of a great counteroffensive against Metz. It was as a result of the consideration of such a possibility that the counterattacks at Le Mort Homme, as well as in the area of Douaumont, were launched—evidently with entirely fresh troops. The force of this countermovement was, for a time, such that the German line had to be taken back at certain points. It was this force which deceived the military experts on the allied side into the theory that the German campaign at Verdun was already ended. The necessity to meet such a force of the French counterattacks is also the reason for the temporary lull in the German forward movement.

The great Spring offensive had been the hope of the Allies and the pride of the French. With the tremendous army reserves of General Joffre the German lines were to be penetrated, France's sacred soil was to be cleared of the invaders. This offensive was spoken of in Paris in the whispering tone of worship; it was the sacred event-to-be, the evangelism of the French.

A recently published report of the French War Ministry shows that the view was originally held in the French camp that the German attacks against Verdun were merely a "make-believe" manoeuvring, aimed at diverting attention from the preparations for a really great offensive at some other point of the front; a view which has found its echo in the neutral countries as well.

The important reserves of General Joffre were to be saved for the great allied Spring offensive. Therefore the attempt was first made when the Verdun campaign began to get along with the reserve formations in the neighboring forts.

However, the development of the military situation has made it necessary for France to mass in the Verdun area alone thirty divisions, with a total strength of 450,000.

As early as January there was circulated among the peasant population of Lorraine the rumor of an impending French offensive against Metz. French fliers dropped messages foreshadowing the event, telling the residents of Metz to leave the town because it was to be completely destroyed. From the direction of Pont-à-Mousson the frontal terrain of Metz was bombarded by heavy calibre guns; the Germans were to be driven from the Combres Height on the Côte Lorraine and ejected from St. Mihiel, and among the French troops west of the Meuse the word was passed that they were to be sent forth against Metz. April 15 was fixed as the date for the beginning of the offensive.

It was about this time that we witnessed the beginning of a French attempt at a counteroffensive at Verdun. West of the Meuse it was set in motion from the salient position on Hill 304 and on the eastern slopes of Mort Homme, as well as in the area between Bois des Corbeaux and the Bois de Cumières. To the east the movement was launched on the front between Vaux and Douaumont and against the German positions in the Bois Caures and on the hills to the southwest of Douaumont, as well as against the whole German line from Douaumont to the ravine of the Vaux Brook.

Simultaneously with these moves there appeared in the press a Reuter dispatch to the effect that the civil population of Metz was about to evacuate the city. That was a distinct echo of the previous warning of the French fliers.

The analysis of this French offensive, the great military surprise, will one day furnish the history of wars a highly in-

teresting chapter of the Verdun campaign. Today it is only known that the French counterattacks on both banks of the Meuse broke down with terrific losses to the attackers. Perhaps the change in the chief command of the Verdun defense, coming as it does at a truly critical moment, may be explained by the ineffectiveness and the heavy losses of that offensive. This fourth phase of the campaign around Verdun was stifled in blood.

The fifth phase began a few days ago with the storming of Hill 304, to the northwest of Verdun, which was the initial success in the resumption of the German attacks.

The gravity of the French situation lies in the losses suffered. The number of killed is so great that the number of unwounded prisoners is only 40 officers and 1,280 men. The consequences of the new German success are, for the French, even more serious. According to a French account of the situation the French Commander in Chief had stationed his ablest army corps along the line Hill 304-Dead Man Hill, on which a German frontal attack took place. The hill was taken by a frontal attack. The possession of Hill 304 will carry the German line further to the Avocourt-Esnes-Chatancourt line, the straight continuation of which extends to the eastern bank of the Meuse. The possession of Hill 304 embodies the control of the Verdun-Paris railway. It makes the French positions between Avocourt, Cumières and Chatancourt untenable; Cumières and Chatancourt are about to share the fate of Malancourt, Haucourt, and Béthincourt.

The area between the Bois de Corbeaux and the Bois de Cumières has been the scene of violent fighting of late. Here there ascends from the village of Cumières on the edge of the Meuse Valley, against Hill 295, a ravine whose northern rim is formed by the Bois de Corbeaux and the Bois de Cumières, while the southern edge is called Les Caurettes. The little Bois Caurettes has already been mentioned repeatedly in the French official reports, as the objective of German storming attacks threatening to cut the French off from

the village of Cumières, and again as the scene of very violent French counterattacks which were aimed at averting that danger. After the loss of Hill 304 the French will find themselves compelled to evacuate this area, too. Then the entire terrain on the left bank of the Meuse, to the line Avocourt-Esnes-Chatancourt, will be cleared of the French.

An official Berlin report contains the first intimation as to the strength of the German troops standing before Verdun. The strength on the French side is estimated by this report at fifty-one divisions, of which some have several times gone into fire after the losses had been replaced. The German force before Verdun, the report says, is not even half that figure. Figuring upon 20,000 men in a French division, we would arrive at the staggering number of more than 1,000,000 French troops on the various fronts of Verdun. That seems to us an exaggeration. Nevertheless, the Berlin report states the numerical proportion between the French and German troops. This proportion may also serve as a factor in the estimate of the losses on both sides.

Those are presumptions. The fact is that the storming of Hill 304 represents a great success for the Germans. The military situation of the Verdun campaign is developing upon the straight line of military logic. The advance proceeds slowly, in accordance with the given circumstances and the tactics employed, but unhaltingly toward the ultimate goal. Dead Man Hill—the name of the oft-mentioned and furiously fought for hill to the west of the Meuse—is the miners' name for the razed part of a ravine. The frontal terrain of Verdun is being systematically "razed" by the German troops. The last stage of the Verdun campaign, the stage which will be the shortest of all, will bring the fall of the fortress proper.

The original theory that the German attacks before Verdun were only feints, destined to veil other intentions at other points of the far-flung front which stretches from the North Sea to the Swiss mountains, has been rectified by

the events of the last two months. The latest forward movement by the German troops after the storming of Hill 304, against the Verdun-Paris railway and the western outer fortifications of Verdun, show clearly that the German campaign there is by no means ended. The once popular assertion that the various pauses by which the German advance is interrupted were the result of exhaustion of the German forces is heard no longer. The view that the German General Staff inaugurated the Verdun drive in order to forestall the so loudly heralded allied Spring offensive is contradicted by many weighty military considerations. The Entente press still thinks the Germans capable of deeper plans. It speaks of threatening preparations for a new German offensive on the Yser and in Northern France, and its latest sensation is the announcement of German attempts at landing on the coast of England.

As long as the definite decision has not come to pass at Verdun, it is improbable that a new movement on a large scale will be launched at any other point of the large western front.

At the outbreak of the war Germany set out to force the decision by the bold dash against Paris from the north. At that time the strategy of destruction had developed into recklessness. It had to atone for it with failure.

From Verdun the gate from the east

is to be opened for the advance into the interior of France; recklessness has given way to caution.

The number of prisoners taken and guns captured as well as the size and importance of the hostile territory occupied are, viewed from the higher military perspective which comprises the ultimate success, irrelevant. The conclusions which history will deduce from the events before Verdun will culminate in the lesson that, many as have been the surprises of this war, the final decision always falls upon the battlefield, in open field battles such as that of Verdun.

There, at Verdun, men are fighting men, as in the ancient epics. There the proof will be furnished that the bullets of iron and steel after all shoot straighter and safer than those of silver; that the sword that is swung is, after all, still more powerful than the pen that writes notes.

Not very far from Verdun lies the great military camp of Chalons. Over Chalons leads the road from Verdun to Paris. The camp rises upon the historic Catalaunic fields on which, in 451, the western Goths defeated King Attila. Legend has it that at the same time there was fought, high in the air, above the field of carnage, a battle of ghosts. Above Verdun, too, the ghosts are fighting today, not only smokelessly, but inaudibly as well. And in this battle of ghosts the prize is peace.

Verdun

H. A. CRUSO in Westminster Gazette

Two faiths there be which lighten earthly ways:

One overhigh for reason to attain,

A morning star, invisible at noon's blaze,

A star for which all wanderers are fain,

But the more striven toward the more obscured

By flickering creeds of fancy, till they cry

"It is not!" so sometimes at even, cured

Of restless reason, glimpse it ere they die.

The other gemlike, patiently sought out,

Fashioned in stress, by courage lit, cut fine

From flaw by sharp experience and doubt

Till man's thought quickens to a flame divine.

This is thy faith, for this thy sons have died;

For this, great France, we battle by thy side.

War Events From Two Viewpoints

In order that no phase of the truth may be overlooked CURRENT HISTORY offers two expert interpretations of the military events of the month, one written from the German, the other from the American point of view.

[AMERICAN VIEW]

The Month's Military Developments From April 15 to May 15, 1916

By J. B. W. Gardiner

Formerly Lieutenant Eleventh United States Cavalry

[MAP OF VERDUN ON PAGE 419]

THE dominant features of the month are, first, the capture of Trebizond by the Russians; second, the surrender of General Townshend and his army of British at Kut-el-Amara to the Turks; and, third, the continued fighting in the Verdun sector. I give them in their order of importance as well as in their chronological order, for, as the Russians work their way westward, the movement from the Caucasus is becoming daily more important.

Suddenly and unexpectedly reports reached us that the Russians, forcing the Turkish position along Kara Dere, had taken Trebizond. It seems that they advanced in three columns, with some indefinite connection between them, one clinging close to the seacoast, the other along the road from Erzerum, and the third from Bitlis. The only column, however, which appears to have contributed directly to the capture of Trebizond was that operating along the coast. The Kara Dere was the only defensive line covering the city. The river, rising in the Alps of Pontus, runs from the escarpment of these mountains through a very deep gorge with almost perpendicular sides. So rapid is the descent from the plateau to the Black Sea that its current is really torrential. The eastern bank of the river had been, some time previously, thoroughly strengthened by the Turks, in all probability under the guidance of the German engineer corps. With the Black Sea guarding one flank of this line, and the almost impassable

mountains of the Alps of Pontus on the other, it was obviously impossible to turn the position either from the north or the south. The only alternative was a frontal attack, and this is what the Russians made.

Points which can be used as bases of supplies are in this country few and far between, because roads are so few and railroads conspicuous for their absence. There is, therefore, no line by which supplies and ammunition can be sent forward to the various parts of the front, and, indeed, no way by which the bases themselves could be stocked up. It is necessary, therefore, if the Russians hope to continue their advance, that they establish a base which they can readily feed, which base has also means of reaching if not the entire front at least the most important of the three columns. No other point in this part of the theatre of operations answers this need as does Trebizond. The Russian fleet is in absolute and complete control of the Black Sea, and therefore it is a matter of no difficulty to maintain a flow of supplies into any Black Sea port which their land forces control. Moreover, the only passable roads in this whole section have branches running to Trebizond.

With Trebizond firmly in Russian hands, there are few points of importance in Asia Minor that cannot be fed with supplies of all kinds. From the standpoint of the Turks, moreover, Trebizond is for the same reason of equal importance. That port is the main avenue of



ONE RUSSIAN COLUMN HAS TAKEN TREBIZOND AND IS PUSHING WESTWARD TOWARD CONSTANTINOPLE. ANOTHER IS NEAR ERZINGAN, AND A THIRD IS THREATENING DIARBEKR AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY, WHILE A FOURTH HAS JUST FOUGHT ITS WAY ACROSS THE PERSIAN BORDER NORTHEAST OF BAGDAD.

supply upon which all the Turkish forces in that region depend, and it is through that port that all reinforcements in men and material must come. This affects not only those forces between the mountains and the sea, but also the troops in Armenia further south. In holding Trebizond, therefore, the Russians, in the final analysis, command all that maze of eastern mountain country as far south as the plain of Mesopotamia.

The Russian operations must be regarded as having for their immediate object the stretching of a line across Asia Minor from the Gulf of Alexandria to the Black Sea. Therefore the various Russian successes or reverses must be analyzed with reference to their effect on that purpose. Such a line presupposes the capture also of Erzingan and Diarbekr. It was not, however,

until the fall of Trebizond that the occupation of these points and the establishment of the line mentioned became a possibility. Once these places have fallen the railway which leaves the main road from Constantinople to the east at Aleppo will be almost in Russian hands, as they will be but a short distance from Raz-el-Ain, its extreme eastern point. It is but fair to say, however, that the present part of the journey is the most difficult. Now the Russians are in the mountains, a wild tangle which forms almost the entire eastern part of Asia Minor. Once these have been passed they will have the advantage of an advance over the great central plain, which will make the latter stage of the fighting much simpler from the standpoint of terrain.

The Russians are pursuing their ad-

vantage with no delay. Their right wing, which has been somewhat to the east of their left and centre, has made great strides through Persia and is now only about 100 miles east of Bagdad. This move, combined with the successes further north, threatens all the Turkish forces that participated in the capture of the British at Kut. It is not known just how extensive this Turkish force is. It is apparent, however, that 100,000 men would be a very conservative estimate. It will be remembered that Townshend had about 9,000 men under him and that the relief force was about 80,000 strong. To oppose these two forces and prevent a junction between them when they were separated by only a few miles necessitated a body of troops at least as large as that stated.

In fact, the situation of this body of Turks is fast becoming precarious. They are dependent entirely on the Tigris and the Euphrates for supplies. The strong British relief force is south and east of them, so that they cannot draw from Persia or from the country between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. Once Bagdad is reached, the line of the Tigris has been cut, and the line of the Euphrates is only twenty miles away. West of them is the great Syrian Desert, from which, of course, nothing can come. It is beginning to look as if the Russians had stolen a march on the German General Staff, striking in a quarter where they were not expected and going forward at a rate which was not thought possible, thus capturing in an incredibly short time fortified places which the world was certain the Turks could hold, and all this at a time when the Germans had thoroughly involved themselves in an inextricable fashion at Verdun.

The great war will not be decided in Asia Minor. There can be no two ways about that. But the campaign against the Turks may prove the straw that will break the camel's back.

Much stress has been laid on the surrender of the British forces under General Townshend at Kut-el-Amara. As a military proposition it is entirely negligible. Only about 9,000 men surrendered, the rear guard of the British army

which started in 1914 from the Gulf of Persia to capture Bagdad and was thrown back at Ctesiphon. It was not a particularly brilliant feat of Turkish arms. The British were hopelessly outnumbered. Its only value to the Teutonic allies is found in the damage it causes British prestige in the Orient. The British, of course, rule over the largest number of Moslems in the world, those in India. If Turkey were strong enough to cause a holy war it might be disastrous. If such a thing were at all probable, however, it would have happened long ago. Instead, there are strong indications that the Moslems in India are more ready to take up arms for England and against their co-religionists than to do the reverse. It is easy to overrate the effect of the British defeat, and this is what is pretty generally being done. All this might be different were the Russians not running loose through Asiatic Turkey. But any danger which the Kut episode might have had to England is more than offset by the fact that today the Russians are at least fifty miles nearer the city of the Caliphs than the British ever were. In the east, then, in spite of British reverses, the fighting during the last month distinctly favors the Allies, and as this article is being written, it seems, from such information as is at hand, that nothing can save Bagdad from falling into Russian hands. Once this happens the entire face of the Mesopotamian operations may change, as it is impossible to estimate the effect on the Moslem world of seeing that city in the hands of the Christians.

Before Verdun the Germans are still continuing what seems to be a useless sacrifice for something of very doubtful value. The German press still speaks of Verdun as the heart of France and the gateway to Paris. Verdun is not in any sense the way to Paris. Had the city fallen in the first days of the attack, as it is now evident the Germans expected it would, the damage to the French would have been considerable. Now no such event is possible. The French are still hard and fast on their main line of defense on the east bank of the river, from which line the heaviest of Ger-

man attacks do not appear to have sufficient force to move them. On the west bank the French are still several miles in advance of their main line, and the Germans have not as yet been able to make any appreciable dent in the more important of their advance posts.

So sure are the French of their ground that they have yet to make a general sustained counterattack. At certain important positions they have attacked, and, wherever this has been done, have invariably gained what they sought. The month has been marked by this later phase, the offensive of the French in defense of crucial points. It has been particularly noticeable at two points—the Woods of Avocourt and in front of Le Mort Homme. In the former case the Germans had taken a small redoubt near the southern edge of the woods. In the latter case, they had through persistent and expensive attacks taken a series of trenches on the northern and western side of the hill. The French in a few days had recovered the Avocourt redoubt and had thrust the Germans back again

to the foot of Le Mort Homme. Seeing this, the Germans replied with another violent assault on Hill 304. The assault showed all the power, all the concentration of heavy artillery fire that had marked the opening days of the battle. The gain was insignificant. There was some, it is true, and they did gain a foothold on the northern slopes. But there they are held fast.

As the battle has developed, it is beginning to appear as a very serious miscalculation of the German General Staff. That they had expected to carry Verdun in the first rush of the battle is most evident. That their failure has upset all their calculations is also evident; for from the way the attack is now shifting from one point to another, marking a failure at each point, it is beginning to appear that the Germans do not know quite what to do. But one thing is certain—that, as matters stand today, the Germans have at least 200,000 men less than they had on Feb. 21, and they have nothing to show for their sacrifice.

[GERMAN VIEW]

Military Events of the Month

IN a review of the war from April 15 to May 15, chief attention belongs, beside Verdun, to the Mesopotamian Tigris city Kut-el-Amara, the ancient Parthian stronghold which for thousands of years had passed from memory, and which today once again stands in the midst of the flooding life of world-historic development.

As the fighting at Verdun constitutes the last phase of the European war, so does the fate of Kut-el-Amara present a decisive factor in the world war. The capitulation of the British army under General Townshend at the end of April, and the occupation by the Turks of the Tigris city, which lies 400 kilometers to the northwest of the Persian Gulf and 40 kilometers to the southeast of Bagdad, sounds the deathknell to a policy.

The organizer of the victory at Kut-el-Amara, von der Goltz Pasha, Field Mar-

shal of two empires, rejuvenator of the Osmanic Army, was not destined to witness the crowning of his life's work in Turkey; in the City of Bagdad, which served him as general headquarters, he succumbed to illness shortly before the victory came.

The military significance of the fall of Kut-el-Amara overshadows the discontinuance of the Dardanelles campaign. For, after all, that campaign was merely a military adventure and a political accident. The Mesopotamian campaign, on the other hand, represented the straight and logical continuance by war of a centuries-old policy. That British policy was to be guaranteed its extreme and ultimate materialization through the possession of the land of the Euphrates and Tigris. The union jack hoisted over Bagdad would have rammed the doors to the roads leading from the north to

the Persian Gulf, which form one of the routes to India. Through the medium of the tracks of the Bagdad Railway Germany proposes to establish the connection with the gulf.

By means of the Bagdad Railway Germany proposes to reach her place in the sun of the Near East. After the fall of Verdun an understanding between Germany and France will be feasible. Kut-el-Amara already has furnished the basis for an understanding between Russia and Germany. Nor will England be able to escape the consequences—military and political—of these two most important events of the war.

The collapse of the French offensive against the Plateau of Douaumont-Vaux, east of the Meuse, and the capture by storm of Hill 304, in the territory west of the river, [this is denied by the French,] have given added weight to the probability that the decision will fall in the latter region. This was predicted even last March by Colonel Repington, the well-known military expert of *The London Times*. He went so far in his prediction as to foreshadow the evacuation by the French of the entire region east of the Meuse after it had fulfilled its task of serving as a bridgehead, in order that the whole defensive strength might be concentrated upon the territory to the west of the river.

On that bank the German attacking front now runs from south of the Bois d'Avocourt, over Hill 304, then south of Le Mort Homme, to the bank of the Meuse north of Cumières. The next objective of the German attacks is the road Avocourt-Esnes-Chattancourt. The village of Esnes, however, already is the aim of a lively Germany artillery activity. The village, an important intersection of communications, is also connected by a road with Montzéville, to the south. From there a road leads to Donbasle-en-Argonne, which is a station on the Verdun-Paris railway.

For this reason the bombardment of that region has provoked excitement and consternation in Paris, which is met by military critics by pointing to the strength of the second French defense position. The principal points of pro-

tection of that defense line are Montzéville, between Hill 310, southward of Esnes, and Hill 272, and the Bois Bourrus. With the latter wood the French line of defense already enters into the immediate province of the fortress proper.

It is on this line that the decision will fall after the still projecting French front between Le Mort Homme and Cumières has been crushed in in the region of the Bois de Courettes. Hill 310, to the south of Esnes, according to the French military critics, embodies the hope in a successful beating off of the German onslaughts. This position has been built out after all rules of modern arts of fortification and with utilization of the lessons of the present war. General Petain, who in the meantime has found a successor in the person of General Nivelle, as a consequence of the costly failure of the offensive movement on the right bank, is said to have personally supervised this construction.

All these hills are densely wooded, and particularly the Forêt de Hesse, the pivotal point of the left flank of the French line, is adapted for the establishment of a defense position because of its impassability and its dense wood. As everywhere around Verdun, the "co-operation" between hills and woods form the brilliant precondition of the French defense.

However, after the positions of the first French line have been gradually crushed in and the region of Esnes has, with Hill 304, lost its last bulwark, the second defense line will scarcely put greater obstacles in the way of the German advance than were presented by the difficult territory to the north of Hill 304.

One must not attach too great a military significance to the German attacks against various positions of the far-extended British front, which now reaches to south of the Somme. This front has been thinned to such a degree by the withdrawal of French forces that even the Australian and New Zealand regiments had to be called upon to fill in. In spite of the weakening of the fronts to the south of the Somme the German

operations against the British positions between the Somme and Maricourt, and upward to the La Bassée Canal, are not to be interpreted as preparations for an attempt to break through, but rather as a "feeling out" of the respective fronts for possible thrusts in the future.

The reported plan of a new offensive on the Dvina front by Field Marshal von Hindenburg against the Russians, of which Petrograd tells us, will probably materialize as little as will the reported advance of Bulgarian, German, and Austro-Hungarian troops against the allied positions before Saloniki. During the last month there has not been a single action in the Russian or in the Balkan theatre that could have furnished the slightest relief for the French before Verdun.

The Russians have continued during the last thirty days their operations in the Caucasus and in Persia. After the capture of Erzerum by the Russians, it was predicted that they would now promptly hasten to the aid of the hard-pressed British expeditionary force in Mesopotamia. After the fall of Kut-el-Amara the allied military critics triumphantly prophesied that now the Russians would cut off the Turks from the rear.

However, the principal directions of the Russian advance point southward, to the Persian Gulf, and to the west, to the Mediterranean. Russia's appearance on the Mediterranean would signify a new menace to England. The possession of Armenia includes the control of Western Asia. Erzerum and Erzingan dominate the northern, Kharput and Malatia the central and southern, part of Asia. From Armenia and across Kurdistan the roads lead to Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Syria. Russia has occupied Kars, has taken Erzerum and Trebizond, and is about to break through to the Mediter-

anean by way of Kurdistan and Cilicia. The goal is Alexandretta on the Bay of Iscanderum, opposite the British Island of Cyprus. But the way is still long and extremely difficult. The Turkish army still stands protectingly before Erzingan. It has been reinforced through bodies of troops released after the fall of Kut-el-Amara.

The Russians will not get beyond Trebizond, the base of their right wing on the Black Sea. In the centre the Turks have repeatedly assumed the offensive, on the line Baiburt-Manachatun-Kope Mountain. On their left wing, on the Felahie front, the Russians have suffered considerable reverses.

With the military occupation of Ispahan, the second capital of the Persian Empire, Russia had already reached the southern border of its sphere of interests as stipulated through the Russo-British Convention of Aug. 30, 1907, and had approached within 200 miles of the Persian Gulf, the goal of its ambition for the open sea.

The fighting on the Perso-Mesopotamian frontier, which is described as having Bagdad as its objective, and in which the Turks have been driven back by the Russians from Kasri Shirin to Chanykin, 110 and 100 miles, respectively, from Bagdad, are entirely remote from the principal roads leading through Persia to the gulf.

At Kut-el-Amara England has lost a campaign. By way of Erzingan the Russians are striving for the Mediterranean. Through Persia they are seeking a way to the Persian Gulf. Before Verdun the French offensive power has been broken and its defensive power will exhaust itself. The events of the last month, on widely separated roads, are pointing to the final decision and to peace.



THE SUBMARINE CRISIS

Text of American Note to Germany, With Appendix on Sussex Case

The diplomatic correspondence of the United States with Germany on the submarine issue has extended over more than a year, several times threatening a break in the relations of the two countries. President Wilson's first note of protest was sent on Feb. 10, 1915, just after Germany had declared the waters around England a "war zone." The issue became acute with the note of May 15, sent eight days after the destruction of the Lusitania. The documents exchanged in the intervening twelve months will be found in the files of CURRENT HISTORY. In our May issue the unsatisfactory German reply regarding the Sussex was presented with data indicating the approach of a grave diplomatic crisis. Herewith we print the four notes in which that crisis was met and its acute stage passed—by the yielding of Germany. President Wilson's historic note of April 18 won the desired promise that merchant vessels, "both within and without the area declared a naval war zone shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless the ship attempt to escape or offer resistance"; and his supplementary note of May 8 rejected absolutely the complicating conditions which Germany had sought to impose. The official documents follow.

Department of State,

Washington, April 18, 1916.

The Secretary of State to Ambassador
Gerard:

You are instructed to deliver to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs a communication reading as follows:

I DID not fail to transmit immediately by telegraph to my Government your Excellency's note of the 10th inst. in regard to certain attacks by German submarines, and particularly in regard to the disastrous explosion which on March 24 last wrecked the French steamship Sussex in the English Channel. I have now the honor to deliver, under instructions from my Government, the following reply to your Excellency:

Information now in the possession of the Government of the United States fully establishes the facts in the case of the Sussex, and the inferences which my Government has drawn from that information it regards as confirmed by the circumstances set forth in your Excellency's note of the 10th inst. On the 24th of March, 1916, at about 2:50

o'clock in the afternoon, the unarmed steamer Sussex, with 325 or more passengers on board, among whom were a number of American citizens, was torpedoed while crossing from Folkestone to Dieppe. The Sussex had never been armed; was a vessel known to be habitually used only for the conveyance of passengers across the English Channel; and was not following the route taken by troop ships or supply ships. About eighty of her passengers, noncombatants of all ages and sexes, including citizens of the United States, were killed or injured.

A careful, detailed, and scrupulously impartial investigation by naval and military officers of the United States has conclusively established the fact that the Sussex was torpedoed without warning or summons to surrender, and that the torpedo by which she was struck was of German manufacture. In the view of the Government of the United States these facts from the first made the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a German submarine unavoidable. It now considers that conclusion substantiated by the statements of your

Excellency's note. A full statement of the facts upon which the Government of the United States has based its conclusion is inclosed.

The Government of the United States, after having given careful consideration to the note of the Imperial Government of the 10th of April, regrets to state that the impression made upon it by the statements and proposals contained in that note is that the Imperial Government has failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation which has resulted, not alone from the attack on the *Sussex*, but from the whole method and character of submarine warfare as disclosed by the unrestrained practice of the commanders of German undersea craft during the past twelvemonth and more in the indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations. If the sinking of the *Sussex* had been an isolated case the Government of the United States might find it possible to hope that the officer who was responsible for that act had willfully violated his orders or had been criminally negligent in taking none of the precautions they prescribed, and that the ends of justice might be satisfied by imposing upon him an adequate punishment, coupled with a formal disavowal of the act and payment of a suitable indemnity by the Imperial Government. But, though the attack upon the *Sussex* was manifestly indefensible and caused a loss of life so tragical as to make it stand forth as one of the most terrible examples of the inhumanity of submarine warfare as the commanders of German vessels are conducting it, it unhappily does not stand alone.

On the contrary, the Government of the United States is forced by recent events to conclude that it is only one instance, even though one of the most extreme and most distressing instances, of the deliberate method and spirit of indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations which have become more and more unmistakable as the activity of German undersea vessels of war has in recent months been quickened and extended.

The Imperial Government will recall

that when, in February, 1915, it announced its intention of treating the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland as embraced within the seat of war and of destroying all merchant ships owned by its enemies that might be found within that zone of danger, and warned all vessels, neutral as well as belligerent, to keep out of the waters thus proscribed or to enter them at their peril, the Government of the United States earnestly protested. It took the position that such a policy could not be pursued without constant gross and palpable violations of the accepted law of nations, particularly if submarine craft were to be employed as its instruments, inasmuch as the rules prescribed by that law, rules founded on the principles of humanity and established for the protection of the lives of noncombatants at sea, could not in the nature of the case be observed by such vessels. It based its protest on the ground that persons of neutral nationality and vessels of neutral ownership would be exposed to extreme and intolerable risks, and that no right to close any part of the high seas could lawfully be asserted by the Imperial Government in the circumstances then existing. The law of nations in these matters, upon which the Government of the United States based that protest, is not of recent origin or founded upon merely arbitrary principles set up by convention. It is based, on the contrary, upon manifest principles of humanity and has long been established with the approval and by the express assent of all civilized nations.

The Imperial Government, notwithstanding, persisted in carrying out the policy announced, expressing the hope that the dangers involved, at any rate to neutral vessels, would be reduced to a minimum by the instructions which it had issued to the commanders of its submarines, and assuring the Government of the United States that it would take every possible precaution both to respect the rights of neutrals and to safeguard the lives of noncombatants.

In pursuance of this policy of submarine warfare against the commerce of its adversaries, thus announced and thus

entered upon in despite of the solemn protest of the Government of the United States, the commanders of the Imperial Government's undersea vessels have carried on practices of such ruthless destruction, which have made it more and more evident as the months have gone by that the Imperial Government has found it impracticable to put any such restraints upon them as it had hoped and promised to put. Again and again the Imperial Government has given its solemn assurances to the Government of the United States that at least passenger ships would not be thus dealt with, and yet it has repeatedly permitted its undersea commanders to disregard those assurances with entire impunity. As recently as February last it gave notice that it would regard all armed merchantmen owned by its enemies as part of the armed naval forces of its adversaries and deal with them as with men-of-war, thus, at least by implication, pledging itself to give warning to vessels which were not armed and to accord security of life to their passengers and crews; but even this limitation their submarine commanders have recklessly ignored.

Vessels of neutral ownership, even vessels of neutral ownership bound from neutral port to neutral port, have been destroyed, along with vessels of belligerent ownership, in constantly increasing numbers. Sometimes the merchantmen attacked have been warned and summoned to surrender before being fired on or torpedoed; sometimes their passengers and crews have been vouchsafed the poor security of being allowed to take to the ship's boats before the ship was sent to the bottom. But again and again no warning has been given, no escape even to the ship's boats allowed to those on board. Great liners like the *Lusitania* and *Arabic*, and mere passenger boats like the *Sussex*, have been attacked without a moment's warning, often before they have even become aware that they were in the presence of an armed ship of the enemy, and the lives of noncombatants, passengers and crew, have been destroyed wholesale and in a manner which the Government of the United States cannot but regard as


wanton and without the slightest color of justification. No limit of any kind has, in fact, been set to their indiscriminate pursuit and destruction of merchantmen of all kinds and nationalities within the waters which the Imperial Government has chosen to designate as lying within the seat of war. The roll of Americans who have lost their lives upon ships thus attacked and destroyed has grown month by month until the ominous toll has mounted into the hundreds.

The Government of the United States has been very patient. At every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy it has sought to be governed by the most thoughtful consideration of the extraordinary circumstances of an unprecedented war and to be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and Government of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations and assurances of the Imperial Government as, of course, given in entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped, even against hope, that it would prove to be possible for the Imperial Government so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations. It has made every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation.

It now owes it to a just regard for its own rights to say to the Imperial Government that that time has come. It has become painfully evident to it that the position which it took at the very outset is inevitable, namely, the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce, is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of noncombatants.

If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of

A BATTLE VIEWED FROM A BRITISH BIPLANE



Wonderful View of a German Gas Attack. With Massed German Troops Ready to Rush Forward, and French Shells Bursting Over Them
(© American Press Association)

GLIMPSES OF A FRENCH FRONT



"Here Comes a Fokker!"



Dinner on a Cold Day



Using a Periscope

commerce by the use of submarines, without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether. This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance, but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations.

LANSING.

APPENDIX

STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUSSEX CASE, ACCOMPANYING NOTE TO GERMAN GOVERNMENT OF APRIL 18, 1916.

The French Channel steamer *Sussex*, employed regularly in passenger service between the ports of Folkestone, England, and Dieppe, France, as it had been for years, (French Foreign Office,) left Folkestone for Dieppe at 1:25 P. M. March 24, 1916, with 325 passengers and a crew of fifty-three men. (Declaration of Captain Mouffet; Rear Admiral Grasset's report.) The passengers, among whom were about twenty-five American citizens, (telegram London Embassy, March 25, and Paris Embassy, March 26 and 28,) were of several nationalities and many of them were women and children and nearly half of them subjects of neutral States. (Report of Commander Sayles and Lieutenant Smith; Rear Admiral Grasset's report.) The *Sussex* carried no armament, (French Foreign Office report of Commander Sayles and Lieutenant Smith; affidavits of American passengers,) has never been employed as a troopship, and was following a route not used for transporting troops from Great Britain to France. (British Admiralty statement; French Foreign Office.)

The steamer proceeded on its course almost due south after passing Dungeness. (Declaration of Captain Mouffet.) The weather was clear and the sea smooth. (Affidavits of Edna Hale, John H. Hearley, Gertrude W. Warren.)

At 2:50 P. M., when the *Sussex* was about thirteen miles from Dungeness, (declaration of Captain Mouffet,) the Captain of the

vessel, who was on the bridge, saw, about 150 meters from the ship, on the port side, the wake of a torpedo. (Declaration of Captain Mouffet.) It was also seen very clearly by the first officer and the boatswain, who were with the Captain on the bridge. (Report of Rear Admiral Grasset.) Immediately the Captain gave orders to port the helm and stop the starboard engine, (declaration of Captain Mouffet,) the purpose being to swing the vessel to starboard so as to dodge the torpedo by allowing it to pass along the port bow on a line converging with the altered course of the steamer. Before, however, the vessel could be turned far enough to avoid crossing the course of the torpedo, the latter struck the hull at an angle a short distance forward of the bridge, exploded, destroyed the entire forward part of the steamer as far back as the first water-tight bulkhead, carried away the foremast with the wireless antennae, and killed or injured about eighty of the persons on board. (Declaration of Captain Mouffet; report of Rear Admiral Grasset; deposition of Henry S. Beer.) At the time no other vessel was in sight. (Affidavits of Samuel F. Bemis, T. W. Culbertson, John H. Hearley, and others.)

The approach of the torpedo was witnessed by several other persons on the vessel. (Affidavits of Samuel F. Bemis, Henry S. Beer, Gertrude W. Warren.) One of these, an American citizen named Henry S. Beer, was leaning on the port rail, about ten feet behind the bridge and gazing seaward when he saw the approaching torpedo about 100 yards away and exclaimed to his wife and companion: "A torpedo!" Immediately following his exclamation the missile struck the vessel. (Depositions of Henry S. Beer and Mrs. Henry S. Beer.)

In further corroboration of the fact that the Captain saw the torpedo coming toward the vessel is the sworn statement of the engineers on duty that the order to port the helm and to stop the starboard engine was received and obeyed. (Report of Admiral Grasset.) No reasonable explanation can be given for this unusual order other than that the Captain saw something which caused him to change his course sharply to starboard.

In addition to this evidence, which would in itself appear to be conclusive that the agent of destruction was a torpedo, is that of Lieutenant Smith, U. S. N., attached to the American Embassy at Paris, who, accompanied by Major Logan, U. S. A., of the Embassy, went to Boulogne, inspected the hull of the *Sussex* and personally found beneath the mass of water-soaked debris of the wreck fifteen pieces of metal, which they retained in their possession, as they did not believe the pieces formed part of the vessel. The inspection of the hull disclosed that the vessel was wrecked by an external explosion, the boilers being intact, and that a short distance forward of the bridge was a large

dent, showing that the vessel had received a heavy blow, the direction of impact being from abaft the beam along a line at an acute angle with the keel of the vessel. (Report of Lieutenant Smith, cabled April 9.) This evidence coincides with and corroborates the statement that the vessel was swinging to starboard and away from the torpedo when struck.

The pieces of metal which the American officers had collected were compared by Lieutenant Smith, Lieut. Commander Sayles, and Major Logan with mines and plans of mines in possession of the French naval authorities at Boulogne, Rochefort, and Toulon, and British naval authorities at Portsmouth. These officers are positive in their opinion that these pieces of metal were not parts of a mine. (Report of Lieutenant Smith, cabled April 2 and 5.)

Among these fifteen pieces of metal were two screw-bolts showing the effects of an explosion, which were stamped with "K" and "56" on faces of the head of one, and "K" and "58" on faces of the head of the other. On examining German torpedoes in the possession of the French naval authorities at Toulon, and of the English naval authorities at Portsmouth, the American officers found that identical screws with the letter "K" and a number were employed to fasten the "war" head (Kopf) to the air chamber. (Lieutenant Smith's reports, cabled April 2, 5, and 13.)

The screws used in French and English torpedoes have no markings and are of a slightly different size. (Same reports.) Furthermore, the American officers were able by comparison and close examination to positively identify and locate all the remaining pieces of metal as parts of a German torpedo as follows:

Fragment 3, part of inner seat of water relief valve of engine valve.

Fragments 4 and 5, punto bands of engine room casing.

Fragments 6 and 10, inclusive, and 12, parts of engine cylinders.

Fragments 11, 13, 14, 15, parts of steel warhead still bearing the distinctive red paint common to German torpedo warheads. (Report of Lieutenant Smith, cabled April 5.)

In view of these authenticated facts there can be no reasonable doubt but that the *Sussex* was torpedoed and that the torpedo was of German manufacture. As no vessel was seen by any person on the *Sussex*, the conclusion is irresistible that the torpedo was launched without warning from a submarine which was submerged at the time of the attack and remained beneath the surface after the explosion.

The conclusion thus reached from the evidence (the affidavits being those of Ameri-

can citizens) collected by the Department of State is substantiated by the statement in the Imperial Government's note of April 10, 1916. According to those statements—

(A) *A German submarine torpedoed a steamer one and one-half miles southeast of Bull Rock Bank.*

Department's Comment—The point of attack is exactly in the course which was taken by the *Sussex* after passing Dungeness and about one-half mile from the place where the Captain of the *Sussex* states he was torpedoed.

(B) *The attack took place at 3:55 o'clock P. M., Central European time.*

Department's Comment—3:55 P. M. Central European time would correspond to 2:55 P. M. Western European time. The time of the striking of the torpedo, according to the Captain of the *Sussex*, and the stopping of the clocks on board the vessel, was 2:50 P. M. Western time.

(C) *The torpedo when it struck caused an explosion which tore away the whole foreship up to the bridge.*

Department's Comment—The forepart of the *Sussex* was wrecked as far back as the first watertight bulkhead, according to the official reports.

(D) *The German submarine was submerged when the torpedo was launched, and there is no statement that it came to the surface after the attack.*

Department's Comment—The conclusion was reached that the submarine was submerged from the fact that no one on the *Sussex* saw a submarine, though the weather was fine.

(E) *No warning was given and no attempt was made to give one, since it is not mentioned.*

Department's Comment—The evidence collected shows affirmatively no warning was given.

(F) *A sketch by the submarine commander of the steamer which he torpedoed does not agree with a photograph of the *Sussex* in The London Graphic.*

Department's Comment—This sketch was apparently made from memory of an observation of the vessel through a periscope. As the only differences noted by the commander, who relied on his memory, were the position of the smokestack and the shape of the stern, it is to be presumed the vessels were similar in other respects.

(G) *No other German submarines on that day attacked steamers in that locality.*

Department's Comment—As no vessel is reported to have been torpedoed without warning by a submerged submarine other than the *Sussex*, it is beyond question that that vessel was torpedoed by the submarine whose commander's report is relied upon in the note of April 10.

LANSING.

President Wilson's Address to Congress

Joint Session, April 19, 1916

On the day after the foregoing note to Germany had been dispatched the President informed Congress of his action in a noteworthy speech delivered before both houses in joint session. In part his address was necessarily a repetition of the substance of the note. After summarizing the situation Mr. Wilson continued:

IN pursuance of the policy of submarine warfare against the commerce of its adversaries, thus announced and entered upon by the Imperial German Government, despite the solemn protest of this Government, the commanders of German undersea vessels have attacked merchant ships with greater and greater activity, not only upon the high seas surrounding Great Britain and Ireland but wherever they could encounter them, in a way that has grown more and more ruthless, more and more indiscriminate, as the months have gone by, less and less observant of restraints of any kind, and have delivered their attacks without compunction against vessels of every nationality and bound upon every sort of errand. Vessels of neutral ownership, even vessels of neutral ownership bound from neutral port to neutral port, have been destroyed along with vessels of belligerent ownership in constantly increasing numbers. Sometimes the merchantman attacked has been warned and summoned to surrender before being fired on or torpedoed; sometimes passengers or crews have been vouchsafed the poor security of being allowed to take to the ship's boats before she was sent to the bottom. But again and again no warning has been given, no escape even to the ship's boats allowed to those on board. What this Government foresaw must happen has happened. Tragedy has followed tragedy on the seas in such fashion, with such attendant circumstances, as to make it grossly evident that warfare of such a sort, if warfare it be, cannot be carried on without the most palpable violation of the dictates alike of right and of hu-

manity. Whatever the disposition and intention of the Imperial German Government, it has manifestly proved impossible for it to keep such methods of attack upon the commerce of its enemies within the bounds set by either the reason or the heart of mankind.

[After summarizing the facts of Germany's new campaign, announced in February, against armed liners, and recalling typical cases of violation of international law from the *Lusitania* to the *Sussex* case, he concluded with these words:]

I have deemed it my duty, therefore, to say to the Imperial German Government that if it is still its purpose to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines, notwithstanding the now demonstrated impossibility of conducting that warfare in accordance with what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue and that unless the Imperial German Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, this Government can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the Government of the German Empire altogether.

This decision I have arrived at with the keenest regret; the possibility of the action contemplated I am sure all thoughtful Americans will look forward to with unaffected reluctance. But we cannot forget that we are in some sort and by the force of circumstances the responsible spokesmen of the rights of humanity, and that we cannot remain silent while those rights seem in process of being swept utterly away in the maelstrom of this terrible war. We owe it to

a due regard for our own rights as a nation, to our sense of duty as a representative of the rights of neutrals the world over, and to a just conception of the rights of mankind to take this stand now with the utmost solemnity and firmness.

I have taken it, and taken it in the confidence that it will meet with your

approval and support. All sober-minded men must unite in hoping that the Imperial German Government, which has in other circumstances stood as the champion of all that we are now contending for in the interest of humanity, may recognize the justice of our demands and meet them in the spirit in which they are made.

American Memorandum on Armed Merchant Vessels

BY direction of the President a memorandum was prepared during March, 1916, in regard to the status of armed merchant vessels in neutral ports and on the high seas. A week after sending the note of April 18 to Germany this memorandum was made public as a statement of the American Government's attitude on the principles relating to submarines and armed merchantmen in war. The full text of Mr. Lansing's memorandum is given below.

Department of State,
Washington, March 25, 1916.

I.

The status of an armed merchant vessel of a belligerent is to be considered from two points of view: First, from that of a neutral when the vessel enters its ports, and, second, from that of an enemy when the vessel is on the high seas.

First—An armed merchant vessel in neutral ports.

(1) It is necessary for a neutral Government to determine the status of an armed merchant vessel of belligerent nationality which enters its jurisdiction, in order that the Government may protect itself from responsibility for the destruction of life and property by permitting its ports to be used as bases of hostile operations by belligerent warships.

(2) If the vessel carries a commission or orders issued by a belligerent Government and directing it under penalty to conduct aggressive operations, or if it is conclusively shown to have conducted such operations, it should be regarded and treated as a warship.

(3) If sufficient evidence is wanting a neutral Government, in order to safeguard itself from liability for failure to preserve its neutrality may reasonably presume from these facts the status of an armed merchant ves-

sel which frequents its waters. There is no settled rule of international law as to the sufficiency of evidence to establish such a presumption. As a result a neutral Government must decide for itself the sufficiency of the evidence which it requires to determine the character of the vessel. For the guidance of its port officers and other officials a neutral Government may therefore declare a standard of evidence, but such standard may be changed on account of the general conditions of naval warfare or modified on account of the circumstances of a particular case. These changes and modifications may be made at any time during the progress of the war, since the determination of the status of an armed merchant vessel in neutral waters may affect the liability of a neutral Government.

Second—An armed merchant vessel on the high seas.

(1) It is necessary for a belligerent warship to determine the status of an armed merchant vessel of an enemy encountered on the high seas, since the rights of life and property of belligerents and neutrals on board the vessel may be impaired if its status is that of an enemy warship.

(2) The determination of warlike character must rest in no case upon presumption but upon conclusive evidence, because the responsibility for the destruction of life and property depends on the actual facts of the case and cannot be avoided or lessened by a standard of evidence which a belligerent may announce as creating a presumption of hostile character. On the other hand, to safeguard himself from possible liability for unwarranted destruction of life and property the belligerent should, in the absence of conclusive evidence, act on the presumption that an armed merchantman is of peaceful character.

(3) A presumption based solely on the presence of an armament on a merchant vessel of an enemy is not a sufficient reason for a belligerent to declare it to be a warship and proceed to attack it without regard to the rights of the persons on board. Conclusive

evidence of a purpose to use the armament for aggression is essential. Consequently an armament which a neutral Government, seeking to perform its neutral duties, may presume to be intended for aggression, might in fact on the high seas be used solely for protection. A neutral Government has no opportunity to determine the purpose of an armament on a merchant vessel unless there is evidence in the ship's papers or other proof as to its previous use, so that the Government is justified in substituting an arbitrary rule of presumption in arriving at the status of the merchant vessel. On the other hand, a belligerent warship can on the high seas test by actual experience the purpose of an armament on an enemy merchant vessel, and so determine by direct evidence the status of the vessel.

The status of an armed merchant vessel as a warship in neutral waters may be determined, in the absence of documentary proof or conclusive evidence of previous aggressive conduct, by presumption derived from all the circumstances of the case.

The status of such vessel as a warship on the high seas must be determined only upon conclusive evidence of aggressive purpose, in the absence of which it is to be presumed that the vessel has a private and peaceable character, and it should be so treated by an enemy warship.

In brief, a neutral Government may proceed upon the presumption that an armed merchant vessel of belligerent nationality is armed for aggression, while a belligerent should proceed on the presumption that the vessel is armed for protection. Both of these presumptions may be overcome by evidence—the first by secondary or collateral evidence, since the fact to be established is negative in character; the second by primary and direct evidence, since the fact to be established is positive in character.

II.

The character of the evidence upon which the status of an armed merchant vessel of belligerent nationality is to be determined when visiting neutral waters and when traversing the high seas having been stated, it is important to consider the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents as affected by the status of armed merchant vessels in neutral ports and on the high seas.

First—The relations of belligerents and neutrals as affected by the status of armed merchant vessels in neutral ports.

(1) It appears to be the established rule of international law that warships of a belligerent may enter neutral ports and accept limited hospitality there upon condition that they leave, as a rule, within twenty-four hours after their arrival.

(2) Belligerent warships are also entitled to take on fuel once in three months in ports of a neutral country.

(3) As a mode of enforcing these rules, a neutral has the right to cause belligerent

warships failing to comply with them, together with their officers and crews, to be interned during the remainder of the war.

(4) Merchantmen of belligerent nationality, armed only for purposes of protection against the enemy, are entitled to enter and leave neutral ports without hindrance in the course of legitimate trade.

(5) Armed merchantmen of belligerent nationality under a commission or orders of their Government to use, under penalty, their armament for aggressive purposes, or merchantmen which, without such commission or orders, have used their armaments for aggressive purposes, are not entitled to the same hospitality in neutral ports as peaceable armed merchantmen.

Second—The relations of belligerents and neutrals as affected by the status of armed merchant vessels on the high seas.

(1) Innocent neutral property on the high seas cannot legally be confiscated, but is subject to inspection by a belligerent. Resistance to inspection removes this immunity and subjects the property to condemnation by a prize court, which is charged with the preservation of the legal rights of the owners of neutral property.

(2) Neutral property engaged in contraband trade, breach of blockade, or unneutral service obtains the character of enemy property and is subject to seizure by a belligerent and condemnation by a prize court.

(3) When hostile and innocent property is mixed, as in the case of a neutral ship carrying a cargo which is entirely or partly contraband, this fact can only be determined by inspection. Such innocent property may be of uncertain character, as it has been frequently held that it is more or less contaminated by association with hostile property. For example, under the Declaration of London, (which, so far as the provisions covering this subject are concerned, has been adopted by all the belligerents,) the presence of a cargo which in bulk or value consists of 50 per cent. contraband articles impresses the ship with enemy character and subjects it to seizure and condemnation by a prize court.

(4) Enemy property, including ships and cargoes, is always subject to seizure and condemnation. Any enemy property taken by a belligerent on the high seas is a total loss to the owners. There is no redress in a prize court. The only means of avoiding loss is by flight or successful resistance. Enemy merchant ships have, therefore, the right to arm for the purpose of self-protection.

(5) A belligerent warship is any vessel which, under commission or orders of its Government imposing penalties or entitling it to prize money, is armed for the purpose of seeking and capturing or destroying enemy property or hostile neutral property on the seas. The size of the vessel, strength of armament, and its defensive or offensive force are immaterial.

(6) A belligerent warship has, incidental

to the right of seizure, the right to visit and search all vessels on the high seas for the purpose of determining the hostile or innocent character of the vessels and their cargoes. If the hostile character of the property is known, however, the belligerent warship may seize the property without exercising the right of visit and search which is solely for the purpose of obtaining knowledge as to the character of the property. The attacking vessel must display its colors before exercising belligerent rights.

(7) When a belligerent warship meets a merchantman on the high seas which is known to be enemy owned and attempts to capture the vessel, the latter may exercise its right of self-protection either by flight or by resistance. The right to capture and the right to prevent capture are recognized as equally justifiable.

(8) The exercise of the right of capture is limited, nevertheless, by certain accepted rules of conduct based on the principles of humanity and regard for innocent property, even if there is definite knowledge that some of the property, cargo, as well as the vessel, is of enemy character. As a character of these limitations, it has become the established practice for warships to give merchant vessels an opportunity to surrender or submit to visit and search before attempting to seize them by force. The observance of this rule of naval warfare tends to prevent the loss of life of noncombatants and the destruction of innocent neutral property which would result from sudden attack.

(9) If, however, before a summons to surrender is given, a merchantman of belligerent nationality, aware of the approach of an enemy warship, uses its armament to keep the enemy at a distance, or after it has been summoned to surrender it resists or flees, the warship may properly exercise force to compel surrender.

(10) If the merchantman finally surrenders, the belligerent warship may release it or take it into custody. In the case of an enemy merchantman it may be sunk, but

only if it is impossible to take it into port, and provided always that the persons on board are put in a place of safety. In the case of a neutral merchantman, the right to sink it in any circumstances is doubtful.

(11) A merchantman entitled to exercise the right of self-protection may do so when certain of attack by an enemy warship, otherwise the exercise of the right would be so restricted as to render it ineffectual. There is a distinct difference, however, between the exercise of the right of self-protection and the act of cruising the seas in an armed vessel for the purpose of attacking enemy naval vessels.

(12) In the event that merchant ships of belligerent nationality are armed and under commission or orders to attack in all circumstances certain classes of enemy naval vessels for the purpose of destroying them, and are entitled to receive prize money for such service from their Government, or are liable to a penalty for failure to obey the orders given, such merchant ships lose their status as peaceable merchant ships and are to a limited extent incorporated in the naval forces of their Government, even though it is not their sole occupation to conduct hostile operations.

(13) A vessel engaged intermittently in commerce and under a commission or orders of its Government imposing a penalty, in pursuing and attacking enemy naval craft, possesses a status tainted with a hostile purpose which it cannot throw aside or assume at will. It should, therefore, be considered as an armed public vessel and receive the treatment of a warship by an enemy and by neutrals. Any person taking passage on such a vessel cannot expect immunity other than that accorded persons who are on board a warship. A private vessel, engaged in seeking enemy naval craft, without such a commission or orders from its Government, stands in a relation to the enemy similar to that of a civilian who fires upon the organized military forces of a belligerent, and is entitled to no more considerate treatment.

Germany's Reply, Conceding Reforms in Submarine Warfare

Berlin, May 4, 1916.

The undersigned, on behalf of the Imperial German Government, has the honor to present to his Excellency the Ambassador of the United States, Mr. James W. Gerard, the following reply to the note of April 20 regarding the conduct of German submarine warfare.

THE German Government handed over to the proper naval authorities for early investigation the evidence concerning the Sussex, as communicated by the Government of the United States. Judging by the results that the investigation has hitherto yielded, the German Government is alive to the possibility

that the ship mentioned in the note of April 10 as having been torpedoed by a German submarine is actually identical with the *Sussex*.

The German Government begs to reserve further communication on the matter until certain points are ascertained, which are of decisive importance for establishing the facts of the case. Should it turn out that the commander was wrong in assuming the vessel to be a man-of-war, the German Government will not fail to draw the consequence resulting therefrom.

In connection with the case of the *Sussex* the Government of the United States made a series of statements, the gist of which is the assertion that the incident is to be considered but one instance of a deliberate method of indiscriminate destruction of vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations by German submarine commanders.

The German Government must emphatically repudiate the assertion. The German Government, however, thinks it of little avail to enter into details in the present stage of affairs, more particularly as the Government of the United States omitted to substantiate the assertion by reference to concrete facts.

The German Government will only state that it has imposed far-reaching restraints upon the use of the submarine weapon, solely in consideration of neutrals' interests, in spite of the fact that these restrictions are necessarily of advantage to Germany's enemies. No such consideration has ever been shown neutrals by Great Britain and her allies.

The German submarine forces have had, in fact, orders to conduct the submarine warfare in accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, the sole exception being the conduct of warfare against enemy trade carried on enemy freight ships encountered in the war zone surrounding Great Britain. With regard to these, no assurances have ever been given to the Government of the United States. No such assurances are contained in the declaration of Feb. 8, 1916.

The German Government cannot admit any doubt that these orders were given or are executed in good faith. Errors actually occurred. They can in no kind of warfare be avoided altogether. Allowances must be made in the conduct of naval warfare against an enemy resorting to all kinds of ruses, whether permissible or illicit.

But apart from the possibility of errors, naval warfare, just like warfare on land, implies unavoidable dangers for neutral persons and goods entering the fighting zone. Even in cases where the naval action is confined to ordinary forms of cruiser warfare, neutral persons and goods repeatedly come to grief.

The German Government has repeatedly and explicitly pointed out the dangers from mines that have led to the loss of numerous ships.

The German Government has made several proposals to the Government of the United States in order to reduce to a minimum for American travelers and goods the inherent dangers of naval warfare. Unfortunately the Government of the United States decided not to accept the proposals. Had it accepted, the Government of the United States would have been instrumental in preventing the greater part of the accidents that American citizens have met with in the meantime.

The German Government still stands by its offer to come to an agreement along these lines.

As the German Government repeatedly declared, it cannot dispense with the use of the submarine weapon in the conduct of warfare against enemy trade. The German Government, however, has now decided to make a further concession, adapting methods of submarine war to the interests of neutrals. In reaching its decision the German Government is actuated by considerations which are above the level of the disputed question.

The German Government attaches no less importance to the sacred principles of humanity than the Government of the United States. It again fully takes into account that both Governments for many years co-operated in developing international law in conformity with these prin-

ciples, the ultimate object of which has always been to confine warfare on sea and land to armed forces of belligerents and safeguard as far as possible noncombatants against the horrors of war.

But although these considerations are of great weight, they alone would not under present circumstances have determined the attitude of the German Government. For in answer to the appeal by the Government of the United States on behalf of the sacred principles of humanity and international law, the German Government must repeat once more, with all emphasis, that it was not the German, but the British, Government which ignored all accepted rules of international law and extended this terrible war to the lives and property of noncombatants, having no regard whatever for the interests and rights of neutrals and noncombatants that through this method of warfare have been severely injured.

In self-defense against the illegal conduct of British warfare, while fighting a bitter struggle for national existence, Germany had to resort to the hard but effective weapon of submarine warfare.

As matters stand, the German Government cannot but reiterate regret that the sentiments of humanity, which the Government of the United States extends with such fervor to the unhappy victims of submarine warfare, are not extended with the same warmth of feeling to many millions of women and children who, according to the avowed intention of the British Government, shall be starved, and who by sufferings shall force the victorious armies of the Central Powers into ignominious capitulation.

The German Government, in agreement with the German people, fails to understand this discrimination, all the more as it has repeatedly and explicitly declared itself ready to use the submarine weapon in strict conformity with the rules of international law as recognized before the outbreak of the war, if Great Britain likewise was ready to adapt the conduct of warfare to these rules.

Several attempts made by the Government of the United States to prevail upon the British Government to act ac-

cordingly failed because of flat refusal on the part of the British Government. Moreover, Great Britain again and again has violated international law, surpassing all bounds in outraging neutral rights. The latest measure adopted by Great Britain, declaring German bunker coal contraband and establishing conditions under which English bunker coal alone is supplied to neutrals, is nothing but an unheard-of attempt by way of exaction to force neutral tonnage into the service of British trade war.

The German people knows that the Government of the United States has the power to confine the war to armed forces of the belligerent countries, in the interest of humanity and maintenance of international law. The Government of the United States would have been certain of attaining this end had it been determined to insist, against Great Britain, on the incontrovertible rights to freedom of the seas. But, as matters stand, the German people is under the impression that the Government of the United States, while demanding that Germany, struggling for existence, shall restrain the use of an effective weapon and while making compliance with these demands a condition for maintenance of relations with Germany, confines itself to protests against illegal methods adopted by Germany's enemies. Moreover, the German people knows to what considerable extent its enemies are supplied with all kinds of war material from the United States.

It will, therefore, be understood that the appeal made by the Government of the United States to sentiments of humanity and principles of international law cannot, under the circumstances, meet the same hearty response from the German people which such an appeal otherwise always is certain to find here. If the German Government, nevertheless, is resolved to go to the utmost limit of concessions, it has been guided not alone by the friendship connecting the two great nations for over one hundred years, but also by the thought of the great doom which threatens the entire civilized world should the cruel and sanguinary war be extended and prolonged.

The German Government, conscious of

Germany's strength, twice within the last few months announced before the world its readiness to make peace on a basis safeguarding Germany's vital interests, thus indicating that it is not Germany's fault if peace is still withheld from the nations of Europe. The German Government feels all the more justified in declaring that responsibility could not be borne before the forum of mankind and in history if after twenty-one months of the war's duration the submarine question, under discussion between the German Government and the Government of the United States, were to take a turn seriously threatening maintenance of peace between the two nations.

As far as lies with the German Government, it wishes to prevent things from taking such a course. The German Government, moreover, is prepared to do its utmost to confine operations of the war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents, thereby also insuring the freedom of the seas, a principle upon which the German Government believes, now as before, that it is in agreement with the Government of the United States.

The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government of the United States that German naval forces have received the following order:

In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels, recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless the ship attempt to escape or offer resistance.

But neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interests, restrict the use of an effective weapon, if the

enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating rules of international law. Such a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality, and the German Government is convinced that the Government of the United States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the Government of the United States repeatedly declares that it is determined to restore the principle of freedom of the seas, from whatever quarter it has been violated.

Accordingly, the German Government is confident that in consequence of the new orders issued to the naval forces the Government of the United States will also now consider all impediments removed which may have been in the way of a mutual co-operation toward restoration of the freedom of the seas during the war, as suggested in the note of July 23, 1915, and it does not doubt that the Government of the United States will now demand and insist that the British Government shall forthwith observe the rules of international law universally recognized before the war, as are laid down in the notes presented by the Government of the United States to the British Government Dec. 28, 1914, and Nov. 5, 1915.

Should steps taken by the Government of the United States not attain the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new situation in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision.

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the American Ambassador assurances of highest consideration.

VON JAGOW.



Answer by the United States

President Wilson instructed the American Ambassador at Berlin to deliver the following reply to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs:

Washington, May 8, 1916.

THE note of the Imperial German Government under date of May 4, 1916, has received careful consideration by the Government of the United States. It is especially noted, as indicating the purpose of the Imperial Government as to the future, that it "is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of the war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents" and that it is determined to impose upon all its commanders at sea the limitations of the recognized rules of international law upon which the Government of the United States has insisted.

Throughout the months which have elapsed since the Imperial Government announced, on Feb. 4, 1915, its submarine policy, now happily abandoned, the Government of the United States has been constantly guided and restrained by motives of friendship in its patient efforts to bring to an amicable settlement the critical questions arising from that policy. Accepting the Imperial Government's declaration of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between the two countries, the Government of the

United States will rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the Imperial Government, such as will remove the principal danger to an interruption of the good relations existing between the United States and Germany.

The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent Government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government's note of the fourth instant might appear to be susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative.

LANSING.

A British Reply to Germany's Note

By Lord Robert Cecil

Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs

In behalf of the British Foreign Office the following comment upon certain portions of the German note was made public by Lord Robert Cecil:

THE reply of the German Government to the American note of April 20 respecting submarine warfare is not a communication upon which any general comment can properly be made in this

country, as the questions at issue concern the United States and Germany, and any interference by a third party would be presumptuous. Since, however, the German note contains certain misstatements of fact respecting the actions of Great Britain the following observations may not be thought out of place:

The German Government state that

they have, so far as is possible, instituted a far-reaching restraint upon the use of the submarine weapon, solely in consideration of neutral interests and in spite of the fact that these restrictions were necessarily of advantage to Germany's enemies. It is alleged that no such consideration has ever been shown to neutrals by Great Britain and her allies.

Do the facts bear out these assertions? So far as is known, the measures taken by Great Britain against German trade have cost no neutral his life. Great Britain maintains that they are in accord with the principles of international law and is prepared to make good that claim. They can surely compare favorably, so far as consideration to neutrals is concerned, with a policy whose fruits are seen in the tragedies of the *Lusitania*, the *Arabic*, and the *Sussex*.

The Germans maintain that it was owing to the illegal conduct of the British warfare that Germany was forced to resort to her submarine campaign. This is not the first time that the Germans have attempted to justify their submarine warfare on the ground that it is a measure of reprisal against the action of the British Government in cutting off supplies from Germany. The following list of incidents, in chronological order, should suffice to dispose of this plea:

September, 1914.—Dutch vessel *Maria*, from California for Dublin and Belfast with cargo of grain for the civil population, sunk by the German cruiser *Karlsruhe*.

Oct. 26, 1914.—The Admiral *Ganteaume*, with 2,000 unarmed refugees, sunk by a German submarine.

December, 1914.—Admiral von Tirpitz foreshadowed adoption of submarine campaign.

Jan. 27, 1915.—American ship *William P. Frye*, with wheat from Seattle for Queens-town, sunk by German auxiliary cruiser *Kronprinz Wilhelm*.

[The *William P. Frye* was sunk by the Prinz *Eitel Friedrich*, according to the records.]

Feb. 4, 1915.—Declaration by the German Government of their intention to institute a general submarine blockade of Great Britain and Ireland, with the avowed purpose of cutting off all supplies from these islands. This blockade was put into effect officially Feb. 18, although, as a matter of fact, a merchant ship had been sunk by a German submarine at the end of January.

It was not until March 11, 1915, that the present measures against German trade were put in force by Great Britain. Before the enforcement of those measures the Germans had destroyed cargoes of foodstuffs coming to the civilian population of this country, had declared their intention of instituting a system of submarine outrage, and had actually submarined merchant vessels without warning.

As for their pretended tenderness for noncombatants, their slaughter of old men, children, women, and girls in Belgium and Northern France, not to speak of the unreported proceedings of their honored allies in Armenia, forever prevents them from being heard in such a cause.

The German Government speaks of many millions of women and children who, according to the avowed intention of the British Government, are to be starved and who by their sufferings shall force the victorious armies of the Central Powers into an ignominious capitulation. In this connection it is interesting to remember that at the beginning of last month the German Chancellor made the following remarks in the Reichstag:

I can understand that in 1915 the enemy would not give up hope of starving Germany, but I cannot understand how cool heads can cling to it after the experience of 1915. Our enemies forget that, thanks to the organizing powers of the whole nation, Germany is equal to the task of the distribution of victuals. Our stocks of bread and grain will not only be sufficient, but will leave an ample reserve with which to commence the new year. We have not run short of anything in the past, nor shall we run short of anything in the future.

There is a curious contradiction between this statement and the present appeal on behalf of starving women and children. However, presuming that the statement of the Chancellor in the Reichstag was untrue, it is interesting to recall the opinions of two former German statesmen, Prince Bismarck and Count Caprivi, as to the right of a belligerent to cut off supplies from the enemy.

In 1885, at the time when his Majesty's Government were discussing with the French Government the question of the right to declare foodstuffs not intend-

ed for the military forces to be contraband, Prince Bismarck made the following statement to the Kiel Chamber of Commerce:

I reply to the Chamber of Commerce that any disadvantage our commercial and carrying interests may suffer by the treatment of rice as contraband of war does not justify our opposing a measure which it has been thought fit to take in carrying on a foreign war. Every war is a calamity which entails evil consequences, not only on the combatants but also on neutrals. The measure in question has for its object the shortening of the war by increasing the difficulties of the enemy, and is a justifiable step in war if impartially enforced against all neutral ships.

In 1892 Count Caprivi made the following remarks in the Reichstag in the course of a discussion respecting the question of international protection for private property at sea:

A country may be dependent for her food or for her raw products upon her trade. In fact, it may be absolutely necessary to destroy an enemy's trade. The private introduction of provisions into Paris was prohibited during the siege, and in the same way a nation would be justified in preventing the import of food and raw produce.

These older German authorities were right. The truth is, all war is cruel, horrible, but those who have drenched Europe in blood; who scatter death and destruction among combatants and non-combatants by their Zeppelin bombs and

submarine torpedoes; who, by their poisoned gas and high explosive shells have maimed, tortured, and slain millions of the best and bravest of their fellow-creatures, are presuming too far on the toleration of mankind when they complain of such a comparatively humane method of warfare as blockade.

Of the German peace overtures, if such they are to be called, I will say little. It was only in last December that their Chancellor declared that we believed it to be in our interests to attribute falsely to them peace proposals. Yet the German Government now say that twice within the last few months Germany has announced before the world her readiness to make peace. Which is the truth?

It may be that the Germans want peace. If so, it is because they fear defeat. It may be only that they want to appear peaceful. For us it matters not. Our attitude, at any rate, is unchanged. We drew the sword unwillingly. We shall sheathe it gladly. But we should be untrue to our trust, we should be betraying civilization if we abandoned our task until we have re-established in Europe the supremacy of law, the sanctity of treaties, and the right of all nations, great and small, to live their lives, to fulfill their destinies, free from the intolerable menace of Prussian militarism.

Germany's Note Admitting the Sinking of the Sussex

In this note, which virtually closes the episode, Germany admits the torpedoing of the Sussex, and offers reparation. The official text, as cabled by Ambassador Gerard, is as follows:

American Embassy,
Berlin, May 8, 1916.

SUPPLEMENTING his note of the 4th instant concerning the conduct of the German submarine warfare, the undersigned has the honor to inform his Excellency, the American Ambassador, Mr. James W. Gerard, that the further investigation made by the German naval authorities concerned in regard to the French steamship *Sussex*, on the basis of the American material, has been concluded in the meantime. In

conformity with the result of this investigation the assumption expressed in the note of the undersigned of the 10th ultimo, that the damage of the *Sussex* was to be traced back to a cause other than the attack of a German submarine, cannot be maintained.

Such an assumption had to be arrived at with certainty from the material in the possession of the German Government, for itself, and without further knowledge of the circumstances connected with the torpedoing of the *Sussex*, the more so as apart from the points enumerated in the note of the 10th ultimo the following facts had come to the attention of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy through reliable information: March 24, 1916, approximately at the same time as the *Sussex*, an auxiliary warship left the port of Folkestone

with a large transport of British infantry on board. On the same day a transport steamer was torpedoed in the Channel. A few minutes preceding the explosion on the *Sussex* she had passed through a mass of ship wreckage, which created the impression that a ship had sunk at that spot shortly before. All these facts justified the conclusion that the only case of torpedoing which could be considered under the circumstances had struck the British war vessel, whereas the *Sussex* had met with an accident in some other way.

However, on the basis of the American material, the German Government cannot withhold its conviction that the ship torpedoed by the German submarine is in fact identical with the *Sussex*, for in accordance with this material the place, the time, and the effect of the explosion by which the *Sussex* was damaged agree in the essential details with the statement of the German commander, so that there can no longer be any question of the possibility of two independent occurrences. An additional reason is constituted by the fact that officers of the American Navy found fragments of an explosive in the hold of the *Sussex* which are described by them upon firm grounds as parts of a German torpedo.

Finally, the counterevidence which was deduced in the note of the 10th ultimo from the difference in appearance of the vessel described by the submarine commander and the only reproduction of the *Sussex* then available has proved to be untenable, inasmuch as according to a photograph of the damaged *Sussex* now to hand the characteristic distinctions no longer existed at the time of the accident. While the *Sussex* in the photograph of my (the) *Daily Graphic* inclosed in the note only carried one mast and also showed the white gangway customary on passenger ves-

sels on the level with the portholes, O. W. S., the reproduction of the damaged *Sussex* shows a second mast and a uniform dark color, and thus approaches in her outer appearance the description of the vessel as furnished by the submarine commander.

In view of the general impression of all the facts at hand the German Government considers it beyond doubt that the commander of the submarine acted in the bona fide belief that he was facing an enemy warship. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that, misled by the appearance of the vessel, under the pressure of the circumstances, he formed his judgment too hurriedly in establishing her character and did not, therefore, act fully in accordance with the strict instruction which called upon him to exercise particular care.

In view of these circumstances the German Government frankly admits that the assurance given to the American Government, in accordance with which passenger vessels were not to be attacked without warning, has not been adhered to in the present case. As was intimated by the undersigned in the note of the 4th instant, the German Government does not hesitate to draw from this resultant consequences. It therefore expresses to the American Government its sincere regret regarding the deplorable incident and declares its readiness to pay an adequate indemnity to the injured American citizens. It also disapproves of the conduct of the commander, who has been appropriately punished.

Expressing the hope that the American Government will consider the case of the *Sussex* as settled by these statements, the undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to the Ambassador the assurance of his highest consideration.

VON JAGOW.

A German Medal Celebrating the Torpedoing of the *Lusitania*

PHOTOGRAPHS of a satirical German medal issued in commemoration of the destruction of the *Lusitania* have recently reached this country. The medal is engraved and issued in bronze by Karl Goetz of Munich, and is offered for sale all over Europe, being catalogued by a large Amsterdam coin dealer at the price of 7¼ florins. The Numismatist calls the attention of Americans to it with the mild remark that the average collector in this country "will wonder why, considering it from any point of view, it should have been issued."

On the obverse appears the prow of the *Lusitania* at the moment of sinking, with an aeroplane and a mounted gun, (which the whole world now knows it did not carry.) Above is the inscription, "Keine Bannware," ("No Contraband,") and below "Der Grosse Dampfer *Lusitania* durch ein deutsches Tauchboot versenkt, 7 Mai, 1915," ("The Great Steamship *Lusitania*, Sunk by a German Submarine, May 7, 1915.") On the reverse is a figure of Death, in the Cunard Line office, selling tickets to passengers for the fatal journey. The satirical inscription is "Ge-



GERMAN MEDAL OF LUSITANIA DISASTER


schäft über alles," ("Business First.") The medal is cast in bronze, is 2 3-16 inches across, and has a beveled edge.

This treatment of an act which caused the death of 1,198 passengers, of whom 124 were Americans, is commented upon in a two-column article in the Paris Figaro, from which the following is an extract:

"I am not quite sure that the fact of having issued this 'satirical' medal to commemorate and glorify the crime of the German pirates is not something, if not more hideous, at least more ignominious than the crime itself. The German Emperor and his Grand Admiral, von Tirpitz, are malefactors under the common law, the one decorated, the other crowned. They at least run the risk of public malefactors, like a Cartouche or a Mandrin. The submarine officers who

fired the murderous torpedo are slaves, gross and brutal, in passive obedience. There is not a marine officer in all the other fleets of the world, the Austrians and Turks excepted, who would not have broken his sword rather than execute so infamous an order.

"But of what mud can that soul be made, if one can call it a soul, which in the guise of an artist sneeringly celebrates that atrocious hecatomb as a victory, and hawks it about for money! And the whole German Nation, which also has glorified the abominable and cowardly crime, and which amuses itself with this abject commemoration! That is what, in the space of half a century, the Hohenzollern dynasty has made of the Germany of Goethe and Kant. If we do not crush the wild beast in its lair, what will become of the rest of the world?



Why Americans Are Pro-Ally

By Booth Tarkington

Popular American Novelist

At the request of an English friend Mr. Tarkington recently wrote this pithy analysis of American war sentiment for the information of the British public.

ALL normal and educated Americans have been from the beginning, and now are, "pro-ally."

There are no exceptions. A few "prominent citizens"—not a dozen, all told—have been entertained and personally enlightened by the Kaiser, or by his close adherents, and are "pro-Germans"; but that sort of enlightenment is, of course, destructive to education, and these troubled gentlemen have had no visible influence, though one hears that two or three of them have been able to convert their wives to the German view. There are also, here and there, a few "pro-German" oddities, quirk-brained persons and tender-hearted souls, who are "for Germany" because everybody else is cursing Germany. They are of no consequence and may fairly be classed as not normal.

It should be understood, of course, that the educated "German-American" is not an educated American. The "German-Americans" are becoming consistent lately: they advocate the hyphen for all persons dwelling within the United States; they would not forbid even Colonel Roosevelt to be known as a Dutch-English-German-American, though the Colonel himself appears to be sluggish in claiming his rights in the

matter. We may dismiss the "German-Americans" from this consideration, not without compassion: they are human and they are sweating blood.

Officials are all neutral. They are neutral because the United States is officially neutral. Politicians, for the greater part, affect to be neutral. That is because they are politicians and wish to offend nobody. The end will be, of course, that as feeling grows higher they will offend everybody. Neutrality always offends everybody.

Almost all of the newspapers are "pro-ally," though numbers of them pose as neutral. But you may accept it as the fact that all officials and politicians and editors who are educated Americans are actually "pro-ally." The "great mass of the proletariat" are vaguely "pro-ally," but more definitely, as about everything,

pro-nothing. They do not know that the war affects them, and they do not think about it.

The American is "pro-ally," but not because he is characteristically of English descent. Characteristically he doesn't know his descent. He sometimes guesses at it, idly, concluding, if his name be Baker, or Knight, or Thompson, that his ancestors may have been English—he



BOOTH TARKINGTON

doesn't care. Nor does he regard England as the "Mother Country"; nor is that saying much in his mind: "Blood is thicker than water." He is not "pro-ally" out of sympathy. Who thinks he is fails to understand the American. The American is pro-Belgian out of sympathy; and he is anti-Teuton, in the Belgian matter, out of indignation; but he is "pro-ally" because history is "pro-ally."

We were the onlookers from the beginning, and we saw that Germans made the war. We saw that the German Nation went into the war with a patriotic stupidity, magnificent and horrible; that the German Nation was wholly in the grip of a herd instinct which had been used by manipulators; and that these manipulators, having made the Germans into a loyal, warlike tribe, brought on the war in the approved manner employed by all war chiefs desiring a war. Their unblemished hypocrisy was of an old, old model always employed by war chiefs—and absolutely obvious to any mind not under the sway of herd instinct.

The Germans saw what had happened here. They understood that an impartial national mind had judged them; so they naturally organized a stupendous campaign attacking our judgment. For their purpose, their propaganda accomplished precisely nothing.

* * * Now, this is the American mind; this is how the American thinks of the war: "The German Nation has been revealed as a warlike tribe, wonderful in that capacity, but not to be thought civilized merely because it uses typewriters. Its will is the will of its chieftains and its credulity is theirs to use as they choose. The chieftains, for their own greater power and greater glory, as they, in their barbaric way, conceive glory, and for the expansion and increased riches of the tribe under their control, made this war. They forced it at a chosen time—as they forced the last three wars which they have made. They then began operations with a crime which would dishonor a civilized nation but which a barbaric tribe would consider creditable. Their descendants, who will probably become civilized in the course

of time, will be dishonored by this crime, but the barbarians who committed it will naturally never comprehend the shame of it.

"England came into the war for good reasons, whether those reasons were to protect herself, or because the violation of Belgium demanded it. The latter motive is the finer, but the former is sufficient. Probably both motives operated together, strengthened by a promise to aid France—a good promise. My birds-eye view is of an England fighting to make a predatory tribe learn to keep the peace. And England must win. I am not worried about the freedom of the seas under England: I am worried about freedom anywhere under Germany. There were some sufferers down South wailing about their cotton, and there are others out in pocket and complaining of the high hand of England; and our Government, being neutral, must send bothersome notes to England—the Government is literally bound to do so. These are 'technicalities'; I wish they could be abolished. I do not want England bothered. We have a real note pending with Germany; the Lusitania case is just what it was last May, and we have waited so long that other nations have forgotten that we are only waiting, or they think that our waiting means a pitiable acquiescence. Not yet!

"And about our getting rich through the sale of munitions to the Allies, I am sorry if that sale is what causes our prosperity. It is a horrible way to make money. It is absolutely necessary that we furnish munitions to the Allies, and we shall not tolerate interference with our manufacture and shipping of these munitions, but I wish there were no profit-taking. However, under any circumstances, the Allies must be supplied with munitions—for they must win!"

That is the American thought.

Working against the American is something fermented of sloppy materials and waste, stirred and brewed into a gas by the ebullience of these times. The fermentation takes place, where history informs us that many of our fermentations of ignorance, for the last sixty years, have taken place, within the Democratic

Party; its opponent, the Republican Party, specializing, at times, in the fermentations of corruption, until it is forced out of power and into reformation. Mr. Bryan, late Secretary of State, is the witch of the Democratic caldron, and, to drop the figure, he is trying to prevent the President's renomination. Mr. Bryan has often used "mob ignorance" to effect his purposes; but it is generally believed that he is quite sincere, and that upon the frequent occasions when he makes use of mob or Congressional ignorance he is honorably and consistently ignorant himself. He is a man of unsullied conscience; he has never in his life done a thing which he believed to be wrong; and his career reveals a long series of coincidences, in each of which his sincere view of the True and the Right and the Elevating was precisely that which seemed most likely to elevate Mr. Bryan. However, nobody believes him to be a hypocrite; it is felt, merely, that he is incapable of analyzing his own real motives.

He still has power within the Democratic Party, and he has used it to embarrass the President in the latter's dealings with the German Government. Mr. Bryan can now count upon the German-Americans and the pacifists, and also upon a number of personal henchmen. He hopes for a vast addition, contributed by public ignorance, to these forces; he hopes that there will develop a great

body of voters to whom international law and all foreign relations mean nothing; who are unaware that they dwell upon a round world; who are indifferent to the outcome of the war—in brief, who have never beheld the sea and would riot to keep from having to fight for some incomprehensible nonsense about submarine boats. So far, however, this body of reserves for Mr. Bryan and his rather nauseating Congressmen—and the German-Americans and pacifists—has not developed. In our belief it will not be at all formidable.

Except for an army or navy man, here and there, it is the fact that in August, 1914, almost all Americans thought that there would be no more great wars. Now we think of little except preparation for our own defense. Defense against whom? Who was it that so utterly changed our minds? Not England. Not France. Not Russia. There is not a sane American who thinks of England or France or Russia or Italy when he thinks of "preparedness." And "preparedness" is in either the foreground or the background of every American mind continually. Shall we fight without "preparedness"? We still hope for honorable peace, whether we are prepared or not prepared for war, but the American answer to the question just asked is, "Yes, if we have to!" England, whom we fought twice when we were unprepared, need not doubt it.

Colonel Watterson on German Hopes

Colonel Henry Watterson, once an officer in the Confederate Army, now the dean of American journalism, writes in The Louisville Courier-Journal:

God bless the noble, patient, puissant, helpless people of Germany. As mistaken as the noble, patient, puissant people of the Confederacy, they have fought and are fighting as wondrous, as inflexible, and as futile a battle. There can be but one end of it. If the world is not again to sink into the Dark Ages, if another fall from civilization into barbarism be not before us, the gigantic, bloodthirsty, savage dominion of Prussian militarism must be as completely dissolved as the armies of the South in the great war of sections in America were dissolved. In the one case republican government went with the armies of the Union; on the other hand, civilization and Christianity. If the Confederacy had won, democracy had been proved a failure. If Prussia could win, the world were lost.

The Best Way to Enforce Peace

WRITTEN FOR CURRENT HISTORY

By John Cadwalader, Jr.

THREE contingencies as to the outcome of the European war present themselves: (1) A complete victory for Germany, (2) a complete victory for the Allies, or (3) a draw in which Germany's fleet and army remain intact. It is, of course, probable that a complete victory for the Allies will leave us free from all immediate danger of foreign attack. But there is still Mexico as a plague spot, and there is small chance, if one of the foreign belligerents—say, France, Italy, Russia, or Japan—thought its citizens in danger there, and their rights ignored, that the aggrieved nation would not feel amply justified in intervening to protect them. Once having intervened it would find it very difficult to let go. This Government in such case would be obliged to interfere.

The Monroe Doctrine is a standing insult to every nation except one, and just because we have for 100 years pursued what seems to most of the world a "dog in the manger" policy we cannot tamely relinquish it without forfeiting all respect. It has been treated by our statesmen, and in the main rightly so, as not only an altruistic principle of protection to our weaker neighbors, but as also a measure of self-defense essential to the free development of America's twin offspring, liberty and democracy.

Words cannot describe what would inevitably happen to this country in the event of a German victory. We have been given undoubted proof that "live and let live" is no part of Germany's scheme. Her aims are purely selfish, and she will carry those aims to the logical extreme. Covetousness in Germany is a virtue, and if there is any portion of America that Germany covets she will seize it when the time is ripe, or if perchance she believes, as she truly does, that she could administer our Government far better than we can ourselves,

she will unquestionably lay her plans, not in a hurry, but very carefully and systematically, to take it from us.

The consequences to us in the event of a draw in the European war are almost equally serious. In that case, assuming that Germany retains her fleet and her army, and is deprived of any possibility of expansion in Africa or Asia, what more certain than that she will look toward Mexico or South America to make up her losses? Popular writers have suggested the further possibility of an immediate descent on our unprotected coasts and the collection of an indemnity from the cities of the eastern seaboard sufficient to pay all the expenses of her war. As it now seems likely that Congress will do something in the way of preparedness to block this scheme, it is more probable that the attack will be made indirectly on Central or South America, giving Germany a much better chance to establish herself there firmly before we could exert any considerable pressure against her.

Optimists and pacifists, of course, say that these are mere bogies of the imagination, because Germany will be too exhausted after the war, even should it end in an even draw, to think of beginning another; but the teaching of history is against this "flattering unction." What aggressive nation has ever stopped fighting because it had enough? The lust for conquest grows by feeding on itself, and the people at home that blindly follow such a government must be kept fed up on more and more conquests, lest they turn their attention to home problems and to the question, "What good came of it at last?"

But apart from all other possibilities, fraught with danger as they are to the richest and the most unprepared nation on earth, does not the bare possibility of a German victory stiffen the limbs and freeze the blood of every true

American? The triumph of the most ruthless aggressor, fortified with the most devilish instruments of science and with the most indefatigable determination to pursue his ends regardless of the rights of any living thing; cynical and indifferent to law, religion, and humanity—can such an event be contemplated and not arouse all our manhood to instant action?

The law, whether it be national or international, is made for the protection of the weak; but, as the German leaders of thought have said again and again, the weak have no place in the scheme of things when it comes to their interfering with the strong. Religion, unless it be the worship of Thor and Odin, the gods of Thunder and of Battles, is the product of weak minds, and Christianity especially is a confession of failure.

Humanity, or what is left of it since the German began his assaults, makes no appeal to men whose one thought is to devise some new form of frightfulness; but what is left of it—and this the German knows and gloats on—has still the capacity to suffer, and the limit of its capacity for this at least is not in sight.

Whither, therefore, does our argument lead? We have two contingencies, one dangerous, the other more so, and we have a third contingency, the possibility of which should make us tremble for all that is dear to us and all that is sacred in life.

Let us for a moment conceive what would have happened to us if England had not throughout the war controlled the seas. If Germany had been in complete control as England has been we should have been her vassal. Trade with the Allies would have been altogether stopped, and trade with neutrals only permitted so far as it did not interfere with Germany's plans.

This, of course, is the least that we might have suffered, inasmuch as Germany believes in exercising her power to the fullest extent, and having the power to seize and hold for ransom any or all of our sea coast cities, she would have done it without hesitation or scruple.

But supposing that England and Germany had been more evenly matched on the ocean, so that neither could be said to have control; our position would have been well-nigh as perilous, and our commerce at the mercy of both belligerents.

Granted that our trade has been diverted to English harbors, and that we have suffered vexatious delays and hindrances as the result of England's blockade or quasi-blockade of Germany, at least she has not sunk our ships nor massacred passengers and crews. Until this war began such practices were reserved for pirates, and it was not considered possible that the lives of non-combatants at sea could be endangered by any power that called itself civilized. The record of the Confederate navy in our civil war was a model in this respect.

Ample justification existed for our Government to declare in the cause of humanity as well as in its own self-interest that the torpedoing or sinking of passenger or merchant vessels by submarines in view of the unavoidable danger to lives was absolutely violative of the spirit of international law, and thus by one bold stroke we should have made the freedom of the seas a reality. The Constitution gives to Congress the power "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations," and we have asserted the power to override rights that were generally recognized by international law, as, e. g., when we declared by special statute the slave trade to be piracy, although previously sustained on general principles by the Supreme Court in the case of the *Antelope*, 10 Wheat., 66.

What more glorious edict, the equivalent of a worldwide emancipation proclamation, than an act of Congress proclaiming to the world that this country would punish as felons and pirates all those who took the lives of noncombatants at sea by submarine attack, whether those noncombatants were enemies or neutrals!

But, alas, we have permitted the piratical practice to continue, and the ruthless aggressor has grown more ruthless

as the desperation of his case grows ever greater.

The remedy, and the only remedy, that will "provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity" is a union, alliance, or diplomatic understanding between all English-speaking peoples for the policing of the seas. With England, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, the freest and most democratic Commonwealths of the world, united with us in such a way that each is bound to help the other against any power that endangers the lives of noncombatants at sea, there need be no fear that international law may become the sport of any ambitious power.

Dr. Eliot argues earnestly and ably for an offensive and defensive alliance of England, France, and America, with others to follow, for the freedom of the seas.

It is better, it seems to the writer, to describe it as a treaty for the policing of the seas, which is at all times a matter of vital interest to ourselves and not less so to England and her colonies, and which would not involve us in a departure from our traditional policy of isolation in matters relating to European politics. Furthermore, with such policing guaranteed by an overwhelming combination sufficient to paralyze the trade of any two powers who sought to oppose it, no matter what offensive strength they might develop on land, the way of the transgressor would be hard, indeed.

If we should feel that Anglo-Saxon character and civilization were not sufficient guarantee against the use of such power at all times for improper ends, it would be easy to provide that if any one of the constituent powers were guilty of piratical acts the remaining members of the league should be absolved and free to adopt measures of repression against it.

What more simple, complete, and effective league to enforce peace could be devised? Simple, because the peoples involved are already one in spirit and in aspiration; complete, because our race has its young and virile democracies

growing up in every section of the globe; effective, because the sea, our own element, is the greatest medium of civilization and of bringing together the scattered elements of the human race.

Thus we come back to the ideal with which liberalism started—that the world must draw closer together, else it fall asunder altogether—but a liberalism based on the protection of the law and of that strongest bond to draw all nations to observe the law, the majesty of a truly majestic Anglo-Saxon fleet.

The problem would no longer be "The Influence of Sea Power on History," but "The Maintenance by Sea Power of the Liberties and Rights of all Mankind."

The argument for an immediate denunciation of the attacks on noncombatants at sea seems unanswerable. If this nation feels that Germany's submarine war is opposed to every principle of humanity as well as to the spirit if not the letter of international law, now is the time to say so. By waiting till the war is over, the practices that we abhor become precedents for the next war. Furthermore, what faith will England put in any of our high professions if we show a continued unwillingness to maintain our principles at any sacrifice?

The country is moving toward the assertion of protection for noncombatants at sea, as the recent vote in Congress shows. That there were any Senators or Representatives willing to abandon our citizens to their fate by warning them not to travel on armed merchantmen is a deplorable fact. But that the great majority stood up for human rights against the clamor of the commercial interests, the pacifists, and the German corruptionists offers great hope for the future. If submarine warfare is limited to its proper sphere, viz., operations against ships of war, there will be small temptation for any naval power to attempt any future campaign of frightfulness.

The destruction of the enemy's commerce is the chief purpose of naval warfare, and it has in the opinion of the ablest thinkers been the deciding factor in most wars. Can we not confidently

expect that if America takes her stand against the barbarous practices of submarine warfare it will be a great factor in ending not only the present awful struggle, but also all future projects for world dominion by "blood and iron"?

The plan proposed, so far as the writer is aware, presents no legal or constitutional difficulty. An agreement for the policing of the seas may require the use of force to suppress acts which the high contracting parties define as piracy and, therefore, may of course lead to war. That act, however, which would in fact be the declaration of war in such case, would be the act of a foreign power. A state of war would, therefore, exist without a declaration by Congress and without any usurpation of such authority by the President.

The honor of the country is placed ultimately in the hands of Congress, which could, if it saw fit, refuse to provide for the common defense even in

case of invasion, just as it has the power to abrogate any treaty that has been entered into and so to violate our plighted faith. But just as it has never refused to vote appropriations to foreign powers in treaties made by the President and ratified by the Senate, although the House has often shown a stubborn spirit, so it is not conceivable that a treaty of the sort herein advocated, when duly ratified by the Senate, would not receive the fullest support from our direct Representatives, just as from that great, crude, uncouth, but withal simple and generous-minded mass of humanity that we call the American people.

We must have faith in that better side of our national character and not expose to foreign view that very raw side of one type of American

"That bids him flout the law he makes;
That bids him make the law he flouts;
Till, crazed by many doubts, he wakes
The drumming guns that have no doubts."
PHILADELPHIA, Penn.

If Great Britain Had Remained Neutral

By Dr. BERNHARD DERNBURG

In concluding a long article in the Berliner Tageblatt on the economic consequences of the war to Great Britain, Dr. Dernburg, at one time the Kaiser's confidential envoy in the United States, declared:

If England had remained neutral, not taken a hand in the Austro-Serbian row, and not encouraged Russia to take part in it, she would not only have saved the fourth of her national wealth, which this war is, directly and indirectly, costing her, but she would have been able to attain a position like that of the United States, which in the year 1915 had an excess of exports amounting to 7,800,000,000 marks, (\$1,950,000,000,) a sum which must be paid to her by foreign nations, either in gold or its equivalent. The conclusion to be drawn from this exposition is that it is impossible for even the richest country of the world to maintain its trade, industry, and commerce intact, lend enormous sums to its allies in cash and still larger amounts in munitions and services, and at the same time maintain the biggest navy and a mighty army—the British enlistments have exceeded 3,800,000 men—and that, consequently, it is extremely improbable that after the close of this struggle England will possess any economic preponderancy over Germany or be able to attain such a position.

The Two Gorgon Heads

By Pierre Loti

Member of the French Academy

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY from Le Figaro]

"I begin by taking. Afterward I can always find learned men to demonstrate that it was my good right."—Frederick II. (whom, for lack of a better, they call the Great.)

I.

THEIR KAISER

HIS is one of those accursed faces upon which, with age, emerge all the horror and all the night that lurked in the bottom of the soul.

The features at times are not ignoble, no,

but on such faces something has been inscribed that is a thousand times worse than ugliness, and one cannot look at them. * * * Thus it is with their Kaiser. To freeze you, his sinister likeness, the least of his portraits glimpsed in a newspaper, is sufficient. Oh! that viperine eye, ambushed under flabby eyelids, that smile twisted by all his inner defects; skilled hypocrisy, unhealthy brutality, cold ferocity, without counting that excess of arrogance, in whose presence inanimate whips start up and begin lashing!

I once saw, at the back of an old temple in Japan, a hideous image which was regarded as a masterpiece of its kind, and which had been kept for ages under a veil in one of the treasure boxes. (You know the veneration of the Japanese for demon images, and the mastery of their artists in the horrible.) It was a human mask, with rather regular and refined

features, but when you had looked at it well its atrocious expression, at once cruel and dead, pursued you for days and nights. In the midst of the corpse-like flesh and pallid wrinkles its two eyes, half closed, the one more than the other, glittered and seemed to wink, as if to say, "For a long time, in my box, I have been pondering something frightful for you, and at last you have come, and I have you, and here it is!"



PIERRE LOTI

Well, for any one who knows how to see, the face of their Kaiser is as frightful as that one hidden in the old temple yonder, whatever may be the fashion of the helmet, with point or with death's head, in which he may fancy to deck himself. Through all the years that the dreadful look of that man has pursued me I have had a presentiment, like the rest of the world, that he was "pondering something for us," but also that it would be diabolically worked out, and more frightful than all the old crimes of the barbaric ages. And I said to myself that for

the safety of humanity that thing ought to be killed!

Kill it, yes! Strike down the hyena! It should have been done before its latent rage was fully in evidence—or at least it should have been chained, muzzled, imprisoned behind closed and solid bars!

Their Kaiser, their unnamable and proteiform Kaiser: every time that you

imagine you have said all there is to say about him he confounds you with something new which one would never have foreseen. After his almost stupid obstinacy in trying to represent his Germany as the attacked victim, in face of the most blinding evidence, the most formal written proofs, and the most crushing confessions of his accomplices, has he not of late felt the need of "swearing before God" that his conscience was pure and that he had not desired war! Before what God? Before his own, naturally; before "his old God," whom in private he must surely call "My old Beelzebub!" What elegance, too, in that epithet "old" applied to such a name!

It seems that their Kaiser has received from his old Beelzebub, besides the mission of spreading over the earth the greatest amount of mourning, of causing the most blood and tears to flow, also the other mission of hunting down every beauty, every religious remembrance, in order to profane all, to soil everything, and to render ugly all that he could not destroy. He has succeeded even in dishonoring science, in degrading it to the rôle of accomplice to his crimes.

And not only will this war of his own making—this war which he had willed with so much infernal premeditation—be a thousand times more destructive of human lives than all past wars put together, but he and his set must needs wreak their rage upon all those treasures of art which should have been the inviolable patrimony of civilized Europe. And if ever he had been able to become the absolute master which his vanity of a sick man dreamed of being, it would no longer have been by explosives and scrap iron that he would have succeeded in destroying everything, but by the incurable bad taste of his Germany. It is enough to have visited Berlin, capital of the crude, the guilt, the parvenu, in order to imagine what would have become of our cities. And one shudders also to think of the swift and final downfall of the wonderful Orient, with Stamboul, Damascus, Bagdad, on the day when he shall be the one to make the laws there.

Their Kaiser, whose look has death in

it, baffles reason and common sense. The morbid degeneracy of his brain is incontestible, yet in certain lines it is superiorly organized for evil, and is specialized in killing. For the honor of humanity let us agree that he is mad, as a certain Prince of Saxony has just declared. Granted, he is mad; in any country but Germany his war would have brought him a straitjacket in a dungeon. But, to the misfortune of Europe, his birth has made him Kaiser of the only people capable of accepting and following him—a people "cruel by nature, whom civilization has rendered ferocious," as Goethe says—and a people whose stupidity is infinite, as Schopenhauer confessed in his solemn testament.

In this "infinite stupidity" he himself shares at certain points; otherwise, would he have fumbled so irremediably his first move in 1914, through having imagined, up to the last minute, that England would not budge, even in the presence of the great sacrifice of Belgium? And is there not at least as much stupidity as ferocity in his massacres of civilians, his plots in America, his Zeppelins, poison gas, and the rest, all things of which he is personally the odious instigator, and which have succeeded only in accumulating against him and his Germany all the hatreds and disgusts in the world?

At the end of forty years of desperate preparation, with means so formidable, that he should recoil at no method however atrocious or vile, that he should care naught for any human law, any human pity, any conscience; that he should wallow thus in blood only to end in a fiasco—no, truly, something essential is lacking in the head of that assassin! And one must be the German people in order to go on allowing one's self to be led to destruction by such an unbalanced knave.

Destruction and barbarism! And will there be no limit to the sheeplike submission of those people, who, at the present moment, are getting themselves slaughtered like cattle in charges conducted with an imbecile rage by a microcephalic youth as devoid of intelligence as he is of soul?

II.

FERDINAND OF COBURG

Tsar of Bulgaria

To find a being more abominable than their Kaiser and their Crown Prince would at one time have seemed an impossible wager, but the wager has been accepted and won; this Coburg has been found!

And when one recalls that he had stirred the enthusiasm, in his hour, of most of our French women! About 1913, when I alone was beginning to nail him to the pillory, they were exalting his name and wearing his colors. A paladin of the cross, he was called. Oh! a free paladin, indeed, carrying a scapulary and saturated with masses after the style of Louis XI., but a man who, one fine morning, when the Queen could not see him, had forced his son to apostatize. It is known, besides, that he is now preparing for us the comedy of a reconversion to Catholicism, which he had formerly abjured for political reasons—and he will find priests yonder to bless that operation with serious faces.

A Gorgon's head is this other, too, his face marked likewise with the stigmata of knavery and crime. The first time that I encountered the furtive glance of his too-little eyes—it was twenty-five years ago at Sofia—I felt passing through my nerves that shudder of disgust by which instinct warns one of the approach of a monster. And I asked, "Who is that vampire?"

In a low and frightened voice some one replied, "Why, that is our Prince; you ought to salute him!"

"No! The idea!"

A cowardly assassin in his private life, but an assassin at a distance, he was wont to pass prudently beyond the frontier whenever his executor of high commissions had "work" to do under his orders; and then, when this hangman threatened to compromise him too much, he would have the official's hands cut off, (Panitza, Stambouloff, &c.)

And this man, like the other, *prays!* When it was hoped recently that the great accomplice was about to die of the

hereditary vices in his blood, he knelt for a long time between two rows of Germans summoned as spectators, to ask Heaven for the invalid's recovery—a monster praying for a monster; and then he rose, all steeped in grace divine, to say to the bystanders: "Never before have I prayed with such fervor!" Could even the thick-headed Boches, for whom this play-acting was intended, resist the impulse to mad laughter?

Assassin likewise in political life—assassin of nations! After his first enormous crime against the Serbs, his allies then, whom he had knifed in the back without a declaration of war, he attempted, as you may remember, to throw the crime back upon his Ministers when it turned out badly. And against this same heroic people, already crushed by barbarian hordes, he has just renewed—without warning, as always—his traitorous blow: the sort of oily cut-throat that would come up behind and finish off a man already in the grip of a band of highwaymen. If the alliance of Germany with Turkey did not of itself reach the point where it was necessary to compass the "suicide" of the heir apparent, it has done so in the case of Bulgaria. Their Kaiser and this Coburg, a diminutive copy of him, must have a fatal understanding with each other; one might have guessed as much merely from comparing the two faces, the two looks of beasts of the night. How comes it, then, that our diplomats at the little Court of Sofia did not suspect twenty months sooner that the brigand pact was signed in the shadow? And today, behold these two united to the point of half devouring each other, these two repulsive creatures in whose presence the most degraded criminals who drag the bullet in convict prisons seem to have committed only innocent peccadillos!

III.

THE NEUTRALS

Wake up, then, you small or large neutral countries, who do not yet realize that without us it would have been your turn to be stamped upon like Belgium, like Serbia and Montenegro! The world can breathe only after the complete

crushing of these last of the barbarians; how have you failed to feel it? What do you need to open your eyes? If it is not enough to see all our ruins—intentional and needless ruins—to read the many irrefutable attestations of enraged murders, not sparing even our smallest infants, if all that is not enough, then at least look among yourselves, look at the insolent irony of the pressures which the people of prey make you endure, or look at all the attacks, bold and secret, already committed on the other side of the ocean!

Or, again, if you are absolutely unable any longer to see what is happening around you, at least glance through what their intellectuals, their "great men," have written for centuries; on every page you will be frightened to find the most barefaced apologies for violence, rapine, and crime. Thus you will discover that all the horror overwhelming Europe today has existed in germ in the Teutonic brain from the very beginning, and that no other race in the world would have dared to denounce itself with so much cynical nonchalance.


And you, prelates or monks of a neighborhood clergy, who reproach us for being irreligious, and who make for our enemies the blindest of propaganda, pray leaf over a little the official manifesto of the Bishops of Belgium, and tell us what kind of a soul those people have who all the time profane the name of the Most High in their burlesque prayers, and then run amuck against all the sanctuaries of the faith, cathedrals or humble village churches, overthrowing crucifixes and killing priests!

Unless one belongs to their cursed race is it logically possible to be pro-German?

One may be neutral, I know, but only through terror, or because one is unprepared, or perhaps, without knowing it, because of the allurements of a certain momentary profit, or because of a little unrealized and short-lived egotism. It is terrible, of course, to throw one's self into such a struggle; but neutrality or even hesitation is becoming more than a dangerous mistake, and has already become almost a crime.

An insane villain had dreamed of dragging us all back twenty centuries to the old degrading servitudes and the old darkneses; he was plotting to realize for his own profit a vast bankruptcy of progress, of liberty, of human thought, and in his plans of an insatiable ogre it was you, neutral peoples, you who were marked next for attack. At least help us a little, so that this may end more quickly, this orgy of theft, of destruction, of massacre, of showering the earth with blood. Enough! Let us get out of this nightmare! Enough! Let all the world arise! Will not he who holds his hand today be ashamed afterward to keep his place in the sun of victory and peace which shall shine on us again? And we, when at last we shall have beaten down the mad hyena, losing our blood in streams, shall we not be almost in the right to say, with our arms still in our hands: "You neutrals, who will profit from the deliverance without having taken part in the struggle, at least pay us a little with your lands and your gold!"

Oh, let the tocsin sound in all directions, regardless of boundaries, from one end of the earth to the other; let it sound the supreme alarm; let the drums of all earth's armies beat the charge! And have at the German Beast!



Why Europe Was Deceived

By Guglielmo Ferrero

Italy's Foremost Living Historian

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY from *Le Temps* of Paris]

THERE is no denying that during the ten years that preceded the European war Germany had risen greatly in the opinion of the world, while France had fallen. Everywhere the Germanophile movement was gaining ground irresistibly. More and more all classes, professions, and parties in Europe and America agreed in regarding Germany as a model. The industry, commerce, banking, science, schools, army, merchant marine, navy, and many social institutions of Germany were the objects of growing admiration in all the world.

One scarcely dared to remark that the diplomacy of the powerful empire was sometimes maladroit, that the attitudes of the Emperor were not always quite serious, that German industry and commerce were trying to develop themselves with the aid of complicated and laborious expedients. One often ended by finding in these criticisms of detail the occasion for new encomiums. If the Government had faults, the people were admirable; their efforts, in all departments of human activity, were prodigious.

Even revolutionary parties which could not sympathize with the "feudal" institutions of Germany had become more or less Germanophile. The organization of the Socialist Party and its apparent strength, the law for workingmen's pen-

sions, the efforts made by the Government and the municipalities to solve the problem of proper housing and insure healthful living conditions to the masses—these things had touched the most hardened revolutionary hearts in many countries.

The conservative classes, too, admired Germany as the only country in Europe that did not yet tremble before those whom it should rule. Admiration for Germany had become so great that the world counted especially upon its strength and wisdom to preserve peace. As late as July 30, 1914, statesmen, both young and old, in the various countries of Europe believed that once again the world would be indebted for peace to the German Empire.

On the other hand, a singular and growing mistrust enveloped France. It is true

that the French were still universally credited with intelligence, culture, taste, and many agreeable and brilliant qualities; but men denied their possession of the solid and serious qualities—the energy, the perseverance, the audacity, the breadth of view—necessary for enterprises of great spread of wing. France was "aging and falling off." Stingy, foresighted, prudent to the verge of timidity, torn by religious and political struggles, weakened by the errors and excesses of a Government grown more and more democratic, it seemed to be a



GUGLIELMO FERRERO

country of small industries, of moderate fortunes, and of routine, destined to be effaced increasingly before better endowed rivals.

France was reproached with being a laggard in many ways, in spite of all the revolutions she had wrought. She was acknowledged to be rich, but her envied wealth was attributed to the weakness of her spirit of initiative, which led her to economize, as if the gold pieces fell from the sky upon her privileged soil to be picked up by a nation of happy idlers! She was still regarded, after so many years, as the chief menace to European peace because of her secret aspirations for an impossible revenge; but at the same time many were convinced that her military power had been destroyed by wealth, pleasures, and anti-militarism, by democratic theories, by the incurable disorganization of the army. Between these two reproaches there was an evident contradiction, but Europe did not appear to perceive it. Men repeated everywhere at the same time that France desired war and that she no longer knew how to make war.

How often I have discussed these questions in the last decade in Europe, even in France, and in my journeys through the two Americas! But all arguments shattered themselves against an invincible mistrust. One doubted. French society seemed to be menaced from without and from within—by Germany, by alcoholism, by depopulation, by anti-militarism, by civil strife, by moral corruption, by political and bureaucratic disorganization. A fact no less grave, the new generations were everywhere more favorable to Germany and more hostile to France than the old. This could easily be noted in Italy. The prestige that Germany enjoyed in Italy has often been ascribed to her victories. That was true, in a measure, of the generation that concluded the Triple Alliance in 1882 and witnessed the wars of 1866 and of 1870, but not of the generation that followed. And the latter admired Germany much more than did its predecessor. One could justly say that everybody in Italy had become or was becoming Germanophile after 1900.

When one recalls that state of things the sudden change produced by the war appears all the more extraordinary. It will not be easy for future historians to describe the shudder of horror and of terror that everywhere seized the admirers of Germany when they discovered all at once the sombre ambitions that lay concealed at the bottom of the feverish activity which had so long blinded the world. During the first months of the war France was avenged for the calumnies she had suffered, by the anguish with which many of her former detractors prayed God's pardon for having misjudged her. The change has been so sudden and so complete that we need not be astonished if many of the converts have ended by believing that it is not their opinion which has changed, but France herself; that a miracle was wrought, and that in two days this "aging" country renewed its youth.

The self-esteem of men is never at a loss for expedients when it wishes to excuse a fault or error. But, however great may be the faith in miracles which Europe has put to the test since the beginning of the war, that faith cannot hide from clear-sighted minds the fact that our epoch had deceived itself. A problem—a grave problem—arises, then, and will long confront us: Why and how could so enlightened an age deceive itself so egregiously?

The solution of this enigma probably will be a hard and painful task for our epoch; for the underlying error is bound up with too many ideas which had come to be accepted as proved beyond discussion, with too many sentiments which seemed to us a part of honor and of human nature itself, with too many interests which we were accustomed to regard as sacred. Yet this error, like so many others committed by humanity, was merely the too sweeping application of a principle which, within certain limits, was true. It might be defined by saying that our epoch had convinced itself that numbers are not merely one species of power, but power itself.

Why did the world so admire Germany for twenty years? Because Germany was the one country in Europe where the pro-

digious swarming of the people on a soil restricted, but rich in coal, produced the most rapid and immediate development of industry, of commerce, of wealth, and of military power. With a population multiplying rapidly on land very rich in fuel, Germany could and did become the first metallurgical power in Europe and the second in the world. The growth in population and in metallurgy in turn shaped the rapid development of a great number of industries and public services of which iron is the principal element. The whole empire was covered with railways and factories of every kind; the army was constantly increased; an enormous merchant marine and the second war fleet in the world were created in a few years; cities grew larger everywhere, and almost all were rebuilt; the wealth of the people increased in reality each year, but it seemed to increase still more, because the rapidity of the circulation increased along with its mass, keeping up a perpetual movement throughout the country.

This rapid and complex development won the admiration of the world. On the other hand, what harmed France was the relative slowness of her development, which seemed to connote, in last analysis, the opposite type of demographic phenomenon.

It was, in short, a purely quantitative conception of progress that dominated Europe and America up to the beginning of the war; that furnished the standards of measurement for judging peoples, governments, generations, and that caused the world to dedicate Germany to the uninterrupted triumphs of youth and France to the bitter disillusionments of age. This conception, moreover, which makes progress consist in the increase of wealth and of all that serves to produce it—men and tools—has never been seriously contested by philosophy; it has spread through the masses and become one of the directing ideas of our civilization. It has, incontestably, the great advantage of offering, for the measurement of the world, a standard that seems certain. If progress consists in the growth of population and production, statistics will tell us with mathematical

precision what nations are most progressive and in what proportion each of us has accomplished his duty.

This conception of progress, indeed, is true, at least in part. No one would deny that numbers are a power. The war has shown that the increase of population, the development of industry, and the strength of the Government had made of Germany a military force even more formidable than we had believed. It is evident, besides, that Germany would have been completely defeated long ago if France had counted ten or fifteen million more inhabitants.

But this conception of progress must also contain an element of error if the world, which believed in it with so blind a faith, has been so stupefied upon seeing hordes of conquerors suddenly leaping the frontiers of the country where, according to that conception, the arts of peace should have found their inviolable asylum. Neither Europe nor America expected to see such a hurricane of violence come out of the progressive effort of our epoch, and through the ambition of the nation which had been for ten years their favorite. What, then, was the defect in that conception? Why does the world deplore the fact that it was so grievously mistaken concerning Germany and France? Because—permit me to repeat it—if numbers are a power, they are not *the power*.


The quantitative conception of progress has reduced the life of nations, which is very complex, to elements which are too simple, neglecting a great number of moral and intellectual forces that cannot be reduced to figures. There lies its defect. A nation and a civilization are not merely quantities that can be expressed in figures; they are also a sum total of qualities—vices and virtues—which elude any numerical evaluation and which must be appreciated with the aid of standards more delicate and less sure. These standards are more difficult to apply, and their combinations are sometimes very difficult to foresee. The apparent order which the police maintain in the streets, the cleanness of the stations, or the coldest statistics of population and commerce may hide the

most extravagant madness of a whole nation, exalted by cupidity and pride. A country where population increases little, where political contests are sharp and the services of the highway commissioner mediocre, can nevertheless preserve a feeling of right, of honor, and of justice, which will make it, in a great historical crisis, a necessary element of equilibrium and of safety.

To this simple truth the eyes of the world were almost completely closed for thirty years. To this truth they are beginning, little by little, to be reopened under the shock of the most tragic of events. The supposed miracle in France means nothing else. It is the quantitative theory of progress, in which our epoch had believed with so much faith, because it seemed to simplify the most complicated problems of life, that has deceived the world. The world is beginning to realize it, and to perceive that the great problems of moral life cannot, like so many others, be simplified by the ingenuity of man; for their

difficulty is the very reason for their existence.

How an epoch which has done such great things, and has surpassed in knowledge all those that preceded it, could so long delude itself regarding the value of the standards it used, and could judge the most delicate things of life so carelessly and grossly, is another formidable problem which the European war has just propounded to us. If our age wishes seriously to solve it, it can, upon the ruins accumulated by the immense catastrophe, turn toward the past and better understand in its essence all the history of the nineteenth century. It can get hold of itself more easily in the midst of the dreadful surprises that have been overwhelming it for the last eighteen months. It can also get its bearings and find the way to the future more quickly in the midst of the present upheavals, and prepare itself, by a profound and complete examination of its conscience, for the formidable tasks that await it after the war.



Burdens and Dangers From Europe's Colossal War Debts

THE hostilities in Europe will have gone on two years should the war continue to Aug. 1. Attempts to gauge its burden to all the powers involved have resulted in a calculation that, if it is still in progress on the second anniversary, the direct cost of the struggle will have been in excess of \$45,000,000,000. The total military expenditure in the first year was approximately \$17,500,000,000. In the second year it will have been \$28,000,000,000.

These figures, as the Mechanics and Metals National Bank of New York points out, represent simply the expenditure for carrying on the hostilities. They do not allow for the destruction of cities, railways, ships, factories, warehouses, bridges, roads, or agricultural values. Neither do they allow for the economic loss through the killing and maiming of men, the loss of production in occupied territories, the decrease in stocks of food, metal, and other materials, the derangement of the machinery of distribution, or the cost of pensions. They measure in a common term an expenditure of capital which, to the Governments concerned, will in the end be translated for the most part into permanent additions to their national debt.

If the war costs \$45,000,000,000 it will represent a sum three times greater than the entire capitalization of the railways of the United States, and four times greater than the total deposits of all our national banks. It will represent a sum six times greater than that expended in the civil war. It will represent forty times the amount of the present national debt of the United States, 120 times the cost of the Panama Canal, 500 times the amount of the annual American gold output. Direct cost of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-71 was \$2,500,000,000, and of the South African war \$1,250,000,000.

The aggregate amount named for a full two years' warfare is believed to be well within the actual total. Dr. Karl

Helfferrich, Germany's Finance Minister, has named precisely that amount, \$45,000,000,000, as an outside figure of the war cost to only March 31.

Great Britain's expenditures are now in the neighborhood of \$25,000,000 a day. The daily average was \$14,000,000 a year ago. France is spending \$18,000,000 a day, according to the latest estimate of Alexandre Ribot. Last year France spent \$8,000,000 daily. Russia, which a year ago spent an amount equal to that of France, is now spending \$15,500,000 daily, according to Pierre Bark. These daily war expenditures of the Entente Allies make a total of \$58,500,000.

Germany's present daily war cost is \$16,600,000, on the authority of Dr. Helfferrich. That of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria combined, on the same authority, is \$10,900,000. The aggregate for the Central Allies is therefore \$27,500,000. Altogether, the cost of strife to all of the belligerents is approximately \$86,000,000.

It is estimated that in spite of the present relative position of the nations as regards war cost, the direct cost to the chief nations of the Central Alliance has been only a little short of that of Great Britain, whose aggregate up to the present time has surpassed that of any other single belligerent. Great Britain's expenditure has increased gradually. Germany's was large from the first, because of extensive campaigns on two fronts, and because of the superior number of individual enemy nations.

Great Britain has lent funds on an extensive scale for the purchase of military supplies to Russia, France, Italy, Belgium, and certain neutral countries. France has made advances to Russia, Belgium, Serbia, and neutrals. Germany has extended credits to Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. Advances, or loans, by the strong powers to the weaker belligerents and to neutrals have amounted to \$3,500,000,000. Figures from

English sources indicate that Russia in this manner has received \$1,125,000,000, Italy \$675,000,000, Belgium and Serbia \$875,000,000. Turkey and Bulgaria have received perhaps \$700,000,000.

Pro-rated over the entire population, the direct war cost has meant more to France than to any other belligerent. England is second on the list, Germany third, and Russia, because of its vast population, nearly last. Reduced to a per diem basis, the war has cost France 30 cents daily for each inhabitant of the republic. It has cost England 28 cents a day for each inhabitant, Germany 22 cents, and Russia 6 cents.

ANALYSIS OF THE DEBTS

Professor W. S. Rossiter analyzes in detail the debts of the warring nations in the Atlantic Monthly, asserting that the total losses, direct and indirect, in the first two years, amount to \$80,000,000,000. Mr. Edgar Crammond of the Royal Statistical Society, London, computes that the aggregate value of human life lost in the first year of the war was \$11,475,900,000 or \$2,933 per man based on the average earning power of the man in the various countries. The increase during the last century, in the national debts of the principal powers—Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Germany—presents some striking contrasts. It appears that the total in 1816 was \$6,182,180,000, of which Great Britain owed \$4,502,180,000, while in 1916 the total was \$56,631,437,017, an increase of fourteen-fold; in that same period the national wealth increased six-fold, and the population two and one-half times. Data are offered by Professor Rossiter, showing the proportion of debt as it actually existed before the war and what the percentage would have been if computed on the debt basis of 1816:

RELATIVE PROPORTION OF DEBT

Nation.	If Computed on Debt Basis	
	of 1816.	Actual, 1916.
Great Britain.....	61	13
Russia	12	19
Austria-Hungary	4	16
France	20	21
Italy	1	11
Germany	2	20
	100	100

The aggregate of war loans contracted up to March 15, 1916, was \$31,900,150,554. The debts of the warring nations in less than two years increased one-third more than the accumulations of 100 years prior to the war. The aggregate national debts of the nations at war and the per capita burdens now and in 1816 are as follows:

Nation.	Total Debts, 1916.	Per Capita.	
		1816.	1916.
Germany	\$13,114,078,000	\$5	\$192
France	12,358,459,444	9	310
Great Britain.....	11,269,768,463	224	242
Russia	8,710,233,000	17	*61
Austria-Hungary..	6,338,300,000	14	124
Italy	4,015,080,000	7	113
Belgium	\$25,518,000	...	106

*Russia in Europe population basis.

The following table by Professor Rossiter shows the proportion which the war debt contracted in two years bears to the total debt:

WEIGHT OF THE WAR AND TOTAL INDEBTEDNESS ON SCALE OF 100

Country.	Weight of Debt.	
	War Debt.	Aggregate Debt.
Germany	26	23
Great Britain.....	25	20
France	23	22
Austria-Hungary	8	11
Russia	13	16
Italy	5	7
Belgium	1
Total.....	100	100

The following table shows the actual war loans as contracted up to March 15, 1916, (computed by The London Economist:)

WAR LOANS OF NATIONS AT WAR, MARCH 15, 1916

Country.	Amount.	*Unit.	Dollars.
Germany ...	34,681,000,000	Mark	†8,254,078,000
Great Britain	1,662,600,000	£	8,077,320,000
France	40,576,827,566	Franc	7,425,559,444
Austria-H'g'y	524,200,000	£	2,547,500,000
Russia	8,073,000,000	Ruble	4,117,533,110
Italy	8,212,000,000	Lira	1,478,160,000

Total.....31,900,150,554

*Custom House standard: £ 4.86; Mark .238; Franc .183; Ruble .51; Lira .18.

†The first German loan realized 4,460 millions of marks, the second 9,060, the third 12,101. The fourth loan is now in process of flotation, and although the amount realized is unknown, it is an important factor of indebtedness. In the German debt here given the fourth loan is included as approximating the second—9,060 millions of marks.

Germany's Invasion of French Industry Before the War

By Raphaël-Georges Levy

[By arrangement with The Quarterly Review, London]

DURING the last twenty-five years the nature of German emigration has undergone a radical change. The poorer classes of Germany, which, about the middle of the nineteenth century, poured in large numbers into the United States and other American countries, have almost ceased to leave their native land. The richer Germany grew, and the more work there was at home, the less temptation to go abroad. On the other hand, Germany was seeking in all parts of the world markets for her manufactured goods, and endeavoring to obtain fresh supplies of the raw materials needed by her factories.

In order to attain these ends, she began to send abroad, not destitute workmen, but an army of clerks, commercial travelers, engineers, contractors, who settled temporarily or permanently in the countries from which they hoped to draw the resources needed at home or which they intended to flood with goods manufactured in Germany. If necessary, Germany exported also the capital needed to start the works which she intended to set up in foreign parts, or to purchase those suited for her purpose, because in doing so she prepared customers for German industry.

One great problem for Germany has been to secure a sufficient quantity of iron ore. Her iron lodes are small, and by no means in proportion with her collieries. Her coal output is rapidly increasing and nearly equals that of the United Kingdom. In France the reverse is the case. The iron deposits of French Lorraine have proved to be very important. During recent years great lodes of iron ore have been discovered in Normandy. Germany has bought leases, and she has sold, to the owners

of the ore deposits, coal or coke in exchange for their ore. Herr Thyssen is the man whose name has been most often heard in connection with the German ante-bellum invasion of France. In the French Lorraine basin he owns the mines of Batilly, Jouaville, Boulogny; in Normandy he has bought the mines of Perrières, Soumont, and Diélette. All these enterprises have turned out well for Herr Thyssen, whose wealth is estimated at \$100,000,000. One-seventh part of the French Eastern basin and one-half of the Normandy basin belonged to German manufacturers, who owned besides mining interests in other parts of France and in French colonies. The few shares taken by Frenchmen in German undertakings are not to be compared with the control acquired by Germans over French mining resources. Once having got the ore, the Germans built mills near the mines or bought mills situated in the neighborhood.

Germany was not satisfied with establishing her industrial captains on our territory; she was selling us a growing quantity of goods manufactured within her borders. In 1912 she sent us 94,000 tons of engines and 26,000 tons of tools and machinery, whereas she bought from us only 5,200 tons of the former and 4,000 of the latter.

Much has been said about the conditions of German competition. In many instances it was based on the practice known as "dumping," i. e., offering goods abroad at a price much under cost, so as to compete successfully with the native products of the country which it is intended to conquer. For this purpose, the exporting manufacturers must be linked together in a strong pool, so as to be able to uphold high prices in their own country. By these they get compensa-



THE BLASTED REGION OF VERDUN

German Shells, Some of Which Are Seen Bursting, Have Cut Off the
Trees and Honeycombed the Earth With Great Holes

(© Underwood & Underwood)



THE CATHEDRAL OF YPRES

**West Front as Seen From the Cloth Hall: the East Front Is Totally
Destroyed by German Shells**
(© American Press Association)

tion for the losses which they sustain temporarily through their sales abroad. This loss, in the mind of the members of the pool, is only a temporary one; the final aim is to crush the industry of the country which they invade. As soon as this part of the program is realized, they put up the prices and gain ample compensation for the sacrifices made during the struggle with their former competitors.

One of the most habitual forms of this invasion of France by German industry has been the formation of French companies the capital of which was owned by Germans, and under whose shield they sold their products. German firms are on the watch for opportunities of getting an interest in French companies, and even endeavor to absorb them entirely.


The manufacturing of chemical and pharmaceutic products is one of the fields where German supremacy has been most effective during the last thirty years. This is the more surprising as nearly all the great discoveries which have been the origin of the dyer's industry were made by Frenchmen. The latter have not drawn from their discoveries all the practical results which our foes have subsequently evolved. In accordance with their habit, they created in France companies with a French frontage, whose only business it was to act as agents of German factories. Similar phenomena occurred in the manufacture of oily materials.

The German electrical companies have tried in several ways to get a footing in France. The celebrated Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft (A. E. G.) founded the Compagnie Centrale d'Energie Electrique, through which they acquired some interests in Rouen, Châteauroux, Alger, and Oran. The Schuckert, another great electrical concern, had also a share in several French companies. In this field, as in metallurgy, the object

was the same—to conquer the French market; but the method was different. The invaders concealed themselves; they tried to keep French frontages in order to make people believe that the products sold by them were made in France and sold by Frenchmen.

Among the agencies working for German export trade the first place should be given to the great shipping companies. Besides these agents, who, by virtue of their business, are a kind of official pioneers of the export trade, one must not forget the innumerable Germans established in France, especially in the Departments of the East and the North, where the men served in business firms as servants or masters and in the towns as workmen, the women as teachers or nurses. They were constantly engaged in spying out and preparing means of approach for the tradesmen as well as for the soldiers of their country. The main factors of success in their commercial campaign were the cheapness of their goods, the quickness of their deliveries, and their easy terms of payment.

One of the secret supplements of the Deutsche Export Revue, which is sent only to German subscribers, declares that, in order to conquer a country economically, it is necessary to export into it men; this has been done with the tenacity which is one of the features of the German character. Where the ground was favorable, as in Antwerp, they flooded it. In France, where they knew that public sentiment was, in a certain sense, against them, and where they met with powerful national organizations, they acted more modestly. But everywhere they were doing their underground work, trying to extend their influence, to penetrate all the secrets of the country of which they were the guests, and to prepare in silence a way for their armies.



Frenzied German Trade a Cause of the War

Professor Millioud's Book

MAURICE MILLIOUD, a noted Swiss economist, who holds the Chair of Sociology in the University of Lausanne, has made a study of the economic conditions which helped to precipitate the European war. This volume, written in French, is now published in English by the Houghton Mifflin Company of Boston under the title "The Ruling Caste and Frenzied Finance in Germany." In the first section of his book Professor Millioud analyzes the feudal and militarist caste that rules Germany, finding that, while Pan-Germanism represents the ideal and mental state of that caste, it is really the lower or uneducated class that has been most powerfully influenced by that ideal.

In the second section Professor Millioud discusses "Germany's Aims at Conquest by Trade and by War," finding the chief cause of the war in economic conditions. For Germany's action in setting Europe on fire he finds four contributing causes, which, he says, pieced together, show "a terrible organizing for conquest and power which staggers one by its heinousness and terrifies by reason of the inexorable severity which it threatens." In his study of the first of these four causes he rejects the explanation given by the Germans themselves, that they were the victims of a plot hatched by Russia, and after examination concludes: "It is clear, then, that the war was intended, the consequences had been considered, and it was entered into of deliberate purpose."

Of the explanation accepted in all foreign countries, especially England and the United States, that Germany was forced into the war by the militarist class and the impelling force of Pan-Germanic aims, he says that these forces must be considered as a symptom, a clue, rather than a cause. The idea that political necessity caused the war is not satisfactory, because Germany's political and military hegemony on the Con-

tinental was undisputed. In the economic theory, the determination to use the army for the profit of industry and trade and to crush competition and destroy financial resources in two or three rival powers, the author finds many more facts and arguments to explain Germany's reason for precipitating war.

"Everything," he says, "points to the fact that the war was a step taken in despair, a stroke carefully planned, threatened several times before, * * * yet at last hurriedly rushed into in 1914."

He outlines the German scheme of trade conquest and explains the methods that were employed. These methods required huge amounts of capital, and it was, Professor Millioud thinks, the methods of using that capital, the overextension of trade and the pyramiding of loans by which it was financed, making possible Germany's long-credit system, that brought on the troubles which were the chief factor in plunging the nation into war.

"Threatened by no one, Germany felt herself menaced on all sides. She claimed to be fighting for very existence, and she spoke truth. Her manufacturers, financiers, and statesmen had dragged her so deeply and by such methods into a war of economic conquest that she could not withdraw. The methods employed were now working against her. Without having entirely miscarried, victory [in economic domination] was clearly beyond her grasp. Must she wait the inevitable crash, the stoppage of trade, the downfall of her credit, the misery which must overwhelm her people, and the fury which would perhaps possess them in consequence? Would not such a state of things make war inevitable sooner or later, and was it not better to make war while there was most likelihood of its ending rapidly and victoriously in her favor?"

Sir Edward Grey on the Cause of the War and Peace Conditions

[BY SIR EDWARD GREY, THE BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THROUGH EDWARD PRICE BELL OF THE CHICAGO NEWS.]

PRUSSIAN tyranny over Western Europe, including these islands, our people will not stand. The pledges given by Mr. Asquith as regards the restoration of Belgium and Serbia shall be kept. We have signed a pact to make peace only in concert with our allies. This pact, I need not say, we shall honor strictly and to the end." Thus spoke Sir Edward Grey. He continued:

"What we and our allies are fighting for is a free Europe. We want Europe free not only from the domination of one nationality by another, but from hectoring diplomacy and the peril of war; free from the constant rattling of the sword in the scabbard, and from the perpetual talk of shining armor and war lords.

"In fact, we feel that we are fighting for equal rights, for law, justice, and peace, and for civilization throughout the world, as against brute force, which knows no restraint and no mercy."

"What do you mean by the destruction of Prussian militarism?" was asked.

"What Prussia proposes as we understand her," replied Sir Edward, "is Prussian supremacy. She proposes a Europe modeled and ruled by Prussia. She is to dispose of the liberties of her neighbors and of us all.

"We say that life on these terms is intolerable. This also is what France, Italy, and Russia say. We are not only fighting Prussia's attempt to do in this instance to all Europe what she did to non-Prussian Germany, but we are fighting the German idea of the wholesomeness, almost desirability, of ever recurrent war. Prussia under Bismarck deliberately and admittedly made three wars.

"We want settled peace throughout

Europe which will be a guarantee against aggressive war. Germany's philosophy is that settled peace spells disintegration, degeneracy, and the sacrifice of the heroic qualities in the human character. Such philosophy, if it is to survive as a practical force, means eternal apprehension and unrest. It means ever-increasing armaments. It means arresting the development of mankind along the lines of culture and humanity.

"We are fighting this idea. We do not believe in war as the preferable method of settling disputes between nations. When nations cannot see eye to eye, when they quarrel, when there is a threat of war, we believe that the controversy should be settled by methods other than those of war.

"Such other methods are always successful when there is good-will and no aggressive spirit. We believe in negotiation. We have faith in international conferences. We proposed a conference before this war broke out. We urged Germany to agree to a conference. Germany declined to do so.

"Then I requested Germany to select some form of mediation—some method of her own for a peaceful settlement. She would not come forward with any such suggestion. Then the Emperor of Russia proposed to Germany to send the dispute to the tribunal at The Hague. There was no response.

"Our proposal of a conference was rejected by Germany. Russia, France, and Italy all accepted it. Our proposal that Germany suggest some means of peaceful settlement met with no success, nor did the Czar's proposal. No impartial judgment of any kind was to be permitted to enter. It was a case of Europe submitting to the Teutonic will or going to war.

"If the conference in London in the Balkan crisis of 1912-13 had been worked

to the disadvantage of Germany or her allies, the German reluctance for a conference in 1914 would have been intelligible, but no more convincing pledge of fair play and a single-minded desire for a fair settlement than the conduct of that conference in London has ever been given.

"And in 1914, after Serbia had accepted nine-tenths of Austria's demands, a settlement of the outstanding questions would have been easy. Russia ordered no general mobilization till Germany had refused the conference and till German preparations for war were far ahead of Russia's. Germany declared war on Russia when Austria was showing every disposition to come to terms, and Germany was in fact at war with Russia four or five days before Austria was, though the quarrel at that time was one that primarily concerned Austria and not Germany.

"These two methods of settling international disputes—the method of negotiation and the method of war—I ask you to consider in the light of this struggle. Do we not see the disaster of the war method conclusively shown?

"How much better would have been a conference or a reference to The Hague in 1914 than what has happened since industry and commerce have been dislocated, the burdens of life heavily increased, millions of men slain, maimed, or blinded; international hatred deepened and intensified, and the very fabric of civilization menaced? These have come from the war method.

"The conference we proposed, or The Hague reference proposed by the Czar, would have settled the quarrel in a little time. I think a conference would have settled it in a week, and all these calamities would have been averted. Moreover—a thing of vast importance—we should have gone a long way toward laying the foundations of international peace."

"Do you think the neutrals ever will be able to help toward peace?" he was asked.

"The injustice done by the war has got to be set right. The Allies can tolerate no peace that leaves the wrongs of

this war unredressed. When persons come to me with pacific counsels I think they should tell me what sort of peace they have in mind. They should let me know on which side they stand, for the opponents do not agree. If they think, for example, that Belgium was innocent of offense, that she has been unspeakably wronged, that she should be set up again by those who threw her down, then it seems to me that they should say so. Peace counsels that are purely abstract and make no attempt to discriminate between the rights and wrongs of this war are ineffective, if not irrelevant."

Sir Edward was reminded that desire for conquest, lust for revenge, and jealousy of an economic competitor in the world market were suggested by Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg as the three driving forces of the "coalition against Germany before the war."

NO ANTI-GERMAN COALITION

"There was no coalition against Germany before the war," answered Sir Edward. "Germany knew there was no coalition against her. We had assured her in the most formal and categorical way that in no circumstances should we be a party to any aggression against her. She wanted us to pledge ourselves to unconditional neutrality, wanted us to declare that, no matter what she did on the Continent, we should not interfere.

"It is true that she always referred to a possible war being forced on her. The trouble was that she gave us no test of a war forced on her. She remained free to claim that any war was forced on her. Now she claims that this war was forced on her. I need hardly remind you that Italy, the third member of the Triple Alliance, at the outset definitely refused to accept that view of it.

"No one thought of attacking Germany. There was not a measure taken by any power that was not purely defensive. The German preparations were for attack and were far ahead of the others on the Continent."

"You have observed the German Chancellor's recent reference to Belgium as a bulwark," the interviewer suggested.

"Belgium was a bulwark," answered Sir Edward. "Defensive of Germany, of France, and of European peace. This bulwark, until Germany decided to make war, was in no danger from any quarter. In April, 1913, we had given a renewed assurance to Belgium to respect her neutrality. When war threatened, we asked France if she would adhere to her pledge to respect the neutrality of Belgium and she said 'yes.' We asked Germany the same question, and she declined to answer. Immediately afterward, in scorn of her signature, she assaulted and destroyed the bulwark."

"Von Bethmann Hollweg acknowledged the wrong, pleading that necessity knows no law, and promised that as soon as Germany's military aims were realized she would restore Belgium. Now he says there can be no status quo ante either in the east or the west. In other words, Belgium's independence is gone as Serbia's and Montenegro's independence is gone unless the Allies set it up again."

"To all this we say to Germany: 'Recognize the principle urged by lovers of freedom everywhere and give to the nationalities of Europe real freedom, not the so-called freedom doled out to subject peoples by Prussian tyranny, and make reparation as far as it can be made for the wrong done.'"

"Would you mind indicating the object of Britain's rapprochements in recent years?" Sir Edward was asked.

"Good relations and an end to quarrels with other powers. Going far back we had working relations with the Triple Alliance, but we were habitually in friction with France or Russia. Again and again it brought us to the verge of war, and so we decided to come to an arrangement with France and then with Russia, not with any hostile intent toward Germany or any other power, but wholly to pave the way to permanent peace. So, instead of preparing for war, as Germany asserts without a vestige of truth in support of the assertion, we were endeavoring to avoid war, and German statesmen knew we were endeavoring to avoid war and not to make it."

PEACE THAT DOES JUSTICE

"German statesmen assert that England is the only real obstacle to peace," the interviewer remarked.

"Nobody wants peace more than we want it, but we want a peace that does justice and a peace that re-establishes respect for the public law of the world."

"Presumably Germany would like the neutrals to think that we are applying pressure to keep France, Russia, and Italy in the war. We are not. France, Russia, and Italy need no urging to keep them in the war. They know why they are in the war. They know they are in it to preserve everything that is precious to nationality. It is this knowledge which makes them determined and unconquerable."

"It is impossible for me to express to you our admiration for the achievements of our associates in this struggle. And as is the measure of our admiration, so also will be the measure of our contribution to the common cause."

"There are two statements that come from German sources: One is that we are preventing the Allies from making peace; this goes to the address of the neutrals. The other is that we are advocating a separate peace with the Allies. This goes to the address of one or other of the Allies. Each statement is absolutely untrue."

"You have noted that Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg affirms that Britain wants to destroy united and free Germany."

"We never were smitten with any such madness," answered Sir Edward. "We want nothing of the sort, and von Bethmann Hollweg knows that we want nothing of the sort. We should be glad to see the German people as free as we ourselves want to be free, and as we want the other nationalities of Europe and of the world to be free."

"It belongs to the rudiments of political science. It is abundantly taught by history that you cannot enslave a people and make a success of the job; that you cannot kill a people's soul by foreign despotism and brutality. We aspire to embark upon no such course of folly and futility toward another nation. We be-

lieve that the German people, when once the dreams of world empire cherished by Pan-Germanism are brought to naught, will insist upon the control of its Government. And in this lies the hope of a secure freedom and national independence in Europe, for a Prussian militarism has plotted war to take place at a chosen date in the future."

SIR EDWARD'S PEACE VISION

In the midst of war Sir Edward's great vision remains a vision of peace—not a peace vulnerable to political and militarist intrigue and ambition, but a peace secured by a unified and armed purpose of civilization. Long before the war Sir Edward hoped for a league of nations that would be united, quick and instant to prevent, and, if need be, punish violations of international treaties of public right and of national independence, and would say to the nations that came forward with grievances and claims:

"Put them before an impartial tribunal; subject your claims to the test of law or the judgment of impartial men. If you can win at this bar you will get what you want; if you cannot, you shall not have what you want; and if you start war we shall adjudge you the common enemy of humanity and treat you accordingly. As footpads, burglars, and incendiaries are suppressed in a community, so those who would commit these crimes, and incalculably more than these crimes, will be suppressed among the nations.


"Unless mankind learns from this war to avoid war," said Sir Edward in conclusion, "the struggle will have been in vain. Furthermore, it seems to me that over humanity will loom the menace of destruction. The Germans have thrown the door wide open to every form of attack upon human life. The use of poi-

sonous fumes or something akin to them was recommended to our naval and military authorities many years ago and was rejected by them as too horrible for civilized people to use.

"The Germans have come with floating mines in the open seas, threatening belligerents and neutrals equally. They have come with the indiscriminating and murderous Zeppelin, which does military damage only by accident. They have come with the submarine, which destroys neutral and belligerent ships and crews, in scorn alike of law and mercy. They have come upon blameless nations with invasion, incendiarism, and confiscation. They have come with poisonous gases and liquid fire. All their scientific genius has been dedicated to wiping out human life. They have forced these things into general use in the war.

"If the world cannot organize against war; if war must go on, then all the nations can protect themselves henceforth only by using whatever destructive agencies they can invent, till the resources and inventions of science end by destroying the humanity they were meant to preserve. The Germans assert that their culture is so extraordinarily superior that it gives them a moral right to impose it upon the rest of the world by force. Will the outstanding contribution of the 'Kultur,' disclosed in this war, be such as to lead to wholesale extermination?

"The Prussian authorities apparently have but one idea of peace—an iron peace imposed on other nations by German supremacy. They do not understand that free men and free nations will rather die than submit to that ambition, and that there can be no end to the war till that aim is defeated and renounced."



Germany's Reply to Sazonoff's Charges Regarding Outbreak of the War

[Summarized for CURRENT HISTORY from an Official German Document]

IN his speech at the opening of the Duma, Feb. 22, 1916, Mr. Sazonoff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, took occasion to renew the charge that Germany was guilty of bringing about the present war and that Russia had been dragged into it.

The German Government thereupon issued a communiqué to the semi-official North German Gazette in which it meets this charge. This communiqué is of interest in that it adds fresh material to the already published German White Book on the events leading up to the war. This material deserves attention from all students of the political developments immediately preliminary to the great conflict. Essential portions of this communiqué are quoted herein.

Despite the solemn denials made by her highest military personages, it is definitely known that Russia started war preparations as early as July 25, 1914. Count Pourtales, the German Ambassador at Petrograd, made earnest representations to Mr. Sazonoff, and drew up the following promemoria, now published for the first time:

"I gravely pointed out that it was of the utmost importance not to let military measures interfere with the work of diplomacy. In this respect, I remarked to the Minister, I had to tell him frankly that it had come to my knowledge that Russia was actually making military preparations, and that this news alarmed me to the utmost. I added that among the Military Attachés the rumor even circulated that several corps on the Russian western border had already received mobilization orders. Mr. Sazonoff replied that he could guarantee to me that no mobilization orders had been issued. But he admitted that some military preparations had been made. In a long and detailed argument I explained to Mr.

Sazonoff how dangerous an attempt to support diplomatic action by military measures appeared to me. The Minister retorted that military measures taken for the sake of not being taken unawares by events were far from signifying a desire for war. He then asked me:

"Surely, with you mobilization is not identical with war either?"

"I answered that perhaps it was not identical in theory, but that in a highly civilized State such as Germany mobilization was a measure which cut so deeply into all peaceful conditions that it was only resorted to in the last moment, when war appeared inevitable, i. e., when the safety of the empire was seriously menaced. True, when, then, the button was pressed and the machinery of mobilization was set in motion, it could no longer be stopped. Our geographical position with two fronts that had to be defended, I said, compelled us to act quickly if our national life was endangered."

The Ambassador's reasoning obviously made such an impression on Mr. Sazonoff that he immediately communicated it to the Minister of War. On that same evening General Suchomlinoff requested the German Military Attaché, Major von Eggeling, to call in order to give the Major further assurances on the General's word of honor. (German White Book. Exhibit 13.)

On the evening of July 26 the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Imperial Ambassador a telegram, quoted in the German White Book, to the effect that military preparations on the part of Russia would compel Germany to take countermeasures which would consist in the mobilization of her army, and that mobilization meant war. In accordance with that telegram, in the afternoon of July 27, Mr. Sazonoff was once more warned by Count Pourtales not to proceed with military preparations,

whereupon the Minister referred to declarations given by General Suchomlinoff to the Military Attaché.

On July 28 the Ambassador again discussed with Mr. Sazonoff the Russian military measures. In regard to this, the Ambassador sent the following telegram to Berlin:

"I pointed out to the Minister that trustworthy information had reached us which left no doubt that military preparations were being made exceeding what the Minister of War had told the Military Attaché. I said that I could only explain this to myself by assuming that the military district commanders might be going further in the measures ordered by them than was intended in Petrograd. At any rate, I felt compelled, I said, most earnestly to point to the danger which at the present critical moment might arise from making far-going military preparations."

On the same day, that is to say as early as July 28, the Ambassador felt obliged to enter an energetic protest against the destruction of the wireless telegraph apparatus on a German merchantman that lay in the harbor of Petrograd.

Midday of July 28, after the Minister had informed the Ambassador that because Austria had mobilized against Serbia, Russia felt it necessary to mobilize against Austria, and after Count Pourtalès had raised the gravest objections to such a measure, the Ambassador, in a second interview, spoke of the Russian mobilization order as a "grave mistake, as long as Russia declared her earnest desire to find a peaceful solution."

In the evening of July 28 the Imperial Chancellor gave the Ambassador telegraphic instructions to point out to Mr. Sazonoff most emphatically that a further progress of the Russian mobilization measures would compel Germany to mobilize, and that then a European war could hardly be averted. Those instructions were carried out in the evening of July 29.

On July 30 the mediating activity of the Kaiser and of the German Government took the course already well known

to the world, and resulted—as is known from the speech delivered by the Imperial Chancellor on Aug. 19—in the resumption of the temporarily halted exchange of opinions between Vienna and Petrograd.

In the night July 30-31, the general mobilization of the entire Russian Army and Navy was ordered. No sooner did the news become known than the Imperial Ambassador at Petrograd called at the Foreign Office in order to declare that war seemed inevitable to him unless those orders were canceled. He reported events as follows:

"Early on the 31st I was just about to go to the Foreign Office when the Military Attaché, Major von Eggeling, reported to me that general mobilization orders were just being posted at the street corners. Although the telegram from Vienna had raised some hope, I was now convinced that war was inevitable. As I had learned meanwhile that Mr. Sazonoff was with the Czar at Peterhof, I went at once to see his assistant, Neratow. I expressed myself to him to the effect that I was afraid that the mobilization which was directed against us had utterly ruined those prospects for an understanding which had recently opened up. I felt convinced, I said, that the news of a general mobilization would strike Germany like a flash of lightning, since that measure, in the present state of negotiations, meant a grave menace and provocation to Germany, which the German people could not brook. I said that I could not understand how the Russian Government, just after solemnly assuring us that military measures would not be taken against us, could decide on the fatal step of a general mobilization at the very moment when that Government knew that our Kaiser and the German Government were endeavoring most zealously and successfully, as had just been shown, to mediate between Petrograd and Vienna. I went on to say that the general mobilization of the Russian army could only be interpreted by us in the sense that Russia wanted war at all costs, and that the step would therefore let loose a hurricane in Germany. Mr. Neratow made no answer, but merely ob-

served that he would inform the Minister of my arguments."

Directly after the interview with Mr. Neratow, the Ambassador went to the Czar at Peterhof with the object of giving the monarch a personal explanation of the consequences which the Russian general mobilization was sure to have. Count Pourtales pointed out to the Czar that Austria had just shown her willingness to negotiate with Russia. He dwelt on the new prospects which that attitude gave to a peaceful settlement of the crisis and asked the Czar to withdraw the mobilization order, because otherwise the preservation of peace seemed to be out of the question. The Czar declined the request, saying that a recall of the mobilization order was impossible "for technical reasons."

The German communiqué enters into detail in an analysis of the initial attitude of the British representative. It says:

"On July 25 the British Ambassador pointed out to Mr. Sazonoff that he must be prepared for a German declaration of war as the German countermeasure against a Russian general mobilization.

"The fatal character of the Russian general mobilization was presumably also the reason why the Russian Government delayed in notifying the French ally of it. It is a matter of common knowledge that on the evening of July 31 the French Government had not yet been informed of the fact that Russia had ordered general mobilization in the night July 30-31. We must conclude that the French Ambassador in Petrograd, however incredible it seems, had omitted immediately to report the fact to his Government. The German countermeasure became known in Paris before news of the Russian movement reached the French capital, and so the French public more readily fell into the error of considering the situation as a menace from the German side.

"Hence Russia has not been 'dragged into the war.' The Russian Government let it loose. Mr. Sazonoff knew what the consequences of the Russian mobilization would be; he did not prevent it because he wanted the war, since he felt sure of success. Only the retrogressive move-

ment of the Russian armies makes him so modest now as regards his activity in the matter of having started the conflict. His case is similar in regard to the Russian war object, which he announced to the world in earlier speeches. Besides the conquest of Constantinople and the strait and the domination of the Balkans, the crushing of Austria-Hungary and Germany also played a part, while, according to his present speech, he is graciously resolved to permit our further existence, and declares the notion of letting a nation of seventy millions 'disappear' to be absurd. If Mr. Sazonoff saw himself nearer the realization of his kind intention, which surely he originally had, if he saw himself nearer it than is the case, it is quite certain that he would now be proud of his strong, resolute action in starting the war.

"Today, the calculations of the Triple Entente are clear as daylight. In this place, let us only refer to two utterances of the *Novoye Vremya*. On March 7, 1914, that paper discussed the 'approaching hour' and the 'necessity of improving the army from top to bottom by night and day.' On July 20, 1914, it said: 'The superiority of the Entente on land and sea justifies a more energetic language in the councils of Europe.' This certainty of victory, in the critical days prior to the outbreak of hostilities, seems to have overcome all of Mr. Sazonoff's scruples against a solution by the sword. His confidence in England's co-operation took all restraint from his will to have war. On July 29, 1914, the Reuter correspondent in Petrograd reported:

"In Russian eyes the die is cast and only a political miracle can avert war. A partial mobilization has already been ordered, and there is every indication that the whole of the vast military machinery will soon be set in motion. An imperial manifest is awaited tonight. Confident of England's support, about which doubts have mostly disappeared, the Russian public is prepared to accept war.

"One day later, on July 30, 1914, according to the report of the Reuter correspondent in Petrograd, the English measure of naval preparedness in conjunction with Japan's peaceful assurances 'more than confirmed Russia's determination to stand by her guns.'"

These newly published documents cast

a new light upon the involved activities in Petrograd in the hours preceding the declaration of war. In German eyes they

are a complete contradiction of any Russian statement as to "being dragged into the war."

What Russia Is Fighting For

By Professor Milyukoff

Russian Liberal Leader in the Duma

In the course of a noteworthy speech in the Russian Duma M. Milyukoff stated that a definite agreement of the Allies concerning the future of Constantinople had been reached early in April, 1915. Other important passages of his address are here translated verbatim:

SOcialists in most countries are saying that the war was begun by the Governments against the wish of the peoples. This is false. Even the majority of the Socialists have to agree that it is not true, at least so far as Germany is concerned. The German people and the majority of German Socialists have resolutely supported the Government, and when we speak of the responsibility of the German Emperor we must remember that the Emperor William was forced by his own people to begin the war. Therefore in this case the responsibility for the present butchery must be equally divided between the people and the Government.

But perhaps in Great Britain the Government acted against the will of the people in going into the war? Nothing of the kind. In free England the Government which would act against the will of the people in such an important question would be swept away the very next day. It is true that free British thought has expressed, and is expressing, all sorts of opinions, among them those of an anti-militaristic nature. It is true that when the war began there were very many criticisms against Sir Edward Grey, but we know that in the course of time British democracy showed an astonishing preparedness for the greatest sacrifices, and we can only bow before it. The country has not even stopped at destroying old traditions, and has voluntarily sent millions of its sons to engage in

a life and death struggle, and when the stream of volunteers dried up they went so far as practically to accept compulsory military service. That great country does not follow its Government, but practically leads the Government, and sets us the greatest example of the conscientious union of a whole nation for the accomplishment of a great national task.

The Socialists also ask, "Where are all those great principles in the name of which the war has been proclaimed?" But the war is really being fought for big principles. The fate of Belgium, Serbia, and Poland is brought up against us. This fate is certainly our concern, but only in the sense that we cannot stop the war before Belgium, Serbia, Poland, and Armenia have been fully compensated for everything they have suffered. Therefore, we cannot make a separate peace, but must fight on to the end.

These Socialists regret that the idea of the necessity for crushing militarism goes astray, and that the principles of international life are beginning to be ignored. But we do not forget this idea; it is only those who are ready at the end of this unprecedented war to return to the old state of things in Europe, when the rights of the people were ignored, and when armaments went up regardless. No, we have not sacrificed millions of our sons for nothing, and we do not want to see such a state of things again!

If we return from large perspectives concerning the whole world to the more narrow historical problems of different nations, we must say that these must be also realized to the full extent. These problems are being faced by all the nations. We have them also, and it were a crime to say that the blood of our people

was shed not for their realization, but for somebody else's foreign interest.

Our Russian interest in this war can be defined very briefly: We need an outlet to a free sea. We did not begin the war for this, but without it we shall not end it. The annexation of the Dardanelles is in no way an attempt to enlarge the Russian frontiers. Russia is big enough, and has no need for new territories; but her complete development without an outlet to a free sea cannot possibly be realized. In our time, when the old idea of continentalism is dead, when international relations demanding a seaway have become the order of the day, the State without such communications is an organism without the necessary organs.

You can say to me: "If Turkey had been wiser we could not possibly have realized this aim. We would have had to wait." But when Liman von Sanders entered Constantinople, when the Turkish War Minister became a servant of Germany, and the Turkish fleet became controlled by Germans, the whole situation changed. We fully realize what is the plan of Germany, and for what she is carrying on this war. It is clear to everybody that in the case of victory Germany would create in Europe a central State, and would capture or subjugate Turkey economically, and then politically. "Berlin-Bagdad," that is the German idea; and since it has been created we have no other choice. The question now is not whether the strait shall become Russian or remain Turkish; the question is whether it shall become Russian or remain German.

We must make no mistake. The question which is now being decided will probably be decided forever, but there will scarcely ever be such favorable conditions as there are now. The chief of these conditions is the attitude of our allies toward our national problem. "Ber-

lin-Bagdad" is too real a danger, not only for us, but for Great Britain, with India and Egypt; and for France with her prospects in Syria. On the basis of this real danger an agreement has become possible between powers which for centuries were suspicious of each other.

The end of March (O. S.) and the beginning of April (N. S.) in 1915 is a date which is well worthy of remembrance by large masses of the Russian people. This is the date when a definite agreement was reached between us and our allies.

[In conclusion Mr. Milyukoff urged the necessity of going on with the war. A neutral had come to him to suggest peace.]

He told me that he had come to Russia in order to ascertain what the feeling is with regard to a separate peace. He said: "You cannot imagine how in Germany they wish for peace. Probably the evacuation of Belgium and the evacuation of Serbia might be made the basis for further negotiations."

I answered him: "We know well the feelings of Germany; but in your country they should know who started this war, and whether it is possible by any sort of international agreement based on a simple return to the status quo ante to divert Germany from her aims. We do not want to crush Germany, but we must make it impossible for her in the future to upset the peace of Europe; and by her own free will she will never consent to anything in that direction." No, the fate of a democratic Europe cannot be decided at a congress of diplomats. The new Europe must create new forms of intercourse, and to do this she must show a real creative spirit. That is an enormous task to accomplish, but one which our generation has to face, and it can only be brought to a successful issue by the whole nation's taking part in the shaping of the future destinies of Europe.



Human Documents of the War Fronts

Behind the dry official reports of military events is a vast fund of emotional human interest. It is the aim of this department of CURRENT HISTORY to give the best available glimpses of that side of the war, as found in private letters, personal experiences, and thrilling episodes of courage, humor, or pathos.

The Puzzled German

By Rudyard Kipling

In occasional letters to Herbert Ballie, (Municipal Librarian,) Wellington, New Zealand, Mr. Kipling writes with refreshing vigor about the war. In a letter dated Jan. 12, from Bateman's Burwash, Sussex, England, he remarks:

I WAS at a hospital the other day which held 900 samples of all the stock we raise, and I met a youngster from Auckland, a farmer, half full of sharpnel, but going strong. Also, a Maori, who interested him immensely.

You're quite right in what you say about the new relations between the dominions. All that was small and petty in their rivalries has been washed out in blood. All that was best is better even than before. There is a sort of grave courtesy and affection now at the back of all the chaffing and joking. That is very fine and touching to see. And they do chaff each other, too!

Don't you be too concerned over our bickerings and back talk at this end of the show. It is the ancient habit of the English to grouse and argue and growl over every job they engage in. I had to listen to a long lecture the other day from a wounded bank clerk on the sin of calling the Germans names. He said it was not right to abuse them for following their "national ideals." He was of opinion that no German was fit to live, because his "national ideals didn't square with the ideals of civilization," and he looked forward to the complete wiping out of Germany as a power. But (and he talked about it for ten minutes) that didn't justify "coarse and vulgar abuse." Well, that is a point of view that would not strike most people.

This sort of thing puzzles the German

badly. He cannot understand why men who grouse and criticise their own side keep on hammering him. There was a man called Napoleon who, if you remember, was puzzled in very much the same way, and the worry eventually killed him. The Germans do not yet understand why the "colonies," as they call them, have not "revolted" from England. I cannot help feeling for them. Here they are winning at least one victory per week, and an extra big one once a month. And here are the Allies with their infernal stupidity not yet recognizing that Germany, if properly approached, would be ready to impose "a victorious peace." (They are rather keen just now on "victorious peace" in Germany, but nowhere else!) Instead of which the silly Russians and foolish French and the fat-headed English and the deluded "colonies," who cannot be making money out of the game, are sending up more men and guns against them.

If I were a German I would really be grieved at the blindness of all the rest of the world, and, judging from their papers, they are grieving in multitudes. But I fancy it is a long way yet for them and for us. They have got to go on winning victories for another year, if their men and their money run to it. They will probably finish up with a splendid victory, and then those "damn fool" Allies will "reform their line" and pick up the pieces and get ready to be beaten again—very likely not far from where the lines are now. Then the show will shut up with Germany victorious to the last, and the Allies methodically carving her up into nice harmless pieces. Maybe I am wrong—I hope I am—but

that is the way I see it: Germany winning all the victories, and the Allies winning the war.

One thing we must get into our thick heads is that wherever the German—man or woman—gets a suitable culture to thrive in, he or she means death and loss to civilized people, precisely as germs of any disease, suffered to multiply, mean death or loss to mankind. There is no question of hate or anger or excitement in the matter, any more than there is in flushing out sinks or putting oil on water to prevent mosquitos hatching eggs. As far as we are concerned, the German is typhoid or plague—Pestis Teutonicus, if

you like. But until we realize this elementary fact in peace, we shall always be liable to outbreak of anti-civilization. Make this clear by all means in your power.

I see that Australia has begun to restrict German trade. That is right. Where a bale or box of German goods comes into a civilized country there is always the chance of exposing mankind to danger sooner or later. This has been proved before all mankind in every quarter of the world. * * * We must put the work through, for the sake of all mankind and for the saving of our own souls.

An Officer's Story

Retold by V. Ropshin

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY from the Niva, Petrograd]

I SHOUTED, "Forward!" jumped over the parapet, and ran forward over the field of beetroot. I remembered that I was an officer, and must keep in front of my men.

I heard no shots. At the German trench I felt a blow on my shoulder, just as if some one had hit me with a riding whip. But I did not at first realize that I was wounded. Without stopping, we leaped across the trench. When we were across it I felt a sudden catching of the breath, and everything went black before my eyes. On the right was a deep funnel, the crater of a 12-inch shell. I jumped into the crater.

The funnel was wide, with crumbling edges, and with a sticky, clayey bottom. I sat down on the damp earth and felt that my arm was very sore. I struck a match and began to smoke.

Now I heard the thunder of guns; I distinguished the rattle of howitzers and the whistle of bursting shells. I had a feeling of depression. Involuntarily I closed my eyes.

I sat a whole hour unconscious in this way. When I came to myself I saw a German in front of me, a German officer, in a gray-green cloak and with a round cap of the same color. The officer was

standing straight before me, and was looking me in the face. I tried to rise, but he said in French:

"You are my prisoner! Sit down!" and he covered me with his revolver.

I answered: "Shoot!"

I felt certain that he would shoot me. But he unexpectedly lowered his arm. His face was tanned, with thick, dark hair and wide, blue eyes. After a short silence he said:

"I could shoot you—but I do not want to. We are both prisoners in this hole!"

And he added, saluting: "I am a Captain in the 238th Prussian Regiment; Müller!"

I also gave him my name. We were now sitting at opposite sides of the hole, he a German and I a Frenchman. We remained silent. We both felt awkward, and I tried not to look at him. At last he said:

"You are wounded?"

"Yes."

"Allow me! I shall fix a bandage for you!"

I answered: "Pray, do not trouble yourself!"

But he came over to me and pulled out cotton wadding and bandages. And as he touched me with his hands I experi-

enced a curious transformation. He ceased to be a German, a detested enemy, a man who wanted to shoot me, one of the armed bands whose presence pollutes our land. He was simply Captain Müller, my chance and already kind acquaintance.

He bandaged me skillfully and rapidly. When he had finished he smiled, and said in German: "So!"

I thanked him in French: "Merci!"

Then we sat together, once more in silence. The firing did not diminish, and sometimes the bombs burst near by, quite close to us. The earth trembled, a dark, narrow column rose up, and we were spattered with dirt, with lumps of earth, and smoke. But neither I nor the German stirred. We did not wish to show that we were afraid.

Toward evening the fire grew more intense. The German was now listening to the guns.

"That was yours; that's mine; that's a 120, that's a 75, that's a 77, that's another 75."

My arm was numb and ached severely. I said: "Will you kindly get a flask out of my pocket? I have some cognac."

We drank some brandy, both from the same bottle. First he, then I; and when we had drunk from the same bottle he blushed and raised his big, blue eyes.

"You are married?"

"Yes; I am married."

"Have you any children?"

"No."

"I have—two."

He rose and said, with a wave of his hand: "I own a brickyard, over there, in Hanover. I am a peaceful man. I have

managed the brickyard all my life. I wanted peace—and I have gone to war. And now we are living like moles. We sleep in the water. We risk our lives every minute. People have gone mad. Black has become white, and white black. Tell me, why are we fighting?"

"Your Wilhelm wanted it!"

"Ach! Wilhelm! And did my children want war? Wilhelm wanted it and they did not want it. And I obeyed not them, but Wilhelm! And here I am, on French, on foreign soil, beside you, in this hole; and perhaps I shall die today. I shall die, or you will. They will kill me or you. Why? What for? For Germany? For my brickyard? When will this war end? When will we go home again? Or shall we not go home? Tell me, why are we fighting?"

I wanted to answer him. I wanted to tell him that we Frenchmen were defending our country, and that the Germans were bandits, not guests! But I suddenly felt that I was thrown up into the air, that it had become hot, that there was a rank smell of smoke, and that everything about me was red. This lasted a second—or it may have been a year—and when I came to myself I saw the blue sky overhead. I made an effort to rise. I noticed that the crater was smashed down at the edge, and had grown smaller and deeper. From beneath the overturned, damp earth a pair of boots stuck forth, worn at the heel; and beside them, close to me, lay an officer's round cap, with the brim torn off. I understood—my companion had been killed. My arm ached; I stumbled and lost consciousness. During the night the men of my regiment picked me up.

Real Letters From the Front

Written to an American Artist

IT has seemed to us of interest to present the following extracts from letters of French soldiers, in order that the reader may see for himself the difference between real expressions from men on the battlefield and the words

commonly attributed to them. As one soldier recently put the matter, in speaking of a near relative who had fallen: "We know his last words; and they were not a grandiose sentiment about la patrie, but just 'My poor wife! My poor child!'"

The passages here printed are not expressions of the supreme moment, but they are from men who have been the constant witness of it among their comrades. And this fact should be considered in connection with another—that the writers of these letters are all intellectual men, artists, *littérateurs*, and physicians. From the temper of such men, thrown into terrible conditions so foreign to their usual lives, one gets a new sense of the spirit of the French armies and a new understanding of the respect with which the world stands before them today.

From an artist, Nov. 23, 1914:

Our rôle as territorials is not a very active one, as one thinks of war; just now we are digging trenches. Still there is talk of our occupying some of them shortly. And what of my painting, you will ask me? I think of it a good deal, and I hope to ripen many things while waiting for the moment when I can have the happiness of materializing them—that is, if the future and events permit.

From the same, April 13, 1915:

The glimpse of your family life I get from your letter makes me glad for you and a little jealous for myself, who am so far from home, living an almost subterranean existence. I am far, too, from all my old pre-occupations and speculations. And yet it does not seem as if one should look on all this as a misfortune, though of course one is at the mercy of a bullet or a shell—and the Lord knows if there isn't a big enough rain of them sometimes, and then you will always get a bunch the size of a nice little woman, all at once.

Looking out through my loophole, I see a stretch of beautiful country. As Spring came on, nature assumed an almost mystical significance. There was a whisper of life out there, and through "the blue incense of pale horizons" one could hear it singing in the grass, in the trees, in the air. It chattered volubly, and one seemed to feel its astonishment at finding men so wicked. But life does not stop for such considerations; it goes on in that populous plain—where for days we would see no man.

For a long time now sounds have meant more to me than things seen. One extends the power of one's eyes through sounds—even if they are more generalized than such concrete matters as a burned cottage or a postcard from home, or the *poilu* who brings you your soup. For us who so much of the time cannot look about us (it is the foolhardy ones who get killed first) sounds mean things they never did before: there is information in them, often a warning. And what variety, and how full of suggestion!—a volley of bullets has the sound of a break-

ing wave; a shell passes—it is like the rush of trains in the *métro*; a bullet close to you sounds like a bee.

* * * There is a sad procession of wounded after each day of fighting—but their vehement enthusiasm, (I speak of the more slightly wounded,) their desire to get back into the furnace, stirs your entrails.

From a physician who had been attending the wounded on the firing line:

I am on a month's furlough, granted on account of illness brought on by overwork. I shall go to the Midi, and then return to the front, that I have not left for a year. I hope to stay there till the end of the war or till my own end. That life has an irresistible attraction for one who has once tasted it, everything back of the front seems mean and miserable; the proximity of death gives to life a powerful savor that makes you enjoy it in all its aspects. The further I go the more I look on civilization—or, rather, one civilization—not as a moral phenomenon, but as an aesthetic phenomenon, in which war may play a necessary rôle in exalting the taste for life, the energy to realize, and our driving onward to the unknown.

I continue to write and to prepare the future as if nothing were happening. This war has not surprised me, and if it strikes me grievously in some of my affections, it does not throw me out of the track that my instinct traces for me. I have never been more the master of my mind nor more prodigal of my heart.

I am happy at the success that L.'s painting had in America, but it is a bitter happiness, and one in which the terrible irony of life reveals itself. L. was killed some months ago during an attack on a German trench—without enthusiasm and without fear. He had not, any more than I, the hatred of Germany, but he had the feeling that France and we ourselves could find in this formidable contact, sources of new energy, of which our victory on the Marne revealed the existence with a sort of supernatural splendor. On that day David, covered with blood and dust, struck Goliath on the forehead, and since then, in spite of his marvelous vitality, in spite of his strength and his mass, the knees of the colossus are trembling, and in the end he will fall. I saw that miracle from within, I was a part of it, with a million other Frenchmen; it is one of the great recollections of my life, and I believe, since that day, that France will not perish. If she dies, she will have revealed in her last gesture what a flash of light may yet start from the soul of a great dying people.

From a journalist in a hospital where he was recovering last Summer from injuries caused by the fall of his horse, which was killed under him while he was carrying a message:

The *poilu* in the bed next to mine has been

for a long time at a part of the line where the fighting has made the country uninhabitable for the peasants for a long distance round about. He is pretty badly cut up, but just now he said a real droll thing: "This nurse is the first woman I have seen in three months; it was worth getting wounded just for that."

From the same man after his return to the front, some months later:

The cold weather has set in, and it is cold, indeed. I was not caught in the trenches by it, as I was just sent back here for my days of rest. But imagine what it's going to be soon, standing there at a loophole, as motionless as a statue, your feet in that icy mud, impassable under the snow and sleet that cracks your skin like the bark of an old tree. The poilu is there like a tree in the wind, and as nameless as an elm or an oak, and like them a son of the soil of France.

I am a Second Lieutenant in a brave infantry regiment now—one that has given the measure of its boldness many a time. The spirit is excellent, and I keep it up with reading the war poems of the great Walt Whitman, "Drum Taps."

From an artist:

For the last three months, since I have been at the front, the time passes with the most terrific rapidity, and that disquiets me sometimes, because it emphasizes the fact that we shall have difficulty in making up for the loss of energy withdrawn from our personal ideal. And for how many days yet?—or months, I'd better say. However, I am getting back my taste for work; as badly placed for it as I am, and lacking many things I need, I make the best use I can of chance-found elements and continue my researches. At X. that was quite impossible; I need these surroundings of intense activity to arouse me. We are a strange mechanism.

But there is no denying it, the grandeur of a battle line is impressive, and it gives to the mind a measure of objects unknown before in one's accustomed atmosphere. Is it the idea of death, always present in the thunder of the cannon and the falling shells, that transposes our relative state by broadening its limits? Is it the idea of life, agglomerated in powerful masses, which grows greater through the disappearance of the individual in a gigantic body? I do not know. At all events, synthetic thought makes great progress here, and, for my part, the judgment that I can make of the intellectual past gains in strength here. In this respect the flight of time will not be entirely a detriment to us.

Confidence reigns among us, and the feeling that little by little we are becoming the masters of the hour. For our country and for all of us this long effort of sixteen months was needed, to bring us to what we hoped was abolished forever. And it is hard, I assure you, to relinquish, even for a limited time, the dream of universal union that should have been the ideal of all. Will it finally mean the death of personal power and of secret diplomacy? I am very much afraid that after this drama we shall have a lot of trouble in finding in the tangled skein the spool of thread we had so much work in rolling up.

* * * I have been deeply concerned about my brother, for his post was one of the uttermost danger; once he was slightly wounded and once he was buried alive for a considerable time when a shell demolished the trench he was in. I shall never forget a luncheon we had together, with the shells flying over our heads, one day when I paid him a visit in his trench. We separated that day not wanting to let our secret disquietude show, but I knew what a hell I was leaving him in, with the rapid-fire guns centred on his position, and I did not live till he returned to the reserves.

Two Weeks on a Submarine

By Carl List


This article, by a German-American sailor on a Norwegian ship bound for Queenstown with a cargo of wheat, was communicated to *L'Illustrazione Italiana*, from which it is here translated.

THE Norwegian ship on which I was embarked was nearing the Irish Channel. The afternoon was misty, the sea rough. We were warned by an English steamer of the presence of German submarines in the vicinity. There was a certain depression among those on board.

I asked the Captain if there were anything to do. "No," he answered. Boom!

a cannon shot was heard at the very moment. General confusion. All the men ran up on deck and looked about, terrified. Boom! another cannon shot. Then one of the German sailors, pointing to a spot on the horizon, said: "A German submarine."

It was true. The black spot grew rapidly larger, and then one could make out some human figures near the small



AN OFFICE IN RHEIMS

Effect of a Single German Shell That Plunged Through the Building
and Deep Into the Earth Beneath



COUNT FERDINAND VON ZEPPELIN

Creator of the German Cruiser of the Skies. A New Portrait by
Schwormstadt, Drawn From Life

(By arrangement with *Illustrirte Zeitung*, Berlin; © 1916)

cannon on the deck. It was the famous U-39. We hoisted our flag and awaited events. The Captain sent the mate with our ship's papers over to the submarine, which was now near. Soon those who were not German received orders to take to the boats. The Germans were taken on board the U-39, I among them. When this was done our ship was sunk.

So there I was on board a submarine. The impression of it was strange enough. The first evening, quite exhausted, I threw myself down in a corner. I heard a few short orders, then the sound of the machinery. * * * After that everything was in absolute silence. Some said we were navigating at such a depth that big ships could pass overhead of us. * * * I fell asleep.

Next day on waking I tried to get my bearings. We Germans were treated as friends. We were permitted to go about everywhere.

The boat had the shape of a gigantic cigar, about 200 feet long, divided into numerous compartments. They were full of shining instruments. Now there was a buzzing sound, like the inside of a beehive, now absolute silence reigned. Every nerve was tense with the expectation of the orders on which our lives depended. Toward the prow was the room from which the torpedo was launched, a room full of tubes and valves. The officers' lodgings are very restricted, since the space on board a submarine proscribes any comfort. The commander was Lieut. Capt. Foerstner, a tall young man, thin and pale—which is not surprising, since he never had a moment's repose; neither he nor the men of the crew ever got their clothes off during the twelve days I was on board.

The periscope, the eye of the submarine, made known to us everything that took place on the surface of the water, and it did so with such clearness that it was almost like looking through a telescope. There was always a man on watch there.

Suddenly a ship comes in sight. Its smoke is like a black line drawn on the horizon. A bell rings. It is a signal for each man to be at his post. The U-39 slowly rises to the surface. A last look is given at the mirror of the periscope; no English coast guard is in sight. So everything is ready for action. We hear the command, "Empty the water cistern." Freed from her ballast, the submarine rises to the surface. "Both engines ahead, at full speed!" The boat cleaves her way through the water that cascades her sides with foam. In a short time the ship is reached. The submarine hoists her flag and fires a cannon shot. No flag betrays the nationality of the captured ship, but we can read the name, Gadsby, on her side. She is English. We signal that her whole crew is to take to the lifeboats, and quickly! At any moment we may be surprised.

Through the megaphone we indicate to the men the nearest way to land; then a cannon shot, then a second one. The captured ship, after pitching for a while, sinks.

The time necessary for the sinking of a ship differs considerably in different cases. Some disappear in five minutes, others float for several hours. The finest spectacle I witnessed was the sinking of the Fiery Cross. The crew received orders to get off in the boats. Some of our men rowed up close to the abandoned ship and attached hand grenades to her sides. They were fired and the three-master was blown up with all her sails spread and set. The hull and the rigging went down to the depths, but the sails spread out on the surface of the water like so many little fields of polar ice. Eleven ships were destroyed during my stay on board. Quite a number of others were captured besides these, but they were let go again.

This trip, which I shall never forget, lasted twelve days. It was dangerous, but it was exciting and so fine that I would not have missed it for anything in the world.

The Sinking of the Provence II.

By N. Bokanowski

Deputy of the Department of the Seine

The French Auxiliary cruiser La Provence II., formerly a passenger liner, was sunk by a submarine in the eastern end of the Mediterranean while serving as a troop transport. Nearly 4,000 men are said to have been on board, of whom only 870 were saved. One of the survivors, M. Bokanowski, wrote this thrilling description to President Poincaré of France:

Malta, Feb. 29, 1916.

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT: You are doubtless familiar, in all its details, with the fate of the Provence II. I should like to describe to you—to assuage in a measure the grief of France—the noble behavior of those who made ready at that moment, between sea and sky, to die for their country.

We had on board a battalion and some detachments of the Third Colonial Regiment of Infantry. At the moment of the explosion I was on the bridge, with the commander of the ship, his second in command, and several of the higher officers. We directed the steps to be taken, distributing lifebelts, superintending the launching of boats and liferafts. Not an outcry, not a complaint, not the slightest sign of panic—only the dignified tranquillity of men who long ago had consecrated their lives to the sublime cause that had put arms in their hands.

Everybody would have been saved had it depended only on officers and crew. Unfortunately the ship sank rapidly. The water soon found its way into the boilers. When they began to explode, about ten minutes past 5, I jumped into the sea and swam as fast as I could in order to get beyond the radius of suction. A few moments later there were several deafening explosions. I turned and saw the end. The ship was going down stern foremost. Captain Vesco, still standing on the bridge, cried in a voice that rose above the tumult: "Adieu, mes enfants!" The men, grouped in clusters on the forward deck, replied with an enthusiastic

shout: "Vive la France!" The survivors, swimming about the ship, or safe on boats and rafts, saw the Provence make a sudden plunge, her forward deck standing perpendicular in the air. They, in their turn, saluted with a cry of "Vive la France!" It was a quarter past 5.

After swimming for half an hour I succeeded in reaching an overloaded raft, the occupants of which pulled me aboard. Night was falling, the wind was chill and nipped the flesh of the men, who were almost entirely naked. Throughout the endless night, not a whimper! My companions in misfortune had no words except to lament the fate of those who were drowned and to curse the Boche, who, neither before nor after his treacherous shot, had dared to appear and show his flag. In water up to the waist, with teeth chattering from the cold, but upheld by the desire to survive and be able to punish the villains, we were picked up eighteen hours later by a trawler. Several men had died from the cold on the rafts, and several others had lost their reason.

An English patrol and a French torpedo boat divided the survivors between them, some heading for Milo, others for Malta. I was among the latter, and we arrived here about 1 o'clock yesterday. Captain Vesco, who was in command of the Provence II.; Lieutenant Besson, second in command; Colonel Duhalde, commanding the Third Colonial Regiment of Infantry, remained on the bridge until the very last second of the ship's life in the most noble spirit of self-sacrifice, giving with perfect calmness precise and effective orders for saving the passengers.

The gunners of the Provence's stern gun, having loaded it when the torpedo struck, remained at their posts, trying to discover the hidden foe in order to repay him in his own coin, until the piece was entirely submerged.

Lieutenant Noël, commanding the trawler Canada, having picked up the

signal of distress, hastened in search of the survivors, succeeded, after prolonged efforts, in discovering them, and went about the business of saving them under extremely difficult conditions when he had been without rest for thirty-six hours.

Surgeon Navarre of the Third Colonial Regiment, being taken aboard a trawler nearly exhausted by his eighteen hours on a raft, refused to change his drenched clothing or to take any food until he had dressed the hurts of the wounded and looked after the sick. He was prostrated a long while after such superhuman labors.

And I must mention this other incident, which brings tears to my eyes:

Gauthier, Assistant Quartermaster of the *Provence*, having been taken on board a greatly overloaded raft, was hailed by

a soldier asking for help; he jumped into the water to give him his place, saying: "A sailor's duty is to save the soldiers first of all."

He was picked up, twenty-one hours after the wreck, clinging to a plank.

I call attention also to the devotion and zeal—meriting our profound gratitude—of Lieutenant Sinclair Thomson, commanding the English patrol *Marguerite*, and of his officers and crew, by whose labors about 300 survivors were taken from the place of the wreck to Malta.

Pray pardon the form of this story, Monsieur le Président. I have written it hurriedly, with a bruised hand, and with a head still in a sad muddle. I wished, before my impending departure for Saloniki, to say to you with all my heart: "That is what these noble fellows did!"

BOKANOWSKI.

Sunk and Saved by a U-Boat

By John D. Harrison

This remarkable story of adventure is told by a young Chicagoan who had shipped at Rio de Janeiro on board the Margam Abbey, an English vessel engaged in provisioning British cruisers in the Atlantic:

THE first excitement came when the assistant steward, a man named Kral, who had shipped as a Hollander on the *Margam Abbey* at Seattle, where the flour was taken on board, got into a fight with the chief engineer over the war. He had long been suspected as a German. The Captain ordered his effects to be searched, and discovered two magazine pistols and papers of discharge from the Hamburg-American Line. For two days Kral was kept in irons. In the harbor of Pernambuco the Captain signaled for a police boat and went ashore with him, and that was the last I ever heard of him.

We left Pernambuco on March 5, bound for the Canary Islands, and in the middle of the Atlantic we got in touch with an English second-class cruiser by wireless and supplied her with flour and

canned beef. The Captain gave us news of the German raider *Möwe*, which had captured the *Appam* about a month before, advising us to take a southerly route, keep our lights out, and paint everything black. At 5 o'clock in the morning, on March 12, the Captain called me to the bridge and said we had been followed all night by what he supposed was a British war vessel. I looked through the glass and told him I thought it was a cargo vessel. Then the pursuer began to speed up. The Captain signaled for all steam, and we made about 14½ knots, but the other boat kept gaining. Half an hour later she fired a shot across our bow. Whether she was the *Möwe* or not I do not know, but probably not, as it was reported that the German raider returned safely to Germany about March 5. Fortunately for us the weather grew foggy, we changed our course, and in two hours the pursuing vessel was out of sight.

Two days later we reached Madeira, and after staying four days went to Bordeaux, where we landed a big cargo of flour for Verdun. We received orders

to proceed to Cardiff, Wales, where were the offices of the owners of the vessel. Two days after leaving Bordeaux, while we were at the head of the Bay of Biscay, the first mate, at 3 o'clock in the morning of April 10, sighted a submarine off the starboard bow. We immediately put on steam. The German boat was about two miles off. She chased us and began firing explosive shells, and one rendered us helpless by carrying away half of the propeller. Before that, however, we were in a sinking condition, for fully fifty shots were fired and many struck us below the water line. We carried no guns. The only man on board to be hit was the Chief Engineer. His right shoulder was torn away with a shot as he was putting some provisions in a lifeboat, and he died from his wounds.

We carried two lifeboats. One had twelve holes shot through it, but they were plugged up. The Captain ordered them launched, and we left the ship. One boat pulled toward the Island of Ushant, France, about sixty miles off, while the Captain's boat, in which I was a passenger, turned toward the coast of England, about eighty miles away. After rowing for about two miles, the submarine disappeared. The Margam Abbey was half submerged, but the Captain suggested that we go back, believing we might stand a better chance to be picked up. The Captain and I went aboard to get some medicines from the cabin, when the submarine emerged 300 yards away and fired two more shots, one passing over my head in the cabin. I ran out on the port side and jumped into the water, while the Captain jumped in on the starboard side, where the boat was, and was picked up, and the sailors rowed away, but not before the German commander had called out that he would pick me up. I had on a life belt and was supported by some planks. I was in the water twenty minutes when the submarine came alongside and pulled me in.

The first thing I told the submarine commander was that I was an American. He asked me a lot of questions about the ship, where we were bound, what our cargo was. Then he took me down the conning tower and told the steward to

give me some breakfast. I had hot coffee, ham, and bread, and it surely tasted good. I never saw so much machinery in so small a compass before as in that submarine. She was a big boat, 300 feet long, carrying two six-pound guns, fore and aft, and with two torpedo tubes. The crew numbered about thirty men, all young, fine-looking fellows. I asked the commander if I could take off my clothes to dry them, and he ordered some dry ones to be given to me. I was surely treated very well, and everything about the submarine was in the neatest and cleanest order.

The submarine had in some manner picked up our liferaft and was towing it. The commander and his officers held a consultation, and I was asked to go on deck. It was then that we saw the Margam Abbey sink. We stayed around the place about an hour, and then the commander said he was going to set me adrift on the liferaft. He said I would soon be picked up by one of the English patrol boats, for he said they had been hunting for him for a week, "but tell them from me," he added, "that we are still here."

Well, they put me on the raft in my dry German suit. Half of the crew were on top of the submarine watching me, and they waved their caps and all shouted in English, "Good-bye!" The submarine moved off and soon submerged, and that was the last I saw of her.

The sea was very calm, and I waited, all alone on the raft, to be rescued. About two hours later the patrol boat Kinalde, a Scotch vessel from Aberdeen, hove in sight and took me aboard. I told them that the two boats with the Margam Abbey's crew were not far distant. We found the Captain's boat in three hours with the body of the engineer. His body was carried to England and sent to his home at Sunderland. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon we picked up the other boat, and at night we got to Falmouth and I slept in the hospital. There was great excitement when we told our story, but we learned afterward that this same German submarine had sunk seven boats within a week.

How I Entered Germany

By a Russian Newspaper Correspondent

A correspondent of the Retch, a Russian newspaper, recently managed to pass the German boundary on a false passport, on his way to Berlin. Following is a sample of his cross-examination by German officials:

WITHOUT saying a word the Lieutenant hands to the Captain a few Baedekers. I recognize their red bindings.

"You say you have lived so many years at N.? Can you tell me where you lived there?"

I name a street and the number of a house which I know to exist in N., but where I have never lived.

"You know of course the street Y.? Can you tell me how the square at the end of it is called?"

I give the necessary reply and submit to a further string of such questions. I have to tell the whereabouts of the Post Office, the palace, such and such a theatre, shops, statues, &c. In short, I had to give such information as the Captain could easily check by his Baedeker. I passed the examination with honors.

"You say you lived constantly at—" he does not finish his sentence, as if wishing to trip me up. I repeat the name of a little town in a small, neutral country, and I cannot help laughing inwardly at the perplexity in which the German officer will soon find himself, because I know that a description of this little town will not be found in any of the Baedekers. He searches his Baedeker for the place, and, having found only a tiny dot on the map, angrily gives up the game.

"Now will you follow me," says one of the Lieutenants, and guides me to a corridor, along both sides of which run cubicles like cloak rooms in a miniature theatre in some provincial town. We enter one of the cubicles.

"Will you have the goodness to undress, but, first of all, please take off your boots." The Lieutenant takes the boots and hands them over to the soldier who accompanies us.

"Have no fear. We shall rip them open and take off the heels, but we will sew them up again and return in good condition."

Of course, it is useless to protest; I take off everything. All my body, right down to my feet and nails, is carefully inspected by means of an electric lamp. The lining of my suit is all ripped open, but is not sewn up again. The contents of my pockets are carefully examined. Needless to say, I have no letters, books, papers, nor documents, except my passport. The Lieutenant takes his glasses and looks through my passport, opens my watch, looks at its mechanism, reads the trade mark of the manufacturers, and then takes my fountain pen, with which I never part, pours out the ink, and is busy probing its inside with a hatpin.

"What can one hide there?" I ask inquisitively.

"Have you never seen pendants, rings, and other things? You hold them up to the light, and through a tiny little point you see highly magnified views of cathedrals, of mountains, or of towns, &c. You can do the same with any document—reduce it photographically and carry it at the bottom of your fountain pen."

I had to agree that this was quite possible. The Lieutenant is chatting freely with me, at the same time, of course, trying to catch me unawares. But I am on my guard. My boots were brought in, and, indeed, on the soles one could see new, neat stitches.

I dress, and at last the final stage is reached. A fifth officer haggles with me about the time I should spend in Germany, and I obtain permission to stay ten days in Berlin and four in Dresden.

I breathe freely once more and go on the platform. I look at my watch; all these investigations and searches have taken up altogether fifty-five minutes. I find my place in the train and make myself comfortable. Four hours hence I shall be in Berlin.

Somehow I cannot believe it, and it seems to me that it is all a dream.

What the British Are Doing

By Count Alexei H. Tolstoy

Eminent Russian Journalist

I KNOW not in what manner our Russian views of certain national types are being formed. The English, for instance, we always thought cold, calculating, sly. At the beginning of the war Sir Edward Grey, speaking for an entire nation, seemed almost sphinx-like in his baffling manner. Kitchener seemed the personification of the severe ruler, who will not know human weakness. John Bull is pictured by the cartoonists of all countries as a fat, slyly-winking glutton. And all this turned out to be untrue and just about the reverse in reality.

John Bull is generally a thin, tall man, and simple-natured. The austere Kitchener, who speaks only in monosyllables, is in reality but a representative figure, magnificently adapted for advertising purposes on the screen or posters. They are practical and efficient in their task, but neither this task, nor the organization, nor yet the domination of the world is their goal; not even England for the English. It seems to me the English dream now of universal harmony, when all forces shall be strained, all passions free; when no adventure shall disturb the peace and calm reigning on earth; when falsehood, diplomacy, and guns shall become antiquated.

Sir Edward Grey is the most simple and sincere man in England. Having decided to show us, the Russian journalists, the army, works, and fleet, the English have shown us many secrets, in their simplicity, which we should have forgotten instantly. And we were not even told that it was forbidden to write or talk about them, leaving this to our own sense of decency.

For three days, spent at the front, I studied these young and old Englishmen. They are frank, candid, with that ever-present spark of humor somewhere in their eyes. The difference between them is that one commands entire armies while the other has charge of fifty men

in a trench. And every one of them is first of all a man and a gentleman.

Another mistake we make concerning the British army. Some of us say the only things they do there is to play football, eat pudding, and let the Allies bleed to death. But the British army is great. Haig told us that it now occupies a fourth of the entire front. It began with a hundred thousand and is already passed the million mark. But they think that it is not sufficient for a decisive offensive. And so the English are preparing to strike a terrible and crushing blow at Germany. They are accumulating shells and men, they build whole cities of concrete, where food, clothing, and ammunition from all corners of the world are being gathered, and daily there flows from the Isles to the Continent a river of troops and artillery.

On the third day we finally succeeded in getting to the first line trenches and seeing with our own eyes a little part of that impregnable wall, behind which the English are preparing their blow. At 10 o'clock we arrived in the woods, which were but recently in German hands.

It was warm and clear. White clouds slowly swam in the blue of the sky. Naked, the forest was full of the roar of cannon and shrieking of shells. Somewhere in the distance grenades were exploding. And in the intervals of silence one could hear the chirping of birds. Many trees lay uprooted, and many others bore the marks of shrapnel on their trunks. We entered the trenches. Here we could walk in couples only. Mr. Balfour and I passed through a hole to the extreme trench, which is one endless ditch, running from the sea to Switzerland. It has the depth of a man, and zigzags regularly from horizon to horizon, each of its two sides protected by sacks of sand. It is the ditch that has called a halt to the German hordes, defying millions of tons of steel. A Scotsman was lying on bags on

his back, his legs protruding into the air. At his head was his rifle. In his hands were two small mirrors. He had been lying thus since morning, looking into the glasses, awaiting the appearance of a German helmet on the other side of the sand bags. Another one had made a piece of metal his mirror, also awaiting his prey. Some were cleaning their rifles, some repairing the damage done by grenades.

We were returning. Shells were flying and bursting in our direction, and an iron bird was circling above us. And then some shrapnel shrilled over us, on its way to the German trenches. I looked at

Balfour. His nose was all covered with mud. "The d—d Boches!" he said; "a grenade exploded, and then I suddenly felt something wet on my face."

We went to the famous hill, from where the enormous panorama of the battlefield unfolds itself to the observer's eye. It is a high and abrupt hill. There stretches before one's view an infinite space, in the background of which, far, far in the distance, one could discern the white tower of unfortunate Ypres. Ypres, the wonderful capital of Flanders, has been erased from the surface of the earth. Only by some miracle has the tower escaped.

Flying Across Mount Ararat

By a Russian Airman

Aeroplanes are now being made in New England which will be able, it is said, to fly to Europe under their own power. An English aeroplane has recently made the flight from the Gulf of Saros to Constantinople and back, incidentally dropping bombs on the powder factory in the Pera quarter north of the Golden Horn. But perhaps the most picturesque story of flight that has yet come to hand is this—in the Russkoe Slovo—of a Russian airman flying among the peaks of the "frosty Caucasus," where the valleys are already more than a mile in the air, Erzerum being about level with the summit of Mount Washington.

YOU know what an airman generally looks like, if he is getting ready to do a pretty big climb, under the regulation circumstances of war work; warm clothing, fur gauntlets, a thickly padded helmet; everybody is probably familiar with these attributes of the airman, at least from pictures.

Here, beyond the Caucasus, we dress differently. We do not enjoy the comparative comforts with which the aviation squads carry on their work on the other war fronts, where they have warm quarters and repair shops within easy reach. We have to fit out under an ordinary service tent, and how much it protects you from the icy cold you can easily imagine!

Picture to yourself a human form in underwear, which other human beings are leisurely and effectively wrapping in—newspapers! Oh, paper keeps out the cold splendidly! Any florist at home will tell you that. And here, where we see flowers only in our dreams, we have only one prayer to address to you: Send us

newspapers, more newspapers! We not only read them, we wear them!

The paper packing is the first part of the airman's toilet. Next comes an undervest, then the uniform, a fur jacket or cloak and trousers. Sometimes these latter are fur-covered above, when the aviator ready for flight is hardly distinguished in appearance from a bear. Warm felt shoes; huge fur gloves, in which you have difficulty at first in wiggling your fingers. A warm helmet with holes only for the eyes and mouth. The last detail of the toilet is the "make-up"; the airman's face, as much of it as remains uncovered, is thickly smeared with vaseline as a protection against the icy cold.

In the aerodrome the motor of the aeroplane, set at low speed, is already humming. Human figures are bustling about it. They clothe and warm it also—into the radiator they pour almost boiling water; the oil cylinders are filled with lubricating oil heated over wood fires. These are the ordinary Winter measures.

We have a lot of "special" tricks. In our spare time, we ourselves, our mechanics and motormen are busy trying to find out ways to warm our aeroplanes during flights, so that the oil may not freeze, cakes of ice form in the radiators, and so on. And we have accomplished a great deal in that direction. At least, in our work, cases of motor failure owing to cold have been very rare.

Now for flight. I have had experience in flying over the Eastern European battle front. I have had to be on the lookout for upsets and descents into forests and marshes. I am well acquainted with shrapnel fire. More than once I have looked down upon the picture of massed movements, of separate actions, of big battles. Flights here, beyond the Caucasus, have their peculiar danger, their special difficulties. But nowhere do they give such fascinating beauty as they give here.

You remember how we said that aviation, making such enormous progress during the war, would, after the war, open up new horizons for mankind, not only technical, but also philosophical and psychological horizons; some one, I remember, insisted on new moral horizons also. I want to expand even these prospects. Now more than ever I am convinced that aviation will open new chapters in the art of painting.

Oh, if the late Vrubel could seek and create his colors here, up aloft, above the summits of the highest mountains and passes! And that first flight was far from being the richest in an artistic sense.

Below, it was cold, monotonous. Heavy flakes of snow were falling. In the narrow ravines the wind howled and whirled about. You only know that to the spurs of the mountains on the right or on the left, it is so far; to the cliffs before and behind you, it is so far. You define, so to say, only the frame, within the limits of which you are to climb upward. And later, in flight, you do not observe these limits by sight—snow blinds your eyes—but only by inner feeling and by catching the gusts of wind that rock your plane.

The motor roars rather hoarsely. It

quivers with a strange note in the avalanche of white, icy cold crystals and fatal butterflies that have their birth in the ice zone above the clouds. You stretch your hand out over the edge of the "gondola," and instantly it is white; the white "butterflies" cling about it. The unfortunate observer is still worse off. The gusts of wind whirl around him more violently. Swarms of white "butterflies" unceremoniously settle on his helmet, filling up the eyeholes. A whole carpet of them, dead but as icy cold, lie on the floor of the gondola between the observer's back and the oil and benzine reservoirs.

And now the whirling "butterflies" grow fewer. It is becoming lighter. The motor roars louder, as if rejoicing in its victory over the elements. The aeroplane goes more evenly. A few minutes more and the clouds of the snowstorm are below us. For an instant—but this is only from the unexpectedness, from the brilliant sun rays suddenly striking my tired eyes—the aeroplane pitches downward. The cloud we have just come out of seems unwilling to let us escape from its clutches.

But that is only for an instant. The effort to turn sooner in the direction of the sun, of the expanse, of something infinitely beautiful, which I have not yet had time to become fully conscious of, is transmitted instinctively to my hands, which control the rudders, and the apparatus is once more above the clouds in the cherishing sunlight and the limitless blue sky.

Not only I myself, but all of us who are working here, feel only a single wish in such minutes of "outbreak toward the sun"—to let go the handles of the rudder and give one's self up wholly to the observation of the kingdom of beauty opening out before us.

All about us, in tints of blue or rose, the silent, unpeopled hills, the deep precipices, spread out their gamut of soft or menacing, gentle or repellent tones. There are now glistening, now dull patches of undulating glaciers. There are deceptively near or deceptively distant fields of white, untouched, eternal snow in its inviolable virginity. There are dark blue,

black, green patches of secular forests, a setting, as it were, to bring out these effects of beauty.

The aeroplane goes still higher, still wider prospects open out around us, bathed in sunlight, and everything below, about, above us seems to be molded of crystal and mother of pearl. * * *

Speaking generally, flying is a tranquil enough thing. It is true that, after flying across the plains, you feel that here your attention is more keenly fixed, you become more a single organism with your aeroplane. But it is possible that this only seems to be so, because you have to struggle all the time to tear yourself away from this fascinating beauty and fix your thought on "business." Probably this struggle creates the illusion of general psychological and physical concentration.

The machine "wabbles" generally only over precipices and when approaching passes. This is intelligible. In the first case, there are strong ascending currents, and, in the second, the stream of air rolling over the peaks forms something like a waterfall—you meet with an "airfall" and you only need to guess its near proximity in time and to divine its "rapids" in order to be able to rise higher, where flying is once more tranquil and smooth.

It is much worse when you fall into a "basin." That is our name for a moderate-sized level space surrounded by broken mountains. Here the wind blows as if "from all corners at once." The air strata are in the highest degree uneven, and often, after flying through a dense layer, the apparatus suddenly plunges downward; then, seeming to strike with all its weight against a denser layer, it again flies evenly, and then plunges again. And so sometimes, after a long time, by mere accident, by feeling out your way, you find a layer of even density and get out of the basin through one of the ravines. These plunges and blows are very dangerous; many a time, in the case of a blow

against a dense air layer, we have broken a stay from the sharp change of air pressure on the wings.

Is it cold? Cold as the arctic, ferociously cold! When you are flying over a big glacier you feel that the cold not only wraps itself around your whole body, however well you may be protected by all possible means, but it gets inside you and begins to stop your breathing. Your hands suffer most of all. I and others of my colleagues have had to pick out some safe spot and "land," just because our hands had been frozen into blocks of ice. To "land" among the mountains is something that has happened to me more than once.

Sometimes, though very rarely, the motors have begun to play tricks on account of the cold. Sometimes there have been repairs to make after a course of plunges and bumps in some treacherous "basin." So far, these landings have come off safely; probably because, when you are flying, you instinctively notice some level spot in case of need. You fly on ahead, you leave your landing place behind, but without fail you look out for another and take note of it. This is the way it always is in our work.

Once my machine wobbled badly and began to plunge downward. The elevation was very considerable, there were no sharp peaks, and it seemed that it would be easy to land. And we landed, but—on a billowy glacier which, from above, had seemed a smooth and level stretch. We descended, landed, and began to roll forward. The aeroplane glided with ever-increasing velocity. And we could not take to flight because, on descending, we noticed that one of the wire stays was broken.

Only with great difficulty, with the help of the observer, who slid down to the bottom of the frame and there operated the release handles of the motor, did we succeed in turning the aeroplane sideways and stopping it—not very far from a precipice, bottomless, as all the precipices are here. * * *

Only a Dog

The following sketch, giving a concrete example of the work done by thousands of hospital dogs in the Germany Army, was written for The New York Volkszeitung by a soldier recently returned from the front.

IT was growing dusk. The last ray of sunlight gilded the broad expanse of snow. The ice crystals sparkled like diamonds. The blue shadow of the mountains lay like a veil over the snow and the crevasses.

Franz Böhnke was unconscious of all this beauty. He lay wounded under a bush. The snowshoes that he still had on his feet made his position still more uncomfortable, but he was not able to take them off, because every movement hurt the wound in his right leg, from which the red blood was trickling over the white snow.

There he lay, quite alone. Not a man in sight. Not even an animal, or a bird. The shooting of men had naturally frightened them from their quarters.

Then the horrible thought came to him that it would soon be night and that, because of his wound, which was not dangerous in itself, he would be obliged to lie there and perish from cold or exhaustion.

Then he heard the distant barking of a dog. Were the hospital dogs looking for him? Then he would be saved. He listened breathlessly. The animal would surely bring him aid.

How strange it was, thought he, that man, blessed with reason, crippled and killed his fellow-man, while the dumb brute brought him aid and salvation! If I heard human beings approaching me now I should be filled with terror, for they might be Serbian volunteers who would wickedly attack me, a helpless man. The dog that is barking over there

will not hurt me. He will whine joyously and call loudly for help. Haven't we men something to learn from the animal?


He sank back exhausted. The barking had ceased. It was becoming quite dark. He had been separated from his comrades for three hours. The ski patrol had scattered at the edge of the forest in order to search the neighborhood for the enemy. The members were to reunite in an hour at the old post. They certainly must miss him by this time.

Again he heard the barking of a dog. Perhaps it was only a hallucination caused by the fever that was beginning to grip him.

He thought of the poor, hard-working dogs in the city that pantingly drag their wagons, rest their heated bodies on the cold stones, and welcome every little caress of their masters with such grateful looks. When he was in the city he had never thought much about that. Why, it was only a dog. But now in the solitude he could not understand how men could be so indifferent.

Now he plainly heard the panting of a dog. Something woolly and shaggy brushed against his face. It was the fur of a dog. The animal barked loud and long, so as to attract the men of the hospital corps to the spot.

Franz put both arms around the neck of the shepherd dog, half out of thankfulness. The dog, which up to then had been capering about him, now held still and barked lightly, as if not to shock the wounded man. And so the hospital men found him.



Magazinists of the World on the War

Condensed From Leading Reviews

In the excerpts printed in this department of CURRENT HISTORY will be found examples of current thought in all the warring countries, as represented by their leading writers and more influential periodicals.

Germany's Changed Attitude

By Arnold Bennett

In the course of a recent article in The London Daily News the famous English novelist says:

WE are not simply drifting, and we most certainly are making progress. To perceive that this is so, surely one has only to compare the attitude of Germany eighteen months ago, twelve months ago, even three months ago, with her attitude today. How long is it since Germany was determined to annex Belgium? How long is it since she was determined to stick to Northern France and to take and keep Calais for a menace to Britain? How long is it since she was counting on indemnities to recoup her for the damage of war? Not long ago. Less than two months ago she had arranged to be in Paris at Easter. The recent speech of Bethmann Hollweg, though a proud oratorical effort that had its reward in the cheers of the Reichstag, sang a very different tune from the tune of last year. And it may be prophesied that, if the majority of Britons show anything like the grit that Mr. Asquith consistently displays, the tune six months hence will be a very different tune still—a third tune!

Certain persons say to me in accents of pained and superior incredulity: "But do you really think that we shall defeat Germany in the field?" I'm quite sure we shall if we stick to it. Why not? To hear certain persons talk one would think that there was some magic protection over Germany, and that she had never been defeated before. To this day there are people in this island who believe in Germany as they believe in a first cause. It is strange in face of the facts. Some of their arguments, as that if Germany

could not push the French back from Verdun we cannot push Germany back, absolutely silence rejoinder. What, indeed, is one to say to a man who reasons that because A tries to defeat B and fails, therefore B cannot defeat A? Anyhow, the allied armies, and the mass of the allied nations, believe that we can defeat Germany. And that is what we are now fighting for.

We are fighting, not for terms, but to defeat Germany for the sake of defeating her. It is an instinct, and I think it is a good instinct. It may be an instinct of brute force, but the reign of force is not yet finished on this planet. The exercise of force, and nothing else, has saved Europe from German domination. Physical pluck, ruthless homicide—not arguments nor the enunciation of broad principles—have kept the Germans out of Paris and out of Calais, and the menace of force alone keeps them out of Britain.

It is, of course, not a certainty that we shall defeat Germany in the field. There are factors working against this consummation—irresponsible and venal mischief-makers in Britain, the limits of population in France, and the unshakable traditions which govern Russian administration. But these factors, in my opinion, are immensely outweighed by the obstinate, slow-learning, imperturbable perseverance and the proved financial power of Britain, the magnificent military genius and valor of France, and the vastness of the Russian machine, together with the individual qualities of the Russian soldier. And, be it remembered, that though ourselves and Russia have made disastrous mistakes in the field, and may make more, Joffre has not made

mistakes. Further, though I expect a German defeat in the field, I do not count on it as an essential for a win. The British Navy, the limits of the enemy population and the limits of the enemy wealth, could satisfactorily finish this war even if the armies never conquered a foot of ground. Nor at best do I anticipate a sensational German collapse, with the Kaiser handing over his sword in the manner of Napoleon the Little, and German statesmen on their knees to our envoys.

A writer in "War and Peace" says confidently: "Be the time long or short,

peace will be made in the end as they [the pacifists] say it will." Well, I am inclined to think that on the surface peace will be so made—that is, by argument, successive presentations of terms, and compromises. But only on the surface. At the bottom of the affair, controlling the affair, will be the profound, unspoken German conviction that Germany is beaten, and the compromises will be spectacular rather than real. We are all now satisfactorily engaged in knocking the said conviction into the German skull, and our method of penetrating the skull is the sole efficacious method.

Discontent in Germany and Austria

By M. Likiardopoulo

M. Likiardopoulo is a Russian journalist and connected with the management of the famous Moscow Art Theatre. Being a Greek by birth and an accomplished linguist, he was able to avoid suspicion when he made a trip through Germany and Austria a few months ago. The extracts given below are from an article in the *Mercure de France*.

THE first impression of a traveler who, like myself, has made several previous sojourns in Berlin, is thoroughly depressing. It is a different Berlin, a dirty Berlin, without movement and without life. * * * I have witnessed street scenes which showed an irritable temper ready to burst into clamor. At the approach of people of wealth or authority threats are often to be heard, while expression is loudly given to the discontent over the duration of the war. A crowd gathers on the sidewalk; some talk and others listen; a man exhorts a woman with a little girl to be calm. "It is necessary to suffer," he says, "since Germany is on the way to conquering her enemies, whom she has already beaten." "Yes," replies the woman, "that is what is said, but we do not see this victory. What is the good of victory to me if I have nothing to eat, and even with money and food cards nothing is to be had? And if it is victory, why don't our men return?"

Neither in Berlin nor in Dresden have I been able to find the "Hymn of Hate." I learned that the authorities had confiscated all the placards and post cards and

that police circulars had stopped the rising flood of hate. Another proof that German jingoism has subsided is that in the cafés and public places patriotic songs become rarer. Even at the movies when the portrait of the Kaiser appears on the screen there are no longer cries of "Hoch!" and "Hurrah!" The people remain perfectly calm and quiet. The famous "Eiserne Hindenburg" (the Hindenburg in iron) has remained "in wood." In spite of all efforts to stimulate the public to drive in iron nails at a mark apiece, silver nails at ten marks, and golden nails at a hundred marks, the Field Marshal is still in wood with the exception of his boots and a small part of the tail of his tunic.

Germany is now only thinking peace, talking peace, and working for peace. The dominating word is "Friede," (peace.) In the populous districts there are to be met with from time to time long processions of women with a flag on which is inscribed "Brot und Frieden," (bread and peace.) So as not to rouse the crowd too much the authorities deal indulgently with these demonstrations and disperse the paraders without hav-

ing recourse to arms. Nevertheless, great care is taken not to let them reach the centre of the city where they would be seen by the foreigners. The reports of shooting and slaughter to put down these demonstrations, which appear in allied and neutral newspapers, are therefore exaggerated; but, on the other hand, one cannot believe the German press when it pretends that there have never been any demonstrations against the war and the famine.

"We know," I was told, "that all the newspapers are lying, the foreign ones like our own. At the Café Victoria I have often heard the Daily Liar asked for, and without hesitation the waiter brought The Daily Mail of London. Germany has generally entered on a period of doubt. Even the most reliable official news is received with mistrust."

No one thinks of the territorial gains except perhaps a few junkers. Every German knows the Latin phrase, "*Status quo ante bellum*," and quotes it when peace is spoken of. An influential majority is ready even to give up Alsace-Lorraine. In Dresden I went to see an old friend. "Even if we conquer," he said, "how many decades must it be before we cease to be pariahs and outlaws in the eyes of the whole world? After this war I shall never leave Germany. I would be ashamed to admit that I am a German."

In Vienna the cost of living has gone up by 200 to 250 per cent. Although externally relations are excellent, the traveler who stays some time in Germany and in Austria soon notices that

the Germans despise the Austrians, while the Austrians hate the Germans. The further one gets from the German frontier, especially toward Hungary, the more noticeable is the hatred of the German. The cost of living in Berlin and Vienna appears excessively cheap in comparison with what it is in Budapest, but in spite of all that, there, as in Vienna, there is no thought of economy. All classes of society have been seized by a kind of frenzy. In the restaurants, from the humblest to the most elegant, wine flows in streams to the music of Hungarian bands from 6 in the evening till 2 in the morning. A swarm of disreputable girls has thrown itself on the city, and it is they with the military of all arms and ranks who are in evidence everywhere. Sympathy with the French is openly professed, but on the other hand there is no love for the Slavs, whether Russians, Poles, Serbs, or Rumanians.

After leaving Budapest and crossing the Rumanian border, I had as companion a customs officer. When he learned of the trip I had just made, he brought in four of his colleagues. I had to tell them my story; and then from the mouths of these men I heard such an explosion of hatred against Germany and Austria and such strong assurances that all Rumania is thinking as they that to my mind there is no doubt that Rumania will join the side of the Entente. They told me of the German spies who swarm in Bucharest, of the stream of German gold to buy up public opinion, and of the plots against Take Jonsescu, Filipesco, and other representatives of the Entente Party.

The German Chancellor's Speech

By Gilbert K. Chesterton

Noted English Essayist

Analyzing the German Chancellor's Reichstag address of April 5, Mr. Chesterton says, in the course of an article in Land and Water, London:

ALL that the Chancellor has here really succeeded in doing is making by implication three rather important admissions, which he would probably rather

not make. First, he admits that, in spite of all the talk about the earth-devouring British ogre, Britain really desired all powers to remain powerful and on a sort of equality. Second, he admits that, in spite of the talk about the decadence and disappearance of France, that country has still a considerable chance of playing

the first part in Europe. And third, in the case of Russia and Poland, he admits that the one consistent and conspicuous piece of advice that Prussia ever gave to Russia was uncommonly bad advice, which was indeed the case. Prussia first proposed and pressed the partition of Poland. She afterward prevented the emancipation of Poland. She has since incessantly bragged of the natural inferiority of Poland and the complete subjugation of Poland. She now says, with an unsmiling visage, that she will not give poor Poland to shocking, improper Russia; though it was only by her own wish that Poland was ever given to anybody. Much might be said in a gay and "pleasurable spirit about this attitude, or antic, but for practical purposes a simple and sober fact will suffice; and that is the fact that nobody ever heard, or dreamed of hearing, a Prussian talk in such a tone until after the battle of the Marne.

Here I merely remark on the advantage of hearing the Imperial Chancellor publicly repudiate the chief work of Frederick the Great. It is not the only confession of somewhat the same kind. It is worth while to note one other implied admission, which may have been more intentional, the contrast made between Germany's present aims and her aims in 1870, "when Germany was dreaming of Alsace and empire." No German would deliberately dissociate himself from any imitation of Moltke and the example of Alsace, if he were not bidding cautiously for peace. Truly, Germany is not now thinking of Alsace—in that sense. She has become magnanimous. She is not troubled about getting her neighbor's goods, but only about keeping them.

The first stamp of this sort of stuff is an illogical vanity. The second is an utterly dead and disembodied pedantry. The best summary of it is Rousseau's "*nier ce qui est, et expliquer ce qui n'est pas*." The Prussian is an outlaw and the enemy of everything in existence; but he is very careful in preserving the things which do not exist. Thus, there was and is a compact, unmistakable, independent kingdom called Belgium, which he and every one else not only recognized but

guaranteed. He has suddenly and savagely overpowered it, and now says there must be a new Belgium, by which he means, of course, a German Belgium. That is, we are to declare to all future ages that any Prince who chooses to invade a weaker country shall be rewarded with that country even if he is conquered.

So far the thing, though a joke, might be held to be an old joke. This is not the first, though it might well be the worst, case of a kind of impudence which, being also impenitence, may quite properly be called damned impudence. But what is unique and German, what would only be conceivable in a German, is the fact that the Chancellor covers up this moral tragedy with a sort of scientific fairy tale. He suddenly becomes very much excited on behalf of something which he calls "the long suppressed Flemish race," which must have something which he calls "a sound evolution" based on its national character. The Flemish race would seem to have been so long and so successfully suppressed that the Flemings have forgotten all about it, and are all fighting tooth and nail for a country which they call Belgium. No doubt if the Germans were still in a position to do so, they would invade England to provide a sound evolution for the Jutish race; but I will not speculate, for even in answering such words one wanders out of the land of the living. It is as if a man who had just cut my mother into small pieces told me he had been very careful of her astral body.

The Chancellor remarks that Germany is the only State threatened with destruction. If we may take this as meaning that Prussia is the only country that the Allies, or any other people in the civilized world, have any reason for putting under lock and key, it may be true. If it means that the Allies and the civilized world will probably be in a position at the end of the war to put Prussia under lock and key, this also we may concede to the eager intelligence of the Imperial Chancellor. But it might be noted, as a preliminary point of fact, that whatever nation may be threatened with destruction at the end of the war, at least

two nations were threatened with destruction at the beginning of the war, and were actually visited with practical destruction in the course of the war. The independence of these two nations was threatened by Germans alone, and was destroyed by Germans alone. The sovereignty of Serbia and the neutrality of Belgium were abolished at a blow by the Teutonic Powers, not as part of a difficult settlement of Europe, but as part of a perfectly wanton unsettlement of it. Whether or no any sort of annexation would be Europe's last word to Germany, it was certainly Germany's first act against Europe.

The Chancellor seems to suppose that because he has behaved like an anarchist, he has turned the world into an anarchy. He thinks that the mere fact, which we are ready to concede to him, that Germany has broken the civilization of the

world into pieces, means that we have entirely forgotten how it was put together, and shall be content with any patchwork he may pick and choose for us. In short, he thinks that his bravoës have not only knocked us on the head, but knocked us silly; so that we have forgotten our father's name and our baptism and even the wrong that he has done us. He is mistaken. The story of the German adventure has been dreadful; but we do not find it in the least dubious. It is the character of a crime to shock, but it need not of necessity bewilder; and in this we do not see any particular mystery except the mystery of iniquity. At the end of it the Prussian will not find himself picking up whatever he can get in a scramble; he will find himself more and more separated from his dupes and tools, and punished impartially, and punished alone.

America's Opportunity

By H. G. Wells

In the course of a long article in The London Chronicle entitled "Looking Ahead," Mr. Wells says:

SO far as I can judge, the American mind is eminently free from any sentimental leaning toward the British. Americans have a traditional hatred of the Hanoverian monarchy and a democratic disbelief in autocracy. They are far more acutely aware of differences than resemblances. They suspect every Englishman of being a bit of a gentleman and a bit of a flunky. There is nothing to reciprocate the sympathy and pride that English and Irish republicans and radicals feel for the State. Few Americans realize that there are such beings as English republicans. What has linked them with the British hitherto has been very largely the common language and literature; it is only since the war began that there seems to have been any appreciable development of fraternal feeling. And that has been not so much discovery of a mutual affection as the realization of a far closer community of essential

thought and purpose than has hitherto been suspected.

The Americans, after thinking the matter out with great frankness and vigor, do believe that Britain is, on the whole, fighting against aggression and not for profit; that she is honestly backing France and Belgium against an intolerable attack, and that the Hohenzollern empire is a thing that needs discrediting and, if possible, destroying, in the interests of all humanity, Germany included. And they find that, allowing for their greater nearness, the British are thinking about these things almost exactly as they think about them. * * *

The war and the great occasions that must follow the war will tax the mind and the intellectual and moral forces of the pledged Allies enormously. How far is this new but very great and growing system of thought and learning in the United States capable of that propaganda of ideas and language, that progressive expression of a developing ideal of community * * * which must neces-

sarily take the place of the organized authoritative Kultur of the Teutonic type of State? As an undisguisedly patriotic Englishman I would like to see the lead in this intellectual synthesis of the nations, that must be achieved if wars are to cease, undertaken by Great Britain. But I am bound to confess that in Great Britain I see neither the imaginative courage of France nor the brisk enterprise of the Americans. I see this matter as a question of peace and civilization; but there are other baser, but quite as effective, reasons why America, France, and Great Britain should exert themselves to create confidence and un-

derstandings between their populations and the Russian population. There is the immediate business opportunity in Russia.

There is the secondary business opportunity in China that can best be developed as the partners rather than as the rivals of the Russians. Since the Americans are nearest, by way of the Pacific, since they are likely to have more capital and more free energy to play with than the pledged Allies, I do, on the whole, incline to the belief that it is they who will yet do the pioneer work and the leading work that this opportunity demands.

Origin and Meaning of the War

By Professor N. Kareyev

Leading Russian Scholar, Member of Academy of Sciences

[Written in Russian and translated for CURRENT HISTORY]

THERE exists already a whole literature on the origin and meaning of the present great struggle. Properly speaking, it is yet too early to write about the meaning of the war to humanity, as this meaning will be made clear only at the end, which still lies in the future, and the subject can therefore be only a matter of guessing, based on one's hopes and wishes, as well as one's doubts and fears. The war has put forward a series of questions, which can receive different answers, depending upon the course which the history of tomorrow may take; and not only different answers, but also unexpected ones, for, after all, the war itself was a great surprise. Even though we take into consideration the fact that the war was predicted by many, there was no knowing when and on what occasion it would commence.

The Governments of the warring countries have all issued collections of diplomatic documents in book form, under colored covers, and they contain enough material for rendering the decision as to who was responsible for the war and in what quarters the guilt is to be locat-

ed. Many details of the historic week which preceded the declaration of war may remain unknown to us; but whatever revelations may be made in the future, whatever historians may dig out of the archives, there will hardly be any essential change in the present indictment of the originators of the war.

Guilty are they who placed a burning match to the tinder that had accumulated in a long period of time. It is true that history, not the originators of the explosion, had created and accumulated that mass of inflammable material. But it was possible to handle it in various ways, not to throw into it burning matches, or to permit similar acts by others. Of itself automatically nothing happens in history. A historical process is a personal process, and not an impersonal evolution. And whatever appears to be impersonal in history is really the result of individual efforts. Each generation of humanity has to deal with a certain aggregation of conditions created by its predecessor, but how the inheritance of the past will be regarded by its heir, and what will become of it, that, in the last analysis, will be found

to depend upon the work of separate individuals or social groups. History ties some very hard knots, which people either entangle still more or try to untie, or simply sever by sword without attempting another solution.

The twentieth century inherited from the past three difficult knots, which could have been let alone, could have been made the object of a concerted effort at disentanglement, could have been more entangled, or could have been severed by sword. Whoever refused to preserve the status quo, or to attempt a peaceful solution, is responsible for the war. The matter certainly was in the hands of one or more individuals for decision. There is little support for those publicists who make general causes responsible for the war, as if "general causes," without individual volition, could accomplish anything in history. Of course, I am infinitely distant from the Carlylean thesis that all history is the product of one will, of the so-called hero or great man. But I am just as distant from the Tolstoyan doctrine, claiming that history is the result of all, minus those persons generally called great.

Much as we may seek the cause for current events in the collective psychology of the German Nation, we shall find that the frame of mind of that nation cannot be held responsible directly for the conflagration. Figuratively, one may speak of guns discharging themselves. In life it never happens. That the mental attitude of the German public was different from the Russian, French, or English, that it was more militant and aggressive, cannot be doubted. But though it constituted a menacing atmosphere, it cannot be held directly responsible for the war, as it in itself was the creation of the real originators of the war.

If, from the question of responsibility, which could be answered in a judicial manner as it has already been done by the American jurist Beck, we pass to the more historical question of the genesis of the war, the collective frame of mind of the German public cannot be left out of consideration. Their military, economic, political, and cultural successes turned

the heads of the Germans, and it is impossible not to bear this in mind while considering the origin of the war. But also some purely materialistic, economic conditions were responsible, though the problems born of these conditions could have been solved peacefully as well. Another cause of the war was the conviction among the German people that earlier or later it would have to take place. Other peoples shared this conviction to some degree.

The great war, if we regard it from all concrete sides, was a surprise. But war, nevertheless, was expected. For a long time its possibility, and even inevitability, was discussed. And to a higher or lesser degree all nations were preparing for war. These very preparations have to a considerable measure prepared the war itself. Growing militarism was justified on the plea of insuring peace, but it contained itself the danger of war.

If it is comparatively easy to locate the causes of the war, it is because long before it broke out the antagonisms on whose foundations the possibility of war rested became clear to all. Past history has formed three complicated major knots in international relations, which, combined with some others of minor importance, constitute the great political tangle of the world war.

The first knot came into existence in 1871, when Germany appropriated Alsace-Lorraine. This was the Franco-German knot, which has been a menace to the peace of the world ever since.

The second may be called the Austro-Russian or Balkan knot. Its beginning in modern history goes back to 1875, when the Herzegovina uprising occurred. Squeezed out from Italy and Germany, Austria turned to the Balkans, where her policies came into conflict with those of Russia. The Hapsburg monarchy found support for its Balkan policies in Germany, which soon began to seek expansion in the same direction, having for its ultimate objective Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia's opponent in the Balkans was not only Austria-Hungary, but also Germany.

The last circumstance served as a tie between the two knots, Franco-German and Austro-Russian; but a third soon joined them, more recent in origin, but very important at that.

At the opening of the present century the Anglo-German knot entered history, forcing England to make friends of her antagonists, Russia and France. So long as Germany remained an agricultural, Continental State, and purely European, England had little to do with her. But the development of German industry and commerce, the creation of Germany's mercantile and naval fleets, the acquisition of colonies, and her movements in Asia to the Persian Gulf, compelled England to modify her attitude toward Germany. The Anglo-German knot became interlocked with the first two, forming a Gordian knot in international politics, which had grown still more complicated, owing to a series of secondary knots connected with each major one. But, grave as the situation was, it was still capable of a peaceful disentanglement. There was no lack of plans for such a happy

solution. It was left for the powers to choose between war and peace. And we know now which side was desirous of avoiding war and which was resolved to draw the sword.

As soon as the great war was declared a flood of new problems rushed before the public eye, demanding solutions. This in itself proves the import of the struggle and the meaning attached to it. In each of the two camps these problems are being offered for solution in different ways, and each of the warring countries wishes to solve them in its own way. Each puts its own meaning into the struggle, according to the efforts exerted by each. Quite frequently the wildest chimeras are suggested, but not infrequently practical problems are advanced which cannot remain unanswered, the Polish question, for example.

The true meaning of the war will appear only when these problems that are clamoring for solution shall have been solved, once for all, definitely and sanely. That can come only after the close of hostilities.

The Pope and the Peace Conference

An interesting glimpse of the Italian attitude regarding the status of the Pope is given in these excerpts from the *Nuova Antologia*.

I.

ANSWER TO ERNESTO NATHAN

BY FILIPPO CRISPOTTI

SIR: You write that "the spectacle presented by Italy today is wonderful; we are all united, parties have virtually disappeared." And, so far as concerns the military and civil contribution to the war, you are right. Then you add: "It is not advisable to raise questions apt to disturb this 'Truce of God,' to sow discord in anticipation." And to a great degree you are right once more. But he who, like the Hon. Soderini and myself, and many others, opposes the a priori exclusion of the Pope from an eventual Peace Conference, is not sowing discord.

We have not proposed to the powers,

much less to Italy, to invite the Pope. The possibility of this invitation was suggested by many voices, on all hands. We have opposed ourselves to those who, having heard these voices, proposed to Italy that she should place herself antecedently and absolutely "in the negative," the first in authority among these being Senator Rolandi Ricci and Deputy Tommaso Mosca. To them we said, very temperately, that it was not right in this way to cause a disturbance of the Truce of God. At the same time I permit myself to say to you, now that you, not from a fear of injuring the Guarantees, like Deputy Mosca, but because of a supposed lack of title in the Pope—a thesis sufficiently general, and one touching the character of the Congress itself, and not only Italy's interest—in part follow Ro-

landi Ricci, as he in his turn follows the thought of Zanichelli on The Hague Congress, and affirm that the Pope would have no title to be admitted to the Peace Conference, and would find nothing to do there.

To controvert these arguments of yours is not to raise unsuitable or untimely questions, or to sow discord. It is to restore the question, which has already been brought before the world, to its natural development, to disencumber it from obstacles which seem to me to be out of place, and to make room for certain truths which, like every truth, are not tares of discord, but elements of concord. You ask: "Is it possible to know on what grounds the Pontiff should take his place in the contemplated Synedion, and not delegates of the Anglican or Lutheran Church, or of the Mohammedan or Buddhist religions, the latter dear to the Japanese?" And the interrogation is stated thus, in order to remain within the limits of State religions, without taking into account the representatives of the Israelites, the Baptists, and those who embrace different forms of philosophic thought, and, fighting in the armies, freely give their lives in battle, even though not enrolled under a State religion.

The reply is simple. If the Pope were invited because of his spiritual title, or because of his just title, no obligation of consistency would constrain the State to issue similar invitations to others, nor to change the Peace Conference into a Conference of Religions, for the reason that it is inaccurate to say that there are other personages having titles equal to those of the Pope. And I affirm this, quite apart from the divine origin of the Pope's mission, which is incommunicable to the ministers of other confessions. Since I have to discuss the question with you, I must remain on ground that is common to us both, and I know that you would not follow me on theological ground. I confine myself to purely palpable facts.

To begin with, what religion has, like the Catholic, a life and organization so distinct from the life and organization of

States, nations, races, upheld by its moral force alone? Where are the heads of religions who, like the Pope, have throughout the world so great importance due solely to a religious title? In the second place, in what religion has the office of head the significance, the scope, which it has in the Catholic religion? In the confessions which you have enumerated the place left for liberty of individual conscience is so great, and the variety of local customs is so large, as to render impossible either a genuine body of doctrine, with a single authority, or a true organism, apt for discipline, worship, hierarchy. The head, when there is one, far from being the master, the legislator, the governor, as the Pope is, in our religion, has a much more restricted authority, sometimes merely an honorary primacy. And I say, "when there is one," because, especially in the aberrant Christian sects, the supremacy is exercised in part, as it is in theory, by the temporal sovereign, in the other part, and in practical details, by a sacerdotal body or person.

Finally, to all these reasons why the spiritual figure of the Pope is unique, even in an earthly sense, it is to be added that infidels and heretics themselves recognize this unique position. Have Governors and Kings, of whatever belief, ever been seen to send Ambassadors to the Chief Rabbis, or to the Chief Priests of Brahma and Buddha, respectfully visiting them in their sees, and considering them, at least in the formality of precedence, as superior to themselves; treating them, that is, as they treat the Pope?

II.

HEADS OF MANY CHURCHES

BY MONSIGNOR UMBERTO BENIGNI

* * * Another capital proof is this: that, at the future Peace Conference, at which the presence of the Roman Catholic Pope is not desired, other Popes will be present. * * * And this undeniable fact will suffice to prove the reality of certain objections—namely: In the coming Peace Conference, an active and decisive part will be taken by the official heads of different Churches: the King of England, head of the Anglican Es-

tablished Church; the King of Prussia, summus episcopus of the Evangelical Church of his kingdom; the Czar of Russia, head of the Orthodox Church of his empire and religious protector of the other Orthodox Christians; the Sultan of Turkey, Padishah, Vicar of Allah for Islam; the Mikado of Japan, son of the gods and head of the religion of his nation.

Italians are so little familiar with such facts that their minds refuse to see in these sovereigns real heads of Churches. Confusing ecclesiastic supremacy with the ecclesiastical function, Italians are led to consider these sovereigns not as the heads of the respective confessions or religions, but, at the most, as exercising civil control over religious life, in the same manner as the Italian Government gives or refuses the exequatur or the placet to the Bishops and parishes of the Kingdom of

Italy. Yet the former view is true, not the latter. The fact that the King of England does not distribute the sacrament to his faithful, and that the Czar does not officiate in the Orthodox Cathedral at Petrograd, does not contravene the fact that the one and the other are the heads, the true heads, of their Churches, since, to be the head of a Church, it is enough to be the direct superior of its hierarchy and its functioning. * * *

How then? It was proclaimed by well known thinkers and politicians, before 1870, that it was necessary to liberate the Pope from the bonds of temporal power in order that he might be able better to occupy himself with the spiritual interests of the Catholic world; now it is proclaimed that, to occupy himself with them, like the other "Popes" in Congress, he should be a temporal sovereign!

Cadorna: Italy's Idol

By Luigi Barzini

In a long and enthusiastic article in the Corriere della Sera of Milan the author thus sketches the chief commander of the Italian Army:

THE great spirit of General Luigi Cadorna is really the moral fulcrum of our army. His person, bony but square of build, solid, full of a vigor that seems to belie his age, quickly reveals his energy and simplicity. None of the trappings of pomp supports his prestige. One who has never seen Cadorna and who enters his office for the first time has no conception of the modest appearance of the old gentleman soldier who awaits him, erect, dressed in the rough uniform of the field, on which glistens the insignia of his rank. The frank cordiality of his salutation, his courteous gesture of invitation, his open smile, the bright expression of his proud, thin, tormented, genial face immediately dispel the slight disquietude of one who approaches a personage in power, which is perhaps merely a putting one's self on guard. And before speaking you have

a certain ineffable sense of confidence that opens the way to your fullest sincerity.

His thick mustache is white, his sparse, straight hair rises from a forehead lined by thought, his whole face has the wrinkles that the cares of life print, but a verdant youth looks out of his clear eyes. They flash, they laugh, those eyes of his, and from them shines the freshness of a spirit that is unalterable because it is perhaps the freshness of a whole soldierly race descended to him with an atavistic confidence in war.

He is not, like Joffre, a silent man, but he is not one who wastes words. He economizes them like ammunition; he saves them up to attain an object, to which they go straight as a cannon shot. Often he is silent for a long time, and seems distraught, but he is listening; and if, in the conversation there comes up an error to be destroyed or a truth to be demonstrated, then he will let go a sentence. It is a blaze of ideas, a brief gust, but the whole web of conjectures, of ra-


tiocinations and of hypotheses that had been spun about him is broken and thrown into disorder, the truth appears. For Cadorna has made of common sense the fundamental law of his thought. "The art of warfare," he has written, "should inspire itself from pure and simple common sense." In this maxim is the whole science of life.

Cadorna understood that to wait meant getting a trench war in our own country; he felt the absolute necessity of using every disposable means at once for a bold attack, even if a dangerous one—both to carry the struggle out of Italy at one blow and to push the front out and have its roots enter as deeply as possible, correcting the most dangerous weaknesses of the frontiers, taking away from the enemy the passes that threatened us the most. He made his demands, and when Cadorna demands he is inflexible, because he does not get the strength of his reasoning from the consensus of other men's opinion. He is sure. He has in himself all the elements of certainty. No objection can move him, for he has made them all to himself already. His will draws things along just through the intuition that every one has of his logic. When he does not draw, he overturns.

Thus the sparse covering troops went outside their limits and little by little became an army, they knit together during the offensive action, broadening out gradually through the arrival of the mobilized forces that were coming from the arteries

of the country. It was a technical prodigy.

Behind the field of military operations which are burning, tangible, there went on for a long time an intense work of creation, of formation, of strengthening—obscure, vast, marvelous. Let us not forget that when Italy felt the need of its army there was no army. Political evils had reduced it to an appearance. In nine months it was called up out of nothing. During that long vigil of waiting, while Europe was on fire, Cadorna improvised the work of decades with an activity that would seem superhuman if one were not acquainted with the iron calm of this man, who knows with preciseness and order what is to be done, and who knows it without knowing fatigue. He deserves the name of the Father of the Army. But even performing miracles, the preparation could only be maintained by a constant effort equal to that demanded by events. And necessity made ever greater demands. The instrument of the struggle had to continue renewing itself right through the struggle. This work of Cadorna's, necessarily the least known, is not the least splendid. It was constantly and urgently his task to face the peril of disproportion between his needs and his means. All the organisms were brought to the extreme of efficiency, were raised to the maximum of their yield, by a veritable wave of energy and will, of enthusiasm and faith that came down from the General in Chief.



Defense of the British Blockade

Great Britain's Reply to Protests of the United States on Interference with Neutral Trade

The State Department at Washington made public on April 24 Sir Edward Grey's official answer to the protest of the United States Government—a protest sent last November—in regard to allied interference with neutral trade. The note contains 13,000 words and has several appendices. All its essential portions are reproduced in full in the following pages of CURRENT HISTORY, with the section numbers of the original. The document is of lasting historical importance. It has not been published in so complete a form elsewhere in the United States.

THE communication addressed by the United States Ambassador in London to Sir E. Grey on Nov. 5, 1915, has received the careful attention of his Majesty's Government in consultation with their allies, the French Government, and his Majesty's Government have now the honor to make the following reply:

2. The first section (Paragraphs 3-15) of the United States note relates to cargoes detained by the British authorities in order to prevent them from reaching an enemy destination, and the complaint of the United States Government is summarized in Paragraph 33, to the effect that the methods sought to be employed by Great Britain to obtain and use evidence of enemy destination of cargoes bound for neutral ports and to impose a contraband character upon such cargoes are without justification.

3. The wording of this summary suggests that the basis of the complaint of the United States Government is not so much that the shipments intercepted by the naval forces were really intended for use in the neutral countries to which they were dispatched, as that the dispatch of goods to the enemy countries has been frustrated by methods which have not been employed by belligerent nations in the past. It would seem to be a fair reply to such a contention that new devices for dispatching goods to the enemy must be met by new methods of applying the fundamental and acknowledged principle of the right to intercept such trade.

4. The question whether the exercise of the right to search can be restricted to search at sea was dealt with in Sir E. Grey's note of Jan. 7, 1915, and his Majesty's Government would again draw attention to the facts that information has constantly reached them of attempts to conceal contraband intended for the enemy in innocent packages, and that these attempts can only be frustrated by examination of the ship and cargo in port. Similarly, in Sir E. Grey's note of Feb. 10,

1915, it was pointed out that the size of modern steamships and their capacity to navigate the waters where the allied patrols have to operate whatever the conditions of the weather, frequently render it a matter of extreme danger, if not of impossibility, even to board the vessels unless they are taken into calm water for the purpose. It is unnecessary to repeat what was said in that note. There is nothing that his Majesty's Government could withdraw, or that the experience of the officers of the allied fleets has tended to show was inaccurate.

5. When visit and search at sea are possible, and when a search can be made there which is sufficient to secure belligerent rights, it may be admitted that it would be an unreasonable hardship on merchant vessels to compel them to come into port, and it may well be believed that maritime nations have hesitated to modify the instructions to their naval officers that it is at sea that these operations should be carried out, and that undue deviation of the vessel from her course must be avoided. That, however, does not affect the fact that it would be impossible under the conditions of modern warfare to confine the rights of visit and search to an examination of the ship at the place where she is encountered without surrendering a fundamental belligerent right.

ADMIRAL JELLCOE'S VIEWS

6. The effect of the size and seaworthiness of merchant vessels upon their search at sea is essentially a technical question, and accordingly his Majesty's Government have thought it well to submit the report of the board of naval experts, quoted by the United States Ambassador in Paragraph 7 of this note, to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe for his observations. The unique experience which this officer has gained as the result of more than eighteen months in command of the Grand Fleet renders his opinion of peculiar value. His report is as follows:

"It is undoubtedly the case that the size of modern vessels is one of the factors which renders search at sea far more difficult than

in the days of smaller vessels. So far as I know it has never been contended that it is necessary to remove every package of a ship's cargo to establish the character and nature of her trace, &c.; but it must be obvious that the larger the vessel and the greater the amount of cargo, the more difficult does examination at sea become, because more packages must be removed.

"This difficulty is much enhanced by the practice of concealing contraband in bales of hay and passengers' luggage, casks, &c.; and this procedure, which has undoubtedly been carried out, necessitates the actual removal of a good deal of cargo for examination in suspected cases. This removal cannot be carried out at sea except in the very finest weather.

"Further, in a large ship the greater bulk of the cargo renders it easier to conceal contraband, especially such valuable metals as nickel, quantities of which can easily be stowed in places other than the holds of a large ship.

"I entirely dispute the contention, therefore, advanced in the American note that there is no difference between the search of a ship of 1,000 tons and one of 20,000 tons. I am sure that the fallacy of the statement must be apparent to any one who has ever carried out such a search at sea.

"There are other facts, however, which render it necessary to bring vessels into port for search. The most important is the manner in which those in command of German submarines, in entire disregard of international law and of their own prize regulations, attack and sink merchant vessels on the high seas, neutral as well as British, without visiting the ship, and therefore without any examination of the cargo. This procedure renders it unsafe for a neutral vessel which is being examined by officers from a British ship to remain stopped on the high seas, and it is therefore in the interests of the neutrals themselves that the examination should be conducted in port.

"The German practice of misusing United States passports in order to procure a safe conduct for military persons and agents of enemy nationality makes it necessary to examine closely all suspect persons, and to do this effectively necessitates bringing the ship into harbor."

7. Sir John Jellicoe goes on to say:

"The difference between the British and the German procedure is that we have acted in the way which causes the least discomfort to neutrals. Instead of sinking neutral ships engaged in trade with the enemy, as the Germans have done in so many cases in direct contravention of Article 113 of their own Naval Prize Regulations, 1909, in which it is laid down that the commander is only justified in destroying a neutral ship which has been captured if

(a) She is liable to condemnation, and

(b) The bringing in might expose the warship to danger or imperil the success of the

operations in which she is engaged at the time

we examine them, giving as little inconvenience as modern naval conditions will allow, sending them into port only where this becomes necessary.

"It must be remembered, however, that it is not the Allies alone who send a percentage of neutral vessels into port for examination, for it is common knowledge that German naval vessels, as stated in Paragraph 19 of the American note, 'seize and bring into German ports neutral vessels bound for Scandinavian and Danish ports.'

"As cases in point, the interception by the Germans of the American oil-tankers *Llama* and *Platuria* in August last may be mentioned. Both were bound to America from Sweden, and were taken into Swinemünde for examination."

FRENCH MINISTRY OF MARINE

8. The French Ministry of Marine shares the views expressed by Sir J. Jellicoe on the question of search at sea, and has added the following statement:

"La pratique navale, telle qu'elle existait autrefois et consistant à visiter les navires en mer, méthode que nous a léguée l'ancienne marine, ne s'adapte plus aux conditions de la navigation actuelle. Les Américains ont pressenti son insuffisance et ont prévu la nécessité de lui en substituer une plus efficace. Dans les Instructions données par le Département de la Marine américaine, du 20 juin, 1898, aux croiseurs des Etats-Unis, on trouve déjà la prescription suivante:

"Si ces derniers (les papiers de bord) indiquent de la contrebande de guerre, le navire devra être saisi; sinon, il sera laissé libre, à moins qu'en raison de puissants motifs de suspicion, une visite plus minutieuse paraisse devoir être exigée."

"Toute méthode doit se modifier en tenant compte des transformations subies par le matériel que les hommes ont à leur disposition à la condition de rester une méthode humaine et civilisée. (Navy Department, General, No. 492, 'Instruction to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers.' Paragraph 13.)

"L'Amirauté française estime qu'aujourd'hui un navire, pour être visité, doit être dérouté sur un port toutes les fois que l'état de la mer, la nature, le poids, le volume, l'armement de la cargaison suspecte, en même temps que l'obscurité et l'absence de précision des papiers de bord, rendent la visite en mer pratiquement impossible ou dangereuse pour le navire visité.

"Au contraire, lorsque les circonstances inverses existent, la visite doit être faite en mer.

"Le déroutement est également nécessaire et justifié, lorsque, le navire neutre entrant dans la zone ou le voisinage des hostilités, (1) il importe, dans l'intérêt même du navire neutre, d'éviter à ce dernier une série d'arrêts et de visites successives et de faire

établir, une fois pour toutes, son caractère inoffensif et de lui permettre ainsi de continuer librement sa route sans être molesté; et (2) le belligérant, dans son droit de légitime défense, est fondé à exercer une surveillance particulière sur les navires inconnus qui circulent dans ces parages."

9. The question of the locality of the search is, however, one of secondary importance. In the view of his Majesty's Government the right of a belligerent to intercept contraband on its way to his enemy is fundamental and incontestable, and ought not to be restricted to intercepting contraband which happens to be accompanied on board the ship by proof sufficient to condemn it. What is essential is to determine whether or not the goods were on their way to the enemy. If they were a belligerent is entitled to detain them, and having regard to the nature of the struggle in which the Allies are engaged they are compelled to take the most effectual steps to exercise that right.

In Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 Sir Edward Grey's reply deals with various objections raised to British prize court procedure, and points out that rules formerly governing such procedure are no longer applicable. The note goes on:

14. It may be doubted whether any belligerent Government would be ready to forego the right of capture of goods on their way to an enemy in every case where such destination was not disclosed by the ship's papers or the evidence of those on board the ship. The difficulty which the United States naval officers found even as early as 1862 in complying with the old rule is illustrated by the quotation from Lord Lyons's note of April 22, 1863, in connection with the case of the *Magicienne*, one of the cases which is dealt with in the appendix to this note, in which he drew attention to the habit of the United States cruisers of seizing vessels on the chance that something might possibly be discovered *ex post facto* which would prevent the captors from being condemned to pay damages.

TRADERS' RISKS

15. The contention advanced by the United States Government in Paragraph 9 of their note, that the effect of this new procedure is to subject traders to risk of loss, delay, and expense so great and so burdensome as practically to destroy much of the export trade of the United States, to neutral countries in Europe is not borne out by the official statistics published in the United States, nor by the reports of the Department of Commerce. The first nine months of 1915 may be taken as a period when the war conditions must have been known to all those engaged in commerce in the United States of America, and when any injurious effects of the prize court procedure would have been recognized. During that period the exports

from the United States of America to the three Scandinavian countries and Holland, the group of neutral countries whose imports have been most affected by the naval operations of the Allies and by the procedure adopted in their prize courts, amounted to \$274,037,000, as compared with \$126,763,000 in the corresponding period of 1913. It is useless to take into account the corresponding figures of 1914 because of the dislocation of trade caused by the outbreak of war, but taking the pre-war months of 1914, the figures for 1913, 1914, and 1915 were as follows:

1913	\$97,480,000
1914	88,132,000
1915	234,960

16. In the face of such figures it seems impossible to accept the contention that the new prize court procedure in Great Britain has practically destroyed much of the export trade of the United States to neutral countries in Europe, and the inference is suggested that if complaints have been made to the Administration at Washington by would-be exporters, they emanated not from persons who desired to engage in genuine commerce with the neutral countries, but from those who desired to dispatch goods to the enemy under cover of a neutral destination, and who found it more difficult to conceal the real facts from the Prize Courts under the new procedure.

17. At this point it would have been opportune to introduce a reply to the contention that appears at first sight to be advanced in Paragraph 13 of the United States note that Great Britain, while interfering with foreign trade, has increased her own with neutral countries adjacent to Germany, but this is rendered unnecessary by the explanation given by Mr. Page at the time that he presented the note, and since confirmed by a statement given out to the press at Washington, that no such meaning is to be attributed to the paragraph. Moreover, the subject has been dealt with in the note which Sir E. Grey sent to Mr. Page on the 13th August last, and again in the note given to the State Department by the British Ambassador at Washington on the 27th December.

The questions of non-interference with goods intended for the "common stock" of a neutral country, and discrimination between bona fide neutral commerce and that intended for the enemy, are dealt with in Paragraphs 18, 19, and 20, and some illuminating examples are given of the way in which efforts were made to get goods through to Germany on the "common stock" excuse, as, for example, the fact that while the quays of Gothenburg were congested for cotton, none was available for the use of Swedish spinners. The note proceeds:

BOGUS CONSIGNEES

21. However sound the principle that goods intended for incorporation in the common stock of a neutral country should not be treated as contraband may be in theory, it is one that can have but little application to the present imports of the Scandinavian countries. The circumstances of a large number of these shipments negative any conclusion that they are bona fide shipments for the importing countries. Many of them are made to persons who are apparently nominees of enemy agents, and who never figured before as importers of such articles. Consignments of meat products are addressed to lightermen and dock laborers. Several thousands of tons of such goods have been found documented for a neutral port and addressed to firms which do not exist there. Large consignments of similar goods were addressed to a baker, to the keeper of a small private hotel, or to a maker of musical instruments. Will it be contended that such imports ought to be regarded as bona fide shipments intended to become part of the common stock of the country?

22. Similarly several of the shipments which the allied naval forces are now obliged to intercept consist of goods for which there is in normal circumstances no sale in the importing country, and it has already been pointed out in a recent decision in the British Prize Court that the rule about incorporation in the common stock of a neutral country cannot apply to such goods. The same line was taken in some of the decisions in the United States Prize Courts during the civil war.

23. In the presence of facts such as those indicated above the United States Government will, it is believed, agree with his Majesty's Government that no belligerent could in modern times submit to be bound by a rule that no goods could be seized unless they were accompanied by papers which established their destination to an enemy country, and that all detentions of ships and goods must be uniformly based on proofs obtained at the time of seizure. To press any such theory is tantamount to asking that all trade between neutral ports shall be free, and would thus render nugatory the exercise of sea power and destroy the pressure which the command of the sea enables the Allies to impose upon their enemy.

24. It is, of course, inevitable that the exercise of belligerent rights at sea, however reasonably exercised, must inconvenience neutral trade, and great pressure is being put upon the United States Government to urge the technical theory that there should be no interference at all with goods passing between neutral ports, and thus to frustrate the measures which the Allies have taken to intercept commerce on its way to or from the enemy. It may not be out of place to recall that the position is somewhat similar to that which arose in the United States in the war between the North and the South.

All students of international law and of military history are aware that the blockade of the Southern States was the most important engine of pressure possessed by the North, and that it was on the point of being rendered ineffective through the use by blockade runners of neutral ports of access. It is well known that the United States Government took immediate steps to stop such trade, and that the United States Supreme Court extended the doctrine of continuous voyage so as to cover all cases where there was an intention to break the blockade by whatever means, direct or indirect.

CIVIL WAR EXAMPLES

25. The configuration of the European coast is such as to render neutral ports the most convenient for the passage of German commerce, and just as it was essential to the United States in the civil war to prevent their blockade from being nullified by the use of neutral ports of access, so it is essential to the allied powers today to see that the measures which they are taking to intercept enemy commerce shall not be rendered illusory by the use of similar ports. The instructions issued by Mr. Seward during the civil war show that he regarded the continuance of the blockade against the Southern States as absolutely vital, and he repeatedly instructed American representatives abroad to assure foreign Governments that, while he was fully alive to the great inconveniences caused by the cutting off of the supplies of cotton from Europe, yet he could not, as American Secretary of State, "sacrifice the Union for cotton." The American representatives in Europe in their published reports again and again expressed the opinion that, whatever might be the policy of the Government, the peoples of Europe would never consent to side with the power that upheld slavery against the power which represented freedom. Their opinion was entirely justified by the result, and in fact neither the French nor the English Government took any decided steps toward breaking the blockade, in spite of the tremendous pressure which was brought to bear upon them, and the terrible suffering of the cotton operatives of this country. Indeed, President Lincoln himself acknowledged in a message to the laboring classes of Manchester his high sense of the spirit of self-sacrifice which they had exhibited in their policy toward America. His Majesty's Government has, of course, no desire to enter upon any examination of the issues involved in that historic conflict, but no one will question the respect which is due to the determination then shown by the French and British peoples not to range themselves on what they believed to be the side of slavery or consent to action which they held might be fatal to the democratic principle of Government, however great the pressure exerted by commercial interests might be.

NEUTRAL TRADE

26. His Majesty's Government desire to assure the United States Government that every effort is being made to distinguish between *bona fide* neutral commerce and that which is really intended for the enemy. The task is one of exceptional difficulty, and the statistics show that a great volume of imports intended for the enemy must have passed through adjacent neutral countries during the war. As an instance, the imports of lard into Sweden during the year 1915 may be taken. In that year the total import of lard into Sweden from all sources was 9,318 tons, of which no less than 9,029 tons came from the United States. In the three years before the war, 1911-13, the annual average import of the same article was only 888, of which 638 tons came from the United States. It is difficult to believe that the requirements of Sweden in respect of lard, even when every allowance is made for possible diversions of trade due to the war, could suddenly have increased more than tenfold in 1915. The inference, indeed, is irresistible that the greater part of these imports must have had another and an enemy destination.

27. It may readily be conceded that the efforts to intercept enemy commerce passing through neutral countries cannot fail to produce some soreness and dissatisfaction. His Majesty's Government have therefore spared no pains in their endeavor to mitigate the inconvenience which must inevitably be occasioned to neutral traders. In pursuance of this object they are resorting to the policy of ascertaining the total requirements of the country concerned, and intercepting such imports as may be presumed, because they are in excess of those requirements, to form no part of the normal trade of the country, and therefore to be destined for the enemy.

28. The total net imports of a particular commodity by any country in normal times give a satisfactory index to its requirements, and where these are provided for on a generous scale, suitable allowance being made for the commercial dislocation inseparable from a state of war, it is not unfair, after eighteen months of war and in the light of the experience which has now been gained, to invite the prize court to regard with suspicion further consignments of any kind of goods of which the imports have already exceeded a figure ample to satisfy the country's requirements.

29. It ought not to be difficult to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with all parties on the subject, as the official statistics afford information not only as to the quantities of particular commodities required by neutral countries, but also of the sources from which they are usually obtained. Arrangements of this nature will be of great service in removing the friction and misunderstanding which now arise, as it will help the commercial classes in the neutral coun-

tries to form an idea of the limits within which their trading operations are not likely to encounter difficulty.

30. The adoption of such a system, although not unattended by difficulty, has been greatly facilitated by agreements made with the organizations which control imports in the neutral countries, as well as by arrangements with some of the shipping lines, and with several of the interests concerned in the import of particular commodities from neutral countries. His Majesty's Government intend to avail themselves of every opportunity which may present itself in order to bring about a more extended adoption of this equitable system.

31. Moreover, the fact that a neutral country adjacent to the enemy territory is importing an abnormal quantity of supplies or commodities, of which her usual imports are relatively small, of which the enemy stands in need, and which are known to pass from that neutral country to the enemy, is by itself an element of proof on which the prize court would be justified in acting, unless it is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. Hostile destination being a question of fact, the court should take all the relevant circumstances into consideration in arriving at its decision, and there seems to be no reason in principle for limiting the facts at which the court is entitled to look in a case of this kind.

EFFECTIVE BLOCKADE.

32. The second section of the United States note (Paragraphs 16-24) deals with the validity of the measures against enemy commerce which were embodied in the British Order in Council of March 11, 1915, and in the French Decree of March 13, and maintains that these measures are invalid because they do not comply with the rules which have been gradually evolved in the past for regulating a blockade of enemy ports, and which were summarized in concrete form in Articles 1-21 of the Declaration of London.

33. These rules can only be applied to their full extent to a blockade in the sense of the term as used in the Declaration of London. His Majesty's Government have already pointed out that a blockade which was limited to the direct traffic with enemy ports would in this case have but little if any effect on enemy commerce, Germany being so placed geographically that her imports and exports can pass through neutral ports of access as easily as through her own. However, with the spirit of the rules, his Majesty's Government and their allies have loyally complied in the measures they have taken to intercept German imports and exports. Due notice has been given by the Allies of the measures they have taken, and goods which were shipped or contracted for before the announcement of the intention of the Allies to detain all commerce on its way to or from the enemy countries have been treated with great liberality. The objects with which the usual declaration and notification of blockade

are issued have therefore been fully achieved. Again, the effectiveness of the work of the allied fleets under the orders referred to is shown by the small number of vessels which escape the allied patrols. It is doubtful whether there has ever been a blockade where the ships which slipped through bore so small a proportion to those which were intercepted.

34. The measures taken by the Allies are aimed at preventing commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany, and not merely at preventing ships from reaching or leaving German ports. His Majesty's Government do not feel, therefore, that the rules set out in the United States note need be discussed in detail. The basis and the justification of the measures which the Allies have taken were dealt with at length in Sir E. Grey's note of July 23, and there is no need to repeat what was there said. It need only be added that the rules applicable to a blockade of enemy ports are strictly followed by the Allies in cases where they apply, as, for instance, in the blockades which have been declared of the Turkish coast of Asia Minor or of the coastline of German East Africa.

TEST OF RESULTS

35. Some further comment is perhaps necessary upon the statements made in Paragraph 19 of the United States note, where it is said that because German coasts are open to trade with Scandinavian countries the measures of the Allies fail to comply with the rule that a blockade must be effective. It is no doubt true that commerce from Sweden and Norway reaches German ports in the Baltic in the same way that commerce still passes to and from Germany across the land frontiers of adjacent States, but this fact does not render the measures which France and Great Britain are taking against German trade the less justifiable. Even if these measures were judged with strict reference to the rules applicable to blockades, a standard by which, in their view, the measures of the Allies ought not to be judged, it must be remembered that the passage of commerce to a blockaded area across a land frontier or across an inland sea has never been held to interfere with the effectiveness of the blockade. If the right to intercept commerce on its way to or from a belligerent country, even though it may enter that country through a neutral port, be granted, it is difficult to see why the interposition of a few miles of sea as well should make any difference. If the doctrine of continuous voyage may rightly be applied to goods going to Germany through Rotterdam, on what ground can it be contended that it is not equally applicable to goods with a similar destination passing through some Swedish port and across the Baltic, or even through neutral waters only? In any case, it must be remembered that the number of ships reaching a blockaded area is not the only test as to whether it is maintained effectively. The best proof of the

thoroughness of a blockade is to be found in its results. This is the test which Mr. Seward, in 1863, when Secretary of State, maintained should be applied to the blockade of the Confederate States. Writing to Mr. Dayton, the United States Minister in Paris, on March 8, he said: "But the true test of the efficiency of the blockade will be found in its results. Cotton commands a price in Manchester, and in Rouen and Lowell four times greater than in New Orleans. * * * Judged by this test of results, I am satisfied that there never was a more effective blockade." Similar language was used in a dispatch to Mr. Adams in London. The great rise in price in Germany of many articles, most necessary to the enemy in the prosecution of the present war, must be well known to the United States Government.

COTTON AS CONTRABAND

36. Attention is drawn in the same paragraph to the fact that cotton has since the measures announced on March 11 been declared to be contraband, and this is quoted as an admission that the blockade is ineffective to prevent shipments of cotton from reaching the enemy countries. The reason for which cotton was declared to be contraband is quite simple. Goods with an enemy destination are not, under the Order in Council, subject to condemnation; they are restored to the owner. Evidence accumulated that it was only for military purposes that cotton was being employed in Germany. All cotton was laid under embargo, and its use in textile factories was prohibited except in very special cases or by military permission. In these circumstances it was right and proper that cotton with an enemy destination should be subjected to condemnation and not merely prevented from passing, and it was for this reason that it was declared to be contraband. The amount of cotton reaching the enemy country has probably not been affected in the least by its being made contraband on Aug. 20, as supplies from overseas had been cut off effectually before that date. Even the *Konfektionär*, a German technical paper dealing with the textile industry, admitted in its issue of July 1 that not a gram of cotton had found its way into Germany for the preceding four weeks.

37. Before leaving the question of the validity of the measures which France and Great Britain have taken against enemy commerce, reference must be made to the statement made in the thirty-third paragraph of the United States note that "the curtailment of neutral rights by these measures, which are admittedly retaliatory and therefore illegal, * * * cannot be admitted." His Majesty's Government are quite unable to admit the principle that to the extent that these measures are retaliatory they are illegal. It is true that these measures were occasioned and necessitated by the illegal and unjustifiable proclamation issued by the German Government on Feb. 4, 1915, constituting the waters

surrounding Great Britain, including the whole English Channel, a "war zone," into which neutral vessels would penetrate at their peril and in which they were liable to be sunk at sight. This proclamation was accompanied by a memorandum alleging that the violation of international law by Great Britain justified the retaliatory measures of the German Government owing to the acquiescence of neutrals in the action of this country. The legitimacy of the use of retaliatory measures was thus admitted by the Germans, although his Majesty's Government and their allies strongly deny the facts upon which their arguments were based. But although these measures may have been provoked by the illegal conduct of the enemy, they do not, in reality, conflict with any general principle of international law, of humanity, or civilization; they are enforced with consideration against neutral countries, and are therefore juridically sound and valid.

On the more abstract question of the legitimacy of measures of retaliation adopted by one belligerent against his opponent, but affecting neutrals only, Sir Edward Grey (in Paragraph 38) observes that such a discussion might well be deferred, but he takes his stand on the principle of equal liberty of action. The note continues:

LEGAL REMEDIES

39. The third section of the United States note deals with the question of the means of redress which are open to United States citizens for any injury or loss which they suffer as the consequence of an unjustifiable exercise of the belligerent rights of the Allies. The contention put forward in these paragraphs appears to be that there is no obligation on neutral individuals, who maintain that they have been damnified by the naval operations of the belligerents to appeal to the prize courts for redress, because the prize courts are fettered by municipal enactments which are binding upon them, whereas the very question which those individuals wish to raise is the validity of such enactments when tested by the canons of international law.

40. These arguments seem to be founded on a misunderstanding of the situation, and to overlook all that was said in Sir E. Grey's note of July 23 on this subject. The extract there quoted from the decisions given by Lord Stowell shows that in Great Britain the prize court has jurisdiction to pronounce a decision on the very point which the United States note indicates, viz., whether an order or instruction to the naval forces issued by his Majesty's Government is inconsistent with those principles of international law which the court is bound to apply

in deciding cases between captors and claimants, and is entitled, if satisfied that the order is not consistent with those principles, to decline to enforce it. The jurisdiction of the prize court in Great Britain, therefore, affords every facility to a United States citizen, whose goods are detained and dealt with under the Order in Council of March 11, to take his case to the prize court and there claim that the order under which the naval authorities have acted is invalid, and that its enforcement entitles him to redress and compensation.

41. In some matters it is true that the prize court is bound by the municipal enactments of its own country. It is the territorial sovereign who sets up the court, and who, therefore, determines the matters which are incidental to its establishment. His Majesty's Government have already pointed out that each country determines for itself the procedure which its prize court shall adopt, but certainly under the British system—and his Majesty's Government were under the impression that, in this matter, the United States had taken the same course—the substantive law, which the court applies as between captor and claimant, consists of the rules and principles of international law, and not the municipal legislation of the country. If reference is made to the case of the *Recovery*, (6 C. Rob. 341,) it will be seen that Lord Stowell refused to enforce in the prize court against a neutral the British navigation laws.

42. Sir E. Grey's note of July 23 was intended to make this point clear, and so far from having intended to "give the impression that his Majesty's Government do not rely upon its soundness or strength," his Majesty's Government wish to lay stress on the fact that the principle that no encroachment should be made upon the jurisdiction and the competence of the prize court is one which they regard as vital.

In subsequent paragraphs dealing with claims made by shippers for compensation, Sir Edward Grey outlines the procedure to be followed by England, and incidentally he touches upon the cases of the *Magicienne*, the *Don José*, the *Labuan*, and the *Saxon*, as cited in the American note. These cases, Sir Edward Grey says, establish the very principle for which his Majesty's Government is now contending—that where the prize court has powers to grant relief no recourse should be had to diplomatic channels.

Full details of the cases in question are contained in an appendix to the note. Sir Edward Grey's concluding remarks in the note itself are as follows:

CONSIDERATION FOR NEUTRALS

49. Finally, his Majesty's Government desire to assure the United States Government that they will continue their efforts to make the exercise of what they conceive to be their belligerent rights as little burdensome to neutrals as possible. Some suggestions have already been referred to in this note which, it is believed, would have that effect, and they are quite ready to consider others. For instance, they have already appointed an impartial and influential commission to examine whether any further steps could be taken to minimize the delays involved in the present methods of dealing with neutral vessels. Again, it has been suggested that it would be a great commercial convenience if neutral shippers knew, before they made arrangements for ship space and for financing their consignments, whether they would be held up by belligerent patrols. A scheme is already in operation which ought to succeed in accomplishing this object. Other suggestions of a like nature might perhaps be made, and the Allied Government would be prepared to give favorable consideration to any proposal for the alleviation of the position of neutrals provided that the substantial effectiveness of the measures now in force against enemy commerce would not be thereby impaired.

50. His Majesty's Government are of opinion that it is to such mitigations that the Allies and the neutrals concerned should look for the removal of the difficulties now encountered, rather than to abrupt changes either in the theory or application of a policy based upon admitted principles of international law carefully adjusted to the altered conditions of modern warfare. Some of the changes which have been advocated would, indeed, if adopted in their entirety, render it impossible for the Allies to persist with effect in their endeavors to deprive the enemy of the resources upon which he depends for the prosecution of operations carried on both by land

and sea with complete disregard of the claims of humanity; for instance, the practice of visiting exclusively at sea, instead of in port, vessels reasonably suspected of carrying supplies to the enemy; or, again, the adoption of the principle that goods notoriously destined for the enemy may not be intercepted if they happen to be carried by a neutral vessel and addressed to a neutral consignee, could not fail to have this result.

51. His Majesty's Government have noted with sincere satisfaction the intimation contained in the concluding passages of the United States note, of the intention of the United States to undertake the task of championing the integrity of neutral rights. The first act of this war was the unprovoked invasion by the enemy of neutral territory—that of Belgium—which he was solemnly pledged by treaty to protect; the occupation of this territory was accompanied by abominable acts of cruelty and oppression in violation of all the accepted rules of war, atrocities the record of which is available in published documents; the disregard of neutral rights has since been extended to naval warfare by the wanton destruction of neutral merchant ships on the high seas, regardless of the lives of those on board. In every theatre and in each phase of the war has been visible the same shocking disregard by the enemy of the rights of innocent persons and neutral peoples. His Majesty's Government would welcome any combination of neutral nations under the lead of the United States which would exert an effective influence to prevent the violation of neutral rights, and they cannot believe that they or their allies have much to fear from any combination for the protection of those rights which takes an impartial and comprehensive view of the conduct of this war, and judges it by a reasonable interpretation of the generally accepted provisions of international law and by the rules of humanity that have hitherto been approved by the civilized world.

Complete List of Contraband Articles

A BRITISH WHITE PAPER issued in April gives an alphabetical list of the articles declared contraband by proclamations now in force. As the former distinction between absolute and conditional contraband has been abolished, the list of absolutely prohibited articles is the most sweeping in the history of wars and commerce. So long as the exceptional conditions in Germany continue, says the British Foreign Office, Great Britain's belligerent rights with regard to the two kinds of contraband

are the same, and the treatment of them will be identical. The articles that will be seized if shipped, directly or through neutral ports, to the Central Powers, are these:

Acetic acid and acetates, acetic ether; acetones, and raw and finished materials, usable for their preparation; aircraft of all kinds, including aeroplanes, airships, balloons, and their component parts, together with accessories and articles suitable for use in connection with aircraft; aluminium, alumina, and salts of aluminium; ammonia liquor, ammonium salts, aniline and its derivatives; animals, saddle, draught, or pack, suitable,

or which may become suitable, for use in war; antimony, together with the sulphides and oxides of antimony; apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, or for the manufacture or repair of arms or of war material for use on land or sea; armor plates; arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their component parts; arsenic and its compounds, arsenical ore, articles especially adapted for use in the manufacture or repair of tires, asbestos.

Barbed wire, barium chlorate and perchlorate, bauxite, benzol and its mixtures and derivatives; bladders, guts, casings, and sausage skins; bones in any form, whole or crushed, and bone ash; boots and shoes suitable for use in war; borax, boric acid, and other boron compounds; bromine.

Calcium acetate, calcium nitrate, and calcium carbide; camp equipments, articles of, and their component parts; camphor, capsicum, carbon disulphide; carbon, halogen compounds of; carbonyl chloride, carborundum in all forms, casein, caustic potash and caustic soda, celluloid, charges and cartridges of all kinds and their component parts; chlorides, metallic (except chloride of sodium) and metalloids; chlorine, chrome ore, chronometers, clothing and fabrics for clothing suitable for use in war, clothing of a distinctively military character; cobalt, copper pyrites and other copper ores; copper unwrought and part wrought, copper wire, alloys and compounds of copper; cork, including cork dust; corundum, natural and artificial, (alundum,) in all forms; cotton, raw, linters, cotton waste, cotton yarns, cotton piece goods, and other cotton products capable of being used in the manufacture of explosives; cresol and its mixtures and derivatives, cyanamide.

Docks, parts of.

Emery in all forms, equipment of a distinctively military character, ethyl alcohol, explosives, whether specially prepared for use in war or not.

Ferro alloys, including ferro-tungsten, ferro-molybdenum, ferro-manganese, ferro-vanadium, and ferro-chrome; field forges and their component parts; field glasses, flax; floating docks and their component parts; foodstuffs, forage, and feeding stuffs for animals; formic ether; fuel, other than mineral oils; fuming sulphuric acid, furs utilisable for clothing suitable for use in war.

Glycerine, gold, gun mountings and their component parts.

Hair, animal of all kinds, and tops, nolls, and yarns of animal hair; harness and saddlery, harness of a distinctively military character, all kinds of; hemp, hides of cattle, buffalos, and horses, horseshoes and shoeing material, hydrochloric acid.

Implements designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, or for the manufacture or repair of arms or of war material for use on land or sea; implements for fixing and cutting barbed wire, iodine and its compounds; iron, electrolytic; iron

hematite, and hematite iron ore; iron pyrites, Kapok.

Lathes capable of being employed in the manufacture of munitions of war; lead and lead ore, leather belting, hydraulic leather, pump leather; leather, undressed or dressed, suitable for saddlery, harness, military boots, or military clothing; limbers and limber boxes and their component parts, lubricants.

Machines capable of being employed in the manufacture of munitions of war, manganese and manganese ore, manganese dioxide, maps and plans of any place within the territory of any belligerent, or within the area of military operations, on a scale of four miles to one inch or any larger scale, and reproductions on any scale, by photography or otherwise, of such maps or plans; materials especially adapted for use in the manufacture or repair of tires, materials used in the manufacture of explosives, mercury, methyl alcohol, military wagons and their component parts; mineral oils, including benzine and motor spirit; molybdenum and molybdenite, motor vehicles of all kinds and their component parts and accessories.

Naphthalene and its mixtures and derivatives; nautical instruments, all kinds of negotiable instruments, nickel and nickel ore, nitric acid and nitrates of all kinds.

Oils and fats, animal, fish, and vegetable, other than those capable of use as lubricants, and not including essential oils; oleaginous seeds, nuts, and kernels; oleum.

Paper money, paraffin wax, peppers, phenol (carbolic acid) and its mixtures and derivatives; phosphorus and its compounds, phosgene, potassium salts, powders, whether specially prepared for use in war or not; projectiles of all kinds and their component parts, prussiate of soda.

Railway materials, both fixed and rolling stock; ramie, rangefinders and their component parts; rattans, realizable securities, resinous products; rubber, (including raw, waste, and reclaimed rubber, solutions and jellies containing rubber, or any other preparations containing rubber, balata, and gutta-percha, and the following varieties of rubber, viz.: Borneo, Guayule, Jelutong, Palembang, Pontianac, and all other substances containing caoutchouc,) and goods made wholly or partly of rubber.

Sabadilla seeds and preparations therefrom, scheelite, searchlights and their component parts, selenium, silver, skins of calves, pigs, sheep, goats, and deer, skins utilisable for clothing suitable for use in war, soap, sodium, sodium chloride and perchlorate, sodium cyanide, solvent naphtha and its mixtures and derivatives, starch, steel containing tungsten or molybdenum, submarine sound signaling apparatus, sulphur, sulphur dioxide, sulphuric acid, sulphuric ether.

Tanning substances of all kinds, including quebracho wood and extracts for use in tanning; telegraphs, materials for; telephones, materials for; telescopes, tin, chloride of tin and tin ore; toluol, and its mixtures and de-

rivatives; tools capable of being employed in the manufacture of munitions of war; tungsten, turpentine, (oil and spirit,) tires for motor vehicles and for cycles.

Urea.

Vanadium, vegetable fibres and yarns made therefrom; vehicles of all kinds, other than motor vehicles, available for use in war, and their component parts; vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds.

Warships, including boats and their component parts of such a nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war; wireless telegraphs, materials for; wolframite, wool tar and wood tar oil; wool, raw, combed, or

carded; wool waste, wool tops and noils; woolen or worsted yarns.

Xylol and its mixtures and derivatives.

Zinc ore.

A supplementary order announced on May 4 that the following articles would be added to the contraband list:

Brooms and brushes; bulbs, flower roots, plants, trees, and shrubs; canned, bottled, dried, and preserved vegetables and pickles; horns and hoofs, ice, animal and vegetable ivory; moss, rubber tires, tubes for motor cars and motor cycles; salt, starch, dextrine, farina, and potato flour.

Origin of the Word "Boche"

By DOUGLAS L. BUFFUM

Since the beginning of the European war numerous attempts have been made to explain the origin of the word "boche," which is now almost universally used by the French soldiers when speaking of the Germans. The correct explanation is probably as follows:

Boche is an abbreviation of caboché, (compare bochon, an abbreviation of cabochon.) This is a recognized French word used familiarly for "head," especially a big, thick head, ("slow-pate.") It is derived from the Latin word caput and the suffix "oecus." Boche seems to have been used first in the under-world of Paris about 1860, with the meaning of a disagreeable, troublesome fellow. In the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 it was not applied to the Germans, but soon afterward it was applied by the Parisian printers to their German assistants because of the reputed slowness of comprehension of these foreign printers. The epithet then used was tête de boche, which had the meaning of tête carrée d'Allemand. The next step was to apply boche to Germans in general.



BUTTER AND POTATO CARDS USED BY RESIDENTS OF BERLIN

How the Great War Began

Official Narrative of the Momentous Scenes Which Led to
the Invasion of Belgium

By Albert de Bassompierre

Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Belgium

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY from *Revue des Deux Mondes*]

ON July 23, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia burst like a thunderclap in the European sky, which had seemed to recover its serenity during the month that had passed since the drama at Sarajevo. From that moment acute distress reigned in the Chancelleries of all the States threatened by the impending catastrophe. At Brussels the strain was intense, for we knew that, although the political crisis of the last few years had not led to war between the great European powers, they had more than once come very near it; and we instantly realized the grave danger of a general conflagration which the Austrian note to Serbia had abruptly laid bare. The Central Empires evidently desired war, since they imposed upon the Ministers at Belgrade conditions that were impossible of acceptance by a proud and independent nation, and since it was certain, on the other hand, that Russia would be morally forced to uphold Serbia's resistance.

The understanding between Berlin and Vienna touching the terms of the note did not for a moment seem to us susceptible of doubt. The reports of Baron Beyens and the Comte de Dudzele, our Ministers at Berlin and Vienna, hardly allowed us to entertain any illusions in that regard. It was becoming evident, or at least infinitely probable, that it seemed to Germany and Austria-Hungary a favorable opportunity to utilize the formidable engine of destruction which had been in preparation, with meticulous care, for forty years; and to crush Russia and France before the military su-

periority of the Germanic Empires could be challenged.

It was therefore in an atmosphere of depression that we passed the last days of July.

For years past the problem which was destined to confront Belgium at the outbreak of a European war in which her powerful neighbors—guarantors one and all of her neutrality—should be belligerents, had been carefully studied at the Foreign Office. We had tried to imagine all the attacks on our neutrality which might conceivably be made, and to scrutinize each one of them, always asking ourselves the question: "In this particular case, what attitude would our duty to ourselves and to Europe command us to assume?"

Notes had been drawn up to summarize the results of these studies. They presupposed, purely *ex hypothesi*, violations of our neutrality by all our neighbors, including the loyal guarantors who are fighting by our side today. They aimed to mark out lines of conduct for the Government on the day of peril.

If these notes, which were read and reread eagerly during the last week of July, 1914, are published some day, they will demonstrate the absolute good faith, the perfectly honorable attitude of Belgium, even in the eyes of those—if any such there shall still be—whom the Germans have succeeded in inducing to believe that we had in advance abandoned our neutrality in favor of France or England; even in the eyes of the Germans themselves, I would say, if it were not certain that our enemies have never had the slightest doubt in that regard,



MOLDERS OF RUSSIA'S DESTINIES

**Emperor Nicholas II. and General Alexeieff at Staff Headquarters
in Petrograd**



ARCHDUKE EUGENIUS OF AUSTRIA

Commander in Chief of Austrian Troops on Italian Front: In Costume of Grand Master of the Teutonic Order

(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)

and that they have knowingly been guilty of the evil action called calumny in bringing against us the accusation of having been false to our duty as neutrals. This calumny, no less, and perhaps even more, than all the blood that has been shed has dug a chasm between Germany and Belgium which will never be bridged over.

The notes that are still on file in the Foreign Office show that there might have happened cases of violation of our neutrality in which the correct attitude for us to assume would have been very hard to decide unhesitatingly and speedily. (For instance, the case of simultaneous or almost simultaneous violations by several belligerents, each accusing his adversary of having been the first offender and ascribing to his own entry upon our territory the character of an act in support of the guarantee.) But, I say again, they prove conclusively the firm resolution on the part of the Government to acquit itself, in every possible conjuncture, with scrupulous rectitude and without regard to what the cost to the country might be, of the duties imposed upon Belgium by the treaties of 1839.

The status of guaranteed neutrality was intended, in the collective purpose of Europe, to place us outside of all contentions and, if that result could not be secured, to furnish our weakness with aid against a possible aggressor. Today the world can judge whether, when the supreme test came, guaranteed neutrality met the hopes that had been based upon it; and the Belgian people are in a position to determine whether this gift of the great powers has been, when all is said, a benefaction to them.

Among the powers that neighbor Belgium are there any which constitute a menace to her existence? And are there others upon which she can rely to safeguard her? Would not the defeat, the humiliation, or the diminished strength of these last, at whatsoever time it might happen, be likely to be the signal for her disappearance as an autonomous nation? Consequently, is there good reason to base the future policy of the kingdom on these consider-

ations, or is it possible to recover a sentiment of equal tranquillity and confidence with respect to all the powers which were formerly set over us? That is the problem with which the war has brought the Belgian people and Government face to face.

But on Aug. 2, 1914, a single fact controlled the situation—Belgium had the status of guaranteed conventional neutrality,* and we must allow ourselves to be guided only by the anxious desire to fulfill its obligations.

To be perfectly frank, we must admit that the eventuality which confronted us that day was that which had appeared to us beforehand most improbable, because it was too brutal and too simple—that of a power which was one of the guarantors of our neutrality requesting us directly and formally to renounce in its favor the neutrality guaranteed by itself, and threatening us with all its destroying wrath if we dared to confine ourselves to the performance pure and simple of a duty which, under those conditions, was so manifest that there was really no need of specialists in the law of nations to point it out to the country!

The German ultimatum* attempted, it is true, to justify the action of the Imperial Government by a labored and awkward insinuation against the adverse party. It began by declaring that "the Imperial Government knew from an unquestionable source the intention of France to march upon Germany over Belgian territory." But this was so manifestly a pretext, it was so outrageously contrary to the truth, it was in such flagrant contradiction with the solemn declaration that France had made to us the day before—as we shall see further on—and with the assurances that the authorities of the republic had repeated so often in the course of recent years, and with what was known of the movements of French troops, that the German Government cannot have been deceived for an instant as to the degree

*The official text of the ultimatum and the reply, together with the treaty articles guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality, appear at the end of this article.

of credence with which its declaration would be met in Belgium.

Between July 23 and Aug. 2, amid the confused mass of news that reached us from every direction, amid the feverish readings and re-readings to which we had to resort to fix accurately in our minds the studies we had made in view of a possible war, the measures of every sort which must be taken in haste—telegrams, diplomatic visits, and telephone calls—a few facts stand out in my memory as being of most importance in that period of excitement.

In the first place, on July 28 we learned by a telegram from the Comte de Duzeele, our Minister at Vienna, of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Serbia. That same evening the Council of Ministers met under the presidency of the King. In face of the warlike preparations that were being made on all sides, the question was raised whether prudence did not demand the mobilization of the Belgian Army.

The Council decided to take a step provided for by the law, the first stage of mobilization; that is to say, to put the army on the reinforced peace footing.

On the next day, July 29, the *Moniteur Belge* published, in connection with the Austro-Serbian war, the declaration calling attention to the statute of Belgian neutrality, which was a formal performance at the beginning of every war.

On Friday, July 31, we learned that the German Government had proclaimed the *Kriegzustand*, that is to say, the measure preliminary to general mobilization of the land and naval forces of the empire. Holland having, for her part, placed her army on a war footing during the day, the Belgian Council of Ministers likewise, at 6 in the evening, decreed a general mobilization. Aug. 1, at midnight, was fixed as the time when it was to begin. It was to be completed, so to speak, in the evening of the 2d.

In the evening of the 31st, about 10 o'clock, the English Minister called to inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs that, in view of the possibility of a European war, Sir Edward Grey had inquired of the French and German Gov-

ernments if each of them was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium, provided that no other power should violate it. Sir Edward Grey, Sir Francis Villiers added, assumed that Belgium would do everything in her power to maintain her neutrality, and that it was her wish that the other powers should observe it and maintain it.

M. Davignon made haste to assure the English Minister of our determination to omit nothing to maintain the neutrality of the country. He begged his Excellency to note the evidence of this determination in the decision to place the army on a war footing, and he warmly thanked Sir Francis Villiers for the important communication that he had made on the part of the British Government.

This proceeding was, in truth, a proof that England still regarded the neutrality of Belgium as an essential matter. It justified the belief—although Sir Francis Villiers did not say it in so many words—that Great Britain, loyal to the Treaty of 1839, would intervene to defend us against any power that should undertake to violate our neutrality.

On Aug. 1, in the morning, M. Klobukowski, the French Minister, called to communicate to M. Davignon the categorical declaration reproduced in the *First Gray Book* as No. 15: "I am authorized to declare that, in the event of an international conflict, the Government of the republic will, as it has always promised, respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event that such neutrality should not be respected by another power, the French Government, to safeguard its own defense, might be led to modify its attitude."

Such was the response, clear and unequivocal, of France to the question asked by the British Government on the preceding day. France did not leave to Great Britain the duty of communicating it to us.

The silence of Germany was becoming alarming. On the day before, July 31, Baron von der Elst had tried to sound Herr von Below-Saleske, the Minister of that country. He had reminded him of

a conversation that he had had in 1911 with his predecessor, Herr von Flotow—a conversation which had drawn from the Imperial Chancellor a message reassuring to Belgium. Germany, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg had said, had no intention, whatever any one might say, of violating Belgian neutrality in case of war; but the Chancellor considered that a public declaration to that effect would impair the military situation of the empire in respect to France, who, being relieved from anxiety as to her northern frontier, would concentrate her full strength on the east.

Baron von der Elst also reminded Herr von Below-Saleske of the declarations of Herr von Jagow to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag in 1913, as to the recognition by Germany of the treaties guaranteeing Belgian neutrality. The German Minister confined himself to replying that he remembered those declarations, and that he was sure that the sentiments expressed by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg in 1911, and by Herr von Jagow in 1913, had not changed.

On Aug. 1, after M. Klobukowski's declaration in the name of France, I was instructed by M. Davignon to go to Herr von Below and inform him of this declaration as well as of the measure taken by the British Government at Berlin and at Paris, which Sir F. Villiers had brought to our knowledge the day before.

The Foreign Minister intended by this means to give the representative of Germany an opportunity to tell us whether his Government had replied in the same sense as France to Great Britain's inquiry concerning respect for our neutrality.

I was to go at first to Sir F. Villiers to ask him if he had any objection to my informing Herr von Below of what he had said to us the day before. The English Minister, who had people in his office, came into the reception room where he received me at once with his usual amiability. He reflected a moment concerning the question I put to him and replied: "The communication that I was instructed to make to the King's Government was made without reservation or condition; it belongs to them, therefore,

and they can make such use of it as they deem proper."

I hastened to the German Legation, where I arrived about 12:30 o'clock. I placed before Herr von Below the inquiry made by Great Britain at Berlin and Paris. I repeated to him the unequivocal and loyal declaration made to us that morning by M. Klobukowski in the name of the French Republic. Lastly, in accordance with M. Davignon's instructions, I told him that the French Legation had requested the press to publish a communiqué making known the attitude of its Government. That communiqué would appear that same evening.

Herr von Below, when I had finished, threw himself back in his chair, and, looking up at the ceiling, with his eyes half closed, he repeated with phonographic accuracy everything that I had first said to him, using the very words that I had used—until I began to wonder whether it was simply a proof of a good memory or whether he was already cognizant of the whole affair before my visit. But when he had finished repeating my communication, he paused a moment, then added: "You will be good enough, I beg, to say to M. Davignon that I am deeply obliged to him for his message, and that I shall inform my Government of it." Thereupon he indicated to me, in the clearest fashion, by rising and offering me a cigarette, that he had nothing more to say to me officially. But he went on almost immediately, in a familiar, conversational tone, to say that personally he was fully convinced that Belgium had nothing to fear from Germany, and that his Government would doubtless consider it unnecessary to amplify or even to repeat its earlier declarations to that effect.

This same language Herr von Below repeated to M. Davignon in the morning of Aug. 2—the very day when he was to deliver the ultimatum of his Government! And he made—always in his individual name—analogous reassuring declarations to the representatives of the press. "Your neighbor's roof may burn, perhaps, but your house will be safe," he said to one of the editors of *Le Soir*, who published the interview at 3 in the

afternoon. Moreover, Captain Brinckmann, the German Military Attaché, said, at 11 in the morning, to one of the editors of the *XX^e Siècle* who questioned him by telephone, "It is not true that Germany has declared war. Our troops have not occupied the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. These are all false reports put forth by persons hostile to the German Empire." The *XX^e Siècle* published these statements of the Military Attaché in its 3 o'clock edition.

Aug. 2 was a Sunday. In the morning we learned by a telegram from the Belgian Minister at St. Petersburg, sent on the previous evening, of the declaration of war by Germany against Russia and the general mobilization of the German armies. In the afternoon a telegram from M. Eyschen, Minister of State of Luxemburg, advised us of the contemptuous invasion of the Grand Duchy by the imperial forces.

Thus the day was full of excitement; about 7 in the evening, having finished my work, I left the office with Baron de Gaiffier. Before reaching the main door of the department, on the Rue de la Loi, we went into the Secretary General's office. With Baron von der Elst we went over the news that had come since morning. It was no longer possible to foster illusions; the operation of the alliances was drawing the powers one after another into the whirlpool. Russia was already at war with Germany. The invasion of Luxemburg indicated clearly that a Franco-German state of war was a question of hours. Were we destined to be engulfed in the catastrophe, or would the miracle of 1870 be repeated? The loyalty of France was manifest. Germany said nothing, and that fact seemed of evil augury, but Herr von Below was so reassuring! Moreover, the step taken by England and the threat which it implied—were not they calculated to make Berlin think twice? In view of the late telegrams, might we not suppose that the German forces assembled along the frontier would move toward the Moselle and would avoid encroaching upon Belgian territory? Was not this hypothesis warranted by the fact that the motives alleged for the

violation of Luxemburg did not exist with respect to Belgium?

We were trying to cling fast to this hope, as shipwrecked men cling to a bunch of straw, when an usher opened the door and, with a perturbed air, announced hastily and unceremoniously: "The German Minister has just gone into M. Davignon's Cabinet."

We realized, all three of us, that at that fateful moment the destiny of our dear little country was about to be decided.

Ten minutes passed, which seemed to us like hours. Then, at 7:30, the haughty figure of Herr von Below appeared on the other side of the courtyard, and the German Emperor's representative, quite impassive, passed out to the street, where his motor car awaited him.

In an instant we were in M. Davignon's office. It was empty, but at the same moment the Minister, who had gone into the adjoining room to summon Comte Leo d'Ursel, his chief clerk, came in with a paper* in his hand, and followed by the Count and by M. Costermans, the second clerk. All three seemed deeply moved.

"This is bad, very bad," said the Minister, who was extremely pale. "Here is the German note, of which Herr von Below gave me a résumé. They demand that we allow the German army to pass over our territory."

"And what reply did you make, Monsieur le Ministre?"

"I took the paper and said that I would go over it with the King and my colleagues. We have twelve hours to reply. But I could not contain my indignation! I told Herr von Below that we could have expected anything save this! Germany, claiming to be our devoted friend, yet proposing to us such a dishonorable course! Let us translate it quickly and send for M. de Broqueville."

I took my pen and seated myself at the Minister's desk, while Comte Leo d'Ursel and Baron de Gaiffier took possession of the German note and immediately set about translating it. I wrote

*Text of note reprinted at end of this article.

as they dictated. M. Davignon and the Secretary General followed the work anxiously, seated at the right and left of the fireplace, facing the desk. The whole scene is indelibly engraved on my memory: the faces of the auditors, the thoughts that jostled each other in my mind—even the look of the paper on which I transcribed in French the words of the ultimatum; I believe that I shall never forget a single one of these details.

The translation was not simple, certain German phrases admitting of diverse interpretations. There were discussions as to the meaning of more than one such phrase, and the first French draft of that historic document bears many erasures and interlineations. Doubtless, too, an expert would detect in the handwriting signs of the extreme nervous tension of the man who held the pen, although outwardly I remained perfectly calm, as did the Minister and most of those present.

We had done about a third of the note when the Prime Minister entered. He saluted us hurriedly and seated himself beside M. Davignon. I read to him the sentences already translated, after M. Davignon had in two words told him of his interview with Herr von Below. M. de Broqueville folded his arms and sat absorbed in thought until the translation was finished. Then he asked me to read the note in French, which I did with deep emotion, striving to maintain my usual tone.

A silence, a tragic silence of several minutes' duration, followed the reading. We had just heard for the first time the infamous ultimatum, and we were reflecting. In the mind of each one of us the passionate memory of our adored, peaceful, blessed country gave place, it may be, to a vague premonition of the horrors that were moving swiftly toward her; but the predominant element in our thoughts was, beyond question, the firm determination to show ourselves worthy of our ancestors in the great days of trial.

It was evident that the German Government put forward the purpose of France to march upon the Meuse solely as a pretext, and that the ultimatum was

a pure and simple demand that we abandon our neutrality in favor of Germany the formidable. They who drafted it did not think for an instant that Belgium, that tiny country that fills so little space on the map of Europe, would dare to refuse to submit without parley to the will of her all-powerful neighbor! They who read it, having a different sort of mentality, were, on the contrary, immediately, spontaneously, without discussion, without hesitation, without even making their thoughts known to one another, filled with the conviction that but one reply was possible—an indignant and peremptory No!

The Secretary General, Baron von der Elst, broke the silence by asking the War Minister:

"But, Monsieur le Ministre, are we ready?"

There was another silence, shorter than the first but no less impressive. Then M. de Broqueville, very calm and self-controlled, speaking slowly, with measured words, replied:

"Yes, we are ready. Mobilization is going forward under extraordinarily favorable conditions. Though begun yesterday morning, it is almost completed. Tomorrow evening the army will be in condition to march—tomorrow morning, indeed, if it should be absolutely necessary. But—there is a 'but'—we have not yet got our heavy artillery."

A few more brief sentences were exchanged. Then M. de Broqueville abruptly pulled out his watch. "It is ten minutes past 8," he said; "we must notify the King at once and ask his Majesty's permission to summon the Council to meet at the Palace at 9, the Ministers of State at 10."

He started almost immediately for the Palace, where he gave the King full information as to the situation. M. Davignon and Baron von der Elst were left alone. The chief clerk went to arrange with M. Costermans for summoning the Council.

I found quite a large party assembled in Comte d'Ursel's office. The report that something was going on had spread

through the department like a train of powder. A few officials and diplomats, who had remained late at their work, were present, watching for those who were closeted with the Ministers to come out. M. de Gaiffier and I posted them as to what was happening. It is with a thrill of genuine pride that I declare that not a man there dreamed for an instant that the reply to the German note could be anything other than an indignant refusal. Some were dismayed, but the great majority were all a-quiver with the patriotic emotion that was to convulse the entire nation on the morrow.

"It is better that Germany has put her cards on the table. We know where we are. There is no possible excuse for hesitation now, whereas we might well have dreaded the most painful uncertainty as to what we ought to do. The army will know at once where the enemy is, and will fight with enthusiasm. And, after all, we shall be supported by France. England will come in. She can't allow Belgium to be sacrificed. Her honor and her self-interest forbid it. And then, if we are crushed, we shall be crushed gloriously, and our fate will be no worse, in the last analysis, than if we did what they demand. If we should yield, we could never again look a Frenchman or an Englishman in the face."

Such were the sentiments that passed from mouth to mouth. There were very few references to the shocking consequences which our reply—it seemed as if it had already been sent—was likely to bring upon our dear and ill-fated land.

About 8:30 o'clock I went out and dined hurriedly, alone, in a restaurant on Place Royale. I remember the strange impression that that brilliantly lighted room produced upon me, and the sort of distress with which I watched the diners at nearby tables. They knew nothing; they had read the afternoon papers containing the reassuring statements made to the reporters during the morning by von Below; they were light-hearted and heedless. And I—I was borne down by the weight of what I knew; of the secret which would be revealed the next day and would bring such a cruel awakening

to everybody about me. I asked myself if I were the plaything of a nightmare or if I were really awake.

A little after 9 I returned to the department. M. Davignon had gone to the Palace, and Baron von der Elst with him. The latter was present at the two councils that were held during the night.

The Baron de Gaiffier was at work in the Minister's office, where I joined him. He had already begun to prepare the draft of a reply to the German ultimatum.

"You see," he said, "the Minister will return very soon and ask us to prepare the reply; and, as there is no possible doubt as to the tenor of it, I have begun it, to save time."

Doubtless some day the details will be written of the meeting of the Council of Ministers which, beginning at 9 o'clock under the Presidency of the King, and being joined at 10 by those Ministers of State when they had succeeded in getting together, continued without interruption until midnight, and was resumed at 2 A. M., to last until nearly 4.

During the early part of that long session the general principles of the reply were agreed upon. About midnight a drafting committee was named and instructed to go to the Foreign Office to prepare a draft of a note. MM. de Broqueville, Minister for War; Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Carton de Wiart, Minister of Justice; von der Henvel and Hymans, Ministers of State, and Baron von der Elst returned to Rue de la Loi. There they found Baron de Gaiffier, who had completed his draft. Without knowing what decision was being reached at the Palace, he had written exactly what it had been there agreed to reply to Germany. So true is it that all Belgians were absolutely one in thought and feeling on perusal of the German ultimatum. A few sentences only were rewritten by the drafting committee.*

While this work was being done, at 1:30 A. M. the German Minister appeared and asked to see Baron von der Elst. Everything goes to show that his Excellency's purpose was to surprise on the faces of such persons as he might meet

*Text of Belgium's reply will be found at the end of this article.

telltale indications of the tenor of our final decision. The Secretary General received him in his office.

The German Minister must have noticed the chilliness of the welcome accorded him. This is how a memorandum printed in the Gray Book (No. 21) describes this nocturnal call:

"At 1:30 A. M. the German Minister asked to see Baron von der Elst. He told him that he was under instructions from his Government to inform us that French dirigibles had dropped bombs, and that a patrol of French cavalry, in violation of the law of nations, since war was not declared, had crossed the frontier.

"The Secretary General asked Herr von Below where these things had taken place. 'In Germany,' was the reply. Baron von der Elst observed that in that case he could not understand the purpose of the communication. Herr von Below said that those acts, contrary to the law of nations, were calculated to arouse suspicion that France would commit other acts contrary to that law."

Half an hour later the draft of the reply to Germany was taken to the Palace and definitively approved by the Council presided over by the King.

About 3:30 o'clock in the morning Comte d'Ursel was called to the telephone by M. Klobukowski, who declared that he had seen distinctly in the sky intermittent flashes which unquestionably came from the searchlights of a German dirigible proceeding toward France. Several persons had told M. Klobukowski that they had seen the same lights.

Shortly after this incident I left the department. The mobilization was still causing some excitement in the neighboring streets. All the windows in the War Department, at the corner of the Avenue des Arts and Rue de la Loi, were brightly lighted, and several motor cars were standing at the door.

At 8 in the morning of Aug. 3 I returned to the department. M. de Gaiffier arrived at the same time; he told me that he had waited till the end of the Cabinet Council, and that M. Davignon, returning from the Palace at 4 o'clock,

had instructed him to deliver personally to Herr von Below-Saleske the reply to the German ultimatum. M. de Gaiffier had had it copied quickly, had gone home about 5 o'clock, and, after trying to get a moment's rest, had gone on foot to the German Embassy on Rue Belliard, where he arrived at exactly 7 o'clock. Admitted to the study of the Minister, who was awaiting him, he handed him the note. Herr von Below read it with an air of detachment, and asked if there was anything else to be said. Baron de Gaiffier replied in the negative, saluted the Minister, and returned to Rue de la Loi.

The legations of France and England were advised without delay of what had taken place. About the same hour the Etoile Belge published the news of the German ultimatum.

At 9:30 Mr. Webber, attaché at the English Legation, in a state of excitement which he did not attempt to conceal, appeared at my office, where, at that moment, I happened to be alone. He came from Sir Francis Villiers to take copies of the German note and of our reply. He knew the general tenor of the documents but not the precise words. I read them both to him. When I came to the sentence, "The Belgian Government, by accepting the proposals that are made to it, would sacrifice the honor of the nation, at the same time that it would be false to its duties toward Europe," I felt my throat swell, and my emotion almost mastered me. I succeeded, however, in reading to the end.

Webber had not moved a muscle; he remained on his feet in front of me. He took my two hands, and, having gazed at me a moment in silence, "Bravo, Belgians!" he said simply, in a voice that was not quite steady. Then he swiftly copied the two notes in shorthand and hurried off with them to his chief.

After he had gone, about 10 o'clock, my attention was attracted by the increasing noise which came up from the city, across the courtyards of the Government buildings, to my open window. It was composed of the cries of the newsboys selling the papers with the news of the ultimatum, of exclamations of surprise and wrath, and of the rapidly in-

creasing agitation aroused in the streets by the terrible intelligence.

On that day, Aug. 3, the Council of Ministers, which sat from 10 o'clock till noon, decided to request the diplomatic support of the powers that had guaranteed our neutrality—other than Germany and Austria-Hungary, of course. The request for military support was designedly, and after mature consideration, postponed until Germany should have consummated her criminal purpose by sending her soldiers upon our territory. We did not propose to give her, until then, any pretext which she could allege for saying that we had broken our neutrality in favor of her enemies. One chance still remained—pitifully slight, it is true, but sufficient to keep hope alive in some persons among us: that Germany, disappointed by our reply to her ultimatum, would hold back at the last moment and countermand the orders to her troops.

M. Arendt, who had preceded Baron de Gaiffier as Directeur Général, (1896-1912,) called upon me in the afternoon about 4 o'clock. He read the ultimatum and our reply, and even he, who had made so profound a study of the guaranteed neutrality which the powers had imposed upon us, and who was the principal author of the memoranda mentioned at the beginning of this paper, actually thought for a moment that our attitude, so decided and so entirely in line with our duty, would cause the German colossus to hesitate. The political blunder that Germany would commit in beginning a world war by an absolutely unjustifiable violation of the neutrality of a friendly country seemed to him so enormous, and the universal reprobation which must inevitably follow it seemed to him so certain to weigh heavily in the final adjustment of accounts, that he was still inclined to doubt.

The Germans had expected to intimidate us. They had reckoned on a consent due to our knowledge of our weakness. The tone of our reply could not leave them in any doubt as to the blunder they had committed. As they knew now that they would have to overcome the desperate resistance of an army which, though

far from numerous, was brave and supported by strong fortresses, would they not fear that all their calculations, that their whole plan, based upon a swift passage across Belgium, would be endangered? Would they not consequently adopt an alternative plan which they probably had in readiness for that eventuality?

Such were the questions which were asked, even at that supreme moment, by the one man of all living Belgians who had undoubtedly meditated most frequently upon the day of anguish that we were now living through.

May we not believe that his clear vision was unerring, and that if Germany had, at the last moment, decided to keep off our soil, she would have given proof of wisdom from the military, and even more from the political, standpoint?

One thing is certain, at all events, because it has been demonstrated by results, and that is that the "crushing" offensive against France through Belgium was an ill-advised operation. It resulted in a fatal failure for Germany. The battle about Liège thwarted it irremediably by causing the imperial army to lose nearly three weeks. The battles of the Marne, the Yser, and Ypres definitively checkmated it.

However that may be, on Aug. 3 there was still some slight doubt as to what Germany would really do, since she had not as yet actually violated our territory; and that doubt seemed to the Belgian Ministers, in their determination to act as men of honor to the end, a sufficient reason why they should not call to their succor, on that day, the armies of the other guarantors of our neutrality and independence. It is proper to remark that at the hour when the Ministers were deliberating, Germany was not officially in a state of war with France or with Great Britain.

On Aug. 4, at 6 A. M., Herr von Below handed M. Davignon a note which put an end to all uncertainty in the minds of those who had still been able to hope. It informed the Belgian Government that Germany, in consequence of Belgium's refusal to accept the "well-intentioned offers that had been made to her, found

herself compelled, if need be by force of arms, to take such measures of security as she deemed indispensable in face of the French manoeuvres."

At 9:30 a telegram informed us that Belgian territory had been violated by German troops at Gemmenich, a village very near the frontier, a few kilometers from Aix-la-Chapelle. (The German vanguard crossed the frontier at precisely two minutes past 8 in the morning of Aug. 4.) On the north it touches Dutch Limbourg. The first shots of the war were fired by Belgian gendarmes on guard at that frontier post! Blood had flowed—the irremediable act was committed!

On the day before the King had ordered the Legislative Chambers to be summoned to meet on this 4th of August, at 10 o'clock. Although the news had had so short a time to become known, and despite the early hour, a dense crowd filled the streets about the park through which the royal procession would pass. The Foreign Office stands beside the Palace of the Nation, where the Chambers hold their sessions. One of its fronts is on the little square before the Palace, the other on Rue de la Loi, at right angles to the first.

Just before 10 o'clock I went into the Secretary General's office on the ground floor, the windows of which look on Rue de la Loi. The city had taken on the festal aspect which it retained until after the arrival of the Germans. On the day before every house had spontaneously hoisted the national flag. By this proud gesture the people had given expression to the satisfaction they felt in knowing that the Government, in its reply to Germany, had faithfully interpreted the deep-rooted sentiment of the whole nation.

At 10 o'clock the first thrill of enthusiasm ran through the crowd, when an open Court carriage brought the Queen and her children to attend the session of Parliament. The whole journey from the Palace was one long and touching ovation.

Three minutes later a tremendous outburst of applause reached my ears across the park. The King had left the Palace;

he was coming along Rue Royale; his arrival was announced by the tempest of excitement and outcries that shook the multitude in the streets, on balconies, even on housetops. The procession turned the corner of the park; preceded by an escort of cavalry of the Civic Guard, and followed by the officers of the royal household, our sovereign approached on horseback, booted and spurred and in campaign uniform, outwardly calm, but visibly controlling his emotion. With an expression of grave solemnity he replied slowly with his hand to the heartfelt, ringing acclamations of the crowd: "Vive, vive le Roi! Vive, vive la Belgique!" It seemed as if the people would never be done with repeating those cries, which blended in a magnificent ovation.

When the King reached the centre of the square before the Palace of the Nation he dismounted, and I saw him, amid a tremendous, unrestrained clamor from the multitude, walk toward the entrance where a deputation of Senators and Representatives awaited him. Their emotion was no less intense and profound than that of everybody else. With arms outstretched, the country's spokesmen seemed to long to embrace the King, to tell him—for the last time, perhaps—how the nation worshipped its independence and the institutions which she had freely bestowed upon herself eighty-four years before.

Those who were present at the scene will never forget it, and very, very few are they who, having witnessed it, could honestly deny that they shed tears as the King passed, while they voiced their love of the fatherland in frenzied shrieks of "Vive le Roi!"

At the window at which I was then standing, and at the others in the same room, were most of the higher officials of the department. Clerks and ushers were mingled with them, and a few ladies had found their way in and added their acclamations to ours. The Comtesse X., wife of a young officer in the Guides, who was to meet a glorious death before the foe a few days later, was among the most agitated. In the middle of the room, a little apart from the rest, stood the counselor of the Austro-Hungarian Le-

gation. His presence there was accidental; he had come with some communication from his Government, altogether foreign, it may be, to the dramatic events of the moment. He was unable to withstand the universal emotion that encompassed him. I did not see him until I turned away from the window after the King had entered; he was wiping the tears from his eyes.

Outside the tumult continued unabated. Beside the park, General de Coune, who commanded the Civic Guard, rose in his stirrups and revived the acclamations of the crowd by his enthusiastic vivats, punctuated by windmill-like wavings of his sword, long after the King had disappeared.

Oh, the sacred and unforgettable emotion that those Belgians lived through on that morning who were privileged to assist at that triumphant apotheosis of the plighted faith, that superb affirmation of the will to live, of a whole people!

I was not present at the historic joint session of the Chambers, but an eyewitness told me that it would be impossible to describe its grandeur.

In that deeply moved assemblage, where the King could declare that there was but one party, that of the fatherland, many military uniforms stood out in relief. That of M. Hubin was espe-

cially remarked—a Socialist Deputy, formerly Sergeant of Carabineers, who had re-entered the service—and that of the Duc d'Ursel, a Catholic Senator, who had enlisted the day before as a private in the Guides, at the age of 41!

Customarily, and very naturally, the diplomatic gallery of a Parliament is not a place where the sentiments of the legislative body find a very distinct echo. On that day, when the King declared that a country which defends itself compels universal respect and cannot perish; when M. de Broqueville hurled at Germany his admirable defiance, "We may be conquered—but submit, never!" when the whole hall seemed likely to fall in under the frenzied acclamations of the hemi-cycle and the galleries, the epic grandeurs of the spectacle drew tears from the eyes of more than one foreign diplomat. Those tears did honor to those who shed them no less than to those whose splendid courage caused them to flow.

On the following day Brussels learned of the first battles at Visé, and the successful resistance of the Liège forts to the formidable onrush of five corps d'élite of the German Army.

By resolutely carrying political honor to its extremest consequences, Belgium had, at a single stroke, entered into glory.

Official Text of the German Ultimatum to Belgium

Note handed in on Aug. 2, 1914, at 7 o'clock P. M. by Herr von Below-Saleske, German Minister, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, 2d August, 1914.

Imperial German Legation in Belgium.
[Highly Confidential.]

The German Government has received reliable information according to which the French forces intend to march on the Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France of marching on Germany through Belgian territory. The Imperial German Government cannot avoid the fear that Belgium, in spite of its best will, will be in no position to repulse such a largely developed French march

without aid. In this fact there is sufficient certainty of a threat directed against Germany.

It is an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to forestall this attack of the enemy.

The German Government would feel keen regret if Belgium should regard as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of the enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to violate Belgian territory.

In order to dissipate any misunderstanding the German Government declares as follows:

1. Germany does not contemplate any act of hostility against Belgium. If Belgium consents in the war about to commence to take up an attitude of friendly neutrality toward

Germany, the German Government on its part undertakes, on the declaration of peace, to guarantee the kingdom and its possessions in their whole extent.

2. Germany undertakes under the conditions laid down to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as peace is concluded.

3. If Belgium preserves a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in agreement with the authorities of the Belgian Government, to buy against cash all that is required by her troops, and to give indemnity for the damages caused in Belgium.

4. If Belgium behaves in a hostile manner toward the German troops, and in particular

raises difficulties against their advance by the opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse, or by destroying roads, railways, tunnels, or other engineering works, Germany will be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this case Germany will take no engagements toward Belgium, but she will leave the later settlement of relations of the two States toward one another to the decision of arms. The German Government has a justified hope that this contingency will not arise and that the Belgian Government will know how to take suitable measures to hinder its taking place. In this case the friendly relations which unite the two neighboring States will become closer and more lasting.

The Reply by Belgium

Note handed in by M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below-Saleske, German Minister.

Brussels, 3d August, 1914.
(7 o'clock in the morning.)

By the note of the 2d August, 1914, the German Government has made known that according to certain intelligence the French forces intend to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur and that Belgium, in spite of her good-will, would not be able without help to beat off an advance of the French troops.

The German Government felt it to be its duty to forestall this attack and to violate Belgian territory. Under these conditions Germany proposes to the King's Government to take up a friendly attitude, and undertakes at the moment of peace to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and of her possessions in their whole extent. The note adds that if Belgium raises difficulties to the forward march of the German troops Germany will be compelled to consider her as an enemy and to leave the later settlement of the two States toward one another to the decision of arms.

This note caused profound and painful surprise to the King's Government.

The intentions which it attributed to France are in contradiction with the express declarations which were made to us on the 1st of August, in the name of the Government of the republic.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation,

a violation of Belgian neutrality were to be committed by France, Belgium would fulfill all her international duties and her army would offer the most vigorous opposition to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, establish the independence and the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the powers, and particularly of the Government of his Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality or to make it respected.

The attempt against her independence with which the German Government threatens her would constitute a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies the violation of that law.

The Belgian Government would, by accepting the propositions which are notified to her, sacrifice the honor of the nation while at the same time betraying her duties toward Europe.

Conscious of the part Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, she refuses to believe that the independence of Belgium can be preserved only at the expense of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope were disappointed the Belgian Government has firmly resolved to repulse by every means in her power any attack upon her rights.

[See Text of Belgian Neutrality Treaty on following page.]



Text of Treaty Guaranteeing Belgium's Neutrality

The following summary of the treaty stipulations which Germany violated when invading Belgium is taken from a Belgian official statement:

THE peculiarity about Belgian neutrality is that it has been imposed upon her by the powers as the one condition upon which they recognized her national existence. No sooner had the Belgians proclaimed their independence than the five powers—England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia—met in conference in London. There they signed, on June 26, 1831, the document known as "The Treaty of 18 Articles." The text of Articles 9 and 10 of the said treaty is as follows:

"Article 9. Belgium, within the limits traced in conformity with the principles laid down in the present preliminaries, shall form a perpetually neutral State. The five powers, without wishing to intervene in the internal affairs of Belgium, guarantee her that perpetual neutrality as well as the integrity and

inviolability of her territory in the limits mentioned in the present article.

"Article 10. By just reciprocity Belgium shall be held to observe this same neutrality toward all the other States and to make no attack on their internal or external tranquillity while always preserving the right to defend herself against any foreign aggression."

This agreement was followed up, on Jan. 23, 1839, by a definitive treaty, accepted by Belgium and by the Netherlands, which treaty regulates Belgium's neutrality as follows:

"Article 7. Belgium, within the limits defined in Articles 1, 2, and 4, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. She is obligated to preserve this neutrality against all the other States."

All the articles of this treaty were placed under the guarantee of the powers. Belgium has always loyally and strictly fulfilled her duties inherent in this neutrality.

German Claims That Belgium's Neutrality Was Forfeited

DR. KARL RATHGEN, Director of the College of Political Economy and Colonial Politics at the University of Hamburg, and one of Germany's chief authorities in his field, devotes an article in No. 162 of the "Preussische Jahrbücher" to an investigation of the motives which induced Belgium, years before the war, to enter into a military agreement with Great Britain. That this agreement invalidated Belgium's claim to be considered a "guaranteed neutral State" is the German contention. Dr. Rathgen thus defines the reason: "The fear of losing its Congo possessions was one of the chief motives of the Belgian Government before the war. This led to the military plans."

"As soon as the idea of transferring the Congo State from the possession of Leopold II. to the Belgian State, clear-sighted politicians," says Dr. Rathgen, "expressed the fear that Belgium's

secure position was forfeited by this step. Through its neutralization the Belgian State was exempt from the opposition of the groups of powers in Europe; the Congo State, which was not neutralized, was exposed to it, however, since the European rivals, England, France, and Germany, as well as the Portuguese African possessions and South African Rhodesia, surrounded it and gave free rein to their rivalry within its territory. From the day of its incorporation, Nov. 15, 1908, anxiety in regard to the Congo State drove Belgium from the secure position which it had formerly occupied.

"Fear of British lust for expansion assumed especial significance. This fear existed while King Leopold II. had exercised despotic control of the territory. The State had been called into life against England's opposition, and the vehemence with which all King Leopold's plans of expansion to the northeast toward the Nile were greeted showed that

this opposition was implacable. The English peril seemed to become especially dangerous because of the claims which the South African Union was making more and more openly on the southeastern corner of the State, the district of Catanga. The protection of the mixed breeds in the mining districts here furnished the English with the pretext of intervening in the independence of the Transvaal. In Brussels a repetition of a Jameson raid on Catanga was feared daily. Added to this was the open British threat to segregate Southern Catanga entirely from the rest of the Congo State 'to prevent the sleeping sickness from spreading.' Every discovery of gold and diamonds was carefully reported in order to increase English greed.

"Smuts, the South African Minister of War and Finance, declared at Pretoria on Oct. 22, 1913: 'The day is not far off on which all or almost all the territory south of the equator will belong to the South African colony.'

"Botha, in an address a few days later at Nigilstrom, emphasized these words by declaring that 'the highest goal of South Africa is a union which shall extend as far as possible to the north.'


"Excitement over these utterances was rife in Belgium. When the Belgian Consul General in Johannesburg still pointed out the danger of the South Africans 'trekking' to Catanga and the Vice Governor of Catanga officially discussed the danger of an invasion, the Belgian Government greatly feared, as Waxweiler states in his work, 'Belgium Neutral and Loyal,' a British menace to its colony in case of a European war.

"This anxiety was increased by the indignation of the British from 1900 on at the atrocities of the Belgian system of exploitation in the Congo, which were reported from authoritative sources. The

Government endeavored to quell this indignation, it is true, but it spread further and further. The importance of public opinion was shown in the attitude of the British Government. The alarm in Belgium was great. Fears were also awakened by the fact that the British Government postponed from month to month the official recognition of the annexation of the Congo State by Belgium on Nov. 15, 1908, although it had before this, in the Spring of 1906, urged this step, even forced it by its threats of intervention in the Congo.

"When the French press, however, with an unequalled wealth of slanderous vituperation, began, from the Summer of 1911 on, its campaign against Germany, one of its most potent slogans was 'German greed wants to have the Congo State.' The Belgian Government of King Albert ceased to exercise that calm of deliberation which it had shown at the time of Leopold II., to the chagrin of Edward VII. Despite the friendly attitude of Germany, which it had always enjoyed since the establishment of the Congo State, harried and nervous from fear of German attack, scourged by the goading French press, held in suspense by England's delay in recognizing the incorporation of the Congo, it flung itself into the latter's arms for protection. On April 30, 1913, it forced the Belgian Chamber to accept the great Belgian military law demanded by the British negotiators, and on May 29 of the same year Sir Edward Grey announced in the House of Commons the recognition of the incorporation of the Congo in the Belgian State, with the refusal of which the country had been frightened and goaded for five years."

Dr. Rathgen concludes: "With the halter of fear for the Congo, Belgium was driven into the stable of the Entente."



The Self-Revelation of the German War Party Before the War

By E. W. Hallifax

The significance of this remarkable article, here summarized from *The Hibbert Journal*, lies in the completeness with which the German war party's object was perceived and denounced in a German book that appeared in 1913.

THE most complete and crushing ex post facto indictment of Germany and Austria that has been formulated was published last Spring in Lausanne—and from a German pen. With merciless persistency and acuteness the author of "J'Accuse" unravels the web of fiction, distortion, and suppression which German and Austrian diplomacy wove around its plot to bring about the world war, and succeeded at least in deluding a large part, if not the majority, of the German Nation. For the delusion of a defensive war was beyond doubt necessary even in the degenerate Germany of today, in order to still the surviving conscience and weld the whole people into one.

But there had not been wanting in Germany even before the war men who perceived the dangerous character of the influences that were at work, and raised warning voices against the war crusade that was being preached. Such, among the books which appeared in 1913, were the anonymous "German World Policy Without War" and Professor Dr. Nippold's "German Chauvinism." The ante factum indictment of the latter volume and the evidence, alluded to by the author of "J'Accuse," which it adduces, throw a searchlight on the mind of Germany during the period 1912-14, and form a striking pendant and supplement to the reasoning of that remarkable book. To readers who have not access to the original some account of it may therefore be of interest.

"German Chauvinism," one of a series of publications of the Union for the Promotion of International Understanding, consists mainly of a selection, from a mass of material "which would fill vol-

umes," of 109 closely printed pages taken from reports of speeches and newspaper articles dealing with the coming war. In his preface Dr. Nippold remarks: "There is no doubt that chauvinism has prodigiously increased in Germany, especially in the last decade. This fact strikes those most who have lived a considerable number of years abroad and now return to Germany. Many Germans in this position have expressed to me their surprise at the fundamental change which has taken place in the soul of the German people in recent years. I, too, can state that I was astonished at this psychological change, when after many years I returned to Germany." The author then allows the war party to reveal themselves in their own speeches and writings, some specimens of which are printed below, and sums up the evidence in a concluding essay, of which the following is a condensed paraphrase:

The chauvinism or fanatical nationalism of which these pages give proofs [thus wrote Dr. Nippold in 1913] not only combines exaggerated self-exaltation with contempt and hostility for foreign nations, thus relapsing into the barbarian notions of antiquity, but, supported by Pan-German ambitions on the one side and the agitation of the Armaments League on the other, it glorifies war as an end in itself and incites the German people to war in a way that a few years ago would have been considered impossible. Still worse, a deliberate system is revealed, whose object is by every means, whether it be distortion of facts or malicious calumny, to win over the nation and, if possible, the Government to the aims of the chauvinists. These people, who dislike a long peace, no matter whether a

reason for war exists or not, are systematically educating the German people to desire war, teaching it that it needs war, and endeavoring in any event to bring war about. They begin by inculcating the longing for war in the youth of the nation as the thing most to be desired in life, and work upon the students in the universities, while such organizations as the Pan-German Union and the Armaments League seek to gain the present generation. Here is a typical specimen:

From the *Jungdeutschland Post*, a weekly periodical for the youth of Germany, published by the League of Young Germany. No. 4, Jan. 25, 1913. "War," by Otto von Gottberg.

Honor and duty teach even us Germans and Christians that the souls of the dead and the living are without rest until a contest has ended with the victory and triumph of our arms. * * * Therefore war is the sublimest and most sacred expression of human action. It affords opportunity of sacrificing the highest possessions for one's brethren according to God's command, and bestows eternal life on the brave. We see this when we go on Sunday to the military church of our town. From our hymn books our eyes fall involuntarily on tablets on the walls. Above long, long lists of names are the words: "These died the hero's death with God for King and Fatherland." Let us desire each Sunday to be registered some day upon those tablets. Then we shall live forever and be envied centuries hence. * * * For us, too, the great and joyous hour of conflict will one day strike. * * * Into the street where we walk today with merry chatter and laughter there will soon fall, still moist, a printed sheet, and from the lips of the first German who reads it there will burst, strong and confident: "A call like echoing thunder sounds." A genuine battle choral is this song, and yet it is thrilled through with the German's exultant joy in war and heroic death. * * * Yes, that will be a great and glad hour, which we may secretly wish for ourselves.

The wish for war when uttered aloud often becomes vain boasting and ludicrous rattling of the sword. But deep and still in the German heart there must live joy in war and a longing for war, because we have enemies enough, and victory comes only to a nation that with music and song goes to war as to a festival. Honor to our lord and ruler who unweariedly guards the world's peace, because he one day has to give account before God's throne not only for Germany's power, honor, and renown, but for every drop of blood shed at his bidding. On his shoulders the anxieties of a conflict will rest with terrific responsibility. We, however, may at his call seize our weapons with light and glad hearts and rejoice in the war. Let us,

then, laugh with all our might at the old women in men's clothes who fear war, and therefore bewail it as dreadful and hateful. No! War is grand. Its august greatness lifts men's hearts high above earthly and commonplace things.

For us, too, such hours are waiting. We will meet them with the manly knowledge that it is grander and nobler after they have passed to live forever on the roll of honor in the church than to die a nameless and common death in our beds. On the world's round antheap we are of importance only as members of a community, of a Fatherland. What becomes of us must and ought to be indifferent to us. Thus did our fathers think, who were able to create the empire only because, along with the resolute will for victory and death, they carried with them to battle their firm, pious faith. A soldier's song tells us how they conceived of their heaven and their reward. Up there in the Hall of Clouds are seated hero Frederick, hero Blücher, the men of the deed, (but not the stay-at-homes who want to make us dislike war.) The great Kaiser, his Moltke, his Roon, his Bismarck, are there. And when a battle is fought on the earth with German weapons, and the faithful slain mount to heaven, a Lance Corporal from Potsdam calls out the guard. Old Fritz leaps from his golden chair, gives the order to present arms, and in imperious tones harangues the Kings and heroes: "Attention, gentlemen! Heroes, too, are they whom I now introduce, and at their head the King's Grenadiers."

Such be Young Germany's Kingdom of Heaven. Thus let it yearn to knock at our doors."

The quintessence of their teaching is that a European war is not merely an eventuality against which it is necessary to be prepared, but a necessity, which in its own interests should be a cause of rejoicing to the German people. The method employed is to set up as an unimpeachable dogma the inevitableness of a war, and then to urge that the time most favorable to Germany should be chosen, in other words, that Germany should bring about war when it best suits her, and, above all, as soon as possible. The German people are believed to be ready, not as of old for a merely defensive war with compelling cause, but for an aggressive war without cause. No longer is it a question of *Si vis pacem, para bellum*, because German national interests require a war; and then, too, what a pity if the splendidly prepared army should be put to no use!

If it is asked to what extent these ideas

have been adopted and assimilated by the nation at large, the answer is that, while the claim of the chauvinists to have the whole nation behind them is false, a great part of the German people has already been infected; and unless the systematic efforts, the arrogant claims, and misrepresentations of the chauvinists are opposed, there is a danger that this movement will gain the upper hand in the near future. The driving forces in this direction are, as the extracts show, organizations like the Pan-German Union and the Armaments League; the nationalist press; Generals such as Keim, Liebert, Bernhardt, Eichhorn, Wrochem, and others who meddle with politics; and politicians like Harden, Bassermann, and their fellows. "When the political situation has cooled down, and causes of war cannot be discerned on the European horizon, they fan the war flame artificially. And they are never so much in their element as when the political situation seems in any way critical, as has frequently happened in recent months. But they would at no time admit that real material for a conflict was wanting. In the absence of any other material as an incitement, the chauvinism in other countries has to serve the purpose. * * * Incidents are of course exploited to the full and exaggerated, no matter whether they are important or not."

Many of these chauvinists [wrote Dr. Nippold] have lost all touch with modern civilization, and indeed with any kind of reality. "Morality and right are conceptions which, as they admit, have little value for them. They set them aside just as they do all the other results that humanity has achieved. * * * Consciously or unconsciously, these gentlemen preach to the German Nation nothing else than barbarism, the mediaeval right of the strongest, as the sole object worth striving for. For what else is it when a predatory war is urged upon the German people, when with this grand purpose it is pressed simply to disregard international law and the limits which morality imposes?"

"That the Pan-German political visionaries are out for the acquisition of colonial territory suits these war Gen-

erals excellently, but they regard it only as means to an end. * * * For, according to their theory, however many colonies Germany acquired, it would need another war after a few decades, since the nation would once more be in danger of moral degeneration. War is to them merely a normal institution in the life of nations, and not simply a means of solving great conflicts to which recourse is had only in case of real necessity. * * * They brand as weak what is said by Governments as to defensive war and the world's need of peace. While other chauvinists at least assume a war to be forced upon Germany—although in fact no one wants to force a war on Germany, this idea being part of the means of suggestion employed by the Pan-Germans—the war Generals have no need of this motive. They are fully prepared to force a war on others. * * * Germany is far more threatened today with danger from itself than from abroad. The Balkan war seemed at last to give the lovers of war their longed-for opportunity. Now they are the more disappointed that even this occasion, which seemed to hold the last great material for a European conflict, has apparently passed by without one."

Dr. Nippold finds grave reason for concern in the fact that these preachers of war have secured so numerous a public, and one so ready to give ear to and blindly to follow them, and that their influence is extending over ever-widening circles. Especially are the educated classes infected, and that this infection is general is proved by the small number of the younger historians who have escaped it.

The political as distinct from the moral danger which threatens from these influences becomes grave as soon as they have the power to affect the decisions of the Government. This may soon come about under the pretense that the chauvinists represent and are identical with the nation. Further, they do mischief abroad and are taken as typical of German feeling, thus earning for Germany the reputation of being the chief disturber of European peace. "But this is certain. If there is anything that could really en-



NICHOLAS PASHITCH

**Serbian Prime Minister, Who, Though an Exile in Italy, Still Helps
to Direct Serbia's Destinies**



KING GUSTAV V. OF SWEDEN

Whose Country Is Disturbed by Reports That Russia Is Fortifying
the Aland Islands in the Baltic
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)

danger the German Empire, it is solely and exclusively the chauvinistic movement and the risk of its gaining the upper hand. This, and not the Triple Entente, is the enemy of Germany. * * * Chauvinism is a political danger against which the country cannot be warned with sufficient speed and energy."

How is the sudden growth of chauvinism in Germany to be explained? The nation has failed to see the new and great international tasks in which since its union it has been called upon to share. Its gaze has been turned backward to the deeds which founded the empire instead of forward to its mission in co-operation with other nations, which mission, together with internal development, would have offered a worthy field for the energies of a rising State. "Conscious of its strength, it has yearned for great deeds, and, missing the true ideal, has given ear to those whose ideal is war. The 'deed' about which the chauvinistic papers are always writing, what is it but 'a gay and festive war,' equivalent to a predatory expedition? Such a predatory policy may have been an ideal of the Middle Ages, but it is one for which there is not and never will be room in the modern civilized world." But Germany disregarded the tasks in behalf of civilization which called for her help, and even set herself in opposition to them, e. g., to the labors of The Hague Conferences. With the catchword "internationalism" she thrust them away. For her feeling of nationhood was too youthful, and she feared it might suffer harm. "Thus Germany failed to recognize the true goal, * * * and threw herself into the arms of the chauvinists who preach * * * war, notwithstanding that today the interests which the nations possess in common far preponderate, and that national tasks have therefore no need of war for their fulfillment." This is shown even for those who advocate an "expansion policy" in the recent publication, "German World Policy Without War."

Thus does a German, more than a year before the outbreak of war, describe the efforts made in Germany to provoke a

war. That Dr. Nippold and the members of his society do not stand alone in their fears and warnings is shown by sixteen extracts in which other writers, and such journals as the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, the *Vossische Zeitung*, and the *Strassburger Neue Zeitung*, bear similar witness.

An article in *März* by Ludwig Thoma, entitled "Poisoners," on March 29, 1913, tells the same tale: For a moment quiet reigns after the furious strife, and calm voices are heard declaring the instigation to war of the last few weeks to be criminal folly. In reality the noise is all about nothing. The German and French Governments are agreed about the questions in dispute, (viz., the Lunéville and Nancy incidents,) both swear they are armed only for defense; the two peoples have no cause of quarrel nor any intention of adventuring their lives and their well-being in war. Whence, then, the distrust, rage, hatred, the shrieks and threats? Not from events, deeds, or desires of conquest. No! render to the chauvinistic press its due. It has conquered. This is its work. A public speech is incomplete without an allusion to the time when we must stake all we hold dear. Interest in scientific inventions is concentrated on them as means of destruction, and is shown by calculating how many hundredweights of dynamite can be hurled down by a Zeppelin. "Everything is poisoned, and this we owe to the nationalistic press. Honor to whom honor is due." It should be noted that the 110 militant extracts, taken from nearly fifty different newspapers, are selected by Dr. Nippold from thousands of speeches and articles of similar tenor. He adds that the worst of them are far exceeded in warlike tone by many recent pamphlets, of which only the titles are quoted, e. g., "The End of France in 19??: a Forecast." * * *

With the aid of the captured Government the Pan-German faction accomplished in the last days of July, 1914, the capture of the remnant of the nation. How completely it has mastered both, recent history makes all too plain.

The Bagdad Railway and a Remarkable Arabian Sultan

[WRITTEN FOR CURRENT HISTORY]

WHERE will the Bagdad Railway end? That is the chief question the war will decide, so far as German *Weltpolitik* is concerned.

Before the war, Berlin, by long and determined negotiations, induced Constantinople and London to allow the extension of the railroad to Busrah, the port of Mesopotamia, on the Shatt Al Arab, the Arab River, sixty miles from the Persian Gulf. If Germany determines the terms of peace after the present war, there is no doubt that the *Bagdadbahn* will have its terminus at Kuweit, 100 miles south of Busrah and right on the Persian Gulf. That would give Germany a base from which, in the next war, she could seize India from the British.

In November, 1899, the Kaiser got his concession for the Bagdad Railway from the Turkish Sultan, Abdul Hamid. In 1900 he tried to get a concession for the terminus of that railway at Kuweit from Sheik Mubarak, the ruler of that town. He was one year too late. In January of 1899 Sheik Mubarak had cast in his lot with the British. He had agreed to follow their advice in all his dealings with foreigners. In return they gave him their protection. He needed it, for in 1901 a Turkish corvette came to Kuweit to carry him off to Constantinople. A British warship arrived just then and drove the Turks

away. When the Germans came to lease twenty square miles of his land, Sheik Mubarak refused to have anything to do with them. It was because Sheik Mubarak so effectually blocked the German plans for a port on the gulf that the British were able to hold up the full development of German ambitions in the Orient.

In is only in the light of these facts that the importance of the approaching battle of Bagdad can be appreciated. The Germans will have to help the Turks to drive the British from the whole Mesopotamian valley before they will be able to get by war what they could not gain by negotiation. That they are determined to succeed there is evident. One of the first measures introduced into the present Turkish Parliament was a bill for a loan of £T2,-

112,000 (\$10,000,000) to be raised in Germany for the completion of the Bagdad Railway.

Now one of the chief characters in this Near East drama has passed away. Sheik Mubarak has died at Kuweit. Whether this introduces any new element into the situation remains to be seen. But the Germans will probably have no more success in dealing with Sheik Jabir, the son and successor, than they had with Sheik Mubarak himself. The latter was nearly 80 years old, and the British, in their treaties with him, planned for his heir as well as himself.



SHEIK MUBARAK


Sheik Mubarak was a most interesting personality. He was a typical Oriental ruler. In many ways he reminded one of Haroun al-Raschid. In all his dealings with the British, however completely he was guided by them in his foreign relations, he never allowed them to interfere in the least in his domestic affairs. He was absolutely independent, as far as his own subjects were concerned. He showed his power in ways that Western rulers use only in times of war. The result was that he was known as a "strong" governor. But as only evil-doers had to fear his punishment, his dominion prospered. Life and property were so safe that Kuwait imitated America in attracting immigrants from Turkey, Persia, and other places where disturbances were too frequent for business prosperity. During the twenty years of Mubarak's reign, Kuwait's population continually increased until it now numbers 50,000 persons. It was always hard to find an empty house in the town, although new ones were constantly being built.

Some months before his death Sheik Mubarak received the decoration of K. C. S. I., (Knight Commander of the Star of India.) On that occasion Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, then Viceroy of India, made a formal visit to Kuwait while on his way to Busrah, which had been captured from the Turks. The form of address had some significant elements that showed that the position of Kuwait was no longer anomalous, nominally Turkish but practically British. Lord Hardinge, in making the presentation,

said: "This is a token of regard from the King-Emperor in grateful recognition of your loyal co-operation and efforts to preserve order and quiet in his dominions." Kuwait is now in the India postal system, to show that it is a British protectorate. But it has its own flag,

with the word Al Kuwait in Arabic in white on a red field, to show that it is independent.

Mubarak's dominion included the town of Kuwait itself and about 100 miles of territory to the south and west and fifty miles to the north. His influence extended much further. Partly because of his age, always a matter of regard among the Arabs, and partly because of the strategic position of his town as the best harbor on the gulf and the seaport for Central Arabia, he maintained a strong place in the politics of all the Arab tribes from Mecca in the



KUWEIT IS A CENTRE OF THE PEARLING INDUSTRY AND OF CARAVAN TRADE.

west to Ahwaz in Persia, and from Narsaria on the Euphrates to Katif in El Hassa. He aided his friend Sheik Khazal in subduing the rebellious Bakhtiari Arabs in Western Persia, and he induced Abd al Aziz, the Emir of Nejd, to acknowledge the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan over El Hassa. His native counsel will be missed and his influence over the Arabs will be longed for in settling the affairs of that increasingly important part of the world.

Sheik Mubarak was practically illiterate. He could read nothing but the handwriting of his own secretaries. But it would be a great mistake to infer that he was ignorant. While ability to read and write would have been invaluable to him, still he was wise beyond the fathom-

ing of his few educated subjects. Nor would a Westerner, after a conversation with him, think of calling him unenlightened and uninteresting. His portrait shows the shrewd, strong character of the man. When Mubarak came to the throne, on the death of his father and older brother, Kuwait was an Arab town out of contact with the world and untouched by modern influence. Not a white man lived in the place. But the new Sheik encouraged ships to come there. He welcomed a British political

agent. He invited American missionaries to establish a dispensary and bookstore there. He introduced the first telephone, automobile, and electric light in the town. Old as he was, he was more progressive than most of his subjects cared to be. He modernized his kingdom as rapidly as he could. It is to be hoped that his successor will follow in his father's footsteps.

If the Germans win the war, the town will be Europeanized in short order, whether the present ruler desires it or not.

With the Russians in Persia

By E. Simais

L'Illustration, which has from the very beginning of the war been distinguished by the excellence of its first-hand material, not only describing events in France, but also covering the Russian and Serbian fields, and going as far from home as the Cameroons and China, now gives what is the first intelligible account of Russia's startlingly dramatic campaign in Persia, the importance of which in world politics is greatly increased by the collapse of the English campaign in Mesopotamia. Russia's victory in the East, not only over Germany, but over her old rival and present ally, seems to be complete.

Germany's plan, intrusted to her representative in Persia, Prince Henry of Reuss, was to make the Shah's realm a bridge between the Turkish Empire and India over which would sweep the wave of the Holy War against the "infidel" Allies; the proclamation of the Holy War against Christians having been obtained by Kaiser Wilhelm from the Sheik ul Islam, as the Kaiser's published telegram to the Crown Prince shows. Russia's plan was, in part, to break down this bridge, thus helping her ally, England; in part, to provide a strong left flank movement for her advance from the Caucasus into Armenia and down the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. She has brilliantly succeeded in both these objects, and her prestige is now further increased by the surrender of General Townshend's army at Kut-el-Amara.

THE Germans, in their plan to involve Persia in the war, had reckoned on the following elements in their favor: An irresolute sovereign, and Government internally divided between the two tendencies which just now divide the world, a vast country almost devoid of all organized means of communication, the absence of a regular army that might serve as the basis of authority, and, so far, no means of assuring the collection of taxes with any regularity. In these troubled waters Germany fished.


Their first incitement to revolt against Russian influence had at least a partial success in the interior of Persia, notably at Ispahan, where, after the assassination of M. Vonkaver, the Russian Consul, and the attempted assassination of the English Consul, every European who was

not a German was forced to flee from the city and take refuge at Teheran. The same thing happened at Kermanshah, Hamadan, Sultanabad, and Shiraz. At this point the Russian Government, in conjunction with England, addressed a note to the Persian Government, demanding that the Persian troops who had entered German service should be disarmed. In his reply the Shah declared his inability to compel this disarming, and in consequence his powerlessness to answer for the lives of Europeans belonging to the allied nations.

Russia, therefore, sent a force of 24,000 men who, at the end of last October, disembarked at Enseli, on the south shore of the Caspian Sea, some seventy or eighty miles from the nearest seaport in the Russian Caucasus, and at the head of the caravan road through Resht to Teheran.

From this point the Russian force advanced along the road as far as Kasbin. The effect of this move was soon felt. As soon as it was officially announced that 4,000 Russian soldiers had left Kasbin for Yeng-Iman, a considerable village about fifty miles from Teheran, the Germans became seriously alarmed, and with them their Persian supporters and armed

Henry of Reuss and his accomplices had established an ascendancy over the Shah who, at their instance, and terrified by the picture which they painted for him of the Russian invasion, had decided to transfer the Persian Government from Teheran to Ispahan. The Shah therefore ordered preparations for departure to be made. On Nov. 14, at 11 A. M., every



RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN IN PERSIA

forces. Alarm became panic, when, on Nov. 14, they learned that 1,000 Russians, who had arrived that morning at Herej, twenty-five miles from Teheran, were marching on the capital.

All the furniture and archives of the German Legation were transported during the night to the American Legation, which was forced to hire a large building to store them in. The Austrian Legation turned its effects over to the Spanish Minister. As for Turkey, her representatives loaded all their possessions on carts drawn by an odd assortment of animals, and fled with them to Shah Abdul Azim. The German Minister betook himself to Kum, the second holy city in Persia after Meshed, between eighty and ninety miles south of Teheran; and there he organized a pretended Committee of Defense, as against the influence of Russia. Shortly after this the Russian advance in Central Persia forced the Germans and their committee to evacuate Kum, and to go first to Kashan and then to Ispahan.

Before these later developments Prince

hired vehicle in Teheran, to the number of 300, was requisitioned, as well as all available horses, donkeys, mules, and camels. The Teheran police and the Persian gendarmes, under the orders of their Swedish instructors, left the city to take up posts along the road from Teheran to Kum, which the Shah was to take.

But the Shah had not finally made up his mind. For five days he gave audiences alternately to the Ministers of Austria and Turkey, who were persuading him to depart, and to the representatives of Russia and England, who wished to keep him. The last won. Like a skillful diplomat, the Russian Minister promised the Shah that the Czar's troops would not pass Yeng-Iman if he remained in Teheran; the Shah remained. Then followed what the Germans have not hesitated to call a grand transformation scene, and what was in reality a bit of comedy shameful enough for its pitiable actors; the Swedish officers, Major Fric, Major de Mare, and Major Helstroem, and Captain Hellemare, who was in com-

mand of the Second Regiment of Gendarmes, refused to return with the First Regiment and the police, which adhered to the Government, and went over, bag and baggage, to the Germans. The Swedish Government later disclaimed all responsibility for the acts of these Swedish officers.

Relying on the promise of the Russians not to enter the capital, the Germans recommenced, directly or by their agents, their campaign of propaganda in Teheran itself.

To triumph over the influence of Russia, they counted especially on arousing a fever of fanaticism among the Persians, worked up by their priests on the day of the Ashura, (the tenth day of the month of Mohurram, the first month of their year.) On that day certain fanatics, wearing long shirts of white cloth and armed with swords, slashed their shaven heads, crying out "Hassan-Hussein!—Death to the Russians and the English!" In this fashion they passed through the principal districts of the city, sprinkling with red the streets and the passersby, some of whom, infected by their fever, distributed among themselves pieces torn from the blood-stained shirts. Leaders pronounced orations to disturb the populace. Groups discussed the "Russian menace," which was problematical, and the "German promises," which were even more so.

Very fortunately, there was more idle trifling than genuine emotion in all this. The arrival of the Russian troops had the effect of a stone fung into a flock of sparrows. The leaders fled without thought of coming back, and the people of Teheran, coming to their senses, recovered the calm which befits peaceable Orientals, whose only enemy is adventure.

The Russian Government, or rather the Grand Duke Nicholas, Viceroy of the Caucasus, whose spirit of energy and decision are so widely recognized, had not hesitated, in presence of the German bravado, which was tolerated, if not actually encouraged by the weakness of the Persian Government, to push forward an imposing force into the heart of Persia. It should be added at once that

this was to render the Shah the greatest service by putting at his disposal, or at least at the disposal of the forces of order, a powerful army. And it was thus that, on Jan. 8, 1916, General Baratoff in person, the Commander in Chief of the Russian Armies in Persia, accompanied by his staff, was in a position to review the "Cossack Brigade" on the Teheran review ground.

The history of this brigade is odd enough. In 1878 the Shah Nasr ed Din, on a visit to St. Petersburg, was so strongly impressed by the martial bearing of the Cossacks of the Imperial Guard that he forthwith arranged with certain officers of the Czar to organize a similar bodyguard for him at Teheran. Since then, the Cossack Brigade of the Shahs has always been supplied with Russian officers. It forms the only military body in Persia which is composed of clean, disciplined, well clothed, well armed, and regularly paid soldiers. Besides these Cossacks the Government forces consisted of police and gendarmes, placed under the order of Swedish officers. We have seen what German money effected among them.

There is also, it is true, a Persian "army." But certain explanations are necessary to make clear the exact meaning which is to be given to that expression. Faithful supporters of his Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia, these soldiers pay no attention to politics, and consider their bayonettes as handy cleavers to chop wood or to cut up a sheep. The cities are not called on to furnish recruits; the human tribute is drawn from the villages. The number of men whom they must supply to the State is proportional to the amount of taxes that they pay, and is calculated at the rate of 100 tomans per head. In other words, in obedience to the "Bonitche" law, a village paying 500 tomans in taxes must, in addition, furnish five soldiers—at least if called upon to do so. And in this case the money will serve to maintain the men in the army, to which the proprietor of the village must send them. As the law lays down no limits of age or strength, the proprietor sends whom he pleases, and unless he himself hap-

pens to be a regimental General, is very careful not to deprive himself of men who are really fit for agricultural work. The same thing happens where the village belongs to several small proprietors. We must not forget that, in Persia, we are still in the epoch of feudalism, and that every peasant is the serf of a lord of the manor.

The number of intermediate ranks in the Persian Army is insignificant. The organization consists chiefly of Generals. Of these, there are four ranks—the Sarpit, a General commanding theoretically 100 men; the Mirpench, with 500 men; the Amir Toman, with 1,000 men, and, finally, the Sidar, the General over 5,000 men, who is a sort of Field Marshal. Their principal revenue is drawn from the exploitation of the right conferred on them by their commissions to raise a number of men corresponding to their rank. As every soldier must offer a sheep to his officer each year, the latter's only concern is to count his sheep, leaving his men to their own devices, and every one is happy.

In the last forty years the Persian Government has several times tried European instructors, of many nationalities. Their efforts are immediately confronted by an insurmountable difficulty, as the most insignificant European Corporal cannot, for the reasons already indicated, hold a rank inferior to that of General—save for the sheep tribute, be it understood. But where do Generals drill recruits? No prestige could stand it. The only memory the old Persian soldiers have preserved of these attempts is that the officers tried to make them march, and that no one ever succeeded in so doing.

The Shah's Government decided, late in the day, to dismiss the army, and to consecrate the money it cost to the formation of a body of gendarmes under Swedish officers. We have seen that the experiment did not succeed, and that the sole support of the Government, except for the Russian expeditionary corps, was the Cossack brigade. The effective force of the latter, which began with 1,000 men, has just been raised to 10,000.

THE RUSSIAN FORCE

Two facts, in themselves unimportant enough, made an impression on the Persians.

The first was the arrival at Kazer Kadjar, the camp of the Cossack brigade, of the first aeroplane, piloted by a Russian aviator—the machine was a Blériot. The excitement was so great that the Shah himself went to the landing place. The officers strongly insisted that his Majesty should enter the machine and be photographed. Their prayers were in vain. The Shah, overcome by misgivings, was in dread that the machine might suddenly take flight and carry off its precious passenger. He would only consent to mount on a bench, placed behind the pilot, convinced that in this way the illusion would be complete. But, when the proof was printed, the imperial legs were visible below! * * *

But the impression caused by the aeroplane was a small thing compared with the effect produced by the first Russian armor-clad automobile which passed through Teheran on its way to Kum, in pursuit of the rebels. This auto, with the very latest improvements, was armed with two machine guns at the sides and a three-inch quick-firing gun behind, and provided also with a searchlight and a periscope. With its guns, and without the men needed to work it, this war auto weighs 8,400 kilograms, and can do forty-five kilometers an hour, (twenty-eight miles.) Two inscriptions in Arabic adorn its sides; one is the word of the Prophet Mohammed: "All that has been created will perish; all that man builds shall fall." The Moslems must, of necessity, feel a profound respect for the men who are masters of such a mechanism as this! The other inscription reads thus: "I give death only to my enemies, while I protect my friends."

But the real discovery was the painting of death's heads at the four corners of the auto. The mere sight of this motor-fort produced a complete right-about in the minds of the local Russophobes; every one became, or declared himself to be, Russophile. Such is Persian character; for four months the Germans had been promising two Prussian

army corps, the first battalion of which had not appeared, while the power of Russia had become visible.

As may be seen, the Russians did not neglect any of the refinements of diplomacy. But they knew how to back it up by military force, the only kind that counts. As early as Dec. 21, at Rabat Karim, situated 40 kilometers (25 miles) to the south of Teheran, 300 Cossacks completely defeated 1,400 gendarmes and volunteers, commanded by the celebrated Swedes, killing 218 men. This was only a skirmish.

On Jan. 2, Russian scouts fell in with a Turkish army 14,000 strong, at Sanj-Bulak, in the province of Azerbaijan, to the south of Tauris. At Mian-do-Ab they rejoined the Russian advance guard which, in face of the numerical superiority of the enemy, retired on Maraga, where the bulk of the Russian force, numbering 18,000, was. The Turks, by forced marches, rushed into the jaws of the wolf, and after five days' fighting left their artillery and 10,000 prisoners in the hands of the Russians. Never before had the Sultan's troops suffered such a defeat in Persia. The tribes that were hostile to Russia fled instantly to their mountains.

The Grand Duke Nicholas on Jan. 6 visited Julfa, a town on the Russo-Persian frontier, to learn the result of the battle of Maraga. He went

back to Tiflis as soon as he knew that victory was won.

The Russian army operating in the province of Azerbaijan, on the Turkish frontier, was under General Chernozuloff, who had been for three years Colonel of the Cossack brigade at Teheran. By the end of January the Russian forces occupied the towns of Kum, Kashan, Hamadan, Sultanabad, and Kengaver, in Central Persia. The bands of rebels and the German officers were massed at Sahneh, between Kengaver and Kermanshah, supported by Turkish regulars. The Czar's force, well supplied with artillery, advanced slowly but surely. Its losses were insignificant compared with those of the Persian bands. The latter, recruited from the tribes of Luristan and Kurdistan, levy taxes for their own purposes, oppress the inhabitants, pillage the villages. The rôle of the Germans, who have ceased to command in the military sense of the word, consists in organizing brigandage to supply the want of money which is already felt; for the attempt to issue paper money guaranteed by the German Government was a fiasco. Not a day passes without the inhabitants of the villages thus maltreated coming to implore the protection of the nearest Russian troops. General Baratoff's energy and strategic ability are rapidly clearing Persia of these German officers who are brigand chiefs, unworthy of the name of soldiers.



British Disaster at Kut-el-Amara

General Townshend's Surrender

MAJOR GEN., CHARLES V. TOWNSHEND'S Anglo-Indian expeditionary force, which started out a year ago to capture Bagdad, and which had been besieged since the 8th of last December at Kut-el-Amara, surrendered unconditionally to superior Turkish forces on April 28, after a heroic resistance of 143 days. According to British official figures, the surrendered army consisted of 2,970 English and 6,000 Indian troops; the Turkish figures, which probably include servants and followers of Indian troops, place the total at 13,300. General Townshend destroyed his guns and munitions before yielding, but Khalil Bey, the Turkish commander, captured much booty, including a large sum of money.

The Turkish official report adds:

In addition to General Townshend, we captured at Kut-el-Amara General Povna, Commander of the Sixth Infantry Division; General Dabmack, Commander of the Sixteenth Brigade; General Hamilton, Commander of the Seventeenth Brigade; Colonel Evans, Commander of the Eighteenth Brigade, and an officer named Smith, Commander of Artillery. The number of officers made prisoners is 551, of whom half are Europeans and half Hindus. Of the soldiers captured 25 per cent. are Europeans and the remainder Hindus.

Although the enemy destroyed a large quantity of arms before the fall of Kut-el-Amara and dropped others into the Tigris, we have found up to the present time forty cannon, twenty machine guns, and nearly 5,000 rifles, which will be ready for use after slight repairs have been made. We also took a large amount of ammunition, one large ship, one small ship, four automobiles and three aeroplanes. Arms and ammunition which were dropped into the Tigris are being recovered by us.

This new and dramatic disaster to British arms, second only to that at the Dardanelles, is again a result of underestimating the strength of the enemy. General Townshend and his men have received only praise for the heroic tenacity with which they maintained an impossible position so many months.

The initial blunder is laid at the door of the India Office, which set too large a task for so small a force. The original expedition was under the direction of General Sir John Nixon; after the failure to reach Bagdad he was superseded by General Sir Percy Lake, who is still in general command of the Mesopotamian operations. The fighting, however, has been led throughout by Townshend, Gorringer, and Aylmer. The relief force under Aylmer is still hemmed in a few miles below Kut.

The story of this attempt to capture the legendary location of the Garden of Eden from the Turks and Germans is long and romantic, as well as tragic. It begins with a series of brilliant successes, among the most notable of which was General Townshend's victory over the Turks at Kut-el-Amara in September, 1915, on his way up the Tigris Valley to Bagdad. All the earlier operations have been described in detail by General Nixon in an official report issued April 5, 1916, part of which is reproduced verbatim after the close of the present article. General Nixon's operations to clear Mesopotamia of Turkish resistance were carried on chiefly by collaborating forces under Townshend and Gorringer, consisting of two divisions of Anglo-Indian troops, or a few over 40,000 men. His report covers the six months from April to September, 1915, and includes the following achievements of British troops:

Clearing Persian Arabistan and securing and repairing the pipe line to the oil fields.


General Townshend's advance from Basra toward Bagdad—as far as Ctesiphon.

The battle of Kurna and the capture of the town on May 31 by General Townshend.

The battle of Amara and the taking of that town by General Townshend on June 3, with 740 Turkish prisoners.

The capture of the Arab stronghold of Nasiriyah, on the Euphrates, July 24, with 1,000 prisoners and many rifles and stores.

General Townshend's victory at Kut-el-Amara on Sept. 28, where a strong army



BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA

under Nur-ed-Din Bey was defeated, thus clearing the way for an advance toward Bagdad.

From Kut-el-Amara General Townshend pushed northward, part of his force following the old caravan trail and part the river, where his troops were transported by boats, most of which had been brought from India and were as primitive as those which the Turks and Arabs brought to oppose them. By Nov. 22 he had fought his way nearly 100 miles northward to Ctesiphon, within eighteen miles of Bagdad. There he was attacked by an overwhelming force and suffered a severe defeat. Though he regained the lost ground the next day, he saw nothing but a siege before him. His water supply gave out, and he decided to retrace his steps and await reinforcements. This retirement, accomplished under extraordinary disadvantages, was hailed in England as a remarkable achievement. Not only did General Townshend ward off the pursuing Turks with comparatively small losses, but he succeeded in taking with him all his wounded.

The main body pushed ahead, but on Dec. 5 Townshend determined to make a stand with the rear guards, at the scene of his previous victory, Kut-el-Amara.

This guard, consisting of something over 10,000 men, made an intrenched camp around the place, while the remainder of his force passed on down the Tigris.

Kut-el-Amara is nothing but a mud collection of ramshackle houses on somewhat raised ground. Behind the river front are a mosque and a collection of one or two storied Arab houses.

Three days after he began to intrench, (that is, on Dec. 8,) Townshend's communications with the main body of troops were cut off, and ever since then he has been besieged. Almost daily attacks were made by the Turks. Townshend is said to have captured over 3,000 Turks and Arabs by sorties.

When it became evident that Townshend was so beset that he could not fight his way out, steps were taken to send a relief expedition. Thirty thousand Indian troops were dispatched, and two Anglo-Indian divisions, which had been fighting in France, were transported to the head of the Persian Gulf, making, with the remnants of Townshend's main expedition, a relief force of 90,000 men. General Sir Percy Lake was placed in command of the entire forces, in succession to Sir John Nixon, and com-

mand of the relief expedition itself was given to Major Gen. Aylmer.

This expedition was poorly supplied in regard to transport and river gunboat service, and Aylmer's march up the river again turned to a retreat after the first dash. The march began on Jan. 6, when the advanced guard left Gherbi, about eighty miles by river southeast of Kut-el-Amara. By Jan. 8 he had reached Sheikh Saad, forty miles to the north, where he defeated the Turks in two pitched battles. Between Jan. 15 and 19 he reached Orah, and on Jan. 21 he was at El Gussa, only eight miles from Kut-el-Amara. On the following day he attacked the Es Sinn intrenchments, which the Turks had built across the river eight miles from Kut, but failed to take them. Floods came to add to the trouble, due to lack of equipment, so that his position became almost as precarious as was Townshend's at Ctesiphon. Like him, Aylmer retreated.

Up to this time the campaign had been under the direction of the India Office, but the War Office in London now took a hand, and a large body of Colonials, including the Thirteenth Division of Gallipoli fame, with full equipment and supplies, was sent from Egypt, together with a flotilla of gunboats. In February Aylmer again started from his base at Gherbi, and General Lake himself joined the expedition. By the middle of March the expedition was near El Owasa and defeated the Turks there, after having met with a reverse at Felahie.

On April 5 the British force carried by assault the Turkish intrenched position at Umm-el-Henna, twenty-two miles from Kut-el-Amara. The next day the capture of Felahie was officially announced. Even then the relief expedition was about fifteen miles further away from Townshend's beleaguered force than it was on Jan. 21. Formidable masses of Turks were gathered on both sides of the Tigris below the invested town, holding intrenched and strongly fortified posts to contest the further advance.

The fighting in this region has been severe ever since, but the relief force, although gaining some ground, was never able to win a decisive victory.

The losses on both sides recently have been heavy. On April 14 it was admitted that the Tigris army had lost 8,100 men up to that time. Since then there have been several battles between the Turks and the relief expedition. In one engagement alone, according to the Turkish accounts, the British lost 4,000 men.

General Townshend's surrender was brought about by the starvation of his forces. Attempts were made to carry supplies to him by aeroplane, but the location of Kut in a bend of the river made it difficult for airmen to land. A shipload of provisions on its way to him ran aground in the Tigris only four miles from the hungry soldiers. With this final misfortune he decided that surrender was the only course left for his beleaguered army.

The Battle That Won Kut-el-Amara

By General Sir John Nixon

Of Sir John Nixon's detailed report of the Mesopotamian operations under his command, made public on April 5, we give here the most interesting portion, namely, his story of how General Townshend captured Kut-el-Amara on Sept. 28, 1915:

THE defeat of Nur-Ed-Din and the occupation of Kut-el-Amara became my next objective as soon as Nasiriyah was secured, and I commenced the transfer of troops toward Amara on the following day.

By Sept. 12 the force was concentrated

at Ali al Gharbi. Thence the advance was continued by route march along the river bank, accompanied by a naval flotilla and shipping, until Sannaiyat (some eight miles below the enemy's position covering Kut-el-Amara) was reached on Sept. 15. Intense heat prevailed during the period of this march, with temperatures ranging from 110 degrees to 116 degrees in the shade. The column remained halted at Sannaiyat until Sept. 25, receiving reinforcements during this period.

Nur-Ed-Din Bey's army lay astride the river some seven miles northeast of Kut and eight miles from General Townshend's force at Sannaiyat. It occupied a line naturally favorable for defense, which, during three or four months of preparation, had been converted into a formidable position. On the right bank the defenses extended for five miles southward along some mounds which commanded an extensive field of fire. The river was blocked by a boom composed of barges and wire cables commanded at close range by guns and fire trenches. On the left bank the intrenchments extended for seven miles, linking up the gaps between the river and three marshes which stretched away to the north. The defenses were well designed and concealed, commanding flat and open approaches. They were elaborately constructed with a thoroughness that missed no detail. In front of the trenches were barbed wire entanglements, military pits, and land mines. Behind were miles of communication trenches connecting the various works and providing covered outlets to the river, where ramps and landing stages had been made to facilitate the transfer of troops to or from ships, while pumping engines and water channels carried water from the river to the trenches.

Nur-Ed-Din's army held this position, one division being on each bank, with some army troops in reserve on the left bank, near a bridge above the main position. A force of Arab horsemen was posted on the Turkish left flank; most of the Turkish regular cavalry were absent during the battle on a raid against our communications at Sheikh Saad.

On Sept. 26 General Townshend advanced to within four miles of the Turkish position. His plan was to make a decisive attack on the left bank by enveloping the Turkish left with his main force, but in order to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the real attack, preliminary dispositions and preparatory attacks were made, with the object of inducing the Turks to expect the principal attack on the right bank.

On the morning of the 27th our troops advanced by both banks. The principal force, on the right bank, made a feint attack on the trenches south of the river, while the left bank detachment intrenched itself within 3,000 yards of the enemy. Meanwhile a bridge had been constructed, and under cover of night the main force crossed from the right bank and deployed opposite the enemy's left flank. On the morning of Sept. 28 a general attack was made against the enemy on the left bank. The Eighteenth Infantry Brigade, under Major Gen. Fry, with its left on the line of the river, made a pinning attack, while Brig. Gen. Delamain, commanding the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Infantry Brigades, advanced in two columns against the enemy's left, one column being directed frontally against the flank intrenchments, while the other moved wide around the flank and attacked in the rear. General Delamain's right flank was protected by the cavalry brigade.

The first troops to enter the enemy trenches were the First Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment, One Hundred and Seventeenth Mahrattas, and Twenty-second Company Sappers and Miners, who made a brilliant assault, well supported by the artillery, and soon after 10 A. M. captured a redoubt and trenches on the enemy's extreme left, inflicting heavy losses and taking 135 prisoners. A combined attack by the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Infantry Brigades was then made, and after hard fighting, during which the enemy made several unsuccessful counterattacks, the whole of the northern part of the enemy's position was in our hands by 2 P. M.

General Delamain reorganized his troops on the captured position and gave

them a much-needed rest, as they were exhausted by the great heat, the long march, and hard fighting. After a brief rest General Delamain moved his column southward to assist the Eighteenth Infantry Brigade, by attacking the enemy opposed to it in rear. Before this attack could develop strong hostile reserves appeared from the southwest, in the direction of the bridge. General Delamain immediately changed his objective, and attacked the new troops, supported by his guns firing at a range of 1,700 yards.

The sight of the approaching enemy and the prospect of getting at him in the open with the bayonet put new life into our infantry, who were suffering from weariness and exhaustion after their long and trying exertions under the tropical sun. For the time thirst and fatigue were forgotten. The attack was made in a most gallant manner with great dash. The enemy were routed with one magnificent rush, which captured four guns and inflicted heavy losses on the Turks. The enemy fought stubbornly, and were saved from complete destruction by the approach of night.

General Delamain's troops bivouacked for the night on the scene of their victory, about two miles from the river, both men and horses suffering severely from want of water, as the brackish water of the marshes is undrinkable. In the morning the column reached the river, and the horses got their first water for forty hours.

Throughout the battle the naval flotilla co-operated with the land attack from positions on the river. Late in the evening of the 28th, led by the Comet, (Lieut. Commander E. C. Cookson, R. N., acting senior naval officer,) the flotilla advanced upstream and endeavored to force a passage through the boom obstruction. The ships came under a terrific fire from both banks at close range. The Comet rammed the boom, but it withstood the shock. Lieut. Commander Cookson was shot dead while most gallantly attempting to cut a wire cable securing the barges.

The Turks evacuated their remaining trenches during the night and escaped

along the bank of the Tigris. On the morning of the 29th a pursuit was organized, troops moving in ships preceded by cavalry on land. The cavalry, consisting of four weak squadrons, overtook the enemy on Oct. 1, but had to wait for the support of the river column, as the Turks were making an orderly retreat, covered by a strong rearguard with infantry and guns. The progress of the river column was so delayed by the difficulties of navigation due to the constantly shifting shallows in the river that it was unable to overtake the retreating enemy. When the ships reached Aziziyah on Oct. 5 the enemy had reached their prepared defensive position at Ctesiphon, covering the road to Bagdad, where they were reinforced.

The Turks lost some 4,000 men in casualties, of whom 1,153 were prisoners captured by us. In addition, we took fourteen guns and a quantity of rifles, ammunition, and stores. Considering the severity of the fighting, our casualties were comparatively small. They amounted to 1,233, including a large proportion of men only slightly wounded.

The defeat of Nur-Ed-Din Bey completed the expulsion of Turkish troops from the Basrah Vilayet. Apart from material gains won at Kut-el-Amara, our troops once again proved their irresistible gallantry in attack, and added another victory to British arms in Mesopotamia.

I am glad to place on record my appreciation of the ability and generalship displayed by Major Gen. C. V. F. Townshend, C. B., D. S. O., throughout these operations. His plan for turning the Turkish left was the manoeuvre whereby the position could best be captured without incurring very heavy losses.

Brig. Gen. Delamain, who commanded the main attack, showed himself to be a resolute and resourceful commander. His leadership during the battle was admirable.

The troops under the command of Major Gen. Townshend displayed high soldierly qualities, and upheld the reputation they have earned during this arduous campaign.

How the British Left Gallipoli

By General Sir Charles C. Monro

Commander of Mediterranean Expeditionary Force

This graphic report, dated March 6, 1916, is addressed to Lord Kitchener, head of the British War Office. General Monro, who is now fighting in France, took command at Gallipoli on Oct. 28, 1915, and shortly afterward recommended immediate evacuation. All the essential and historic portions of the document appear below.

ON Oct. 20, in London, I received your Lordship's instructions to proceed as soon as possible to the Near East and take over the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

My duty on arrival was in broad outline:

(a) To report on the military situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

(b) To express an opinion whether on purely military grounds the Peninsula should be evacuated or another attempt made to carry it.

(c) The number of troops that would be required—

(1) To carry the Peninsula.

(2) To keep the strait open, and

(3) To take Constantinople.

The positions occupied by our troops presented a military situation unique in history. The mere fringe of the coast line had been secured. The beaches and piers upon which they depended for all requirements in personnel and material were exposed to registered and observed artillery fire. Our intrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks. The possible artillery positions were insufficient and defective. The force, in short, held a line possessing every possible military defect. The position was without depth,

the communications were insecure and dependent on the weather. No means existed for the concealment and deployment of fresh troops destined for the offensive—while the Turks enjoyed full

powers of observation, abundant artillery positions, and they had been given the time to supplement the natural advantages which the position presented by all the devices at the disposal of the field engineer.

Another material factor came prominently before me. The troops on the Peninsula had suffered much from various causes—exposure to shell fire, disease, the dearth of competent officers owing to earlier losses, and "make-shifts" due to the attachment of Yeomanry and Mounted Brigades to the Territorial Divisions. Other arguments, irrefutable in

their conclusions, convinced me that a complete evacuation was the only wise course to pursue.

On Nov. 21 the Peninsula was visited by a storm said to be nearly unprecedented for the time of the year. The storm was accompanied by torrential rain, which lasted for twenty-four hours. This was followed by hard frost and a heavy blizzard. In the areas of the Eighth Corps and the Anzac Corps the effects were



GENERAL MONRO

not felt to a very marked degree owing to the protection offered by the surrounding hills. The Ninth Corps was less favorably situated, the water courses in this area became converted into surging rivers, which carried all before them. The water rose in many places to the height of the parapets and all means of communications were prevented. The men, drenched as they were by the rain, suffered from the subsequent blizzard most severely. Large numbers collapsed from exposure and exhaustion, and in spite of untiring efforts that were made to mitigate the suffering I regret to announce that there were 200 deaths from exposure and over 10,000 sick evacuated during the first few days of December.

From reports given by deserters it is probable that the Turks suffered even to a greater degree.

The problem with which we were confronted was the withdrawal of an army of a considerable size from positions in no cases more than 300 yards from the enemy's trenches, and its embarkation on open beaches, every part of which were within effective range of Turkish guns, and from which in winds from the south or southwest, the withdrawal of troops was not possible.

I came to the conclusion that our chances of success were infinitely more probable if we made no departure of any kind from the normal life which we were following both on sea and on land. A feint which did not fully fulfill its purpose would have been worse than useless, and there was the obvious danger that the suspicions of the Turks would be aroused by our adoption of a course the real purport of which could not have been long disguised.

Rapidity of action was imperative, having in view the unsettled weather which might be expected in the Aegean. The success of our operations was entirely dependent on weather conditions. Even a mild wind from the south or southwest was found to raise such a ground swell as to greatly impede communication with the beaches, while anything in the nature of a gale from this direction could not fail to break up the piers, wreck the small

craft, and thus definitely prevent any steps being taken toward withdrawal.

Throughout the period Dec. 10 to 18 the withdrawal proceeded under the most auspicious conditions, and the morning of Dec. 18 found the positions both at Anzac and Suvla reduced to the numbers determined, while the evacuation of guns, animals, stores, and supplies had continued most satisfactorily.

It was imperative, of course, that the front-line trenches should be held, however lightly, until the very last moment and that the withdrawal from these trenches should be simultaneous throughout the line.

The good fortune which had attended the evacuation continued during the night of the 19th-20th. The night was perfectly calm with a slight haze over the moon, an additional stroke of good luck, as there was a full moon on that night.

Soon after dark the covering ships were all in position, and the final withdrawal began. At 1:30 A. M. the withdrawal of the rear parties commenced from the front trenches at Suvla and the left of Anzac. Those on the right of Anzac who were nearer the beach remained in position until 2 A. M. By 5:30 A. M. the last man had quit the trenches.

At Anzac, four 18-pounder guns, two 5-inch howitzers, one 4.7 naval gun, one anti-air craft, and two 3-pounder Hotchkiss guns were left, but they were destroyed before the troops finally embarked. In addition, fifty-six mules, a certain number of carts, mostly stripped of their wheels, and some supplies which were set on fire, were also abandoned.

At Suvla every gun, vehicle and animal was embarked, and all that remained was a small stock of supplies, which were burned.

On Dec. 28 your Lordship's telegram ordering the evacuation of Helles was received, whereupon, in view of the possibility of bad weather intervening, I instructed the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army to complete the operation as rapidly as possible. He was reminded that every effort conditional on not exposing the personnel to undue risk should be made to save all 60-pounder and 18-pounder guns, 6-inch and 4.5 howitzers,

with their ammunition and other accessories, such as mules, and A. T. carts, limbered wagons, &c.

At a meeting which was attended by the Vice Admiral and the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army I explained the course which I thought we should adopt to again deceive the Turks as to our intentions. The situation on the Peninsula had not materially changed owing to our withdrawal from Suvla and Anzac, except that there was a marked increased activity in aerial reconnaissance over our positions, and the islands of Mudros and Imbros, and that hostile patrolling of our trenches was more frequent and daring. The most apparent factor was that the number of heavy guns on the European and Asiatic shores had been considerably augmented, and that these guns were more liberally supplied with German ammunition, the result of which was that our beaches were continuously shelled, especially from the Asiatic shore. I gave it as my opinion that in my judgment I did not regard a feint as an operation offering any prospect of success; and it was decided the navy should do their utmost to pursue a course of retaliation against the Turkish batteries, but to refrain from any unusually aggressive attitude should the Turkish guns remain quiescent.

General Sir W. Birdwood had, in anticipation of being ordered to evacuate Helles, made such complete and far-seeing arrangements that he was able to proceed without delay to the issue of the comprehensive orders which the consummation of such a delicate operation in war requires.

The evacuation, following the same system as was practiced at Suvla and Anzac, proceeded without delay. The French infantry remaining on the Peninsula were relieved on the night of Jan. 1-2, and were embarked by the French navy on the following nights. Progress, however, was slower than had been hoped, owing to delays caused by accident and the weather. One of our largest horse ships was sunk by a French battleship, whereby the withdrawal was considerably retarded, and at the same time strong winds sprang up which interfered mate-

rially with work on the beaches. The character of the weather now setting in offered so little hope of a calm period of any duration that General Sir W. Birdwood arranged with Admiral Sir J. de Robeck for the assistance of some destroyers in order to accelerate the progress of re-embarkation.

Meanwhile the Eighth Corps had maintained the offensive spirit in bombing and minor operations with which they had established the moral superiority they enjoyed over the enemy. On Dec. 29 the Fifty-second Division completed the excellent work which they had been carrying out for so long by capturing a considerable portion of the Turkish trenches, and by successfully holding these in the face of repeated counterattacks. The shelling of our trenches and beaches, however, increased in frequency and intensity, and the average daily casualties continued to increase.

On Jan. 7 the enemy developed heavy artillery fire on the trenches held by the Thirteenth Division, while the Asiatic guns shelled those occupied by the Royal Naval Division. The bombardment, which was reported to be the heaviest experienced since we landed in April, lasted from noon until 5 P. M., and was intensive between 3 and 3:30 P. M.

Jan. 8 was a bright, calm day, with a light breeze from the south. There was every indication of the continuance of favorable conditions, and, in the opinion of the meteorological officer, no important change was to be expected for at least twenty-four hours. The Turkish artillery was unusually inactive. All preparations for the execution of the final stage were complete.

About 7 P. M. the breeze freshened considerably from the southwest, the most unfavorable quarter, but the first trip, timed for 8 P. M., was dispatched without difficulty. The wind, however, continued to rise until, by 11 P. M., the connecting pier between the hulks and the shore at "W" Beach was washed away by heavy seas, and further embarkation into destroyers from these hulks became impracticable. In spite of these difficulties the second trips, which commenced at 11:30 P. M., were carried

out well up to time, and the embarkation of guns continued uninterruptedly. Early in the evening reports had been received from the right flank that a hostile submarine was believed to be moving down the strait, and about midnight H. M. S. Prince George, which had embarked 2,000 men, and was sailing for Mudros, reported she was struck by a torpedo which failed to explode. The indications of the presence of a submarine added considerably to the anxiety for the safety of the troop carriers, and made it necessary for the Vice Admiral to modify the arrangements made for the subsequent bombardment of the evacuated positions.

At 1:50 A. M., Gully Beach reported that the embarkation at that beach was complete, and that the lighters were about to push off, but at 2:10 A. M. a telephone message was received that one of the lighters was aground and could not be refloated. The N. T. O. at once took all possible steps to have another lighter sent in to Gully Beach, and this was, as a matter of fact, done within an hour, but in the meantime, at 2:30 A. M., it was decided to move the 160 men who had been relanded from the grounded lighter to "W" Beach and embark them there.


At 3:30 A. M. the evacuation was complete, and abandoned heaps of stores and supplies were successfully set on fire by time fuses after the last man had embarked. Two magazines of ammunition and explosives were also successfully blown up at 4 A. M. These conflagrations were apparently the first intimation received by the Turks that we had withdrawn. Red lights were immediately dis-

charged from the enemy's trenches, and heavy artillery fire opened on our trenches and beaches. This shelling was maintained until about 6:30 A. M.

Apart from four unserviceable fifteen-pounders which had been destroyed earlier in the month, ten worn-out fifteen-pounders, one six-inch Mark VII. gun, and six old heavy French guns, all of which were previously blown up, were left on the Peninsula. In addition to the above, 508 animals, most of which were destroyed, and a number of vehicles and considerable quantities of stores, material, and supplies, all of which were destroyed by burning, had to be abandoned.

The entire evacuation of the Peninsula had now been completed. It demanded for its successful realization two important military essentials, viz., good luck and skilled disciplined organization, and they were both forthcoming to a marked degree at the hour needed. Our luck was in the ascendant by the marvelous spell of calm weather which prevailed. But we were able to turn to the fullest advantage these accidents of fortune.

Lieut. General Sir W. Birdwood and his corps commanders elaborated and prepared the orders in reference to the evacuation with a skill, competence, and courage which could not have been surpassed, and we had a further stroke of good fortune in being associated with Vice Admiral Sir J. de Robeck, K. C. B., Vice Admiral Wemyss, and a body of naval officers whose work remained throughout this anxious period at that standard of accuracy and professional ability which is beyond the power of criticism or cavil.



Why Italy Went Into the War

By G. F. Guerrazzi

In this second and concluding installment of his monograph on Italy's relations with Austria and Germany Signor Guerrazzi discusses the evil political effects of Germany's commercial activities in Italy, the Teutonic betrayal of Italian interests, and the popular uprising that turned the scales for war.

II.

THE extraordinarily rapid progress of Germany had impressed even those Italians who were least inclined to admire it, and German influences had permeated our universities and scientific bodies. All this, together with the ill-concealed hostility of the French and the somewhat cool friendship of the English, favored the development of our relations with Germany.

It must be remembered that our country is comparatively poor in natural resources. We have very little iron, no coal, practically no mineral wealth; a large portion of our soil consists of rocky, unwooded mountains; even our seas are poor in fish. For these and other reasons the accumulation of wealth is laborious and slow, and modern industrial organization, which can perform such miracles, is still in its infancy with us, and is perhaps not well suited to the Italian temperament. For all these reasons foreign economic influences were bound to react powerfully on Italian life, especially during a period of national depression.

UNWHOLESOME POLITICS

With the completion of our national unity, the chief political questions before us were those of internal liberty and the right to the suffrage. Every now and again an economic question, such as the abolition of the duty on milling, the State control of the railways, &c., would react on politics, and little by little Parliamentary majorities were formed for the protection of special interests of persons and districts. The divergent conditions and needs of Northern and Southern Italy, the defective political education of the southern electorate, socially

subject to a middle class neither wealthy nor active, led to a struggle between two warring sets of interests, resulting in an unwise system of industrial and agrarian protectionism.

As has more than once occurred in conflicts between agriculture and industry, the former sold its best interests for a mess of pottage, obtaining a protective tariff of seven lire on every 100 kilograms of wheat and other illusory benefits, while manufacturers secured a large measure of protection, more especially for steel, cotton fabrics, and sugar refineries. This policy, the result of compromises between hostile groups of interests, was injurious to agriculture, but it was vastly more injurious to the country as a whole in view of the political consequences to which it gave rise.

One of these was the rapid rise of socialism, which secured a firm hold on the imagination of the proletariat and extended its influence to almost all classes of Government and municipal employes. The idealistic programs of the old democratic parties lost their hold on the nation; the attention of the masses was centred exclusively on material advantage; even the Catholic Party had to enter the economic arena in order to keep its hold on its adepts.

RULE OF SPECIAL INTERESTS

All this led to great political confusion, and "special interests" began to rule supreme. The clear vision of their own needs gave them the power to domineer over the Government. Little by little political influence passed, in fact if not in semblance, into the hands of a group of interests, incredibly petty when compared to those of the nation as a whole,

but which succeeded in dominating the country for a series of years.

These interests were mostly centred in men who had but recently emerged from obscurity, who had grown rich rapidly and not always honorably at the cost of the country by building railways or harbors, contracting for military and naval supplies, and so forth. These were the people mainly interested in those industries which clamored for and obtained an excessive measure of protection. Around them were formed those multitudinous currents of interests which succeeded in establishing under a Parliamentary régime a virtual dictatorship, and which paved the path along which Germany, by making use of banking influences, came to exercise political as well as economic power in Italy. Of this unclean coalition of interests the political dictator was Giovanni Giolitti, and the central economic organ the Banca Commerciale Italiana.

GIOVANNI GIOLITTI

Giovanni Giolitti has been a really harmful man to Italy. He not only submitted to, but favored and promoted in a shameless manner this coalition of special interests, serving and being served by them in his political ambitions. Though an adult in the memorable days of our national revival, he was absent from the battlefields and took no part in the conspiracies and labors which led to national unity. He rose from the ranks of the bureaucracy, and his name was never associated with any movement for the realization of high political ideals. He entered Parliament in middle age and was raised to power by intrigue to serve the special interests of his supporters and their friends. Devoid of culture, of idealism, of breadth of views, his strength was based on his lack of scruple, which allowed him to favor the baser elements in the political life of the country and to raise to power men of mediocre character and intellect, of dubious political and often personal morality.

Lacking in civic courage, when corruption, intimidation, and other means worthy only of the abominable traditions of the police under the old tyrannical régimes seemed inadequate to overcome

the difficulties arising from his unsound policy, he deserted his post and withdrew from the Government, waiting to seize the reins of power once more by threats and lobby intrigues when the difficulties from which he had fled should have blown over, or when his successor for the time being seemed likely to acquire a solid footing in Parliament.

CORRUPTING PUBLIC LIFE

Giolitti was in power, with but brief intervals, for more than thirteen years, and unfortunately he was at the head of the Government on the four occasions on which a general election was held. He was thus enabled to secure a Chamber to his own liking, giving his support to those candidates who were loyal to him personally, preferring nonentities or tarnished reputations as being more easily held in hand. His electioneering policy was one of corruption with Government funds or with money provided by banks or business men whom he compensated at the nation's expense by concessions for public works and yet more costly favors. He did not hesitate to have recourse to the most unheard-of police violence and the most brazen-faced trickery to fight those candidates who had the courage to withstand him. His supporters were rewarded with all the favors at the disposal of a Prime Minister; his adversaries were never forgotten. By similar means he secured control over the Senate and over all the branches of the public administration, weeding out those who were not his creatures.

By such means Giolitti succeeded in corrupting Italian public life in all its branches, creating an atmosphere unbearably to the best men of all parties and rendering unsound the most delicate springs and wheels in the machinery of State. Placed in power by Court intrigue, the banking scandals in which he was involved during his first tenure of the Premiership reacted adversely on the estimation in which the monarchy was held, and during the recent tremendous political crisis which he brought on the country he came within an ace of involving the monarchy in his own downfall.

EVIL POLITICAL RESULTS

Such a man and such a policy should have met with strenuous opposition, especially in the ranks of the democracy. But the men who succeeded the leaders of our national revival were unable to resist the temptations set in their path by Giolitti, and were faithful to him rather than to the parties they were supposed to represent. The political corruption which he had sown soon spread. The more noisy section of the democracy was bought at the price of unheard-of concessions and favors granted to Socialist and Republican co-operative associations to the detriment of the State, and with disastrous effects on the political morality of the country. Finally, the support of the advanced parties was purchased by the promise of universal suffrage and payment of members, reforms which should have been conquered and not purchased by submission. As it is they have indeed been costly to the country and to democracy, which by this compact helped to consolidate a political régime which may well be described as the triumph of parasitism in finance, in industry, in the ranks of the proletariat and of the bureaucracy, all united to protect their petty special interests to the injury of the real interests of the nation as a whole, conspiring to form a régime of plutocrats and demagogues capable of disintegrating even the most solidly constituted body politic.

GERMANY FINDS A TOOL

It was this inexhaustible flood of greed and personal ambition which broke down all barriers and made it possible for foreign influences to gain a footing in the State. The chief instrument at the service of this execrable coalition of parasites has been the Banca Commerciale Italiana.

When the Bank of France ceased to support Italian commerce on the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, German financial circles waited to come to our assistance until our leading banks had failed, leaving our commerce and industry an easy prey. They then came forward and founded the Banca Commerciale Italiana. The amount of Ger-

man capital invested in this enterprise was limited, but the management was German. Germans were strongly represented on the Board of Directors, and a large number of the secondary positions were filled by them. Those banks which had survived the financial shipwreck were soon absorbed. Then the industries and businesses which still existed were attacked. They were supplied with abundant credit, which, when the opportune moment came, was curtailed and then withdrawn, and the debt toward the bank compulsorily converted into part ownership at the cost of heavy depreciation. Germans were appointed as managers of such concerns or on their Directorate, thus insuring the Banca Commerciale a preponderating influence. At the same time new industries were started under its patronage, and here again the plant and the management had always to be German, and preference was given to Germany in the purchase of raw material. All this was done at a very small outlay, but with great ability in selecting the right moment for action.

MILITARY DESIGNS

Now, all this, if limited strictly to the economic sphere, may be regrettable from the standpoint of Italian interests, but would not deserve the censure of business men. Unfortunately, however, this financial activity served as a cloak to political aims. As in France and in Belgium, so in Italy many of these factories installed by German capital were organized to serve military purposes; land was acquired at places which could be used as signaling stations and to assist the enemy in case of an armed invasion by Austria-Germany, and many German business houses in Italy became centres of a well-organized system of espionage.

Fortunately for us, we have been able to take the offensive on the enemy's territory in the present war, or we should have had to pay dearly for our unsuspecting confidence in our former allies. The preponderating influence which the Banca Commerciale acquired in all our more important steel and metal works, and engineering and naval industries,

secured for it a most noxious influence over our military armaments, and was certainly one of the reasons why Italy found herself unprovided with artillery when the European war broke out.

The connection between Giolitti's Cabinet and the Banca Commerciale became so intimate that high political and administrative posts were conferred exclusively on people who met with the approval of the bank, and well-known manipulators and brokers in its service were even raised to the dignity of Senators. But it was the Lybian war which brought most clearly into light the political influence of the Banca Commerciale in Italy.

THE LYBIAN WAR

The agreements we had come to with France and England regarding Morocco and the Mediterranean had set our minds at rest about Lybia. No one in Italy dreamed of annexing that country; all we wanted was to be certain that no other great power would establish itself there, precluding us from future expansion and curtailing our safety. It was, however, desirable that we should build up commercial relations with that country, and these were always hindered by the Banca Commerciale, which severely abstained from all activity in those regions.

At last the Banco di Roma undertook the task of commercial penetration, in spite of the undisguised hostility of the Turkish authorities. It would have been easy for Germany, then all powerful at Constantinople, to have favored her ally in this modest attempt at pacific penetration in North Africa. But just as she had never consented to say a word on our behalf at Vienna, so she now abstained from befriending us at Constantinople.

Italy was celebrating in 1911 the jubilee of her national unity. Giolitti was at the head of the Government; a cholera epidemic was threatening; no one had any idea of going to war. Suddenly, in September, one of the constantly recurring incidents with Turkey arose; our reasonable requests were flouted; Germany, as usual, abstained

from using her good offices; and Italy declared war.

DUE TO GERMAN AIMS

What on earth had occurred to drive peace-loving and Giolitti-governed Italy to such a decision? The inside history of these events is not yet known, but it would seem that Germany, after her failures at Agadir and in Morocco, was preparing virtually to annex Tripoli. It would have been easy for the German Ambassador at Constantinople to induce the Sultan to intrust to a German protectorate the remainder of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa. Italy's claims to consideration could, it was thought, be set aside, and, anyhow, what could Italy have done if Germany had decided to act?

Indications show that something of this sort was being discussed between Berlin and Constantinople when a power, friendly to Italy and unwilling to see Germany installed on the Mediterranean, got wind of the matter, and Giolitti was faced with the alternative of going to Tripoli or seeing this other power go there. Had Tripoli been lost to Italy, as Tunis had been, there could be no doubt as to the outburst of popular indignation which would have ensued. Giolitti declared war on Turkey.

GERMANY AND THE TURK

The displeasure of Austria and Germany was shown in no uncertain terms. Giolitti conducted the war hat in hand, almost asking leave of our irate allies before daring to have a shot fired. Time was given to the slow Turkish Navy to take safe refuge in the Dardanelles because such was the good pleasure of Berlin. When the Duke of the Abruzzi directed his cannon against Prevesa, Austria immediately opposed her veto; Italy must attack neither Saloniki, nor the Epirus, nor Smyrna, nor any really vital part of the Ottoman Empire.

All this is clearly shown in the Green Book, in Salandra's speech, and in Sonnino's statements. Consequently we had to drag out a most costly war, while Italian subjects and interests in Turkey were neglected by the German Ambassador to whom they had been intrusted, and Mar-

shal von der Goltz openly assisted the Turkish officers in preparing their plans of campaign.

AN UNFAVORABLE PEACE

In the Summer of 1912 peace negotiations were opened with Turkey on the initiative of a certain Volpi who had been the leading spirit in the organization of the so-called Italian companies founded by the Banca Commerciale in Montenegro and at Constantinople. This same Volpi, under the pretext of acting as "technical agent," and the ex-Ministers Bertolini and Fusinato were appointed as plenipotentiaries to negotiate peace, and the son of the leading German member of the Directorate of the Banca Commerciale was named Secretary.

Meantime the first Balkan war was declared, but the Italian Government shut its eyes to the favorable possibilities which the formation of the Balkan League offered to Italy, nor did it avail itself thereof to secure favorable terms. After all our heavy loss of life and money, peace was made when it suited Turkey and on conditions entirely to her advantage. In face of all this, can any one deny that our allies, and more especially Germany, did all in their power on this occasion to injure our interests?

AUSTRIA IN THE BALKANS

Not only the positive but also the negative advantages of the alliance were denied us. The main purpose of the treaty was to safeguard Italy against the danger of Austria's upsetting the equilibrium in the Balkans and the Adriatic, while guaranteeing Austria against Italian nationalist movements in territories subject to her rule. Now, the Green Book, Salandra's speech in the Capitol, the address recently delivered by our Ambassador in Paris, and the well-known actions of Austria all clearly show that the Dual Monarchy was constantly seeking to attack the rights of the Balkan States which she was pledged to respect. To say nothing of minor incidents, it will suffice to recall the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, the diabolical policy which led to the

destruction of the Balkan League, and the threatened Austrian occupation of Montenegro in April, 1913.

In July of the same year it was only the stubborn opposition of Italy which prevented Austria from attacking Serbia with the assistance of Germany, while all the time she was carrying on criminal intrigues in Albania. It is thus clear that the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, which occurred toward the end of June, 1914, was a mere pretext for the brutal and unheard-of ultimatum which Austria sent to Serbia on June 23 of that year.

ITALIAN NEUTRALITY

It would be superfluous for me to waste time in convincing you that Austria and Germany, but more especially the latter, were determined to bring about the present war. Italy had no hesitation in following the course of action left open to her by the terms of the alliance, and consonant to her position in the European concert and to her traditions. Austria had left Italy completely in the dark as to her intentions with regard to Serbia, thus committing a flagrant violation of her treaty obligations. This being the case, no one could claim that we were obliged to assist her when she took, without our consent, a course of action diametrically opposed to our interests, interests which we had entered the alliance to protect.

It is not difficult to show that Italy might have derived material advantages by joining Germany and Austria in their attack on France. We should certainly have been able to claim ample compensation in the shape of a share in France's African colonies and in the indemnity which would have been extorted from the French Treasury. Indeed, a current of opinion in Italy favored such a course, and rightly held that the military equipment of Italy, though it left much to be desired, was yet quite adequate to insure the success of the German plans for occupying Paris. By such a policy Italy could have secured a share in a rich booty at the cost of much smaller sacrifices than those which she is now making.

ITALY'S REAL MOTIVES

But the Italian Nation would never have consented at such a grave crisis in the history of Europe to a policy inspired purely by selfish motives. Even had the Government wished, the Italian people would have refused to march against France and England. In the case of France the affinity of race and civilization is too strongly felt, while in England we have always admired the cradle of civil liberties. Moreover, the Italians have a keen sense of honor and of the respect due to treaties, and the brutal Austrian aggression on Serbia, the disloyal way in which Germany began the war by violating the neutrality of Belgium, the cynical manner in which the German Chancellor tried to excuse that action, aroused our deep indignation.

While the ever-present desire to free our brothers from thralldom to Austria has contributed to make the war popular, this was not the foremost consideration in determining our action. You may be sure that if we had not had a foot of national soil to redeem from subjection our feelings would not have been different. Always and under all circumstances the Italians would have felt an irresistible repugnance to fighting side by side with the authors of the Belgian massacres, with the oppressors of Serbia; they would have considered it an unspeakable crime to assist in extinguishing those splendid beacons of civilization, France and England.

TRIPLE ALLIANCE BROKEN.

Such was the feeling of the country, shared from the first by the Government. At the very outbreak of the conflict, as we now know, Salandra and San Giuliano informed the German Ambassador (July 25) that the Austrian ultimatum was a breach of the treaty of alliance, and similar statements were made through Italian Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin. But how could the remonstrances of Italy hold back the two empires from their premeditated assault?

Perhaps if we had been in a position to send our armies to the front our voice might have been listened to; but Italy was practically unarmed. The Giolitti

Government had mismanaged the Lybian war, depleting the military stores and never replenishing them, although the enormous cost of the campaign had been justified to the Chamber by asserting that this had been done. * * * Under the circumstances the only course open to us was to proclaim our neutrality, and from that moment the alliance was virtually at an end. Austria and Germany had taken the initiative in breaking it, and our place was henceforth beside the powers of the Triple Entente.

A NATIONAL AWAKENING

The laborious negotiations which ensued between the Italian Government and the Central Empires can be studied in the Green Book, which will be a lasting monument to the rectitude and firmness of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sonnino. During this long period of alternating hopes and fears those who clearly saw that the only path of safety and honor open to Italy was to fight by the side of France and England carried on uninterruptedly their work of national education and preparation toward this end. The thicker grew the intrigues and conspiracies of Giolitti and his followers, the more active the policy of corruption and alternating threats and blandishments of the German Ambassador von Bülow, the harder we worked. And little by little the good seed fructified. When on Jan. 6 the body of Bruno Garibaldi, the grandson of our national hero, was brought back from the battlefields of France to be buried in Rome the impressive spectacle offered by the vast crowds which lined the streets of the Eternal City clearly indicated that the Romans realized and accepted the necessity of war.

A factor which had contributed powerfully toward this end was the constantly recurring atrocities committed by the Germans. We Italians have a strong sense of humanity and justice, and, being largely a nation of seafarers and emigrants, the sinking of merchant ships and harmless passengers so systematically carried out by the German submarines aroused our profound indignation. The sinking of the *Lusitania* had no small share in determining the

current in favor of armed intervention. The events which took place here from the end of April to May 20 deserve the close attention of all who wish to understand the forces which moved Italy during the most critical period of her history since national unity was attained.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH AUSTRIA

Negotiations with the Austrian Government, initiated with a view to finding a new basis for an understanding with Austria now that her action had rendered the Triple Alliance null and void as far as we were concerned, had been carried on slowly and with difficulty during the whole Winter. Sonnino, with his usual straightforwardness, had followed the path to which circumstances had limited his diplomatic action, clearly realizing his responsibilities toward the country and our real interests. The Green Book shows that Austria had no serious intention of giving us satisfaction, but aimed at killing time. In urging Austria to make concessions Germany was half-hearted, due undoubtedly to the confidence which Bülow felt that he would be able to insure the permanent neutrality of Italy by getting his Italian friends to defeat the Salandra Ministry.

Sonnino's firmness at last induced the Austrian Chancellor to state the concessions which he was prepared to make to Italy, concessions in themselves so small and hedged in with so many conditions as to be entirely unacceptable. Mindful of the Parliamentary situation and of the need of making it clear to the Chamber and to the country that every honorable means of avoiding war had been tried, Sonnino submitted counter-proposals drawn up in a spirit of great moderation. Our claim on Trieste was relinquished, and Austrian interests in the Adriatic duly respected.

PEOPLE DEMAND WAR

Meantime our military preparations had been carried on with ceaseless energy; men had been recalled to the colors; the officers of the reserve, the students, and the thousands on thousands of volunteers who had enlisted brought to the army new faith and enthusiasm.

The universities, the independent press, and the public demanded war. In vain the official section of the Socialist Party and German and neutralist gold, assisted by the underhand working of the Giolittiani and of the venal press, made a final effort to falsify public opinion and to intimidate the Government. Protestant Germany even went the length of sending a special envoy to win over the Vatican to its point of view, and through it to act on the Italian people, but all was in vain.

Twice the Salandra Ministry had been intrusted by the unanimous vote of the Chamber with the guardianship of the supreme interests of the nation. It had carried out this arduous duty with due regard to what it knew to be the wishes of the Parliamentary majority. Faithful to the mandate received, when it saw that it would be impossible to attain our ends without recourse to arms it had felt in duty bound to look not only to the Chamber but still more to the country, and had directed its efforts resolutely to prepare for war.

On the 5th of May a monument to Garibaldi and the Thousand was to be unveiled at Quarto, near Genoa. On this occasion, when Italy was to commemorate the fifty-fifth anniversary of that culminating episode in her struggle for national unity, the King had consented to accompany the Ministers who were to be present at the ceremony. For reasons not yet known Victor Emmanuel was unable at the last moment to attend, but he sent a message which electrified the nation and echoed far and wide throughout the land. Who now could hinder Italy in her march toward new and more glorious destinies?

THE CONSPIRATORS

The attempt was made by Giolitti and his partisans. They still hoped by a Parliamentary intrigue to defeat the Ministry, thus compromising the future of Italy. Soon after the arrival of Prince von Bülow in Rome, Giolitti had conferred with him and had published through the press a letter to one of his partisans in which he tried to revive the hopes of the neutralists by giving them

to understand that "much" could be obtained by diplomatic action, thus attempting to undermine the confidence of the country in Salandra, while hampering and circumscribing the negotiations which were then going on between Austria and Italy. He had then retired once more to the country, relying on the activity of his followers in the capital. When the decisive moment came, just before the reopening of the Chamber, he returned to Rome.

Giolitti called on Salandra and had from him full particulars as to the diplomatic and military situation, and it might have been supposed that the grave reasons which induced men of prudence and acumen, such as the Prime Minister and Sonnino, to conclude for the necessity of war would have convinced Giolitti also, and that he would have imposed silence on the indecent carplings of his Parliamentary majority. Yet in spite of all he declared himself resolutely opposed to war and favored an agreement with Austria. Nor was he deterred by the fact (of which he was apprised) that the safety of the country had made it desirable to come to a preliminary understanding with the Triple Entente, and that military secrets had been confided to the Italian General Staff which made the understanding binding in honor on the nation, even though it had not yet received final official sanction.

PARLIAMENTARY CRISIS

Giolitti's next step was to go to the King. According to his own statement he was summoned, but he failed to say whether the summons had been requested and by whom. It has been openly stated that Prince von Bülow secured the audience. He went armed with a legal opinion prepared by one of his partisans to demonstrate that the pledges made to the powers of the Entente were not binding, although they had already led to action, on the ground that they had not yet received the royal sanction; as though pledges which involve the honor of a nation could be set aside by legal quibbles! Giolitti felt that he had the large majority of the Chamber in his hands, and believed that all things were

permitted to him. What he said to the King is not known. It is said that he stated that the movement in favor of intervention was only superficial and that the vast majority of the country was adverse to war; that little confidence could be placed in the army, while the struggle would be a long and exhausting one. This man who for so many years had been at the head of the Government knew the temper of the country so little that he really thought he could play with its destinities at a critical moment just as he had played in the past the game of Parliamentary intrigues.

The attitude of the leader of the Parliamentary majority convinced Salandra that his Cabinet would be defeated in the Chamber. Such a defeat would have been interpreted by the world at large as proof that the Italian Parliament was deaf to our national aspirations. To save the country from such a disaster the Ministry handed in its resignation to the King.

ITALY'S "PASSION WEEK"

The resignation of Salandra and his colleagues gave a shock to the whole of Italy, including those who until then had held aloof from the struggle. All had the clear sensation that the country was in danger, and grief gave place to desperation and to magnanimous anger. The interventionists feared for a moment that all was up and felt that the time had come for supreme resolutions and grave responsibilities, and they prepared themselves resolutely for action.

But the whole country rose unanimously in a great burst of indignation. You know what Rome was like during those sixty hours of the Ministerial crisis. The people, including representatives of every class, realized that foreign influences were deciding the fate of Italy, and they protested in no uncertain terms. If on the Sunday morning which closed what had veritably been a "Passion Week" for the whole Italian Nation, the announcement had been made that Giolitti or one of his satellites had been called to the Government, there is no doubt that Rome, and with Rome the whole of Italy, would have arisen and the

army would certainly not have been on the side of Giolitti!

Thus the Italian people resolutely carried out a revolution which will be memorable in history. I use the word revolution advisedly, for the movement of those memorable days of May overthrew a régime which had held sway over the country for many years. The political power, detained by a small minority of persons and of interests, was revindicated by the nation as a whole, and used for the defense of its supreme national interests. And the Italian people, having overthrown the barriers which had been set up between it and its King, resolutely faced the task before it. It faced with full knowledge and grim determination the tremendous sacrifices of a fierce and lengthy war. History tells us that wars have generally been decreed by the few. This war was decreed by the people. I do not know of any other instance in which a whole nation has realized the need of a war and has forced its representatives to declare it.

CHAMPION OF RIGHT

I wish that the American people would clearly realize that the Italians have not entered on this war, as some have said, to come to the assistance of the victors. After overcoming internal difficulties of all sorts, we entered the field when the final outcome of the struggle was still uncertain and far off. The Italian people did not desert its allies of thirty years' standing; those allies deserted us secretly, and in a way and for a purpose which amounted to betrayal. The Triple Alliance, the result of political intrigues which caused irreparable injury to Italy, had never been considered by the Central Empires as forming a bond of friendship between them and us, but had always been used by them to exploit Italy economically and politically. Consequently, when Austria acted in flagrant violation of the treaty on which it was based we were no longer bound by it.

To protect her very existence, to safeguard her prestige, to preserve those principles in the name of which we reasserted our national existence, and on which the whole of modern civilization is based, Italy has entered the

field to defend the cause of progress threatened by the German desire of universal dominion. And in so doing our country is taking the position assigned her by her whole history in a struggle between two hostile tendencies, two hostile races, two hostile civilizations.

When the time comes to discuss the terms of peace Italy will range herself with those who respect the principle of nationalities; her influence will be on the side of moderation. She will labor to secure an enduring peace by eliminating the causes of future conflicts. If, as we hope, the arrogant militarism of Prussia will be undone, Italy will unite with England in opposing a policy aimed at humiliating or oppressing the German peoples. They should in the future have all the liberty to expand and develop compatible with the similar needs of other nations.

A MEMORABLE EVENING

On the memorable evening on which I went with the citizens of Rome to the Capitol, the starting point of so much of the history of the human race, to celebrate the initiation and draw the auspices for the future of our war, I had an almost mystic intuition of happier destinies yet reserved for the nations of the earth. Our national poet, d'Annunzio, had evoked in a moving speech the virtues of our forefathers. The sun had set. The ground on which I stood was historic, most solemn the hour and the occasion. Just then the great bell of the Capitol filled the evening air with its sonorous vibrations. A great silence fell over the vast crowd which had gathered there, and all heads were reverently uncovered as though the voices of past centuries were announcing to the peoples of the earth that a new and better epoch was dawning for them.

And I, in the name of my country, and of all that is good and noble, conclude with the wish that this sensation which came over me, the result of patriotic exaltation and of the inspiration of the place and the occasion, may be justified by events, and that the nations which are now grappling in a death struggle may one day be bound together by the ties of love.

THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

[Canadian Cartoon]

Twelve o'Clock Rapidly Approaches



—From *The Montreal Star*.

THE TIME OF DAY FOR GERMANY: What will happen when the hour and minute hands come together?

[French Cartoon]

The Assassins



—Maurice Neumont in *L'Esprit Satirique* en France.

Setting forth to murder the peace of Europe.

[German Cartoon]

Out of an Anguished Soul



—© *Simplicissimus, Munich.*

"Oh, Lord on High, how couldst thou permit these barbarians, and not us Englishmen, to discover the Zeppelins!"

[English Cartoon]

In the Submarine Zone



—Louis Raemaekers in *Land and Water*, London.

VOICE ON THE U-BOAT: "Seems to be neutral; send him down."

[German Cartoons]

Joffre's Explanation



"The Germans are at the end of their rope. They have no way out except victory."

French War News




—© *Simplicissimus*, Munich.

"The situation gives no cause for uneasiness."

[German Cartoon]

Mammon, King of America



—© Jugend, Munich.

"Blood, after all, is the best fertilizer for the dollar crop!"

[English Cartoon]

After a Zeppelin Raid



—Louis Raemaekers in *Land and Water*, London.


The Kaiser Counts the Bag.

[English Cartoons]

Stinging Himself



The scorpion is said to sting itself to death when it cannot get through a ring of fire.



—From The Westminster Gazette.

Wide Awake After the Winter.

Russia Returns From the Hindenburg Jubilee



—© Kladderadatch, Berlin.

"Kuropatkin, my son, you look pretty badly off."
"Oh, father, if I had known that Hindenburg was just celebrating his fiftieth year as a soldier, I would have postponed my visit."

Italy's Predicament



—© Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.

The Roman She-Wolf is trying hard to escape being sucked dry, but the English-French twins will not let go.

[Polish Cartoon]
Egypt Germanized



—From the *Mucha*, Warsaw.

How Egypt Would Appear if Ruled
 From Berlin.

[French Cartoon]
Voices From the Deep



—From *Le Matin*, Paris.

"Pirate! What was our crime?"

[Rumanian Cartoon]
Bouquets for the Kaiser



—From the *Veselia*, Bucharest.

His Victims "Strafing" Him With
 Thistles.

[Russian Cartoon]
Turkish Delights




—From the *Novi Satiricon*, Petrograd.

"Our present position is very comfort-
 able, indeed."

[German Cartoon]

In Mesopotamia



—© *Lustige Blätter*, Berlin.

History repeats itself! Six thousand years after Adam and Eve, two other sinners have been driven from the Garden of Eden.

[French Cartoon]

German Courage



—Maurice Neumont in *L'Esprit Satirique en France*.

Killing civilians in Belgium.

[German Cartoon]

The British Lion




—© *Lustige Blätter*, Berlin.

"Heavens, the beast is flying right over me!"

[German Cartoon]

An Austrian Visits Venice



—© *Simplicissimus, Munich.*

“That is the only stranger we have seen this year!”

[Russian War Loan Poster]

Help the Defenders!



"Whoever is not repelling the enemy with his own breast should buy the 5½ per cent. war loan bonds."

Helpful Suggestions for German Church Architects



A Death's-Head Willie Window.




—From *The Westminster Gazette*.

A Saintly-Sultan Window.

[American Cartoon]

"Everybody's Doing It"



—From *The New York Times*.

Isn't it about time to stop the favorite sport?

[French Cartoon]

The Bogey Man




—From *La Vie Parisienne*, Paris.

A Nightmare of Springtime, 1916.

[American Cartoon]

Fluttering Again



—From *The Los Angeles Times*.

Not a Good Place to Alight.

[Austrian Cartoon]

Diogenes Skouloudis of Greece



—From *Die Muskete*, Vienna.

GENERAL SARRAIL: "And now, my dear friend, is there anything else you desire?"

PRIME MINISTER SKOULUDIS: "Only a quiet spot somewhere in the shade."

[American Cartoon]

Irish Patriots



—From *The New York Evening Sun*.

An Old Tune by a New Orchestra.

Progress of the War

Recording Campaigns on All Fronts and Collateral Events
From April 12 Up to and Including
May 11, 1916

CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE

April 13—German artillery bombards Hill 304 and lines from Le Mort Homme to Cumières.

April 15—Berlin reports defeat of French in fight at Le Mort Homme; British repel German bombing attacks at St. Eloi.

April 17—Germans resume furious assault on French lines between the Meuse and Douaumont and gain footing in Chauffour Wood.

April 19—German guns pound Hill 304, Le Mort Homme, Cumières, and the region of Douaumont and Vaux.

April 20—Russians land large force at Marselles; Germans capture 600 meters of French trenches in Ypres-Langemarck road.

April 22—Russian troops move toward Verdun; Germans make vain assaults on Le Mort Homme positions.

April 25—Second Russian force arrives in France; Germans pound Hill 304 and Moulainville in the Woivre.

May 1—Germans shell Hill 304, and are repulsed in heavy assault on Le Mort Homme.

May 2—French offensives carry German trenches on 500-meter front near Douaumont and gain ground at Le Mort Homme.

May 4—French have thrown back Germans on the northwest side of Le Mort Homme beyond the line held at the beginning of March.

May 5-6—Germans win foothold in advanced French trenches north of Hill 304.

May 7—Germans gain a footing in first French line west of the Meuse, between Haudromont Wood and Fort Douaumont.

May 8—French drive Germans out of captured trench at Hill 304.

May 9—French repulse heavy attacks at Hill 304.

May 10—French repulse strong attack at Hill 287.

May 11—Violent bombardment of French positions in the Caillette Wood.

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE

April 15—Russians take the offensive in sector comprising village of Garbunovka and wrest two hills from the Germans.

April 21—Germans repulsed near Olyka and Mourivatza; Russians silence Ikskull batteries.

April 29—Germans take Russian positions south of Lake Narocz, together with more than 5,600 prisoners.

May 1—Russians check three German attacks southeast of Olyka.

May 6—Germans direct violent bombardment on Dvina front against Ikskull and region east of Friedrichstadt.

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

April 14—Italians capture Austrian positions on the crest of Lobbia Alta in the Adamella zone.

April 18—Austro-Hungarians repulse attacks in the Sugana Valley and capture many prisoners.

April 19—Italians occupy Monte Fume Pass.

April 26—Austrian troops reoccupy part of Col di Lana.

May 1—Italians destroy village of Pannone, south of Mori, and carry a strong mountain position on the Upper Aviso.

May 2—Italians take Covento Pass and Lares Pass and positions at Crozzon and Crozzon di Sares.

ASIA MINOR AND EGYPT

April 14—Russians report repulse of Turks west of Erzerum.

April 15—Russians defeat Turkish division near Bitlis.

April 16—Turks ejected by Russians from a position seventeen miles east of Trebizond.

April 17—Russians enter area of Trebizond fortifications; British defeated in battle on the right bank of the Tigris, more than 4,000 killed or wounded.

April 18—Russians take Trebizond, with the aid of the fleet, putting a garrison of from 50,000 to 60,000 Turks to flight.

April 20—Russians press on toward Baiburt and Erzincan; position of British army, besieged in Kut-el-Amara, becomes critical because of food shortage.

April 23—British repulsed after entering Turkish trenches on the Tigris; British in Egypt attacked in village of Quatia and compelled to withdraw, but beat off hostile force at Dueidar.

April 24—British bombard Sannayyat on the Tigris; Russians stop Turkish offensive in the direction of Kharpout on the Caucasus front.

April 29—British army at Kut-el-Amara under General Townshend surrenders to the Turks because of exhaustion of supplies; 8,970 troops, 514 British officers, including four Generals, and \$5,000,000 in cash taken.

May 1-4—Three Russian army groups make steady progress toward Baiburt, Erzincan, and Diarbekr.

May 10—Turks report Russians checked in region of Kirvaz.

May 11—Turks drive Russians out of positions nearly ten miles in length in the Mount Kope sector.

AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

April 22—British capture Umbugive and Salanga, in German East Africa.

April 24—British occupy Kondoa, in the district of Irangi.

AERIAL RECORD

On the Austro-Italian front, an Austrian air squadron raided Ravenna, May 4, and engaged in a running fight with Italian destroyers southwest of the mouth of the Po. Italians, on several occasions, dropped bombs on Trieste.

Russian positions on the Gulf of Riga were raided by German aircraft.

Constantinople was raided on April 14 by British naval aeroplanes, which dropped bombs on the Zeitunlik powder factory and aeroplane hangars. On April 27 the city was again attacked by Russian hydroaeroplanes.

On the western front, twenty-six aeroplanes were shot down by German aviators during the month of April. The Germans lost twenty-two machines.

A Zeppelin was destroyed by a British light cruiser off the German coast near Schleswig and another was destroyed at Saloniki.

Raids on the east coast of England and Scotland continued. For three successive nights, April 24-April 26, Zeppelins were active, but no casualties resulted and they were driven off by British aeroplanes. On May 2 five German airships attacked the northeast coast of England and the southeast coast of Scotland, killing thirty-six people. The Zeppelin L-20 was destroyed on the Norwegian coast after the raid and later was blown up by the Norwegians. The following day bombs were dropped on Deal. One man was injured and several houses damaged.

NAVAL RECORD

On April 25 German warships bombarded Lowestoft and Yarmouth on the east coast of England, but were driven off in twenty minutes by British ships and aeroplanes. Four persons were killed and twelve wounded in Lowestoft, and several British vessels were hit. British warships attacked German positions on the Belgian coast and inflicted heavy damage on Zeebrugge.

In the Mediterranean Sea the British battleship Russell, the mine sweeper Nasturtium, and the armed yacht Aegusa, formerly Sir Thomas Lipton's Erin, were sunk by mines.

About forty vessels, belligerent and neutral, were sunk in the war zone. These included two ships under charter by the American Commission for Relief in Bel-

gium—the British ship Hendonhall and the Swedish ship Fridland. The Brazilian Government ordered an inquiry into the sinking of the steamer Rio Branco on May 2. A German submarine was sunk off the east coast of England on April 28. On May 8 the White Star liner Cymric, engaged in freight service, was torpedoed without warning. Five members of the crew were killed and many injured. There were no Americans on board.

MISCELLANEOUS

On April 21 Sir Roger Casement and two Irish confederates, with twenty-two Germans, were captured from a German ship that attempted to land arms in Ireland. Coincident with this occurred a revolutionary outbreak in Ireland, fostered by the Sinn Fein Society, and an Irish republic was proclaimed with Patrick H. Pearse as "Provisional President." This was promptly suppressed by British troops, but not without heavy casualties. On May 11 Premier Asquith announced in Parliament that 180 rebels or civilian noncombatants were killed and 614 wounded, besides 124 soldiers or policemen killed and 388 wounded. Fourteen persons were executed, seventy-three sentenced to penal servitude, six to hard labor, and 1,706 deported.

There has been a further interchange of notes between the United States and Germany concerning submarine warfare. On April 18 Secretary Lansing sent a note to Germany declaring that "unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether." With the note was sent an appendix containing a statement of facts concerning the attack on the Sussex. On April 19 President Wilson addressed a joint session of Congress on the subject. The German reply, dated May 4, admitted the possibility that the Sussex had been torpedoed and said that German submarine commanders had been ordered to apply the principles of visit and search, due warning, and provision for the safety of those on board, both within and without the war zone, but it demanded that the United States insist that the British Government observe the rules of international law concerning blockade. On May 8 Secretary Lansing replied, accepting Germany's promise of a new submarine policy, but rejecting any condition as to the British blockade. On the same day Germany sent another note on the Sussex case, admitting that the ship was torpedoed, expressing regret, offering indemnity, and saying that the commander of the attacking submarine had been punished.

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
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
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
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